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...by the anxieties provoked by the lack of control seances invited, while simultaneously preserving the element of consolation they provided. The workings of this process of accommodation are particularly clear in the serious seance formulated by Kardec. Rather than being uncontrolled, Kardec's seance took on the highly regulated appearance of a scientific experiment. The elements of danger introduced by ecstatic trances, uncontrolled, eroticized female behavior, and the possibility of madness disappeared in Spiritist practice. Along with these threats, Spiritism eliminated the uncanny and spectacular elements of the seance, which were probably the basis of its popular success during the fad period of 1853. Indeed, just about the only aspect of the original *tables tournantes* the Spiritists retained was that which Victor Hugo, like many others, had found so consoling: the possibility of direct communication with the dead, in the context of a thoroughly "modern" religious practice. Spiritism, certainly, shared neither the Catholic Church's archaism, nor its seemingly quixotic devotion to outmoded ways of knowing.

While adherents of the serious seance may have felt the pull of spiritual crisis, they had no desire to allay their anxieties through social change. On the contrary, the serious seance seemed to cement the existing order into place, reinforcing the rules of civility, the separation of the spheres, the domination of the educated expert, and the preeminence of empirical forms of knowledge. Rather than providing a utopian vision of a perfect society yet to be created on earth, the serious seance appeared to reveal the perfection and inevitability of things as they were.

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SUTTAS AS HISTORY: FOUR APPROACHES TO THE *Sermon on the Noble Quest* (ARIYAPARIYESANA-SUTTA)

The study of Theravāda Buddhist history was born of a nineteenth-century enthusiasm about the ancient suttas, or sermons, attributed to the Buddha, which Theravāda Buddhists have preserved in the major "Divisions" (Nikāyas) of the "Sutta Basket" (Suttapiṭaka) of their "Pāli Canon" (Tipiṭaka). As early as the 1830s George Turnour had argued for the "historical accuracy" of traditional Theravādan claims about the great antiquity and unique authenticity of the Pāli version of early Buddhist history.[1] Following from that argument, the suttas (and partly overlapping texts of the Vinaya, or monastic discipline) were once thought to be veritable windows into the original Buddhist community. From them historians of earlier generations spun out a biography of the "historical Buddha," a social history of India in the time of the Buddha, and an impressive array of contradictory opinions about a supposed "original" Buddhist teaching.

But during the present century, and especially during the past several decades, Buddhologists, anthropologists, and historians of religions have raised serious doubts about this naive use of the suttas as sources for reconstructing Theravāda Buddhist history. Thus, it is now widely recognized that the form in which the suttas survive today, like Pāli itself, is the result of grammatical and editorial decisions made in Sri Lanka centuries after the lifetime of the Buddha. An extreme version of this view would argue on that basis that it is impossible to fix the texts of the

[1] On Turnour's contribution to the historiography of the Pāli texts, see the appendix to my "Buddhist History: The Pāli Vaṃsas of Sri Lanka," in *Querying the Medieval*, by Ronald Inden, Daud Ali, and Jonathan S. Walters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press).

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suttas before the time of Buddhaghosa's commentaries on them, a full millennium after the Buddha. Comparison with parallel material in non-Pāli canons makes certain that parts of the suttas are indeed translations of texts considerably more ancient than that, probably as ancient as we will ever possess, but this move simultaneously guarantees the lateness and nonrepresentativeness of those parts of the suttas without such parallels, especially the contextual stories within which the Buddha's teachings are framed. As these stories have supplied the bulk of detail for social historians and biographers of the Buddha, the problem becomes immediately apparent. Moreover, the historical claims made by Theravāda Buddhists (in the vaṃsas, or chronicles, and in the commentaries) now appear to tell us more about the time in which they were made (ca. fifth century A.D.) than they do about the ancient periods of history they narrate.[2] More important still, historians and anthropologists have pointed to a rift between the Buddhism constructed as "canonical" on the basis of the teachings in the suttas and the actual practices and ideas of contemporary Theravāda Buddhists.[3] As similar divergences from this "canonical Buddhism" are evidenced as early in Buddhist history as our evidence itself, namely the time of Aśoka Maurya (third century B.C.), the question emerges whether the reconstructed "early Buddhism" ever existed at all.

As a result, though the suttas remain immensely important to comparative philosophers and philologists, for whom these concerns may seem at best tangential, I think it fair to say that among contemporary historians of the Theravāda there has been a marked shift away from attempting to say much of anything at all about "early Buddhism." Whereas earlier scholars tended to ignore post-Aśokan Buddhist history as corrupt, more recent scholars have tended to regard early Buddhist history as unknowable. In recent decades we have become increasingly concerned with recovering the later premodern and modern Theravāda histories for which more reliable evidence does exist. Though a handful of suttas have remained central in more recent understandings of the historical development of Theravāda

[2] See my "Mahāyāna Theravāda and the Origins of the Mahāvihāra," *Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities* 23, nos. 1 and 2 (1997): 100–119, "Mahāsena at the Mahāvihāra: The Politics and Interpretation of History in Medieval Sri Lanka," in *Invoking the Past: The Uses of History in South Asia*, ed. Avril Powell and Daud Ali (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press), "Buddhist History: The Pāli Vaṃsas of Sri Lanka" (n. 1 above).

[3] Now classic studies include Melford Spiro, *Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and Its Burmese Vicissitudes* (New York, 1970); and Richard Gombrich, *Precept and Practice: Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971). For important counterreadings, which insist that the rift tells us we are wrong in constructing a "canonical Buddhism" rather than that actual Buddhists are somehow corruptions of themselves, see Martin Southwold, *Buddhism in Life: The Anthropological Study of Religion and the Sinhalese Practice of Buddhism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983); and David Scott, *Formations of Ritual: Colonial and Anthropological Discourses on the Sinhala Yaktovil* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

tradition, the bulk of the seventeen thousand-odd suttas in the Tipiṭaka have become increasingly irrelevant to historians working in the field.

As one of those historians, and despite my wholehearted support for attempts at recovering a postcanonical Theravāda Buddhist history, I find this fact unsettling. Of course, in thinking of the suttas as foundational while simultaneously all but ignoring them (except in the classroom), I curiously parallel the practices of the "medieval" Buddhists whom I study. But like those of them who continued to draw on suttas in liturgical contexts or commentarial traditions, I feel that there *should* be something more to the Tipiṭaka than, to borrow Steve Collins's lovely phrase, "the very idea" of it.[4] Has all the scholarly labor devoted to editing and translating the suttas been for naught? Must historians relinquish these ancient documents to the nonhistorical analyses of comparative philosophers and philologists? Is there nothing more for historians to learn from the suttas? If we are to answer these questions in the negative, we must define historical approaches to the suttas which can still be viable today. And I suspect that historians of religions working in other areas of Buddhist and even non-Buddhist history face similar challenges in rethinking parallel "canonical" texts in the traditions they study.

This article attempts to define such approaches for the Theravāda case. An American Academy of Religion–sponsored collaboration on "Pāli Texts in New Contexts" (a conference held in Chicago, May 1998) forced me to confront the problem of reading suttas as history in light of one specific sutta that has captured my imagination over the years, namely the Ariyapariyesanasutta, or Sermon on the Noble Quest (henceforth NQ). After a brief introduction to the basic themes of NQ and its position in the Tipiṭaka, I use it as a basis for exploring four different, but certainly not unrelated, "modes" of historical study of the suttas. I refer to these with the inelegant but descriptive titles, "historical source mode," "text of its day mode," "textual whole mode," and "later reading mode." My identification of these modes is not original; I merely attempt to describe generally the range of options that I find in the existing scholarship and in the process to articulate some of the potential opportunities as well as the difficulties entailed by each. The original contribution is in my new readings of NQ according to each mode, focusing in particular on that portion of NQ which is concerned with the Bodhisatta's pre-Enlightenment training. After showing that each of these programs for studying suttas historically does in fact allow us new insight into NQ, I return in the conclusion to more general questions surrounding the historicity of the suttas and, by implication, the study of all such "canonical" texts.

[4] Steve Collins, "On the Very Idea of the Pāli Canon," *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 15 (1990): 89–126.

Ariyapariyesanasutta (NQ) is contained as the twenty-sixth sutta in the "Middle Length Division" (Majjhimanikāya) of the "Sutta Basket" of the Tipiṭaka. Running sixteen pages in the Romanized Pāli edition,[5] the sermon is remembered, like most of the suttas, to have been preached while the Buddha was dwelling in the Jetavana Monastery at Sāvatthi (Śrāvasti, modern Saheth Maheth, Uttar Pradesh, India). A group of monks approaches the Buddha's chief attendant, Ānanda, in order to express their desire to hear a sermon "face to face with the Blessed one." Ānanda instructs them to wait at the hermitage of a Brahmin named Rammaka, to which he leads the Buddha after the latter's afternoon bath. When he arrives, the Buddha praises the assembled monks for their diligence in studying the teachings (Dhamma), then proceeds to distinguish between ignoble (*anariya*) and noble (*ariya*) forms of questing (*pariyesanā*). In the former case, a person who is attached to things of the world nevertheless clings to things of the world, thereby failing to escape his or her destiny to be born, to grow old, to die, to grieve, and to be defiled in the perpetual cycle of *saṃsāra*. In the latter case, a person who is destined to those eventualities realizes the danger (*ādīnavaṃ*) in the things of the world that are likewise so destined and renounces them in search of "the unborn [unaging, undying, ungrieving, undefiled] unexcelled Nirvana, which is bound up with peacefulness."[6]

The Buddha proceeds to tell the monks an abbreviated autobiography, using his own spiritual journey as an illustration of the progression from the ignoble to the Noble Quest. He details his movements from his initial rejection of the world through his encounters and ultimate dissatisfaction with two teachers (named Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta), his attainment of Enlightenment (*bodhi*), his initial aversion to preaching, his honoring of God's request that he preach anyway, his search for an audience, an odd and unproductive meeting with an Ājīvika named Upaka, and finally his preaching of the First Sermon to the "Group of Five" monks (*pañcavaggiyabhikkū*) with whom he had practiced austerities and to whom he had decided to preach after learning (from certain deities as well as a survey by his Buddha-eye) that his first choices (the two former teachers) were already dead. He then delivers to the monks assembled at Rammaka's hermitage what I take to be the sermon proper, namely an extended explanation that the Buddhist saint (*arahant*), being free from the snares of Māra (Death), is comparable to a free-roaming beast of prey, whereas a person ensnared in worldly passions is as much subject to Death as a trapped beast is subject to the hunter. The text concludes with a typical statement that, on hearing this sermon, those monks rejoiced at the Buddha's words.

[5] The Sermon on the Noble Quest is found in V. Trenckner, ed., *The Majjhima-Nikāya* (London: Pali Text Society, 1888), pp. 160–75.

[6] Ibid., p. 163. All translations from the Pali are my own.

1. HISTORICAL SOURCE MODE

In his 1894–95 American Lectures in the History of Religions, Pali Text Society founder T. W. Rhys Davids, discussing the topic of the Bodhisatta's teachers, refers to the good fortune that "we have an account in the *Ariya Pariyesana Sutta*, given by Gotama himself, of the essence of the teaching of . . . Āḷāra Kālāma, and of the reasons which led Gotama to be dissatisfied with the result."[7] Implicit in such statements is the assumption of scholars in Rhys Davids's generation that the suttas provide us a transparent window into the events and ideas of the early Buddhist community and, by extension, the events and ideas of the Buddha's own life. Like NQ, virtually all the suttas are framed as particular moments in the Buddha biography and, of course, as expressions of the Buddha's own teachings; some of them also narrate parts of the Buddha biography itself. As NQ is one of those suttas promising access to the Buddha biography on both levels, it is little wonder that Rhys Davids highlighted it in his narration of that biography.[8]

One hundred years later, however much we still rely on the testimony of the suttas in reconstructing "the historical Buddha" and "what the Buddha taught," we all feel a certain need to qualify Rhys Davids's statements. As mentioned, according to a strict standard for historical evidence we should be treating the suttas as products of the tenth rather than the first century of the Buddha Era (fifth century A.D. rather than fifth century B.C.). Yet I think there is also general agreement that that standard is *too* strict. Texts of the fifth century A.D. (e.g., Buddhaghosa's Samantappasādikā), and even a little earlier (the earliest is Dīpavaṃsa, ca. A.D. 302), claim that the suttas were by then already very ancient indeed. And even if we ignore these claims and fix the texts nearer the time of the commentaries, we still must admit that at least by that time they were already being read as windows into the time of the Buddha himself. There is moreover plenty of evidence—namely parallel transmissions of suttas and parts of suttas in non-Pāli traditions, for example, in the famous manuscript finds of North India and Central Asia, the early translations of the sūtras preserved in the Chinese Tripiṭaka, and in Buddhist Sanskrit works like Lalitavistara and Mahāvastvavadāna—that at least portions of

[7] T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism: Its History and Literature* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1896), p. 102.

[8] In fact, as I shall explicate in greater detail below, NQ and related suttas of the Majjhimanikāya are the *only* canonical narratives of many crucial moments in the Buddha biography; NQ is relied on implicitly and explicitly in *all* reconstructions of the Buddha biography from later canonical times to the present, both by Buddhists and by scholars.

the suttas are considerably earlier than the fifth century A.D. According to this line of inquiry, it is possible to place one portion of NQ in the earliest layer of the tradition; at least this portion of NQ can still be treated as a document of, and therefore as evidence for, the early Buddhist period.

This portion of NQ is what I will designate (in Sec. 2 below) the "inner frame" or "frame III." It is that same autobiographical fragment which commences with Gotama's renunciation as "a Bodhisatta who had not yet become the Sambuddha, who . . . being a young man with very black hair, auspicious with youth, at the prime age, while [his] parents who did not approve were weeping and wailing, did cut off [his] hair, put on yellow robes and go forth from home to homelessness," and which continues through his encounters with two teachers, his (unstipulated) period of asceticism, attainment of *bodhi*, journey to Benares, and preaching of the First Sermon.[9] There are several lines along which this autobiographical narrative's comparative antiquity can be argued.

First, the language of the text itself belies its age. On one hand, it includes much weird, obscure, and troubling material that might better have been excluded had editorial discretion in fact enjoyed the upper hand. Among the points that I can explain only as a faithfulness to exact transmission are the inclusion of the Buddha's "un-marvelous verses" (*anacchariyā gāthā*) uttered after enlightenment;[10] the problematic initial hesitance of the Buddha to preach his message[11] and the apparent need of anonymous deities to inform the newly awakened Buddha that his former teachers were already dead;[12] the failure of Upaka, followed at first by the Group of Five, to recognize the extraordinary state of his being; the rather un-Buddhalike, half-boastful, half-defensive tone in which he declares himself Buddha to Upaka and the Group of Five; and seeming inconsistencies with accepted biographical tradition, such as the

[9] M (= Majjhima-nikāya) I:163–73.

[10] In his commentary, Buddhaghosa is obviously troubled by this designation; ignoring the obvious meaning, *an* (not) + *acchariyā* (marvelous), he reads the term as *anu* (exceedingly) + *acchariyā* (wonderful), which may be grammatically questionable yet seems rather more appropriate for the first words uttered after the Enlightenment. See J. H. Woods and D. Kosambi, eds., *Papañcasūdanī nāma Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā of Buddhaghosācārīya* (London: Pali Text Society, 1928), 2:175.

[11] Many later Buddha biographies wrestle with this incident, which suggests that it did not sit comfortably with the Buddhists who inherited it. Thus Buddhavaṃsa omits it in the biography of Gotama proper (and does not make it a stock category in the many Buddha biographies it narrates), choosing instead to make it the occasion for the declaration of Buddhavaṃsa itself (again without a hint that the Buddha actually hesitated). Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita has God come in an exalted company, more as a social call than an actual plea; the Buddha already knows he is going to preach his message before God arrives. A similar move is also made in later texts such as the Nidānakathā of the Jātakaṭṭhakathā. In the Lotus Sūtra the Buddha not only knows that he will preach before God arrives but knows it from the veritable beginning of time.

[12] In NQ itself this uneasiness is apparent: the gods tell the Buddha that the two teachers are dead, but his knowledge and insight in this regard then seem to arise on their own. Aśvaghoṣa (Buddhacarita xiv.106) simply omits the deities altogether.

statement that he was in "the prime of his youth" (no indication of being a twenty-nine-year-old married father) and that his parents (in the plural) were weeping and wailing when he renounced the world (whereas later Buddha biographies insist that his mother was long-since dead). On the other hand, there is something very human about all this: doubt, arrogance, lag times in reaching Enlightenment or convincing others, a remembered youth when the Buddha was not yet Buddha, the physiological reference to his "very black hair" (*susukālakeso*), and so forth. This seems to reflect a certain genuineness. Little wonder that Rhys Davids could treat it as true autobiography (despite the fact that this same early fragment details such "mythological" realities as chats with God and gods and all-seeing Buddha-eyes).

Perhaps more persuasively, second, this portion of the narrative is repeated almost verbatim at other points in the Tipiṭaka. The whole narrative is repeated in three other suttas of the Majjhimanikāya[13] while other parallels are found elsewhere in the Tipiṭaka (some of the narrative has been joined with an early Mārakathā to create the opening of the Mahāvagga of the Pali Vinaya,[14] while the words uttered to Upaka the Ājīvika reappear often in the form of quotation).[15] These are large narrative segments, suggesting that they belong to a different class from the repeated stock phrases, clichés, lists, and so on, that are well known in the sutta texts. Whereas the latter could all have been editorial innovations, I agree with E. J. Thomas that in the present case the editors likely had an extant narrative that they reworked as these suttas, Mahāvagga, or Kathāvatthu; this narrative fragment would therefore predate the initial compiling and editing of the Tipiṭaka in the form we have it today.[16]

[13] Etienne Lamotte, *History of Indian Buddhism*, trans. Sara Webb-Boin (Louvain, 1988), pp. 648–49: "1. *Biographical fragments incorporated in the Sūtras*—In the *Majjhimanikāya*, four suttas which repeat and complement one another all tell us of an important phase in Śākyamuni's life, namely, the period which extends from the flight from Kapilavastu until the Enlightenment: these are the *Ariyapariyesana* (M I, pp. 163–73; T 26, No. 204, ch. 56, pp. 776b–778c), the *Dvedhāvitakka* (M I, p. 117), the *Bhayabherava* (M I, pp. 17–23; T 125, ch. 23, pp. 665b–666c) and the *Mahāsaccakasutta* (M I, pp. 240–49). Against the will of his parents, he left home and donned the yellow robe of the religious; he studied successively under Ārāra Kālāma and Udraka Rāmaputra; the former taught him the way of nihilism, the latter that of neither-perception-nor-nonperception; however Śākyamuni considering their doctrines to be imperfect, abandoned them, passed through Magadha and withdrew [sic] into solitude, in the neighbourhood of Uruvilvā (M I, pp. 163–67; T 26, ch. 56, 776b–777a)."

[14] I have tried to work some of this out in "Rethinking Buddhist Missions" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1992), pp. 228–30. Parallel passages are: M I:167–73 = Mahāvagga I:5–I:6 (with the addition of Dhammacakkappavattanasutta at the point where it belongs in the narrative).

[15] As at Kathāvatthu 289; see G. P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names* (London: Pali Text Society, 1937), 1:386.

[16] Edward J. Thomas, *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History* (1927; reprint, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 62, n. 1: "See *Majjh.* i, 23, 117, 167; 247–49; ii 93–94; these are repetitions, and this means that the redactor or redactors of this collection incorporated an older document."

Third, in addition to being present in sutta form in Chinese and Japanese canons, this narrative fragment has also been used by the compilers of the Lalitavistara and Mahāvastvavadāna. In Thomas's estimation, this too would mean that the narrative is very old.[17] I have compared in detail only the passages that relate to the Bodhisatta's teachers, so I hesitate to generalize about the incorporation of the entire narrative fragment, but at least with regard to the teachers I think it quite clear that the Buddhist Sanskrit authors have worked from a Pāli or more likely related Prakrit version rather than the other way around (which in many cases, such as the parallels between Lalitavistara or Mahāvastu and supplements in the commentaries, is more likely the direction of the borrowing). Thus, in the Mahāvastu we find a number of grammatical errors that are best explained as bad translation from the Prakrit.[18] Although these slips do not appear in the Lalitavistara version, others give away its origin, too, in a Pāli-like prototype.[19] Mahāvastvavādana contains virtually nothing that is not in the Pāli; Lalitavistara supplements the terse statements about Uddaka Rāmaputta (here Sanskritized as Rudraka Rāmaputra) by making the Buddha already have a philosophical rebuttal before meeting him and meeting Rudraka only in the interest of showing him up. Both Sanskrit versions omit the "conjoining frame" of NQ (about destiny to rebirth, etc.), which further suggests the greater antiquity of the embedded portion, the Buddha autobiography.

Fourth, the great antiquity of this narrative fragment can be argued from its apparent use, as a basis for supplementation, in later Buddha biographies. Though I will deal with the question of supplementation more fully below, here it is important merely to note that subsequent Buddha biographies all supplement this text to the extent that they take up the pre-Enlightenment/Bodhisattva stage of the biography at all, given that this is our *only* early version of those events.[20] But this is not merely a matter of supposition; the use of actual phrases or scenes from NQ and parallel Majjhimanikāya suttas betrays the reliance of later Buddha biographies on the Pāli or Pāli-original. I have already shown this for Mahāvastu and Lalitavistara, but in this context I should also point to some obvious parallels in Buddhavaṃsa (ca. second century B.C.),[21] Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita (ca. first century A.D.),[22] the Chinese Abhiniṣkramaṇasūtra (translated sixth century A.D.; the Sanskrit original was doubtless earlier),[23] and the travels of the Chinese pilgrim Xuanzang (seventh century A.D.),[24] as well as numerous later Theravāda biographies in Pāli and the vernacular languages. The consistent incorporation

[17] Ibid., p. 64.

[18] E. Senart, *Le Mahāvastu: texte Sanscrit publié pour la prèmiere fois et accompagné d'introductions et d'un commentaire* (Paris, 1897), 2:117–20. We find the Pāli *ukkamakānaṃ mātāpitunnaṃ assamukhānaṃ rudantānaṃ* (genitive absolute construction, "while [my] parents who did not approve were weeping and wailing") badly rendered as *akāmakānāṃ mātāpitṛṇāṃ aśrukaṇṭhānāṃ rudanmukhānāṃ*, which in addition to being garbled in a way that can only be explained as bad translation ("weep-necked" instead of "weeping" [literally, "faces of tears"]; "wail-faced" instead of "wailing") betrays its Pāli-like origin in the use of the real plural rather than the dual, which an original composition in Sanskrit would surely have employed for "mother and father." The dual, of course, is lacking in Pāli and some related Prakrits. Likewise, mistakes in *sandhi* throughout suggest direct copying from a Pāli-like manuscript or oral tradition, in either of which *sandhi* rules are loose, informal, or nonexistent. There are lines omitted such that the Sanskrit text is almost gibberish without the Pāli (*sa khalvahaṃ bhikṣavaḥ yena Udrako Rāmaputra etadavocat*; cf. the Pāli *Atha khvāhaṃ bhikkhave yena Uddako Rāmaputto ten' upasaṃkamiṃ, upasaṃkamitvā Uddakaṃ Rāmaputtaṃ etad avocaṃ*). Most telling, the pseudo-Sanskritization of "Uddaka" as "Udraka" is belied in the onetime slip, in all the manuscripts, into the Pāli spelling "Uddaka."

[19] Thus, in addition to similar *sandhi* gaffes, Lalitavistara employs the common Pāli term *ātāpī*, zealous, which is not ordinarily found in Sanskrit, in rendering the common Pāli description of an *arahant* (*eko vupakaṭṭho appamatto ātāpī pahitatto*) as *eko 'pramatta ātāpī vyapakṛṣṭo*.

[20] Thomas, pp. 229–30: "Of his six years' striving we know from the Canon only what the *Majjhima* tells us (above, pp. 62ff.)."

[21] The Buddhavaṃsa (BV; Richard Morris, ed., *The Buddhavaṃsa and the Cariyā-Piṭaka* [London: Pali Text Society, 1882; citations are to chapter and verse]) opens with a scene of Brahmā begging, located in the canon only in NQ and related texts (BV 1:6), and this becomes standard in the account of other Buddhas too (e.g., 2:211); the period of striving also becomes standard of the *type* "Buddha," though note that Āḷāra and Uddaka do not appear in this account; another parallel is the recognition (by Sumedha, however) of liability to birth (*jātidhamma*), etc., and the language of "why then don't I . . ." (BV 2:7–9; cf. I. B. Horner and B. C. Law, trans., *Buddhavaṃsa, Chronicle of the Buddhas and Cariyāpiṭaka, Basket of Conduct*, Minor Anthologies of the Pāli Canon, vol. 3 [London: Pali Text Society, 1975], p. 10, n. 4).

[22] The Buddhacarita (E. H. Johnston, ed. and trans., *The Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha* [1936; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992; citations are to chapter and verse]) contains the self-recognition of destiny to birth, etc. (iv.89; v.12–13; also the language of seeing the danger in this, e.g., iv.97 and xi.7; also xii.48); black hair/supreme youth of the bodhisatta (viii.52; cf. x.23: "prime of youth"; xii.8: flush of youth"), weeping in the palace (viii.81; cf. ix.13), visit to Āḷāra (Ārāḍa) Kālāma (ix.6; xi.69; ch. xii, esp. xii.83: "Thus he was not satisfied on learning the doctrine of Arāḍa, and, discerning that it was incomplete, he turned away from there"); visit to Udraka Rāmaputra (xii.84–88; same language of attainments in both teachers' cases); pure bank of Nerañjarā River (xii.90); description of Nibbāna being sought (xi.59: "the stage in which there is neither old age, nor fear, nor disease, nor birth, nor death"); description of the ultimate as *paramaṃ śivaṃ* (xii.69 = Pāli *paramaṃ sivaṃ*); description of the eight *jhānas* (xii.49 ff.); surveying the world with purified eye, people of little or great dust, etc. (xiv.8 ff.); sees Arāḍa and Udraka are dead so decides to preach to the Group of Five (xiv.106—but now out of the surviving Sanskrit text); the whole thing is predicated on a rejection of the passions, precisely what NQ's sermon proper (see frame IV, below) is actually about; see esp. chap. xi.

[23] The Abhiniṣkramaṇasūtra (Samuel Beal, trans., *The Romantic Legend of Śākya Buddha: A Translation of the Chinese Version of the Abhiniṣkramaṇasūtra* [1875; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985]) is obviously drawing on NQ either directly or indirectly (perhaps via the Buddhacarita) in its descriptions of the visit to the teachers (pp. 169–77) and of the events after the Enlightenment (pp. 242–50).

[24] Samuel Beal, trans., *Si Yu Ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World* (1884; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981): NQ (probably through Buddhacarita transmission?) is clearly presupposed by ii.54–55 (stupa of reluctance of the Group of Five, also mention of Āḷāra and Uddaka); ii.139–42 (weird story of Uddaka).

of bits of our text, whether verbatim or paraphrased, in these later supplements supports the view that the fragment is an early one and also that it is a narrative that in later centuries continued to be of "practical" or actual importance to Buddhists.

If one or more of these arguments for the antiquity of this portion, at least, of NQ is persuasive, then we can place *this* sutta in a period anterior to the time of Buddhaghosa (which anyway seems quite clear in the radical distance between Buddhaghosa's readings and those of the original, as I suggest below in Sec. IV). It can at least be antedated to the time of the Buddhist Sanskrit literature, the first or second century A.D. (which in any event is as early as any known Buddhist manuscripts). And given that this narrative appears to have existed as a unit prior to the editing of the suttas and Vinaya in the form we have them today, it presumably can be located as early into Buddhist history as we ever are likely to get.

Yet fixing the text at an early period does not in itself yield any significant historical information. If in fact in this instance we can circumvent the doubts raised about the antiquity of the suttas en bloc, we are still left with the question of how the autobiographical fragment ought to be interpreted. Within "historical source mode," the next move would be to ask whether the narrative as such can be taken as "accurate," a designation requiring that the reported information be the result of eyewitness observation and "objective" recording. Here the problems inherent in "historical source mode" are not so easily overcome.

On one hand, the evidence does not prove (though it also does not disprove) that even this autobiographical fragment is old enough to be counted as an eyewitness report by the Buddha or of the Buddha's words. As studies of the historical Jesus have made only too clear, what adepts thought about the founder a century or two after his death can be at great remove from the historical biography of the founder himself. The best our evidence allows us to say is that this autobiographical fragment accurately records the thoughts that somewhat later Buddhists had about the Buddha, or their beliefs about the words he spoke.

On the other hand, even if we allow the fragment to survive from the mouth of the Buddha himself, via the memories of the selfsame monks who heard the sermon at Rammaka's hermitage, there are still reasons to doubt the "historical accuracy" of the passage in question. Three different sorts of objections have been articulated.

1. The first is a pseudoscientific skepticism about the authenticity of the "mythic portions" of this ancient fragment, namely the chats with God and the gods and the Buddha-eye that surveys the whole world. These elements are integral to the narrative in all its appearances and in most of its supplements, meaning that there is no basis for trying to portray them as later accretions from which an even more original core can be separated

out. Their presence casts doubt on an historicist reading of the fragment, for it suggests that something more than a commonsense nineteenth-century "objectivity" was at work in the original composition.[25]

2. A second (and less easily dismissed) argument is raised by Thomas, namely that the Bodhisatta's encounters with Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta are reported in formulaic fashion, nearly word for word the same in both instances. Moreover, he points out, the two teachers are made to claim specific meditative achievements that Thomas maintains were inventions of later Buddhist tradition. Thus Thomas concludes that the narrative of the Bodhisatta's training bears no historical relevance.[26]

[25] Some scholars have actively pooh-poohed this criticism (e.g., C. A. F. Rhys Davids's defensive argument that "who is to say [God's appearance before the Buddha] is any less true than the baptism in the Jordan?") but most scholars (e.g., T. W. Rhys Davids, Etienne Lamotte, E. J. Thomas, A. Foucher) have seemingly confirmed it in their utter silence about these matters (which nevertheless does not prevent them from narrating other aspects of this Buddha autobiography as "historical fact").

[26] "*We are told in the legends* that Buddha studied under Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka the son of Rāma, but all we learn is that the former made the goal consist in the attainment of the stage of nothingness, and the latter in the attainment of the stage of neither consciousness nor non-consciousness. These are Buddhist terms for two of the attainments, and *there is no reason to suppose that the legend is recording exact details of fact* about two teachers who were dead before Buddha began to preach. The compiler is using the only terms he knew to express the imperfect efforts of Buddha's predecessors" (Thomas, p. 184). Explaining himself, Thomas adds (n. 2): "There is one other reference to Āḷāra in the Canon, which shows that he was looked upon as a practiser of concentration. See p. 150. When we come down to the second century, A.D., we find much more detailed accounts of his philosophy in Aśvaghosha's *Buddhacarita*, ch. 12, and they have even been treated as evidence for the sixth century B.C. Their historical value is discussed in ch. xvi." Following that reference, cf. pp. 229–30: "Of his six years' striving we know from the Canon only what the *Majjhima* tells us (above, pp. 62ff.). His two teachers are described as practising concentration, and what they inculcated were two of the so-called Attainments, which are also a part of the Buddhist system, but probably not a primitive part of it. *It seems very unlikely that the compiler of the sutta a century or two later had any real knowledge of the facts* of their teaching. He had to describe their imperfect methods, and he gives them in what are exact descriptions of two Buddhist practices. Nothing about the philosophical systems of these teachers is said either in the Canon or out of it until we come to Aśvaghosha's poem of the first or second century A.D. [BC xii.17 ff.]. There we are told that Ārāḍa or Āḷāra first described his philosophy concisely to Gotama. It has a resemblance to the Sānkhya philosophy, but is without some of its most characteristic doctrines. R. Schmidt calls it an older form of Sānkhya. Windisch supposes that Aśvaghosha introduced only what he needed for this purpose. The point is important only with regard to the question of the origin of Buddhistic principles, and even then only on the supposition that Aśvaghosha is faithfully describing a system in the form in which it existed before Buddha began to preach. This is entirely improbable. *The terminology used is neither that of early Sānkhya nor of early Buddhism.* More important is Aśvaghosha's account of the replies of the two teachers to Gotama's questions about the religious life and the obtaining of final release. Āḷāra's reply consists of a description identical with the methods of the Buddhist monk up to the last Attainment but one. The monk reaches the four trances, and then successively attains *space*, the *infinite*, and *nothingness*. These last three stages are concise statements of the first three of the four Attainments. This account corresponds to the statement in the Pāli that Āḷāra taught the Attainment of the state of Nothingness. The description of Uddaka's doctrine also corresponds with the Pāli in making his teaching the fourth Attainment. Aśvaghosha has thus added nothing essential to the canonical statement beyond giving an

in virtually ignoring the teachers of the Bodhisatta altogether, Etienne Lamotte seems to concur.[27]

3. A third argument against the historicity of the text has been raised by A. Foucher, who in good Orientalist fashion imputes bad motives to the compilers of that portion of the fragment which details the meetings with the teachers. These compilers, says Foucher—inexplicably unaware of their own cultural mores—maligned the bodhisattva:

> Another fault of our biographers was their incapacity to imagine the future Buddha in any way but as invested with shining glory. . . . Our authors have tried to reduce to a minimum the Bodhisattva's period of study as well as the need of it. If we are to believe them, he guessed all the answers before they were given to him, and was quick to make his teachers feel their incapacity to teach him. He soon decided to leave Arāda Kālāpa [a Sanskrit spelling of Āḷāra Kālāma], even though the latter offered to share with him the direction of the community of scholars. Thus our authors, blinded by fanaticism, failed to see that, according to Indian ethics, they were portraying the most unfaithful and insolent of pupils. The *Lalitavistara* even attempted to put this unworthy version in the mouth of the Buddha, but sometimes forgot to change the verbs from the third to the first person.[28] Having left Arāda's community in Vaiśālī, the Bodhisattva came to Rājagṛha [*sic*] where, as we have seen, he at once met King Bimbisāra. . . . The story goes on much as the above, attributing the same kindliness to the master [Rudraka Rāmaputra] and the same presumption to the so-called disciple. This time we are even told that the Bodhisattva only became Rudrāka's [*sic*] pupil in order to reveal the faults of his teacher's doctrine both to himself and to others. Because we feel that the foolish biographers, not the Bodhisattva, were responsible for these unfortunate statements, we need not spend more time on these particular readings.[29]

Of course by historicist standards, this argument that the reporting was "biased" is as damning as the second argument, above, that the reporting was not done by eyewitnesses; both of these would explain/bolster the first argument that the thing reported is unhistorical/mythic.

Nevertheless, the agreed-on solution seems to be the uneasy compromise of treating the narrative as true in substance—*everyone* has the

independent account of a philosophical system which *has no appearance of being historical*" (my emphasis throughout, except the emphasis on space, the infinite, and nothingness, which is in the text).

[27] Lamotte's only mention of the teachers is his brief notice of NQ and related Majjhima suttas in an appendix, cited in full in n. 13 above.

[28] Here Foucher inserts a footnote (n. 9) to Henry Clarke Warren, *Buddhism in Translations* (1886; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992), p. 334, which contains his translation of the relevant portion of NQ, not Lalitavistara! And there is no inconsistency I see in the use of pronouns; the first person is employed consistently throughout.

[29] A. Foucher, *The Life of the Buddha according to the Ancient Texts and Monuments of India*, trans. Simone Brangier Boas (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1963). The original French edition is *La vie du Bouddha* (Editions Payot, 1949), pp. 96–97.

Buddha meet teachers prior to Enlightenment, and almost everyone stipulates them as these two (and/or others who have been named elsewhere) and as teachers of yogic trances and Hindu philosophy—while basically ignoring, in addition to all that "mythic" material, also the full detail of the stories of the encounters with Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta (or, as with K. D. P. Wickremesinghe, reverting to the old naiveté of simply treating it all at face value as historical reporting).[30] Of course in "historical source mode" there is no way to do anything else, these being the only sources we have.

"Historical source mode" is based on what I believe to be an erroneous assumption that the compilers of the suttas were somehow *trying* to objectively report historical facts in a would-be nineteenth-century European way. So long as this assumption remains operative, there is nothing to do except judge the suttas as though they had been compiled by Edward Gibbon; and given that they were not, the impasse reached by scholarship in this mode seems inevitable. But rather than abandon the baby with the bathwater, we can disagree with Thomas's assertion that this is the only point of importance in the study of this portion of NQ.[31] Rather, we can turn to alternative interpretive strategies that make the motive of the compilers a question rather than a given. In Sections II and III I examine two such alternative interpretive strategies that take as their starting point the conclusions about the antiquity of NQ, made possible by "historical source mode," but that lead, I think, to much more productive questions and answers about the text under consideration. In Section IV, I examine an additional interpretive strategy to which this first mode of study is altogether irrelevant. Thus, even if we finally retire "historical source mode" as outdated, unproductive, and—let us be frank—boring, still there remain exciting ways in which a historian can make use of NQ.

II. TEXT OF ITS DAY MODE

In "historical source mode" the reader of the text is the scholar himself or herself, interpreting directly on the basis of standards for historicity characteristic, not of the period in which the suttas were composed, nor even of the later Buddhist history in which they were preserved, but rather of the period in which the scholar herself or himself lives and thinks. In the past I have assumed this flaw to be virtually fatal to the attempt at finding history in suttas like The Sermon on the Noble Quest. It should come as little surprise that the final results of an enterprise devoted entirely to judging suttas on the basis of standards that do not belong to them turns out to be hand-wringing, uneasy compromise, and

[30] K. D. P. Wickremesinghe, *The Biography of the Buddha* (Colombo, 1972), pp. 53–56.

[31] See Thomas (n. 16 above), p. 229.

ennui. But I now admit that this does not mean that the historian's only option is to give up the attempt altogether. Rather, in the past decade I think it has been sufficiently well shown that different sorts of historical analysis, far more promising, solid, and interesting, become possible once we remove ourselves from the position of reader and ask instead how people in the tradition itself would have read such-and-such a text.

While in greater or lesser degree I think this shift has been made by many different scholars, maybe even most of us, in many different keys, if not by members of the contemporary Theravāda establishment, I shall nevertheless try to focus my comments on three scholars whose work strikes me as emblematic of three (no doubt related) directions in which this shift from interpreting reader to interpreter of readership allows us to move. In the present and subsequent parts I examine two approaches to the study of the readership of the suttas in the time of their own production/composition, one of them focusing on an external readership or a context of recitation to and about outsiders, represented by the sociohistorical reconstructions of Greg Bailey. The other of them (in Sec. III) focuses on an internal readership or a context of composition and/or interpretation by and for fellow Buddhists, represented by the literary analyses of Steve Collins. In the fourth part I discuss another approach to the study of the suttas, which shifts attention to readers within the tradition in times posterior to the time in which the suttas themselves were produced. While Collins's literary analyses presumably carry over to later members of the tradition as well—indeed, if I read him correctly, the point is precisely the degree to which the ideologies of the producers of the suttas shaped later readings and ideological and sociopolitical realities—the fourth mode is more pointedly represented by Anne Blackburn's exciting work with the culture of manuscript production and education in a late premodern setting (eighteenth-century Kandy) admittedly far removed from the early Buddhist community and, for that matter, from any original meaning of the suttas.

Bailey's work begins from a frank admission that we are on thin ice trying to use the suttas for the social history of Brahminism in the time of the Buddha, given that Buddhist representations of Brahmins of the day are virtual "caricatures."[32] Yet in the end I think he shows persuasively that with a great deal of care this can be accomplished, and I agree with him that in the absence of other sources it must be accomplished. Bailey certainly does not engage, however, in the sort of face-value read-

[32] In addition to some detailed correspondence with Greg Bailey in 1995, I base what I say here on his "Problems of the Interpretation of the Data Pertaining to Religious Interaction in Ancient India: The Conversion Stories in the *Sutta Nipāta*," *Indo-British Review* 19, no. 1:1–20.

ing that characterizes "historical source mode," from which perspective, in terms of his question, Buddhist caricatures of Brahmins would be treated as true representations of what Brahmins then were actually like (or else, and more likely, they would be denounced for failing to be such representations). Rather, he delicately fleshes out his social history from between the lines of the earliest and most difficult suttas, in Sutta-nipāta, engaging in a sort of hermeneutical suspicion of both the presences and absences in them. I find compelling his argument that the stories of conversions of Brahmins in Sutta-nipāta "illuminat[e] aspects of the Buddhists' self-consciousness of their own fragility and apprehension in the face of the overwhelming cultural opponent they faced in the form of brahmanical culture, the chief symbol and advocate of which was the brahmin himself."[33] From this perspective, the texts give proof, not of their caricatures, but of the fact that early Buddhists felt a need to caricaturize in the first place. The fact that such a need was apparently not felt by Brahmin writers of the early Buddhist period, who recorded no mention of the Buddhists at all, reinforces Bailey's sociohistorical conclusion that Brahmanical culture really did have an overwhelming advantage over the incipient Buddhist community, which appeared to be just one more, no doubt extreme, Upaniṣadic group.

Quite apart from the interesting perspective this gives us on the relationship of Buddhists to theists during the early Buddhist Period—and from the light, I might add, which it sheds on the eventual virulence with which theist writers, beginning with the authors of the Bhagavad-gītā, felt compelled to sling insults at Buddhists—I find Bailey's work promising because it suggests the possibility of reading the suttas as artefacts of the times and places that produced them. Rather than view them as passive purveyors of historical truth qua nineteenth-century encyclopedias, it becomes possible to view them as actions within a particular set of sociohistorical circumstances. Of course, there are all sorts of problems in trying to determine just what those circumstances were, especially because there is already a certain unsteadiness in a method based on second-guessing ancient texts, and here the question of the relative antiquity of the suttas becomes absolutely critical. But we do have an enormous amount of textual material on hand both Buddhist and Brahminical—and, it is crucial to add, Jain, for they too were actively attacked by and attackers of the Buddhists from an early date[34]—such that, even in the

[33] Ibid., p. 19.

[34] The Jain case is especially interesting for the obviously intertextual relationship between the biographies of the respective founders, who are interchangeably referred to with the same epithets (Buddha, Jina, Mahāvīra, Arahant) and whose biographies exhibit differences as minor—yet definitive, distinctive, across an unthinkable line—as the iconographic difference of whether or not the genitals show.

absence of any hard evidence predating the time of Aśoka Maurya, so long as our historical linguistics is accurate we should be able to capture the dialogical moments or intertextual relationships on which historical reconstruction becomes possible.[35] For an obvious example, the Tevijja Sutta names several Upaniṣads known from our extant collections, including Chandoka for Chāṇḍogya, Addhariya for Aitareyya, Tittiriya for Taittiriya, and so on,[36] an extremely important link which helps date both bodies of literature by placing them in the same general milieu.

The importance of the external, the non-Buddhist—whether these "others" were assumed to have been among the readers/hearers or merely the object of representation by Buddhist readers/hearers—is evident in NQ. When we consider the sequence of events that is actually narrated in the autobiographical fragment under consideration, it is possible to view the entire Buddha biography, in this possibly earliest, original formulation, as little more than a series of encounters with representatives or symbols of the non-Buddhist communities among whom the early Buddhists coexisted: indeed, precisely the groups that are singled out by the Aśokan inscriptions. The fragment begins with Brahmins: Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, followed by none less than Brahmā the Lord of Creation (Brahmā Sahampati). This encounter with God is followed by a wonderful series of punning references to Jains, as I will discuss in a moment, which are made in a discussion with an Ājīvika named Upaka, after which the now-Buddha returns to Brahmins (the Group of Five) and transforms them with the superiority of his attainments (despite their initial agreement not even to rise to greet him). Indeed, the whole narrative is one of triumph over these non-Buddhists, who are however treated reverentially, with a healthy dose of pity for their less exalted state (except perhaps the Jains, who would have been the early Buddhists' closest competitors, whose texts are most directly intertextual with Buddhist texts, and who appear to be attacked directly as a result).

Thus as soon as the Bodhisatta is questing after the good, he is quickly mastering the teachings of first Āḷāra Kāḷāma and then, almost as an afterthought, Uddaka Rāmaputta, both of whom acknowledge his supreme ability and offer either to make him partner in leading the community (Āḷāra) or leader of the community outright (Uddaka). Yet as Foucher found so upsetting and unlikely, the Bodhisatta is made to abandon both teachers/communities because their attainments, however exalted and close to the goal, are not quite there yet. Without any teacher whatsoever, a point reiterated several times just after the Enlightenment, he becomes

[35] On dialogical as opposed to monological readings of South Asian texts, generally, see Ron Inden's introduction in Inden, Ali, and Walters (n. 1 above). My "Buddhist History" in that same volume applies Inden's insights to Buddhist texts.

[36] T. W. Rhys Davids, trans., *Buddhist Suttas* (reprint, New York: Dover, 1969), p. 171.

Buddha and agrees to preach only after the Brahmins' God himself comes to beg him to do so, for the sake of the whole world (including God!). Some anonymous deities—also symbolic of the theist world in which the early Buddhists existed—then confirm what he sees with his Buddha-eye, namely that poor Āḷāra and Uddaka have just died, so he sets out to meet the Group of Five who are staying in the Deer Park near Benares.

Along the way he meets Upaka the Ājīvika, who instantly recognizes that the Buddha is something special but who pathetically fails to believe the Buddha's rather exuberant first self-declaration, shrugs his shoulders, and walks away. In the process of that exchange Upaka somewhat sarcastically responds that in his self-declaration the Buddha makes himself appear to be the unrivalled (*ananta*) victor (*jina*), something along the lines of, "Well aren't you just Jesus Christ?"—to which the Buddha answers with an unabashed "Yes, I am"! Coupled with the odd references, by God himself, to the "stained doctrine, devised by impure minds" which "formerly, among the Magadhans appeared"—no doubt referring to Jainism—there is obviously a polemical stance toward Jains, as well as Ājīvikas, at work here. As mentioned, the final act in this Buddha autobiography is the submission of the Group of Five Brahmin mendicant ascetics to the Buddha. Before hearing the first and subsequent suttas, they are forced to submit to the Buddha's own unique title (Tathāgatha, paralleling in its distinctiveness the epithet Tīrthaṃkara in the Jain world), thereby admitting a level of unique superiority to him, and to submit to his communal rule (begging, studying, meditating, attaining *arahant*-ship). Here, then, there is much material for imagining the sociohistorical position of the early Buddhist community, surrounded as it was by other and likely bigger disciplinary orders of *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas*.

The potential of this sort of thinking for moving beyond the impasse of "historical source mode" becomes especially clear in applying it to the question of the Bodhisatta's teachers. Thomas's complaint that NQ's descriptions are little more than caricatures is answered with Bailey's view that caricatures are also part of the history we are trying to reconstruct. Foucher's complaint about the unlikely portrayal of Gotama as an uppity student just a little too smart to be believed is answered with Bailey's suggestion that the early Buddhists were apprehensive and self-conscious about their position vis-à-vis non-Buddhist disciplinary orders. That is, the points raised by Thomas and Foucher become, rather than "faults of our biographers," rather clever strategies in early Buddhist attempts at self-definition and promotion vis-à-vis their own rivals. What if we were to take the caricatures and overkill as evidence that the Buddha's relationship with Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta actually mattered to the early Buddhists (if not the Buddha himself) who composed this autobiographical fragment? Perhaps they were significant teachers of the

day, despite the fact that they are otherwise forgotten to history. Perhaps they really did enjoy especially close correspondence to the early Buddhists, such that questions of the Buddha's right to take over both communities could counter an implication that the Buddha is merely a pupil of well-known Yoga masters.

The suggestion that we need to pursue such lines of thought is not as far-fetched as might appear from the fact that the historicity of these teachers has never seriously been engaged in the scholarship. These two teachers are, after all, singled out in the narrative fragment: they are named; their teachings are described; they engage in conversations with the future Buddha; they are clearly achievers of very high states of consciousness; they warrant at least as much attention as the others over whom, I have suggested, the early Buddhist authors of this fragment claimed the Buddha's superiority (Brahmā, Upaka, the Group of Five); the Bodhisatta seeks them out when he first endeavors to learn the truth and seeks to return to them when he first decides to teach it. In terms of sheer quantity in the text, in fact, Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta turn out to be the most important figures in the Buddha autobiography other than the Buddha himself: they deserve more attention than the Group of Five, than the Ājīvika/Jains, and even than God himself (not to mention those weeping parents and unnamed wife and son). It is ironic, then, that "historical source mode" has somehow made their very names irrelevant to the discussion.

If we take seriously Bailey's claim that these texts addressed an external socioreligious reality, the logical assumption to make on the basis of these considerations is that this narrative fragment was composed when Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta were not yet the faceless "Yogic masters" whom later tradition, and Western scholarship, would leave them; it was composed when these teachers were still known, when it still mattered to demonstrate that the Buddhist program is more complete than theirs, when it still mattered that they acknowledged the Bodhisatta's superiority even before he became Buddha, before they died; when it still mattered that he was his *own* teacher. Indeed, the culmination of each encounter with the teachers he is nevertheless admitted to have followed is the expression of each one's desire to have the Buddha take over leadership of his community (which in later sources would appear to have included hundreds of members each).[37] And the Buddha's first thought on Enlightenment is apparently to comply after all; to return to these teachers—and their communities—and teach them the higher Dhamma because "for a long time they had little dust in their eyes." When he discovers that each has died, the Buddha pities them, for each one suffered "a great loss;

[37] According to Mahāvastu and Lalitavistara, Āḷāra's community contained three hundred students, while Uddaka's community contained seven hundred students.

if he had heard this Dhamma he would quickly have understood." There is an almost eschatological promise here: the Buddha could transform these Brahmanical teachers and, by extension, their followings.

These claims would have had real weight only in a situation in which members of those communities, in the absence of their now-dead founders, were active rivals and/or were being persuaded that they made the right choice in joining the Buddhist order (or perhaps were being persuaded to join the Buddhist order in the first place). To others who, like the Buddha, were closely connected with Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, it would indeed matter to know in such absolutely (even painfully) explicit terms whether or not the Buddha taught everything they taught (with those teachers' stamp of approval/offer of succession, after all) but also went beyond them by teaching much, much more.

In this light it seems to me most remarkable to notice, as has not previously been done in this context, that the Pāli texts contain a number of references to the Buddha's interaction with members or former members of both of these communities. Thus, at least one strand of the tradition maintained that the Group of Five monks were in fact followers of Uddaka Rāmaputta; our text, which mentions them as having been there during the period of striving, almost as an afterthought, might similarly be seen to support such a reading.[38] Mahāparinibbānasutta (D.ii.130) mentions a Mallian, Pukkusa, who, paralleling the Group of Five in this reading, had been a follower of Āḷāra Kālāma's but later was convinced by the Buddha's superiority to defect to the Buddhists. The Buddha confronts a belligerent group of Uddaka Rāmaputtists, King Pasenadi and his bodyguard, in the Vassakāra Sutta of the Anguttaranikāya (A.ii.180) and actively attacks Uddaka in suttas in the Saṃyuttanikāya (S.iv.83–84, where Uddaka's claim to have rooted out the source of *dukkha* is refuted) and in the Pāsādika Sutta of the Dīghanikāya (D.iii.126–27, where Uddaka is accused of base thinking). Just as Bailey's work would lead us to see something purposeful in the triumph the Bodhisatta achieves over Brahmins/Brahmā, Jains, and Ājīvikas, so too it would lead us to conclude that, given the great antiquity of this fragment, in the early days of Buddhist history the communities of Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta were serious rivals and probably great sources of aspirants to the new Path.

[38] According to Lalitavistara, the Buddha met them when he arrived at Uddaka's ashram, from whom he spirited them away; Tibetan versions make them representatives of the three hundred (3) and two hundred (2) men sent by the Bodhisatta's father and father-in-law, respectively, to attend on him when he went forth; the Pāli Jātakaṭṭhakathā makes Koṇḍañña the youngest of the eight Brahmins who prophesied at the Bodhisatta's birth. The previous seven having died, he tried to rile their sons to follow him in serving the Bodhisatta, but only four complied; together with him they are the five. See Thomas, p. 80. Buddhaghosa's commentary also treats the five as sons of the Brahmins who first predicted the future greatness of the Bodhisatta.

As interesting as this line of thinking becomes—implying the (I believe) previously unrecognized possibility that our narrative fragment preserves memories of an actual sociohistorical situation in which Āḷāra and Uddaka and their communities were of great concern to the early Buddhists—like "historical source mode" it depends upon fracturing the integrity of the sutta as received, focusing only on that embedded narrative fragment of apparently greatest antiquity. I consider it one of the major contributions of Collins to have shown us so clearly that such fractured interpretation is always incomplete. There is a layer of historicity in the suttas—a history of composition, of aesthetics, of reading—that can be grasped only by treating any particular sutta (or jātaka story, etc.) as a textual whole. In several different contexts, Collins has demonstrated that an analysis of literary devices including frame stories, internal structures, ornamentation, and so forth, can usefully supplement such fragmented readings.[39] This of course belies as much a limitation of fragmented philosophical readings as it does of fragmented historical readings: both history and philosophy are enriched by considering the frames within which the fragments are, we assume purposefully, situated. Here, we access a layer of history that does not require historical linguistics to project narrative fragments into remote antiquity; Collins's points are as relevant (or even more relevant) for the time of editing as for the time of earliest/original composition, if any real distinction between those two can or should be made, and are relevant to later readership as well, anticipating my discussion in the next part.

Although this is not a form of reading at which I can claim any special skill—certainly I lack the nuanced eye that has made Collins's readings so rich—still when I think about Ariyapariyesanasutta in this mode I find real truth in the argument that much is missed in an exclusive focus on that one autobiographical fragment. Yet this is what *every* scholar who has discussed NQ, as far as I have been able to discern, has in fact done; for all the use of NQ in debating "the historical Buddha," not one scholar has paid attention to the literary qualities of the text. On one hand, this causes us to lose sight of the profound teaching that the monks at Rammaka's hermitage so crave, and of which the autobiography is merely an illustration (albeit a powerfully evocative one), consisting in an analysis of the human condition—attachment to things ("wives and sons, slaves and slavegirls, goats and sheep, cocks and pigs, elephants and cows and horses and mares, silver and gold")[40] destining us in their own destiny to birth, old age, dis-

[39] See esp. Steve Collins, "On the Very Idea of the Pāli Canon" (n. 4 above), "The Discourse on What Is Primary (*Aggañña Sutta*)," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 21, no. 4 (1993): 301–93, and *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[40] M I:162.

ease, death, grief, and defilement—as well as an analysis of the bases of this condition (sense pleasures) and a lovely metaphorical illustration of escape from it. Buddhaghosa titles his commentary on this text "Explanation of the Sermon on the Heap of Snares (Pāsarāsisuttavaṇṇanā), which is named 'Sermon on the Noble Quest,'" suggesting that what really matters about this sutta is the final teaching, the snares metaphor, rather than the autobiographical illustration of it. (Indeed, as I suggest below, Buddhaghosa is singularly uninterested in the autobiographical details as such; he is concerned instead to supplement them with other details and to articulate a Buddhology that strikes me as quite foreign to the original.)

This fractured reading also causes us to lose sight of the other way in which this is an important text for recovering the Buddha biography. It, like virtually all of the suttas, narrates a particular moment in the life of the Buddha qua Buddha, during the forty-five years he spent traveling and teaching and instituting the Sangha. The description of the setting—the Buddha's bath, the meeting at Rammaka's hermitage, the manner in which he addressed the monks—may be a comparatively later addition to the early fragment, but it is a key moment in the massive Buddha biography that all the suttas, together, constitute: a Buddha biography so important to Buddhists at the stage when the Tipiṭaka was being compiled that they chose it as the frame for the entire collected teachings of the Buddha. It is precisely as evidence for the daily habits of the Buddha that Buddhaghosa finds this text biographically interesting, as I explain below. Just as historians of the Theravāda have increasingly shifted their focus away from "early Buddhism," in the interest of recovering the comparably understudied later premodern and modern periods of Theravāda history, so there has been a marked shift away from reconstructions of "the historical Buddha" in favor of studies of what Frank Reynolds calls "the biographical process" in later Buddhist history.[41] But as far as I know there has as yet been no attempt to describe and locate the massive Buddha biography that becomes apparent to us when we take the introductory (*nidāna*) portion of each sutta seriously.

Additionally, and here especially I draw inspiration from Collins's work, these different bits of NQ—the teaching, the metaphors, the "one

[41] See Frank E. Reynolds, "The Many Lives of Buddha: A Study of Sacred Biography and Theravāda Tradition," in *The Biographical Process: Studies in the History and Psychology of Religion*, ed. Frank E. Reynolds and Donald Capps (Mouton: The Hague, 1976), pp. 37–61. For fruits of this approach, see the wide-ranging collection of articles in J. Schober, ed., *Sacred Biography in the Buddhist Traditions of South and Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997); John Strong, *The Legend of King Aśoka* (Princeton, N.J., 1983), and *The Legend and Cult of Upagupta: Sanskrit Buddhism in North India and Southeast Asia* (Princeton, N.J., 1992) are exemplary in this regard. For a non-Theravādin parallel, see Phyllis Granoff and Koichi Shinohara, *Monks and Magicians: Religious Biographies in Asia* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1988).

time" at which the sutta takes place, and even that ancient autobiographical fragment—are carefully woven together into a textual whole that has its own integrity, its own beauty, and its own meanings. It will not do to reckon with all the seemingly separate bits and then declare victory; the sutta itself—number 26 in the Majjhimanikāya—is an unfragmented whole. So, too, for that matter, is the Majjhimnikāya itself a whole, and likewise the Tipiṭakā a whole—but an analysis of those wholes obviously lies beyond the scope of this article.

The structure that informs NQ becomes clear when we take up Buddhaghosa's intimation that we should consider the extended metaphor about Māra's snares/beasts of prey as the center or foundation of the text. Treating the actual sermon as a unit (I label it IV below) that is then framed by the rest of the text presents us with a neat structure indeed. The "heap of snares" metaphor (IV) is framed by/told as the culmination of the ancient autobiographical fragment, which I thus deem the "inner frame" (and label III). This was clearly a matter of choice on the part of compilers at some point in the compilation of the Tipiṭaka, for the fragment culminates in other sorts of stories and/or teachings in other versions of it, both in the Pāli and in the Buddhist Sanskrit collections. This inner frame in turn is told as part of a larger narrative about the nature of the Noble Quest more generally, which I call the "conjoining frame" (and label II). But all of these narratives are framed by the monks who are listening to the Buddha's Dhamma-talk at Rammaka's hermitage in Sāvatthi, which I call the "outer frame" (and label I).[42]

The text opens with the monks desiring a Dhamma-talk face-to-face with the Buddha, and their retreat to Rammaka's hermitage toward that end (frame I). The Buddha arrives and begins to discuss the Noble Quest and its opposite, the ignoble quest (frame II). This is the "conjoining" frame because the Buddha identifies the activity of the monks at Rammaka's hermitage (frame I) with the Noble Quest as opposed to the ignoble quest (frame II),[43] then proceeds to narrate the autobiographical

[42] Reverting to text of its day mode for a moment, it is worth noting that this hermitage is mentioned only in NQ; this is our only source for thinking about just who Rammaka might have been: a former follower of Uddaka? Is his name a mishmash allusion to Uddaka Rāmaputta himself? Or is his very anonymity meant to represent any Brahmin? The fact that he is Rammaka *the Brahmin* is repeated seven times in the first paragraph of the text. In either event, the setting may have interesting things to say about the content of the autobiographical fragment in this regard, too.

[43] This is only implicit in NQ itself. The Buddha, on learning that the monks have been there at Rammaka's discussing the Dhamma, praises them saying, "Excellent, monks! It is proper that you, sons of good family who through faith have gone forth from home to the homeless life, sit down together in a Dhamma-discussion. Monks, when you are sitting together there are two proper courses of action for you: either Dhamma-discussion or else the Noble Silence" (p. 161). That this Dhamma-discussion is in fact exemplary of the Noble Quest as such becomes explicit, twice, in Buddhaghosa's commentary: "[The monks] sat down

fragment (frame III) as an illustration of that same transition from an ignoble to a Noble Quest (frame II). As the culmination of the autobiographical fragment, in which the Buddha and the Group of Five have all attained the perfectly peaceful (*paramaṃ sivaṃ*) goal of the Noble Quest, Nirvana, we then have the sermon proper (frame IV), which hearkens back to frame III (by repeating the elaborate narrative of the progression through and beyond the *jhānas* achieved first by the Buddha and then by the Group of Five), frame II (by analyzing the basis of the attachment that distinguishes the Noble Quest from the ignoble quest, likened to the distinction between the beast who just stands on the snares and the beast who is bound up in them) and frame I (in which the whole thing is, after all, preached, as we are reminded in the concluding statement, "Thus spoke the Blessed One, etc.").

In attempting to chart this out, I find a structure something like this:

I. outer frame, monks listening at Rammaka's hermitage
  II. conjoining frame, the Noble Quest
    III. inner frame, Buddha autobiography
      IV. teaching, the heap of snares
    III. teaching is part of and parallels the inner frame
  II. teaching illustrates the conjoining frame
I. teaching is preached to the monks at Rammaka's

In this configuration, it will be clear that NQ as a whole projects the reader through a series of stages to the teaching of the Buddha contained in the final portion, the heap of snares metaphor, then shoots him or her back to the point of departure. This could be charted in a more elaborate fashion. Thus the forward movement to the teaching proper: the monks gathered together are the monks on the Noble Quest; they are following the Buddha's own paradigmatic illustration of being a monk on the Noble Quest; the validity as well as the possibility of being a monk on the Noble Quest is grounded in the Buddha's Enlightenment; the Buddha's Enlightenment that grounds the Noble Quest is known because God begged him to preach; by preaching to the Group of Five the Buddha directed them on the Noble Quest; by listening to what he preached the Group of Five also realized Enlightenment: what he preached is the heap of snares metaphor. And then the movement reverses, bringing the teaching back to the outer frame: the heap of snares metaphor is the Truth the Group of Five

there for a Dhamma-discussion; they were not seated [engaged] in gibberish. Then the Blessed One began this preaching to point out [to the monks,] 'your quest is definitely the Noble Quest' . . . [the statement in NQ that] 'This, monks, is the Noble Quest' should be understood [to imply,] 'this, your own [Dhamma-discussion] for the sake of purity, because it is what ought to be quested after by noble people, is the Noble Quest'" (MA II:169–70 [n. 10 above]).

realized, which is what the Buddha preached to the Group of Five, which is what God begged for, which is an explication of what the Buddha realized, which is the distinction between the Noble Quest and ignoble quest, which is what monks ought to be doing, which is what the monks at Rammaka's hermitage are doing.

The symmetry here, I think, extends beyond the text into the community that compiled and preserved it. The monks joined together in Rammaka's hermitage are an unnamed gaggle, in a sense any monks, the monks who compiled and heard this sutta in the early days of the community or the monks who copied and preserved it down into the present; these monks could be any place (the hermitage is otherwise unknown), whether in the center of things (Sāvatthi, where the Buddha spent the bulk of his forty-five years) or perhaps somewhere out east of it (this is left ambiguous in NQ). The Buddha's humble entrance, an ahem and a tap on the crossbar, is an entrance into any monastery, any time. He tells the monks, and us readers, that they are doing what monks on the Noble Quest ought to be doing, thinking about the Dhamma. He tells them about the Quest, about his own Quest, about its triumphs. They feel the fear of God that they will never get to hear the teaching; they feel the Buddha's pity for Āḷāra and Uddaka, cheated by death, and Upaka, distracted by sectarianism; they feel the awkwardness of the Group of Five, their ignorance of the real situation. the pull of the Buddha's charisma, their change of mind and subsequent quick attainment of the goal by learning . . . here it comes . . . "Five, monks, are these bases for passion." Recent scholars have suggested that post-*parinibbāna* Buddhists felt a profound longing, like the monks at Rammaka's hermitage, to be in the presence of the Buddha; to hear from him the sort of face-to-face Dhamma-talk which in sutta after sutta proves nothing less than salvific.[44] The Sermon on the Noble Quest is structured to satisfy this longing. The Buddha himself *is* face to face with the monks at Rammaka's, with all the later monks who confronted this sutta, and with us, the readers/hearers. And this salvific teaching comes hurtling back through frame after frame to us, sitting here, in anybody's ashram.

A similarly marvelous symmetry can be discerned in the text of that ancient narrative fragment itself. If we consider the various stages of the Buddha biography outlined in this critically important biographical text, we find an easily defined sequence, which could be charted as (1) unenlightened state, (2) encounters with Āḷāra and Uddaka, (3) fulfillment of the Noble Quest, (4) the decision to preach/God's plea and subsequent boast, (5) encounter with Upaka, and (6) meeting with the Group of Five. But on seeing, in "text of its day mode," that there is something significant about Āḷāra and Uddaka, I was able to realize that they play a considerably more central role in this narrative fragment than this simple listing might suggest.

In this fragment, the two teachers are identified primarily, indeed exclusively, as the teachers of two of the four formless (*aruṇa*) *jhāna*s recognized in classical Vipassanā meditation. Āḷāra Kālāma is said to have taught the sphere of boundless space (fifth *jhāna*), while Uddaka Rāmaputta is said to have taught the sphere of neither perception nor nonperception (eighth *jhāna*). Taking these narrative elements—"teacher" and "*jhāna*s"—as well as explicit references to the pair as textual markers of their role in the autobiography, we find that they keep reappearing like a chorus after each discrete moment in the unfolding of the narrative. Thus the ancient fragment is structured as follows, with discrete events indicated by letters and the "chorus" of references to the teachers of the *jhāna*s indicated by asterisks:

(*a*) the bodhisatta is in his unenlightened state ("Even I, O monks . . .")
* encounters with Āḷāra and Uddaka/mastery of the *jhāna*s
(*b*) fulfillment of the Noble Quest/Enlightenment
* Enlightenment involves a progression through and outside of the *jhāna*s
(*c*) decision to preach/God's plea and subsequent boast
* Buddha wants to teach Āḷāra and Uddaka; discovering them dead, he goes to Benares
(*d*) encounter with Upaka the Ājīvika
* Buddha's self-declaration as Teacherless Teacher
(*e*) meeting with the Group of Five
* Buddha becomes teacher of *jhāna*s (and beyond) to the Group of Five (who happen to be former followers of Uddaka?)

Thus the text itself highlights a certain centrality to the teachers; the story of the Buddha's paradigmatic Noble Quest is intimately bound up with Āḷāra and Uddaka at literally every stage. Without repeating myself, if "text of its day mode" is on track, here we have a very nice overlap of the two modes, in which an appreciation of the text's internal logic and structure speaks to what appears to have been its external audience.

But if that is the case, what is it saying? On one hand it is saying—*pace* Lamotte, Thomas, Foucher, T. W. Rhys Davids, and others who would downplay their significance—that Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, whoever they were, played a critical role in helping to define the Buddha's distinctively Buddhist teaching and community. On the other hand, these

[44] I believe that this sense of longing for the Buddha's presence was first noticed by Paul Mus (*Barabadur: Esquisse d'une histoire du Bouddhisme fondée sur la critique archéologique des textes* [Hanoi, 1935], preface). Manifestations of it have been described, in strikingly different keys, by Gregory Schopen (*Bones, Stones and Buddhist Monks* [Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997]), John Strong (*The Legend of King Aśoka* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983]), and M. David Eckel (*To See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness* [Princeton, N.J., 1994]).

recurring choruses, allusions to the Bodhisatta's teachers, are always allusions to their ultimate inadequacy: these Upaniṣadic gurus have been usurped, they are now dead, their former pupils have come into the Buddhist fold, the Buddhist Path goes beyond their refined versions of mystical wallowing to a self-declared "undefiled, unsurpassed, perfectly peaceful Nirvana," which blinds Māra by leaving him no tracks at all. This is a message intended for all of us—the Group of Five, God, the monks at Rammaka's hermitage, former followers of Āḷāra and Uddaka, monastic compilers, monks seated together in monasteries discussing Dhamma, whomever reads or hears this sutta—which has become obscure only because memory of the teachers thus usurped, and of the independent identity of their communities, has long since disappeared.

IV. LATER READING MODE

It will be clear that I consider the second and third modes described above to be more interesting, and potentially more productive, than I consider the now-outdated "historical source mode" to be. But in one important sense the modes presented in Sections II and III never escape from a problem inherent in "historical source mode." Though these modes shift attention from reading to readership, the scholar still must interpret the original text directly, and any thinking about readership, context, and so forth, must be spun out of that direct interpretation. As a historian, this troubles me: How do we know people read the text in such and such a fashion? In terms at least of evidence, is this not still the same sort of interpretation found in "historical source mode," just knocked back a few notches? I feel myself on much firmer ground when I have evidence of later readership of whatever sutta I may want to study. This is not to deny that history is *always* interpretative, imaginary, and mutable; rather it is to assume that the presence of evidence makes for better interpretation, imagination, and openness to seeing things anew. Thus I am personally most interested in pursuing a fourth mode of interpretation, which asks about how the text was read, on the basis of whatever evidence might actually exist as the remnant of such readings. In my experience, this evidence takes one of three (sometimes overlapping) forms.

First, there is what we might call the manuscript record. In addition to the sheer quantification that a catalog of existing manuscripts of some particular sutta can provide, giving us some rough idea of its popularity, regional distribution, and so on, when we work closely with manuscripts there is always much the object itself can, even wants, to tell us. It bespeaks, whether in its physical condition (wear and tear, quality of production, materials, script, etc.) or in its contents (colophons, titles, name inscriptions, etc.), or in both, a great deal about where it came from, how

it was treated, and how it was understood. Anne Blackburn's project of reconstructing eighteenth-century monastic education through an examination of the holdings in period temple libraries is unprecedented in the field and promises to tell us more than we have ever known about actual textual practices in any period of Theravāda Buddhist history.[45]

However, in terms of the suttas there is a major problem here. Except for certain suttas prized for particular reasons (Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta for meditation training, Dhammacakkappavattanasutta for foundational doctrine and historical uniqueness, Ratanasutta and the other *paritta/pirit* texts for supernormal efficacy, etc.), most of the suttas do not have a manuscript record as such. Thus, even as important a sutta as NQ does not appear as a separate piece in any of the fifty-odd Kandyan temple preaching manuscripts (*bana pot*) that I have collected, nor have I been able to locate a single manuscript in any of the available catalogs of palm leaf manuscripts holdings anywhere in the world. Of course, there are manuscripts of the Majjhimanikāya in which NQ obviously appears—and in which that ancient fragment appears four times—but this is not the same thing as, say, the independent record of the growth of the *pirit* liturgy which manuscripts provide.

The fact is that most suttas, like NQ, do *not* have their own manuscript records. Thus NQ is in some ways more typical of the suttas in general; we would like to study the material culture of their reading and use, but we have no evidence that such a culture even existed. This would seem a terrible impasse indeed, that this most exciting avenue for future work on suttas is closed to the vast majority of them. But in fact I think there are two ways out of this bind. On one hand, the very absence of a separate manuscript culture tells us something important about the use (or, more precisely, nonuse) of this sutta, and probably of most suttas, in the late premodern period that produced the great bulk of our extant manuscripts. We can agree with both Collins and Blackburn that there was more an *idea* of canon than a consistent interest in reading the suttas themselves. We could even conceive a social history of not reading and studying most suttas, against which we could interpret in new ways the desire of major temples and royal patrons to see them preserved in sometimes rather ostentatious fashion.

But these sorts of reflections are not the only way out of the problem because, as mentioned, material remains constitute only one of at least

[45] Anne M. Blackburn, "The Play of the Teaching in the Life of the Sāsana" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996), "Sūtra Sannayas and Saraṇaṃkara," *Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities* 23, nos. 1 and 2 (1997): 76–99, "Looking for the Vinaya: Monastic Discipline in the Practical Canons of the Theravāda," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* (1999, in press), and "Magic in the Monastery: Textual Practice and Monastic Identity in Sri Lanka," *History of Religions* 38 (May 1999), in press.

three different (but overlapping) forms of evidence on which a historically grounded interpretation of the later readership of particular suttas could be based. The second and third forms, by which I mean "supplements" and "commentaries," respectively, do not require a manuscript record as such. As long as one copy of a text that supplements or comments on a particular sutta exists, we can pursue "later reading mode" with reference to the authors (and/or compilers, transmitters) of the supplements or commentaries in question.

In terms of supplementation, I showed in Section I that many later Buddha biographies—even all later Buddha biographies, including scholarly reconstructions—implicitly and often explicitly draw on NQ as their source. In this sense, "historical source mode"—namely, extracting chosen bits of the biographical fragment and supplementing them with other sorts of evidence, pertinent or not—is merely the most recent contribution to a long-standing literary tradition.[46] Because this text has been supplemented so regularly, it occupies its own sort of special place among the suttas and is therefore not entirely typical of them. Indeed, if we question *why* this sutta does not have its own manuscript tradition, we can go beyond the generic answer that like most suttas it simply was not very relevant to the concerns of the people who produced our extant manuscripts. In this instance it seems likely that the need for a special manuscript tradition was obviated by the ever-greater finesse with which NQ was supplemented. If we ask about the manuscript record of the biography conveyed in the sutta, rather than of the sutta itself, then we find it in ever-proliferating abundance. Yet to the extent that much of the sutta material was at least transmitted in other canonical traditions and some post-Tripiṭaka texts, a wider application of this sort of interpretation remains open.

In terms at least of NQ, supplementation is clearly an important avenue for investigation. As shown in Section I, portions of the text's actual language have been embedded in a variety of later supplements, or frames. Whereas in "historical source mode" this was important only by way of demonstrating that the autobiographical fragment is indeed very ancient, in "later reading mode" each and every supplement is a site for further

[46] A recent example of this sort is Michael Carrithers (*The Buddha* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1983]), who explicitly and implicitly embeds most of the NQ narrative (see esp. pp. 20–52) but adds to it an incredible array of material that even my students recognize to be a haphazard collection of tidbits from later Buddha biographies as well as from his own general knowledge (e.g., his digression into the psychoanalysis of altered states as an explanation of the Bodhisatta's encounters with Āḷāra and Uddaka). On the role of "the historical Buddha" more generally, especially in terms of the scholarly construct of pan-Buddhist history, see my *Finding Buddhists in Global History*, American Historical Association Essays on Global and Comparative History Series, ed. Michael Adas (Washington, D.C., 1998).

questions that, when we pursue them, turn out to be some combination of "text of its day mode" and "textual whole mode." That is, each supplement is the relic of a process of reading this autobiographical fragment, whether directly or on the basis of an already-supplemented intermediate form, and thinking about what it means: framing its relevance according to the concerns, agendas, styles, tropes, and hopes of the day.

Thus, for example, in earlier work I have shown that the Buddha biography was supplemented with details about the Bodhisatta's previous lives and the existence of previous Buddhas in a historical context of Buddhist expansion (Buddhist empires of the second and first centuries B.C.) for which these details had profoundly important political, economic, and religious implications.[47] Recognizing *that* some particular detail is added to the original at some particular moment in time-space allows us to ask in meaningful ways *why* such supplementation occurred.

To raise another example of the value of identifying stages in the process of supplementing the original NQ Buddha biography, it has not sufficiently been recognized that the suttas do not provide us good evidence for the Buddha's claimed royal status. Though the name of his father, Suddhodana, does appear in a text of the Vinaya (establishing the rule that one must have parental permission to go forth) and in a sutta of Sutta-nipāta (about his birth), there is otherwise no canonical indication that he was even worthy of note, let alone a powerful (or even world-conquering!) monarch. While there is canonical evidence that the Buddha was believed to be Śākyan (though even this is lacking in NQ), there is no indication that he was intended to rule that kingdom. In Pāli tradition, details about the Buddha's royal birth and the exalted status of Suddhodana, not to mention the narrative of the princely prison in which the latter tried to constrain the former, are startlingly absent, lacking until, truly, the time of the commentaries and vaṃsas (fourth to fifth centuries A.D.). These details are found in Buddha biographies from other traditions, but they are also texts that are much later than the time of Aśoka and shortly thereafter (which is generally treated as the date of the latest compilations of the Nikāyas and the Vinaya). The earliest text in which I have been able to locate explicit statements of the Buddha's royal birth is Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita, in which the Buddha's royal birth, connections, and status are highlighted almost to the point of absurdity. In recognizing this fact, we are enabled to start asking very interesting questions about what it meant to claim royal status for the Buddha at that point in Buddhist history (Aśvaghoṣa is believed to have worked in the court of the Kuṣāna emperor Kaniṣka, no less), about why this claim is made in classical Sanskrit court

[47] Jonathan S. Walters, "Stupa, Story and Empire: Constructions of the Buddha Biography in Early Post-Aśokan India," in Schober, ed. (see n. 41 above).

poetry (rare to have Buddhist classical Sanskrit at all, especially weird because this biography became definitive of a genre of theist court poetry), and so on.

I will not engage in that line of questioning here, except to point out that this is by no means the only addition that Aśvaghoṣa makes to NQ and that might help illuminate the social and/or literary contexts of his day. Thus, for example, Aśvaghoṣa, a converted Brahmin, is as far as I know the first biographer to draw explicit parallels to the Rāmāyana, to justify apparent Buddhist deviance from Vedic precedents with an appeal to different Vedic precedents, and to diffuse the "God begs Buddha to Preach" segment by having Indra come down with Brahmā, more as a sort of friendly call than as a charge to preach (Aśvaghoṣa's bodhisattva already knows he is going to preach). This, too, would have a sharp social edge in Aśvaghoṣa's context, while adding a level of aesthetic quality and completeness to the Buddha biography that had never been achieved before but that has remained the sine qua non for all subsequent Buddha biographies. Indeed, a number of Aśvaghoṣa's innovations, like the innovation that the bodhisattva was heir to a powerful kingdom, became absolutely standard in later biographies across the Buddhist world (and in scholarship on "the historical Buddha"). Thus, in addition to illuminating the sociohistorical contexts and literary practices of Aśvaghoṣa's world, reading Buddhacarita as a later reading of NQ also raises questions about why some of those innovations, and not others, did become standard across the Buddhist world.

In this vein all the Buddha biographies we have are evidence of particular readings of NQ in particular sociohistorical and literary circumstances; one could write a veritable history of Buddhology, if not of the whole religion, as a process of supplementing the original biography in NQ. But from the perspective of this larger history of Buddha biographies, that ancient autobiographical fragment becomes most significant for its absences. Much more than the missing Śākyan royal connection of the (unnamed) bodhisattva, NQ is full of startling silences: here we have no Suddhodana, no Mahāmāyā, no Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī, no Yasodharā and Rāhula, no pleasure palace, no women of the harem, no four signs, no Channa, no renunciatory fanfare, no practice of austerities, no Sujātā's milk-rice, no Māra's army at the Bodhi tree, no three watches of the night, no seven weeks after Enlightenment, no text of the First Sermon (replaced with the heap of snares, frame IV!). The Sermon on the Noble Quest screams out for supplementation, and the tradition is still supplementing it, that same fragment, today. When we make the supplementation itself the object of study, rather than attempt to mix it all together into a complete and "reliable" single account of the biography of "the historical Buddha," literally hundreds of possible histories emerge for investigation.

While we have been blessed with much good work on Buddhist biography in the past decade—including several excellent volumes of essays in which many of these moves toward a sociohistorical and/or literary reading of later Buddha biographies, as texts of their own days, have been made—I do not think that the role of NQ at the base of the whole house of cards has yet been given adequate attention. A failure to see that these later biographies of the Buddha are direct and indirect supplementations of NQ does more than blind us to some of the potentially fruitful sociohistorical and literary analyses that can be made of those texts. Additionally, this failure blinds us to the possibility that many of the supplementations have been spun out of the evidence of the ancient fragment itself.

Thus in the constantly repeated analysis of the ignoble quest and Noble Quest that so bores my students (the language of being destined to birth, death, etc., and the repeated passages about what is destined for these things), we might be able to detect the seeds of a fuller, supplemented Buddha biography: in the phrase "wives and sons are destined for birth" we might find the source for the stories of Yasodharā and Rāhula; "slaves and slavegirls are destined for birth" supplies the Bodhisatta's attendants and harem; "goats and sheep . . . cocks and pigs . . . elephants and cows and horses and mares . . . silver and gold are destined for birth" intimates the opulence of the palace.[48] Continuing through the ancient autobiographical fragment: "being a young man with very black hair" may have been the source for stories about the Bodhisatta's beauty, skill, agility, and so forth; "while my parents" in the plural (Mahāpajāpatī as second wife/surrogate mother of the Buddha) "were weeping and wailing" (the opposition of the king and the whole cycle that explains it); "recognizing the danger in that which is destined for death . . . old age . . . disease" (the first three signs); "isn't it the case that I ought to quest after the unborn, unsurpassed, perfectly peaceful Nirvana?" (the fourth sign).[49] Likewise, "This group of five monks was very helpful to me, who assisted me in my resolution to strive" (the six years' asceticism);[50] whatever sermon about Māra is attached to the end of this fragment, as here the heap of snares (the battle with Māra); the initial reflection on the subtlety of *paṭiccasamuppāda* (the emergence of Buddhahood over the three watches of the night). It is possible to read all of these details as already there in the original text; the supplements work. And even if there is not so direct a relationship between NQ and the later supplements, at least it is clear that NQ's basic structure (I was unenlightened, I sought the truth,

[48] M I:162.
[49] M I:163.
[50] M I:170.

I found it) is the basic structure of every extant or conceivable Buddha biography, which at least should give us pause as evidence of its force.

In this long tradition of supplementation there is a history of thought about Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, too. As mentioned, today it would seem that this is the one dimension of that original Buddha biography (with the possible addition of the meetings with God and the Ājīvika) that has become overall less relevant than it once was. There certainly were supplements that have all the richness and openness implied in the above discussion: Lalitavistara adds a long passage to the effect that the Buddha already had a philosophical rebuttal before he even met Rudraka Rāmaputra and that the only reason he ever sought out a teacher at all was to demonstrate the teacher's incompetence to get to the heart of the matter. (This might have spoken to the sort of context in which the Gītā was being promoted along with Yoga as a theistic alternative to Buddhist meditative practices.) Aśvaghoṣa devotes an entire chapter to "the visit to Ārāḍa" in which that teacher is made to be the proponent of a feigned proto-Sāṃkhya philosophy; the Buddha soundly argues it down in order to get this theist master's seal of approval. (It goes without saying that this will draw us into the multireligious situation of the Kuṣāṇa world.) But after this, within the Buddhist world there was not a lot more textual supplementation; there is a contraction, in which it suffices to say "after giving up the teachings of Āḷāra and Uddaka" or "after rejecting heretical teachers" or simply to omit mentioning the teachers at all (a move made as early as Buddhavaṃsa). Perhaps precisely the fact that made this so relevant at the time of production—the living memory of Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta and the independent existence of their communities of followers—rendered it meaningless in a situation when those no longer obtained.

As indicated, in addition to the history of supplementation, the commentarial process also left as relics of its occurrence critically important evidence for investigating later readings of any sutta. We have commentaries on all the suttas, which as indicated is the case neither with a manuscript tradition nor with a supplementation tradition. More important, the commentary is intended to transmit just *how* one is supposed to read the original, which is not true of the manuscript record (produced as the transmission, not an explanation of it) or of the supplementations (which bury the original in themselves). Though the commentary is obviously intended to be part of the manuscript transmission—without it, the texts are in places unintelligible—and though it embeds the original within itself, the commentary assumes, even demands a reading of the original in tandem with itself. It is thus the best imaginable evidence for just how later Buddhists read each sutta or, to be more precise, for how one Buddhist whose voice was later taken as authoritative read each sutta. That Buddhist was Buddhaghosa, a fifth-century Indian native who came to Sri Lanka, studied the ancient (and no longer extant) Sinhala commentaries on the Tipiṭaka, and reworked them (and a great deal more material) in Pāli.

On one hand Buddhaghosa is himself a supplementer. Thus in the midst of the usual commentarial explanations, problematizations, etiologies of names, geographical specifications, and so forth, Buddhaghosa adds as putative "background" (*anupubbikathā*) to the Buddha's question in NQ, "To whom then should I first preach the Dhamma?" a quick tour through the supplemented Buddha biography, including: the renunciation scene (Kanthaka the horse, Channa the buddy, leaving them at the river), the journey to Magadha (meeting Bimbisāra, recognizing the inadequacy and leaving behind [*sāraṃ avindanto tato pakkamitvā*] the teachers Kālama and Uddaka [their whole names are not even given], performance of austerities), preparation for Enlightenment (the story of Sujātā, attendance of the deities, the bowl going upstream in the river, resolution to achieve Enlightenment, traverse to the Bodhi-maṇḍapa), assault of Māra's army in full detail, the stories of the seven weeks (Mucalinda, Ratanacankama, etc.), and the story of Tapussa and Bhallika the merchants.[51] As a gloss on the encounter with Upaka the Ājīvika he also adds the later details preserved in the Theravāda aṭṭhakathā.[52]

On the other hand, Buddhaghosa always does so much more than confirm my expectation of the details that ought to be included; he makes me hear details that I did not expect ought to be included and puts forth what strike me as rather bizarre readings of his own. These no doubt spoke to the sociohistorical and literary worlds in which Buddhaghosa, like any author, operated. But they also speak to me, starkly. Buddhaghosa is reading the same text I am reading, but he is reading it on the basis of agendas that are so radically different from my own that it takes me great effort even to fathom what he is saying and that in turn cautions me not to be too certain about seeing my own readings "in the text." In a word, NQ always strikes me, despite the chat with God, in the same way that it apparently has struck Buddhists, and scholars, through the ages: as real biography, even autobiography, concerned with a real man, all-too-human, who must strive hard to find the truth he then, somewhat reluctantly, teaches; a man who feels a certain pride in his achievements and who cares what he is called but who speaks in homely

[51] MA II:181–86 (see n. 10 above).

[52] Upaka was love-enslaved by a hunter's daughter, married her and lived a normal, if rather low, lay life. But when she turns out to be trouble he renounces the world and sets out looking for "the boundless Victor" (*anantajina*), the epithet that Buddha so unabashedly accepted in their earlier encounter. Knowing that Upaka would come back, he instructed his attendants to direct anyone seeking "Anantajina" to him, and sure enough Upaka shows up and is quickly initiated into the Dhamma. MA II:189–90.

metaphors and uses self-revelation as a teaching device; a man who clears his throat and knocks lightly when interrupting a group of his students whom he encounters on the way home from his afternoon bath.

But this is not Buddhaghosa's Buddha, not at all. And as mentioned, Buddhaghosa is not very interested in the details of the ancient fragment, except to explain some of the names and add the more important supplemental material. Rather, Buddhaghosa is concerned with what I have called "the outer frame" (frame I). Buddhaghosa opens his explanation of NQ by asking why the monks asked Ānanda about meeting the Buddha, rather than asking him for a face-to-face Dhamma-talk directly. The answer is startling: "Out of respect for the Master they cannot say, 'Venerable Sir, talk about the Dhamma for us'; Buddhas are to be venerated. Like the solitary lion who is king of the beasts, like an elephant in rut, like a cobra with expanded hood, like a great mass of fire, [Buddhas] are approached with difficulty."[53] The monks are too frightened to ask the Buddha, so they ask Ānanda instead. And how, Buddhaghosa asks, could unenlightened Ānanda have known the intention of the Buddha? The answer: he could not have known it. He told the monks to go to Rammaka's hermitage on the basis of a logical inference about the Buddha's daily habits, which are explained in rather excruciating detail to make the point.

This is merely the beginning of a remarkable series of glosses that establishes nothing less than a docetic Buddha, only pretending to be an ordinary human being. Thus in a gloss on the phrase "to wash" (*parisiñcitum*), used in reference to the bath after which the Buddha approaches Rammaka's hermitage, Buddhaghosa argues: "'To wash' [requires this clarification]: When someone bathes [*nahāyati*] by smearing his limbs with clay and chunnam and scrubbing them with a coconut shell, it is said, 'he is bathing'. When someone bathes naturally, without doing all of that, it is said, 'he is washing'. Dirt and grime to be scrubbed away like that do not cling to the body of the Blessed One. The Blessed One only descends into the water for refreshment. Therefore [the sutta] says, 'to wash his limbs.'"[54] Buddhaghosa actually gets quite worked up thinking about the Buddha's bath. He does some marvelous geographical gymnastics with the layout of Sāvatthi in previous aeons to prove that the bathing ghat where the Buddha bathed was private, specially reserved for the purpose even above the bathing ghats dedicated to the king, the city dwellers, and ordinary monks. And this was no ordinary bath: "The Blessed One descended into the water. When he descended all the fish and turtles in his water turned gold; [when the fish and turtles moved in a stream] it was

[53] Ibid., pp. 163–64.
[54] Ibid., p. 166.

like when a stream of solid gold is shot out of the mechanical tube [in the gold-refining process; and when the fish and turtles scattered] it was like when a cloth made of gold is stretched out."[55] He came out of the water—Buddhaghosa is careful to stipulate the manner in which Ānanda helped him dress in dry robes so that no one, including the attendant, could see him naked—and then he stood there in one robe (that is, bare-chested):

> The body of the Blessed One, standing thus, shined as though [it were] the Coral Tree in Indra's heaven, all covered with flowers and fruit, [or as though it were] the stars twinkling on the surface of the sky, laughing with [greater] splendor at a lake full of blossoming lotuses and lilies. The radiance surrounding his *vyāma*-wide aura and his [body which was an] excellent garland of the thirty-two [marks of a Great Man] shined enormously, like a garland of thirty-two moons held in place and strung, like a garland of thirty-two suns, as though one had placed in succession thirty-two Wheel-turning Monarchs, thirty-two kings of the gods and thirty-two Great Brahmās. This is called "illumination Land" [*vaṇṇanā bhūmi*]. In such places the color of the bodies of the Buddhas or the quality of their virtues begins to speak, filled with competent Dhamma-talking resorting to meanings and metaphors and analyses on the basis of pithy segments or entire verses.[56]

The commentator is not kidding about this: "The substantiality [*thāmo*, literally, "hardness"] of Dhamma-talking in such places ought to be understood." Nor is this the end of the bath scene: the Buddha "dries out his limbs" so that a wet robe will not immodestly cling to his body, but "of course, dirt and grime do not stick to the bodies of Buddhas, and water glides off them like a drop of water dropped on a lotus leaf. Even though this is the case, the Blessed One [pretended to dry himself off] out of respect for the disciplinary rule thinking, 'that is certainly the duty of a renunciate'; and having taken the outer robe by both corners he stood there, in front of it, with his body covered."[57]

At this moment Ānanda seizes his chance to suggest that the Blessed One tarry at Rammaka's hermitage, thinking, "From the time the Blessed One, having dressed himself in his outer robe, resolves to go to the Palace of Migāra's Mother,[58] it will be difficult to turn him back. Contradicting the resolution of a Buddha is a grave offense, like stretching out the hand to grab a solitary lion, like taking hold of a powerful elephant, intoxicated in rut, and like grabbing a venomous cobra full of power by

[55] Ibid., p. 167.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid., pp. 167–68.
[58] This is where the Buddha was then spending his nights. Buddhaghosa is careful to give a layout of the palace lest anyone infer that the Buddha was sleeping anywhere near a woman. MA II:165.

the neck. So I will mention the character of the hermitage of Rammaka the Brahmin, asking the Blessed One to go there."[59]

Buddhaghosa is still reading NQ biographically, but not as the sort of biography which all of us, in discussing the historical Buddha, inevitably reproduce as though T. W. Rhys Davids's naiveté of a century ago stands unchallenged. Buddhaghosa's Buddha is a Buddha of his own day, reflecting an advanced Buddhology that is anything but secular humanism and that offers up such unlikely options as a Theravāda Sukhāvati, "Illumination Land." His is a treatment that privileges the frame, the textual whole, over the embedded fragments. And his is a later reading by a member, and a pivotal member, of the tradition itself, who lived far closer than we are to whatever originary moment we may seek to understand. This should, if nothing more, serve to check our assumption that we can just pick up a sutta and "get it."

V. CONCLUSION

This investigation of NQ began with a larger question about the future of historical study of the suttas. Now that the old agendas for studying them—as eyewitness accounts of the Buddha's life and teaching, as manifestos of the world's first scientific humanism or egalitarian democracy, as philological ends in themselves—have increasingly become discredited, I asked aloud what use a contemporary historian might make of them. The question is a genuine one, to which I will offer no easy answer. But having entertained great skepticism about even the possibility of such a future, and having therefore focused in my own scholarship to date almost exclusively on later periods of history for which precisely datable texts, inscriptions, monuments, and/or external sources exist, I must admit that this exercise, and the contemporary scholarship on which I have modeled my approaches, gives me a hopeful sense that this judgment was too hasty.

Each of the approaches that I have explored yields insight into Buddhist history that is new and, given the limitations inherent in any interpretation, well grounded. The autobiographical fragment is part of the earliest recoverable Buddhist tradition. The early community struggled to define itself in close proximity of religious others in general and of the communities of Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta in particular. The Sermon on the Noble Quest is a carefully structured piece of literature designed to bring readers/hearers face-to-face with the Buddha. It is the core of traditions of biographical supplementation that span Buddhist history, and this sutta therefore helps us to identify the stages in the development of the Buddha biography and, by extension, the sociohistorical circumstances in which each was produced. That very epitome of Theravāda orthodoxy, Buddhaghosa, entertained a Buddhological vision far removed from "the historical Buddha" as he has been conceived by many scholars and Buddhist modernists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Perhaps more important, our collaboration in Chicago suggested to me that my attempt at defining these four approaches to the historicity of the suttas may have wider application. It at least provides a vocabulary within which different approaches can be discussed, refined, and tested on the great wealth of suttas (and commentaries) that we are lucky enough to possess. While I do believe that "historical source mode" is now largely bankrupt as an end in itself, it remains—like many of the staples of the larger historicist project in which it participated (such as chronologies, critical editions, and identifications of archaeological sites)—absolutely foundational in any attempt at treating suttas or parts of suttas historically. But fixing a sutta at some point in the tradition is merely the first step in much more interesting historical projects that scholars like Bailey, Collins, and Blackburn have opened up for us. The suttas make possible a new sort of social history of the earliest stages in Buddhist history, nuanced by treating the texts themselves as actions within the sociohistorical circumstances of their production rather than as passive transmitters of neutral information. The suttas contain a wealth of literary beauty and efficacy and can therefore help us imagine early Buddhist worldviews with greater clarity than is afforded by the philosophical doctrines and historical facts we have hitherto extracted in bits from them. The suttas have their own biographies, histories of being read and of not being read, which potentially shed great light on later developments in every realm of Buddhist life.

It may of course turn out to be the case that in each of these modes NQ is uniquely significant. It is after all a sutta that has always been privileged, in Buddhist history and in the history of Buddhological scholarship, as a basis for imagining the Buddha's own life. This privilege is no doubt the result of its obviously great antiquity, it being arguably the oldest Buddha biography in existence. At least the autobiographical fragment appears to be intentionally designed as a response to the multireligious society in which the early Buddhists, and all Buddhists, have found themselves; it is of course no surprise to learn that Buddhists discoursed on the biography of the founder in the same breath that they tried to define their identity as a separate religious order. The fact that this is so ancient a Buddha biography may be the reason that in its final form the sutta seems especially well constructed to bring the reader/hearer face-to-face with the Buddha. This antiquity likewise goes far in explaining why this particular sutta has been so elaborated and ornamented in later

[59] MA II:168.

traditions of supplementation and why Buddhaghosa chose it for some perhaps untypical speculation on the cosmic issues surrounding Buddhahood. In a word, it may be the case that NQ is uniquely significant for historians precisely because it is uniquely historical in its perspective.

This possibility raises an empirical matter: we will only discover what the thousands of suttas (or parallel texts from other religious traditions) may reveal to the historical imagination if we trouble to apply that imagination to them. The Chicago collaboration demonstrated that the four modes, in their various dimensions, will not be equally applicable to all suttas (let alone all religious classics). Only some suttas will have parallels in other suttas or Buddhist Sanskrit works; only some will address external circumstances in explicit or implicit terms; only some will prove to be carefully constructed and powerfully evocative; only some will prove to have been the basis of later supplementation and/or interesting commentary. But even the absence of applicability can address larger questions about the suttas in general, and our discussions did proceed in sometimes useful ways when the questions implicit in one or more of the four modes were raised. Thus it is my hope that, beyond my new historical readings of NQ, this article contributes in some small way to the ongoing history of religions project to understand historically all the "canonical" texts on which religious traditions have been based.

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SHIA LAMENTATION RITUALS AND REINTERPRETATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF INTERCESSION: TWO CASES FROM MODERN INDIA

1. *Shafāʿah* ("INTERCESSION") AND THE QUR'ANIC DOCTRINE OF *tawhīd* ("DIVINE UNITY"): A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Knowing my interest in forms of Shia popular piety, colleagues occasionally send me copies of polemical writings criticizing the more controversial manifestations of Shia devotionalism. One such text sent to me recently was a translation of Muhibbudeen al-Khateeb's *al-Khuṭūṭ al-ʿaridah* (originally published in the 1950s), entitled *Broad Aspects of Shiite Religion (Exposition and Refutation)*. One of the author's harshest comments occurs in his discussion of *tawhīd* (the monotheistic assertion of God's oneness), belief in which is required of all Muslims: "Sunnis believe that Allah is the One, the Only, God, the Almighty Subduer. He has no partners or rivals. . . . The Shi'ites also believe in Allah the Exalted and His Oneness, except that they adulterate this belief with polytheistic rituals and observances. They implore and make supplication to Allah's slaves and worshippers rather than to Him alone, saying, 'O ʿAli!' and 'O Husain!' and 'O Zainab!' . . . They consider their Imams to be infallible, to have knowledge of the unseen, and to partake in the administration of the universe."[1]

The author's unsympathetic harshness notwithstanding, he does identify a distinctive aspect of Shia piety: belief in the intercessory power of the Imams and the Karbala Martyrs, despite the apparent infringement of

[1] Muhibbudeen al-Khateeb, *Al-khutoot al-ʿareedah: Broad Aspects of Shiʿite Religion (Exposition and Refutation)*, trans. Mahmoud Murad (South Burnaby, British Columbia: Majliss of al-Haq Publication Society, 1983), p. 32.

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schools and orders. For a comprehensive examination of the complicated denominational shuffling that occurred around this time, see Takahashi Tōru, *Richō Bukkyō* [Buddhism in Yi Dynasty] (Tokyo, 1929), pp. 137-44.

19. Also to be noted in relation to this is the phenomenon of relative absence of vigorous sectarian movements and conflicts in Korean Buddhist history.

20. That the Mahāyāna world-view, be it its "ahistorical" character or the doctrine of the identity of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, cannot be a sufficient explanation for its "political failure" is easily demonstrated by the case of Japanese Buddhism, certainly the most extreme form of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

21/5

Mahāmaudgalyāyana's Sermon on the Letting-in And not Letting-in (of Sensitive Influences)

by E. Waldschmidt

In the Chinese translation of the *Saṃyuktāgama (Tsa-a-han-ching)* we come across a Sūtra[1] corresponding to the *Avassutapariyāya* (also called *An-avassutapariyāya*) in the *Saḷāyatanasaṃyutta* of the *Saṃyuttanikāya*.[2] The substance of the text is a discourse addressed by Mahāmoggallāna (M., Skt. *Mahāmaudgalyāyana*) to his fellow monks on their request and in the place of the Buddha who does not feel well. M. preaches upon the letting in and not letting in of sensitive influences through the eye and the other organs of sense. This is the common base of the two versions, Pāli (P) and Chinese (C).

In an introductory part of the discourse we are informed of the sojourn of the Buddha among the Sakyas (Skt. *Śākyas*) in the Banyan grove near Kapilavatthu (*Kapilavastu*) at a time when the inhabitants of the town had just built a new assembly hall. The Exalted One was invited to be the first to make use of it, to which he consents. In fixed phrases which are met with in the canon at different places[3] we are informed (a) of the preparations by the Sakyas to get the hall ready for its inauguration by the Buddha, (b) of the Master's arrival there, (c) of the order in which he, his pupils and the inhabitants of the town take their seats inside the hall, and (d) of the unspecified sermon with which the Buddha pleases the audience till late at night. Then he dismisses the Sakyas and asks M. to continue in edifying the monks with a speech on a self-chosen subject.[4] Thereupon M. recites the *Avassuta(dhamma) pariyāya* characterized above.

A while ago my attention was drawn to two Central Asian Sanskrit Ms. fragments (Nos. 1416 and 1449) of the "Turfan Collection," written upon on both sides with characters of the seventh or eighth century A.D. in Northern Turkistan Brāhmī, Type VIb.[5] The larger piece (No. 1416) showed five lines of script and was part of the left side of a paper folio in Pustaka size.

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No. 1449, very small, could be proved to belong to the same folio as No. 1416. It supplies 4-8 syllables of the text in lines 1-4 of the obverse and lines 2-5 of the reverse of the folio. The compounded text of the two fragments reads:

Cat.-No. 1416 + 1449[6]

Folio 1[69][7]

O

1 syāḥ paścima[s]yā[ḥ] uttarasyān=diśaḥ tṛṇolkām=upasaṃharcta na labheta agnir=a(va)tāraṃ na labheta ā[laṃ]-(banaṃ) ///[8]

2 vaṃ manaso=pi dharmeṣu māra upasaṃ ○ krāmati avatārapreksī avatāraga(veṣ)[ī] na labhate māra avat(āram) ///[8]

3 bhavati n[o] tu rūpair=abh[ī]bhūya ○ te śabdāṃ gandhā[ṃ] rasāṃ spraṣṭavyāṃ dha[rm](āṃ) + + + + + . . no tu dharmair=abhi(bhūyate) ///[8]

4 rasābhibhūḥ spraṣṭavyābhibhūḥ ○ dharm[ā]bhibhūḥ abhibhūr=anabhibhū(r)= + + + (pā)[pa]kair=akuśa[lai](r=dharmaiḥ) ///[8]

5 [ky]air=āyatyāṃ jāti[ja]rāmaraṇīyaiḥ sammukhaṃ me āyuṣmantaḥ bhagavato=ntikāc=chru(taṃ) + + + + + .i . . + + + ///[8]

R

1 sruto dharmaparyā[yaḥ] avasrut-ānavasrutaṃ vo dharmaparyāyaṃ deśayiṣye iti .[e] + + + + + + + + + + ///[8]

2 yanasya kathāparyavasānaṃ vi ○ ditvā utthāya niṣīdati paryaṃka[m](=ābhujya ṛjuṃ) [kā]yaṃ praṇi[dh](āya) ///[8]

3 n=āyuṣma[nt]aṃ mahāmaudgalyāya ○ nam=āmantrayati sādhu sādhu maudga(lyāyana sā)[dhu] khalu tvaṃ maudgal[y](āyana) ///[8]

4 deśayasi punar=api tvam=abhīkṣṇa ○ m=api bhikṣūṇā[m]=a[va]srut-ānavasru(taṃ dhar)[m](a)[pa]ryāyāṃ deśayata ///[8]

5 khāya tatra [bhagav]āṃ bhikṣūn=āma[ṃ]trayati udgṛhṇī[dhv](aṃ) bhikṣavaḥ avasru[t]-ānavas[ru]taṃ dharmaparyāyaṃ dh[ā]ra[y](ata) ///[8]

Thrice, in R 1, R 4, and R 5, the title "*avasrut-ānavasruta dharmaparyāya*" is found. After identification and comparison with the

corresponding texts in P and C it became evident that our text fragment sets in with the last part of M.'s discourse, and is followed by the Buddha's approval of what M. has spoken. The particulars are as follows:

M. ends his speech with two similes.[9] Suppose, he says, there is a hut consisting of reeds or grasses, dried up, sapless and old. Then, if somebody with a bundle of inflamed grass comes upon it from the eastern, western, northern or southern quarter, or from below or above, in any case the fire would get access, would get a hold. Even so, Māra, the personified wickedness and seducer to sensuality, would get access, would get a hold, if a monk develops positive or negative inclinations on seeing an object with the eye or recognizing it through any other organ of sense. Furthermore, M. continues, suppose there is a tower or high hall built of firm clay and coated with fresh plaster, then fire would not get access when somebody with a fire-brand comes upon it.[10] Even so, if a monk avoids positive or negative inclinations when using his senses, Mara would not get access, would not get a hold.

I am going now to present the partly restituted text and translation of the Sanskrit fragment which begins in the course of the statement just referred to.

Sanskrit	Translation
1	1 (If somebody) should bring along (to a firmly built [= fire-proof] house) a fire-brand of grasses from the southern, western, northern or eastern quarter, fire would not get access, would not get a hold. (Likewise) Māra, who looks out for access, who seeks access, does not get access, does not get a hold, if he approaches (a self-restrained monk by way of the eye etc.) up to by way of the mind in the case of objects (of thought).
O (*dakṣiṇa*)syāḥ paścimasyāḥ uttarasyān diśaḥ tṛṇolkāṃ upasaṃharcta na labheta agnir a(va)tāraṃ na labheta āl(ambanam/)[11] + + + + + + + + + + + +[12] yā)vaṃ manaso 'pi dharmeṣu māra upasaṃkrāmati avatāraprekṣī avatāraga(ve)ṣī na labhate māra avat(āraṃ *pūrvavat*/)	

2 (*evaṃvihārī bhikṣu rūpam abhibhūr*) bhavati no tu rūpair abhibhūyate (/) śabdāṃ gandhāṃ rasāṃ spraṣṭavyāṃ dharm(*āṃ abhibhūr bhavati*) no tu dharmair abhi(bhūyate /)[13] (*rūpābhibhūḥ śabdābhibhūḥ gandhābhibhūḥ*) rasābhibhūḥ spraṣṭavyābhibhūḥ dharmābhibhūḥ (/)[14] abhibhūr anabhibhūr (*bhavati pā*)pakair akuśalai(*r dharmaiḥ sāṃkleśikaiḥ paunarbhavikaiḥ sajvarair duḥkhavipā*) kyair āyatyām jātijarāmaraṇīyaiḥ (/)[15]

2 (Such a monk) subdues visible objects, is by no means subdued by visible objects, subdues sounds, smells, flavors, touchable things, objects of the mind, is by no means subdued by objects. He is a subduer of visible objects, a subduer of sounds, a subduer of smells, a subduer of flavors, a subduer of touchable things, a subduer of objects of the mind. He is a subduer, is not subdued by evil, improper factors which are sinful, bring about rebirth, are connected with fever (affliction), result in pain, have the consequence of rebirth, decay and death in future.

3 saṃmukhaṃ[16] me āyuṣmantaḥ bhagavato 'ntikāc chru(taḥ *saṃmukham udgṛhītaḥ yo 'yam avasrut-ānava*) sruto dharmaparyāyaḥ avasrutānavasrutaṃ[17] vo dharmaparyāyaṃ deśayiṣye iti .c + + + + + + + + + +

3 In front of, in the presence of the Exalted One, reverends, I have heard, and in front of him taken up this discourse of letting in and not letting in (sensitive influences) (when once the Master proclaimed): "I shall preach to you the sermon of letting in and not letting in [sensitive influences]. Listen!)"

4 (*atha*[18] *bhagavāṃ āyusmato mahāmaudgalyā*)yanasya kathāparyavasānaṃ viditvā utthāya niṣīdati paryaṃkam (ābhujya ṛjuṃ) kāyaṃ praṇidh(āya *pratimukhaṃ smṛtim upasthāpya nivasya bhagavā*)n āyuṣmantaṃ mahāmaudgalyāyanam āmantrayati / sādhu sādhu maudga(lyāyana / sā)dhu khalu tvaṃ maudgaly(āyana *bhikṣūṇām avasrut-añavasrutaṃ dharmaparyāyaṃ*) deśayasi (/) punar[19] api tvam abhīkṣṇaṃ api bhikṣūṇām avasrutānavasru(taṃ dhar)maparyāyaṃ deśaya (/) ta(*d bhaviṣyati dīrgharātraṃ devamanuṣyāṇām arthāya hitāya su*)khaya (/)

4 Then the Exalted One, having recognized the conclusion of the venerable M.'s speech, arose, took up the sitting position of an ascetic, stretched his body upright and collected his attention. Having settled his robes the Exalted One addressed the venerable M.: "Bravo, bravo, Maudgalyāyana! Well indeed did you preach to the monks the sermon of letting in and not letting in (sensitive influences). That will conduce for a long time to prosperity, welfare and happiness of gods and human beings."

5 tatra[20] bhagavāṃ bhikṣūn āma(ṃ) trayati (/) udgṛhnīdhv(aṃ) bhikṣavaḥ avasrut-ānavasrutaṃ dharmaparyāyaṃ dhāray(ata *grāhayata vācayata avasrut-ānavasrutaṃ dharmaparyāyam / tat kasmād dhetoḥ / ayaṃ dharmaparyāyaḥ hitopasaṃhitaḥ arthopasaṃhitaḥ śīlopasaṃhitaḥ brahmacaryopasaṃhitaḥ abhijñāyai saṃbodhaye nirvāṇāya saṃvartate yāvac ca satpuruṣeṇa pravrajitena śraddhayā avasrut-ānavasruto dharmaparyāya udgṛhya*[21] *paryavāpya tathā tathā dhārayitavyo grāhayitavyo vācayitavyaḥ* /)

5 There, the Exalted One addressed the monks: "Take up, monks, the sermon of letting in and not letting in (sensitive influences), maintain, keep and recite the sermon of letting in and not letting in (sensitive influences). For what reason? This sermon will bring about welfare, prosperity, moral conduct, self-restraint (chastity), will lead to higher knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa, up to: by an honest man who has left worldly life through faith should the sermon of letting in and not letting in (sensitive influences), after taking it up and appropriating it, be maintained, kept and recited in exactly the same manner.

6 (*atha bhikṣavo bhagavato bhāṣitam abhinandyānumodya bhagavato 'ntikāt prakrāntāḥ* /)

6 Then the monks, after rejoicing in the speech of the Exalted One, and agreeing with it, went away from the Lord's presence.

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



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

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

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1. Taishō Edition (T), Vol. 2, 315 a-c, Sūtra 276.

2. Ed. Pāli Text Society (PTS). Vol. IV, 182-188; XXXV.202 (*avassuto*).

3. The story of the building of an assembly hall by the Sakyas of Kapilavatthu is told with the same words in the *Sekhasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya* (Sutta 53; Ed. PTS I.353-359). A variation of the text with regard to the owners of the new building and the monk entrusted with the speech is found in the introduction to the *Saṃgītisuttanta* of the *Dīghanikāya* and in its Sanskrit counterpart, the *Saṅgītisūtra*. Cp. E. WALDSCHMIDT, *Die Einleitung des Saṅgītisūtra*, reprinted in E. WALDSCHMIDT, *Von Ceylon bis Turfan*, Göttingen 1967, pp. 258-278, especially p. 259. In the *Saṅgītisūtra* the owners of the new building are the Mallas of Pāpā (P: Pāvā), and the monk who recites the Sūtra is Śāriputra (P: Sāriputta), the second outstanding pupil of the Buddha.

4. This framework is—just as the chief contents of M.'s speech—told similarly in the P as well as in the C versions.

5. Cp. SANDER, LORE, *Paläographisches zu den Sanskrithandschriften der Berliner Turfansammlung*, Wiesbaden 1968, p. 182, Alphabet u.

6. The first transcript of the text was made by Dr. D. SCHLINGLOFF, presently Professor at the University of Munich, during his activity in the Berlin Academy of Sciences between 1954 and 1961. The identification and compounding of the two fragments is due to E. WALDSCHMIDT.

7. O = obverse, R = reverse. *Akṣaras* of doubtful reading have been put into square, restored *akṣaras* in round brackets. A cross (+) marks a totally missing *akṣara*, two dots (. .) an *akṣara* not readable. In the restituted text below, letters in bold type mark the beginning of a line in the Ms. Restituted parts of the text which have not already been supplemented in the documentary transcription are printed in italics.

8. Each line of the Ms. is calculated to have contained about 50 *akṣaras*. /// means that another 12 to 15 *akṣaras* of the line are missing.

9. The following extract refers to the P version.

10. From the eastern, western, etc., quarter, full recapitulation. P (Ed. PTS IV. 187. 1-8): *puratthimāya . . . . . uttarāya . . . . . dakkhiṇāya . . . . . ce pi nam puriso āditтāya tiṇukkāya upasaṅkameyya neva labhetha aggi otāram na labetha aggi ārammaṇam.*

11. The C version is very short at places. For instance, here it has simply: If fire comes up from the four quarters, it is not able to set it (sc. the high and firm house) on fire. T 2. 316 c. 6-7.

12. Conceivable restoration: (*evaṃvihāriṇaṃ khalu ced bhikṣuṃ cakṣuṣo yā*)*vaṃ . . .* Cp. P (IV.187. 8-12): *evam eva kho āvuso evaṃvihāriṃ bhikkhuṃ cakkhuto . . . . sotato . . . ghānato . . . jihvāto . . . kāyato . . . . manato ce pi nam māro upasaṅkamati neva labhati māro otāram na labhati māro ārammaṇaṃ.*

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13. Cp. P (IV.187. 13-19): *evam vihārī cāvuso bhikkhu rūpe adhibhosi na rūpā bhikkhum adhibhaṃsu / sadde . . . gandhe . . . . rase . . . . phoṭṭhabbe . . . dhamme bhikkhu adhibhosi na dhammā bhikkhum adhibhaṃsu.*

14. Cp. P (ibid. 20-21): *ayaṃ vuccatāvuso bhikkhu rūpādhibhū saddādhibhū gandhādhibhū rasādhibhū phoṭṭhabbādhibhū dhammādhibhū.*

15. Cp. P (ibid. 22-24): *adhibhū anadhibhūto / adhibhosi te pāpake akusale dhamme saṅkilesike ponobhavike sadare dukkhavipāke āyatijātijarāmaraṇīye.* The corresponding Sanskrit phrase (used for the restitution of our text) is found in the *Avadānaśataka* II. 107. 3-4. Possibly the phrase has been shortened in our Ms.—For *vipākya* (normal *vipāka*) s. Edgerton *BHSD* s.v.—C (T 2. 316 c. 10-12) has: "If he is victorious over visible objects, victorious over sounds, smells, flavours, touchable things, and objects of the mind, he is also victorious over evil, improper factors which are sinful, inflaming, of painful results, and bring about future rebirth, old age, illness and death."

16. Cp. the P sentence: *sammukhā me taṃ bhante bhagavato sutaṃ sammukhā paṭiggahitaṃ* . . . at a place corresponding to MPS 18. 4 (Ed. WALDSCHMIDT, p. 220). C (T 2.316 c. 12-13) has: "I have received this instruction from the Exalted One personally, (the instruction) which is named the sermon (*dharmaparyāya*) of not letting in (sensitive) influences."

17. Cp. P (IV. 184. 19-21): *avassutapariyāyaṃ ca vo āvuso desissāmi anavassutapariyāyaṃ ca / taṃ suṇātha sādhukaṃ manasi karotha bhāsissāmīti.*

18. Cp. P (IV. 187. 26-29): *atha kho bhagavā uṭṭhahitvā āyasmantaṃ mahāmoggalānaṃ āmantesi / sādhu sādhu moggalāna sādhu kho tvaṃ moggalāna bhikkhūnaṃ avassutapariyāyañ ca anavassutapariyāyañ ca abhāsīti.* The C version (T 2. 316 c. 13-17) is more detailed: At that time the Exalted One knew that Mahāmaudgalyāyana had finished his speech. He arose, sat down with his body stretched upright, collected his mind in front and addressed M.: "Quite well, Maudgalyāyana, have you spoken to the men this sermon which is very profitable, which is (of importance) far beyond measure, which will bring luck for a long time to gods and men."

19. The insertion "*punar api . . .* (up to) *. . . . deśaya*" which is not found in C has a parallel in the *Saṅgītisūtra* (Ed. Stache-Rosen), I, p. 206. 2.

20. For the restitution of the conclusive Sanskrit passages of our text, corresponding phrases in the *Saṅgītisūtra* (Ed. Stache-Rosen), I, p. 206. 3-4 were available. There is general agreement also with C where the Sūtra ends as follows (T 2. 316 c. 17-22): Then the Exalted One addressed the (whole congregation of) monks: "You should take up the sermon of letting in and not letting in (sensitive influences), and preach it extensively to men. For what reason? In the interest of the perfection of morality, in the interest of the perfection of law, in the interest of the perfection of right conduct (chastity, *brahmacarya*) etc. (continuation as translated in the right column above) . . . When the Buddha had finished his speech, the monks who had heard the sermon of the Buddha rejoiced at it and went away respectfully.

21. The phrase *te* (sc. *dharmā*) *udgṛhya paryavāpya (tathā ta)thā dhārayitavyā grāhayitavyā vācayitavyā(ḥ)* is also known from the MPS (Ed. WALDSCHMIDT) 19.7 and 40.60.

The Mahāsāṃghika and the Tathāgatagarbha (Buddhist Doctrinal History, Study 1)

by A. Wayman

Introduction

For the origins of the Mahāyāna we must agree with Hirakawa[1] that while some Mahāyāna doctrines are derived from the Mahāsāṃghika school, some others are derived from the Sarvāstivādin school. I would add that unless some other source can be pointed to, we may conclude that Mahāyāna Buddhism in its various forms, at least leaving out the special development of Tantrism, can be traced to either the Mahāsāṃghika or the Sarvāstivādin schools.

It is well recognized by Buddhologists that the Mahāsāṃghika sect arose by a schism from the previously undivided Buddhist *saṃgha* in the second century after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa (A.N.), leaving the other part of the *saṃgha* to be called Sthavira. As to precisely when the schism occurred, there was a difference of opinion as to whether it happened as a result of the Second Buddhist Council (about 110 A.N.) over a laxity of Vinaya rules by some monks, or happened later in the century (137 A.N.) over the five theses about Arhats and which occasioned a 'Third Buddhist Council' sponsored by the Kings Nanda and Mahāpadma. There were some other possibilities, as summarized by Nattier and Prebish,[2] who conclude that the schism occurred 116 A.N. over Vinaya rules, while the argument over Arhat attainment provoked a further split within the already existing Mahāsāṃghika sect. It is immaterial for our purposes whether the 'five theses of Mahādeva' downgrading the Arhat occasioned the schism between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviras, or whether this downgrading was an internal argument within the Mahāsāṃghika. What is important here is that

the downgrading of the Arhat continued into a Mahāyāna scripture called the *Śrīmālā-sūtra*, and that the five theses are a characteristic of the Mahāsāṃghika, to wit: 1. Arhats are tempted by others, 2. they still have ignorance, 3. they still have doubt, 4. they are liberated by others; and 5. the path is accompanied by utterance. The fifth of these seems explainable by other Mahāsāṃghika tenets, in Bareau's listing:[3] No. 58 'morality is not mental'; No. 59 'morality does not follow upon thought'; No. 60 'virtue caused by a vow increases'; No. 61 'candor (*vijñapti*) is virtue'; No. 62 'reticence (*avijñapti*) is immoral.'

Part I of this paper attempts to relate the *Śrīmālā-sūtra* and the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine to the Mahāsāṃghika school. Part II discusses the terms *dharmatā* and *svabhāva* so as to expose an ancient quarrel.

I. Mahāsāṃghika school and the Śrīmālā-sūtra

The present writer, in collaboration with Hideko Wayman, has published a translation and study of the *Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra* under the title *The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā; a Buddhist Scripture on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory*,[4] in which the position was taken that the Tathāgatagarbha theory, especially as portrayed in this scripture, is a product of the Mahāsāṃghika school. Now, referring to our work as 'Lion's Roar', a correlation will be made to tenets of the Mahāsāṃghika in Bareau's numbering, with my own captions 'Tenets on the Jewel of Buddha', etc.:

Tenets on the Jewel of Buddha:

No. 1 'The Buddhas are supramundane (*lokottara*).' 'Lion's Roar', p. 92: "the Tathāgata does not dwell within the limits of time; the Tathagata-Arhat-Samyaksambuddhas dwell at the uttermost limit."
No. 2 'The Tathāgatas are devoid of flux (*anāsrava*) and mundane natures (*laukikadharma*).' 'Lion's Roar', pp. 88-89: ". . . the natures to be eliminated, exceeding the sands of the Ganges River, which are all utterly eradicated by the enlightenment wisdom of the Tathāgata . . ." 'Lion's Roar', pp. 97-98: "all the Tathāgata-Arhat-Samyaksambuddhas eliminate every source of suffering which incorporates any defilement or secondary defilement . . ."

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Tenets on the Jewel of Dharma:

No. 4 'The Buddha, by a single sound (*śabda*) expresses all the Dharmadhātu.'
No. 42 'All the Sutras promulgated by the Buddha have a final meaning (*nītārtha*).' 'Lion's Roar', p. 89: "Then, as a Tathāgata-Arhat-Samyaksambuddha, one gains the unhindered understanding of all natures (*dharma*) . . .; King of the Doctrine and Lord of the Doctrine; and, having gone to the stage which is sovereign over all natures, utters the Lion's roar . . . 'there is nothing to be known beyond this.' That being so, the Lion's roar of the Tathāgatas has final meaning (*nītārtha*) and explains this meaning straightforwardly (*ekāṃśena*, with a single part)."

Tenets on the Jewel of the Buddha as refuge:

No. 6 "The material body is truly unlimited (*ananta*).' 'Lion's Roar', p. 62: "Homage to you, whose form is limitless".
No. 7 'The power (*prabhāva*) of the Tathāgatas is also limitless'. 'Lion's Roar', p. 76: "The Lord is omnipotent, is the resort". 'Lion's Roar', p. 106: "The Lord is the omnipotent being. The Lord is the resort."
No. 8 'The longevity of the Buddha is also limitless.' 'Lion's Roar', p. 61: "Your Buddha nature does not perish; so it is right to take refuge in you, the *muni*."

Special tenets:

No. 9 'The Buddha, upon converting the living beings and making them born among those with pure faith, has no thought of satisfaction.' 'Lion's Roar', pp. 77-78: "Queen, although I have already explained for incalculable eons the merit and benefit of embracing the Illustrious Doctrine, I still have not come to the end of explaining the merit and benefit of embracing the Illustrious Doctrine."
No. 30 'There are Arhats who . . . are subject to ignorance (*ajñāna*), who have doubts (*kaṅkṣā*), who are saved by others (*paravitīrṇa*) . . .' 'Lion's Roar', p. 80: "Lord, the Arhats and the Pratyekabuddhas not only take refuge in Tathāgatahood, but also have fear

. . . they have many natures to be eliminated."
No. 44 'The self-presence of mind is bright. It is soiled (i.e. darkened) by adventitious secondary defilement.' 'Lion's Roar', p. 106: "this intrinsic purity of the Tathāgatagarbha stained by adventitious secondary defilements is the domain of the Tathāgata, who is the inconceivable master . . ." "the meaning of the defilement on the intrinsically pure consciousness is difficult to understand."
No. 49 'There is no intermediate state (*antarābhava*).' Bareau, p. 68, points out the usual explanation that this concerns the interval some Buddhist sects place between the moment of death and the moment of birth, and adds that the Māhāsaṃghika argumentation on this point is unknown. 'Lion's Roar', p. 104: "Since there is the Tathāgatagarbha, there is a reason for speaking of 'cyclical flow' (*saṃsāra*). Lord, as to 'cyclical flow,' no sooner do the sense organs for perception pass away than it [the Tathāgatagarbha] takes hold of sense organs for perception, and that is 'cyclical flow.'" Thus the *Śrīmālā* denies an intermediate state between the perishing and renewal of sense organs.
No. 78 'There is a root-consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*) which serves as the support (*āśraya*) for eye-perception and the other sensory perceptions, like the root of the tree is the principle of the leaves, etc.' 'Lion's Roar', introduction, p. 44, in reference to the Tathāgatagarbha: It is the "support, holder, base" (*niśraya, ādhāra, pratiṣṭhā*). 'Lion's Roar', p. 104: "Lord, saṃsāra is based on the Tathāgatagarbha . . . no sooner do the sense organs for perception pass away than it takes hold of sense organs for perception. . . 'Perished' is the loss of the senses. 'Born' is the renewal of the senses. But, Lord, the Tathāgatagarbha is not born, does not die. . ." The support nature of the Tathāgatagarbha apparently has the Mahāsāṃghika *mūlavijñāna* as its prototype. The connection with *vijñāna* is not lost in the *Śrīmālā*; confer passage cited partly under tenet No. 49, above, that begins with mention of the intrinsic purity of the Tathāgatagarbha and in the same paragraph switches to the intrinsically pure consciousness, where 'consciousness' represents *citta*, the Abhidharma equivalent to *vijñāna*. 'Lion's Roar', p. 44, the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures have synonyms for the Tathāgatagarbha, 'cause' (*hetu*) and 'seed' (*bīja*), that exactly fit the illustration of the *mūlavijñāna*, "like the root of the tree is the principle of the leaves, etc." The *Śrīmālā* itself emphasizes 'support'.
In short, the *Śrīmālā-sūtra* has passages consistent with most

of the first ten of the Mahāsāṃghika tenets, and has passages consistent with the most celebrated characteristic tenets of this sect among the remaining tenets of Bareau's list.
The *Śrīmālā-sūtra* happens to be the most frequently cited work in the Indian manual of Tathāgatagarbha theory, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (as edited by Johnston; known as the *Uttaratantra* in the Tibetan canon). Among the various reviews of the 'Lion's Roar', I should not neglect one which is competent and also takes issue with our insisted-upon theory of Mahāsāṃghika origins. This is the review by Takasaki,[5] who translated the *Ratnagotravibhāga* into English (1966) and has published in Japanese a voluminous study of the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures.[6] I am grateful to Takasaki for his criticism in regard to the Mahāsāṃghika. The justification of the Mahāsāṃghika thesis was spread here and there in the 'Lion's Roar'; and while convincing to the translators, need not have been convincing to others. Consequently, the foregoing correlation of Mahāsāṃghika tenets with the *Śrīmālā* has been made to render the thesis more convincing.
But there are further difficulties, since it could be objected that a correlation with the traditional Mahāsāṃghika tenets does not *per se* prove a relation with attested Mahāsāṃghika literature. Now, I will attempt to answer the most pointed questions in this regard.
1) If the *Śrīmālāsūtra* is associated with the Mahāsāṃghika school, should it not be named in the canon of that school? Indeed it should, and indeed is included by Paramārtha (mid-sixth cent.) in the Mahāyāna canon of the Mahāsāṃghika sect, as Bareau explicitly reports.[7]
2) If the Mahāsāṃghika sect is to be implicated in the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine, should there not be some passage in a recognized Mahāsāṃghika scripture that can be reasonably identified with this doctrine? Indeed there should be. The most well-known extant work of the Mahāsāṃghika is the *Mahāvastu*, which contains the passage, 'Lion's Roar', p. 43, addressed to the mother of a Buddha: "Today, O queen, you will give birth to a good youth (*sukumāra*) of immortal embryo (*amara-garbha*), who destroys old age and illness, celebrated and beneficial in heaven and on earth, a benefactor of gods and men."[8] Notice the contrast of the word *sukumāra* ('very delicate', perhaps 'easily dying'[9]) with *amara-garbha* ('immortal embryo'), easily identifiable with the Tathāgata-

garbha which is taken as an immortal element in sentient beings, themselves mortal.

3) Is there some way of associating the *Śrīmālāsūtra* with the *Mahāvastu*? The way the 'Lion's Roar', p. 19, does it, is to take the four career-phases of Bodhisattvas mentioned at the beginning of the *Mahāvastu*, namely the 'natural career-phase' (*prakṛti-caryā*), the 'aspiration career-phase' (*praṇidhana-caryā*), the 'conforming career-phase' (*anuloma-caryā*), and the 'nonregressing career-phase' (*anivartana-caryā*); and to combine these with the traditional divisions[10] of the *Śrīmālā* by the following scheme of the first two chapters ('Lion's Roar', p. 19), whose fuller justification is in the 'Lion's Roar' itself:

> Chapter One; "Eliminating All Doubts." 1. Praises of the Infinite Merit of the Tathāgata, and 2. Ten Great Vows. These are both the 'natural career-phase' involving the planting of virtuous roots in the presence of a Buddha.
>
> Chapter Two: "Deciding the Cause." 3. Three All-inclusive Aspirations. This is the 'aspiration career-phase.' 4. Embrace of the Illustrious Doctrine. A. Teaching in the Scope of the Great Aspiration, and B. Teaching the Far-ranging Meaning. These are the 'conforming career-phase.' C. Teaching the Great Meaning. This is the 'nonregressing career-phase.' That finishes the career-phases of the Bodhisattva, namely, the causal part, aimed at the fruit, which is complete Buddhahood.

Some modern Japanese scholars have discussed these career-phases, as Shindo Shiraishi shows.[12] He points out that Ryūshō Hikata in a 1954 work on the Jātakas finds that the four careers, while not the 'consistent principle' of the *Mahāvastu*, must have been the 'fundamental idea' of the compiler of the present enlarged recension of the *Mahāvastu*; and points out that Ryūjō Yamada has found this classification in some chapters of the 'Prajñāparamitā-sūtra', suggesting the priority of the *Mahāvastu* to this 'Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra'. Shiraishi's brief article indicates the importance of the 'prophecy' (*vyākaraṇa*) aspect in the early development of the Bodhisattva doctrine, and the *Mahāvastu* system of four career-phases as a framework of early and later theories.

4) Is there any other evidence of affiliation of the *Śrīmālā* with

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the *Mahāvastu*? Perhaps the most important one is the *Mahāvastu* passage (confer, 'Lion's Roar', p. 33) in the words of Mahā-Katyāyana that the Jātaka tales start from the Eighth Stage, in which stage the Bodhisattvas renounce all they possess, are regarded as Samyaksambuddhas, and thereafter do not regress. This shows the *Mahāvastu* position that the fourth career-phase called 'nonregressing' is meant to cover the last three of the ten Bodhisattva Stages; and this directly ties in with scriptural words of the *Śrīmālāsūtra* ('Lion's Roar', pp. 75-76), beginning, "Lord, the good son of the family or good daughter of the family by renouncing his body, thus obtaining the body of a Buddha, is equal to the uttermost limit of *saṃsāra*; . . ." The Tathāgatagarbha treatise *Ratnagotra-vibhāga* (on 1, 2) quotes the *Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra* to show the arising of the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Samgha) as the basis for the last three Bodhisattva states, thus Śākyamuni under the Bodhi tree as the Eighth Stage.

5) Well, if the *Śrīmālāsūtra* as perhaps the most important of the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures, and the manual of Tathāgatagarbha doctrine, the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, are related to the Mahāsāmghika school in the manner you have asserted, why would not Takasaki Jikidō in his monumental study of the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures preserved in the Chinese canon and who translated the *Ratnagotra-vibhāga* into English, or why would not David Seyfort Ruegg in his monumental study of this topic through the Tibetan treatises (his *La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra*)[13]—have found this out? There are many obscure points about the early Buddhist sects, especially since a few, notably the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivādin, have extensive literary remains and have been much studied, while others are known mainly from brief lists of specialized doctrines. Since the main acknowledged treatise of the Mahāsāmghika school, the *Mahāvastu*, was not translated into either Chinese or Tibetan, its important fund of evidence could not enter into the considerations of either the Chinese or Tibetan commentators. Hence, it is conceivable that both Takasaki and Ruegg, respectively dealing with the Chinese and the Tibetan works, and also using such Sanskrit treatises as the *Ratnagotravibhāga*—which do not treat such matters as the early Buddhist sects—could produce works of deserved reference value in given manners, and still not come up with the solution based on a comparison of the *Śrīmālāsūtra* with the *Mahāvastu*, carried out in a manner different from theirs.[14]

6) Do you still claim that the *Śrīmālāsūtra* was composed in South India in the Āndhra district? The 'Lion's Roar' sets forth this theory with the stipulation of prior acceptance that the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine has a Mahāsāṃghika origin. If the preceding evidence and reasoning be deemed sufficient for establishing the Mahāsāṃghika association, the the further step of determining the provenance is a rather simple matter. The place must be definitely a Mahāsāṃghika stronghold, and one where the Buddhist institution was patronized by prominent ladies, such as queens. According to Bareau,[15] the Mahāsāṃghika initially had their chief residence in Magadha, well prior to the time of King Asoka. Inscriptions in the 2nd cent., A.D. show their presence at Mathurā, at Karle, and in the area of Kabul. The chief distribution (south of the Nerbudā River at Karle, Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, etc.) and far north, toward Afghanistan) was still the case at the time of Hsüan-tsang's travels at the beginning of the 7th cent. It is clear that this must have been the situation at the time of the *Śrīmālā-sūtra* composition, namely 3rd cent., A.D. For the area near Nāgārjunakoṇḍa there is now abundant data in Rao's *Religion in Āndhra*[16] about the great strength of the Mahāsāṃghika in this region at that time, and the role of the Mahāsāṃghika in promoting the art centers of Āndhra. These centers were especially of stūpas, preeminently Amarāvatī. This is consistent with a thesis that prominent laymen were originally charged with taking care of stūpas, but that later the Mahāsāṃghika monks came in league with these laymen and made theological justifications for stūpa worship.[17] Besides, the penchant to artistic depiction of Jātaka scenes was consistent with the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine (per *Mahāvastu*) that the Jātakas start with the Bodhisattva Eighth State, illustrated by Gautama Buddha seated beneath the Tree of Enlightenment;[18] and it is noteworthy in this regard that the three volumes of the *Mahāvastu* are replete with Jātakas. There is art historical evidence that about this time (3rd cent., A.D.) the far northern center was taking artistic inspiration from the Āndhra sites. Thus, Rosen mentions "the decorative patterns on the architecture represented at Begram display the entire repertory of motifs appearing in the works of late Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa." And, "Taking into account the stylistic evidence and the vocabulary of motifs employed, we must conclude that the Begram ivories were done in the latter part of the third or early part of the fourth century A.D., by artists fully conversant

with the art of Āndhra Pradesh."[19] To this evidence, we need only add the acknowledged support by prominent ladies; confer 'Lion's Roar', pp. 1-2. Āndhra was the most creative site of the Mahāsāṃghika. Accordingly, the 'Lion's Roar' claimed, and the authors still claim, that the *Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra* was composed in the Andhra district, and in the 3rd century A.D.

II. The Tathāgatagarbha, dharmatā, and svabhāva

If the foregoing relationship between the Mahāsāṃghika school and the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine be granted, it still would have to be admitted that the relationship would have to belong to the Mahāyāna period and cannot be traced back to the early Mahāsāṃghika sect in 2nd cent. A.N. Now we shall come to grips with a disputed point of Buddhist doctrine that is older than the Mahāyāna and apparently also involves the Mahāsāṃghika and in the end leads to the Tathāgatagarbha. Accordingly, we should consider the Buddhist terms *dharmatā* and *svabhāva*. Certain modern authors seem alarmed at interpreting the term *dharmatā* as representing something that could give rise to something else, and willy-nilly they point to an ancient quarrel. *Svabhāva* is often said to have been denied in the Mādhyamika while the Mādhyamika commentator Candrakīrti takes it as the goal of the Bodhisattva. We shall see that these are related problems.

Certainly Lai[20] is right, generally speaking, in holding that the Indian Buddhist schools do not explain *dharmatā* as creating phenomena, while he finds this interpretation in Chinese Buddhism. In any case, Indian Buddhism could not have meant by *dharmatā* the source of such things as rocks and tables. But there must have been Indian theories, even if considered deviant, that *dharmatā* could give rise to *something*, for otherwise how explain the insistent, even vehement, denials of the possibility, especially in terms of the Pāli equivalent *dhammatā*.

Thus, Jayatilleke several times alludes to a passage in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (book of tens), cited as 'A, Vol. 3, 313'; in his rendition, "It is *in the nature of things* (*dhammatā*) that a person in the state of (meditative) concentration knows and sees what really is. . . . a person does not need to make an effort of will . . ."[21] Jayatilleke stresses that the Buddhist position denies a supernatural intervention; it is 'natural' that the next *dharma* should arise. But note that it is not 'natural' for the word *dhammatā* to be rendered

as an adverbial phrase *'in the nature of things'* (his italics), rather than as a noun.

Rahula,[22] although not referring to Jayatilleke's treatment, translates the whole scriptural passage and writes in agreement that when one does what is required, the result is natural and requires no will; and certainly there is no involvement of 'Grace'. He gives among his examples: a little snake comes to the hermitage of an ascetic *attano dhammatāya*, by "its own habit"—as Rahula properly renders it; *dhammatā* is not a supernatural power. Granted that it is not 'Grace' and the like; but it is doubtful that an *ordinary* mentality understands the snake's 'own habit'. Perhaps the yogin in the Buddhist attainment called *samāpatti* can understand it, as Candrakīrti has maintained (see below).

Kalupahana[23] also deals with this issue. He considers a well-known passage which occurs in the *Madhyamakavṛtti*, "Whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, there remains this (*eṣā*) *dharmatā* of *dharmas*," and properly disagrees with Stcherbatsky's rendition of *dharmatā*, to wit, 'ultimate realities'. Kalupahana goes on to a curious medley:

> As is pointed out below (chapter 5), *dharmatā* (P. *dhammatā*) refers to the causal connection between two *dharmas* rather than an underlying substratum of *dharmas*. If *dharmatā* stands for the causal connection, it cannot mean an ultimate reality (*dharmasvabhāva*) as the Sarvāstivādins understood it, because Nāgārjuna and his followers rejected the conception of *svabhāva*, using the argument that *svabhāva* is opposed to causality."[24]

Observe that Rahula has himself in that article cited the commentary on the *Dīgha-nikāya* explaining the word *dhammatā* as *sabhāvo* (which is of course equivalent to the Sanskrit *svabhāva*) and giving illustrations with the term *nyamo* ('order of things').[25] As I have elsewhere shown,[26] Nāgārjuna's commentator Candrakīrti (hence a 'follower' of Nāgārjuna) in that *Madhyamakavṛtti* and in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* takes *svabhāva* (the equivalent of *dharmatā*) as the Bodhisattva's goal realized in *samāpatti*. Hence, Candrakīrti would say that Nāgārjuna did reject (as Kalupahana and many another asserts he did) "the conception of *svabhāva*," but having rejected this *conception* did not necessarily reject *svabhāva*, any more than in rejecting various conceptions the ancients had about

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blood, one thereby has to reject *blood*.

Theravada not Hinayana!

It is quite clear that Nāgārjuna and his followers denied that anything arises by reason of *svabhāva*. In doing so, by equating *svabhāva* and *dharmatā*, they were agreeing with these followers of the Theravāda tradition, such as now Rahula, who insist that whatever the term *dharmatā* (P. *dhammatā*) may have meant in the ancient texts, it does not stand for a certain something that is a source of *dharmas*. Kalupahana goes further than this by claiming that *dharmatā* refers "to the causal connection between two *dharmas* rather than an underlying substratum of *dharmas*." To assess this, let us first translate the sentence which the above-mentioned *Aṅguttara-nikāya* passage uses to summarize the *dhammatā* statements:

> iti kho, bhikkave, dhammā dhamme abhisandenti, dhammā dhamme paripūrenti apārā pāraṃ gamanāyā.[27]
>
> Thus you should know, monks, the *dhammas* flow into *dhamma*, the *dhammas* are fulfilled in *dhamma*—for going from the not-beyond to the beyond."

Then we notice that Asaṅga has a passage on this very matter in his *Yogācārabhūmi*, section on *hetuvidyā* of which I have edited the extant Sanskrit and here cite in part:[28]

> dharmato 'numānaṃ katamat / yan nānuśliṣṭena dharmasambaddhena tatsambandha [dharmatā] bhyūhanaṃ / tadyathā 'nityasambaddhena duḥkhatāṃ anumīnoti / duḥkhasambaddhena śūnyatā[nā] tmatāṃ jātisambaddhena jarādharmatāṃ jarāsambaddhena maraṇadharmatāṃ . . .

In the following translation I shall render *dharmatā* as 'underlying nature', even though Kalupahana claims that the word does not mean this:

> What is the inference from a *dharma*? The inferring of the underlying nature (*dharmatā*) of its association by an associated *dharma* that is not obviously related. For example, one infers the state of suffering (*duḥkhatā*) from one (i.e. *dharma*) associated with impermanence. One infers voidness and non-self from one associated with suffering; (infers) the underlying nature of old age from one associated with birth,

the underlying nature of death from one (i.e. *dharma*) associated with old age. . . .

That is to say, when Buddhism explains the Truth of Suffering by the characters, suffering, impermanence, voidness, and non-self, these, suffering and so forth, amount to a metaphysical set of inferrable underlying nature to associate seemingly unrelated *dharmas*. Thus *dharmatā* as here explained is not the source of any *dharma*, nor is it the "causal connection between two *dharmas*". It is rather the whole relation as set forth in the scripture, "the *dhammas* flow into *dhamma*, the *dhammas* are fulfilled in *dhamma*," and this relation is ***not obvious***: it must be inferred.

Now, while granting all the foregoing, it still is the case that the Yogācāra and the Tathāgatagarbha literature use a term that suggests production from *dharmatā*, namely *dharmatā-pratilabdha*; and the Tathāgatagarbha literature a further one, *dharmatā-niṣyanda*, as follows.

1. *dharmatā-pratilabdha* 'derived from *dharmatā*'. Ruegg has collected a number of illustrations of this expression from Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, showing that it is ordinarily employed in connection with the *gotra* (family lineage) and the *ṣaḍāyatana* (six sense bases).[29] In the case of the Yogācāra, the texts are Asaṅga's *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. The Tathāgatagarbha treatise *Ratnagotravibhāga* cites the lost *Ṣaḍāyatana-sūtra* for the passage:

> ṣaḍāyatanaviśeṣaḥ sa tādṛśaḥ paramparāgato 'nādikāliko dharmatāpratilabdha iti /[30]
>
> Derived from *dharmatā*, and passing from one existence to another since beginningless time, it (i.e. the *gotra*, the substrate lineage) is specialized by the six sense bases, becoming similar.

The *Śrāvakabhūmi* near its beginning states: "That seed does not have the characteristics of difference as long as it stays apart from the six sense bases (*ṣaḍāyatana*)."[31] Hence, what the *Ṣaḍāyatana-sūtra* meant by the *gotra's* being "specialized by the six sense bases, becoming similar" is being channeled through a particular sense perception (in this sense 'similar'), and thus exhibiting 'characteristics of difference', to wit, from its being channeled through a different sense perception. In the terminology of the Madhyāntavibhāga, being different would be the difference of subject and object, which is brought about by sense perception.[32] The *Ṣaḍāyatana-sūtra* passage may well be the prototype of the various other instances, but the interpretation of the gotra would differ. For Asaṅga, the *gotra* is that of the Śrāvaka, the Pratyekabuddha, or the Bodhisattva, and implicates the *ālayavijñāna*. For the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, the *gotra* is the Tathāgatagarbha.

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2. *dharmatā-niṣyanda* 'flowing from *dharmatā*', as in 'Lion's Roar', p. 94, in the *Śrīmālā-sūtra*: "they have faith flowing from true nature (*dharmatā*)." Observe that this is the same role that the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, I, 15, and Vasubandhu's commentary, attributes to the *dharmadhātu*: ārya-dharma-hetuvād dharmadhātuḥ, "(called) 'Dharmadhātu' because it [voidness, *śūnyatā*] is the cause of the *dharmas* of the nobles." *Śrīmālā* uses similar terms for the Tathāgatagarbha ('Lion's Roar', p. 105): "Lord, if there were no Tathāgatagarbha, there would (not be) . . . aspiration towards Nirvāṇa . . . Whatever be these six perceptions . . . these are unfit for aspiration towards Nirvāṇa . . . the Tathāgatagarbha experiences suffering; hence it is worthy of . . . aspiration towards Nirvāṇa." In this case, the *Madhyāntavibhāga* appears to be an ally of the Tathāgatagarbha position.

In short, it appears that the old quarrel between the Mahāsāṃghika and the Sthavira schools was carried on in many ways. In the old days it was over the status of the Arhat. Later, when the Sthavira had itself divided into sub-sects, giving rise to the Sarvāstivādin, the argument was continued among followers of the Mahāyāna. It appears that the Mahāsāṃghika, or at least some of its sub-sects, had given rise to the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures, the theory of Bodhisattva stages, and art representations, especially of the Jātakas. The Sarvāstivādin came up with its own scriptures such as the Mahāyāna biography of the Buddha, the *Lalitavistara*, and perhaps had a hand in the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures, although the situation here requires much research. In any case, both major Mahāyāna philosophical schools, the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra, appear to have arisen in the Sarvāstivādin tradition. However, of these two, the Yogācāra in its several forms has been variously influenced by the Mahāsāṃghika-type Buddhism, but was careful to keep a distance. If one stays in the Mādhyamika works, there is a harping on the denial that *dharmas* arise from *svabhāva* or from

dharmatā, thus in agreement with the Theravāda. The position of the Yogācāra is more subtle: It does not care to make the denials of the Mādhyamika, but neither would it take *dharmatā* as a permanent, substantial entity, since the *ālayavijñāna* itself must disappear for Nirvāṇa without remainder.[33] One may also refer to Asaṅga's statement in the *Hetuvidyā* section, as cited above. One must move entirely to the other side, the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, stemming, as we believe to have established, from the Mahāsāṃghika, to get a reinterpretation of *dharmatā* as 'thusness' (*tathatā*), the permanent Tathāgatagarbha.[34]

But since the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine was much appreciated in China, perhaps fortified by accompanying the impressive artistic representations of the school, it is reasonable that the novel interpretation of certain terms—such as *dharmatā*—would get a sympathetic hearing. While Lai is not strictly correct in claiming that the interpretation of *dharmatā* as a source of phenomena is something worked up for the first time in China, we should agree that the theory was amplified in China in a manner that had not been done in India.

In conclusion, while the deviant interpretation of important Buddhist terms understandably inspired denunciations from followers of the 'elders' (the ārya-sthāvira), if one will give fair credit to the Buddhist currents that were most instrumental in conversion to the Buddhist faith outside of India it may well be that we should give the nod to those ancient schismatics, the Mahāsāṃghikas.

NOTES

1. Akira Hirakawa, "The Rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relationship to the Worship of Stupas," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, No. 22, Tokyo, 1963, p. 57.

2. Janice J. Nattier and Charles S. Prebish, "Mahāsāṃghika Origins: The Beginnings of Buddhist Sectarianism," *History of Religions*, 16:3, Feb., 1977, pp. 237, ff.

3. André Bareau, *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1955), Chapitre I 'Les Mahâsânghika', pp. 55-74.

4. Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1974.

5. Takasaki, Jikidō, in *The Eastern Buddhist*, New Series, IX:1, May, 1976, pp. 135-138.

6. For thorough-going reviews of Takasaki's main works, see J. W. de Jong, in *Indo-Iranian Journal*, XI:1 (1968), pp. 36-54, for the *Ratnagotravibhāga*; and in *Indo-Iranian Journal*, XVIII (1976), pp. 311-315, for "The formation of the tathāgatagarbha theory" (in Japanese) (Tokyo, 1974).

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7. Bareau, *Les sectes*, p. 296.

8. *Mahāvastu Avadāna*, ed. by Radhagovinda Basak, Vol. 1, p. 266; and Vol. 2, p. 28.

9. See Manfred Mayrhofer, *Kurzgefasstes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen* (Heidelberg, 1955), Lieferung 4, pp. 232-233.

10. Namely the 'chapters' 1 through 4 in the Guṇabhadra Chinese version of *Śrīmālā-sūtra*.

11. Compare Mahāsāṃghika tenet No. 60, cited above (Introduction), 'Virtue caused by a vow increases'.

12. "A Study of the Mahāvastu," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (Tokyo), VI:1, Jan. 1958, pp. 306-311.

13. École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris, 1969.

14. A reviewer of the 'Lion's Roar' in *Philosophy East and West* doubted the Mahāsāṃghika origin because Ruegg's book does not mention it—an unfortunate disservice to Ruegg's own work.

15. Bareau, *Les sectes*, p. 55.

16. B.S.L. Hanumantha Rao, *Religion in Āndhra* (Tripurasundari, 1973), pp. 74-83.

17. Hirakawa, "The Rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism," pp. 102-106, does not explicitly say this, but comes close. The *Śrīmālā-sūtra* does mention ('Lion's Roar', p. 76) the lay Bodhisattva group, but is silent about stūpa care and worship.

18. Cf. J.J. Jones, tr. *The Mahāvastu*, Vol. I (London, 1949), p. 83; for the illustration of Gautama Buddha, cf. J. Takasaki, *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga* (Roma, 1966), p. 147; and in comparison with Tantrism, Alex Wayman, *Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra; the Arcane Lore of Forty Verses* (Delhi, 1977), pp. 341-342.

19. Elizabeth S. Rosen, "The Begram Ivories," *Marsyas* (Institute of Fine Arts, N.Y.U.), Vol. XVII, 1974-75, pp. 45-46.

20. Whalen Lai, "Chinese Buddhist causation theories: An analysis of the sinitic Mahāyāna understanding of *pratītya-samutpada*," *Philosophy East and West*, July 1977, p. 250.

21. K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1963), starting at pp. 420-421.

22. Walpola Rahula, "Wrong Notions of Dhammatā (Dharmatā)," *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner*, ed. by L. Cousins, A. Kunst, and K. R. Norman (Dordrecht, 1974), pp. 182, 185, and 186.

23. David J. Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1975), p. 75.

24. Kalupahana, *Causality*, pp. 75-76. Although I disagree with him at this point, may I add that he has many fine observations in this book.

25. Rahula, "Wrong Notions," p. 183.

26. A. Wayman, "Who understands the four alternatives of the Buddhist texts?" *Philosophy East and West*, 27:1, Jan., 1977, pp. 14, 18.

27. Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, ed., *The Aṅguttara Nikāya*, Navakanipāta, Daskanipāta, and Ekādaskanipāta (Bihar Government, 1960), p. 101.

28. I have edited with translation the *hetuvidyā* section as a part of a

book under preparation. Readers of Chinese can find the passage in Taishō Vol. 30, at p. 358B-10.

29. Ruegg, *La théorie*, especially pp. 90, 92-93, 106-107.

30. E. H. Johnston, ed., *The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantra-śāstra* (Patna, 1950), text p. 55.

31. Alex Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript* (Berkeley, 1961), p. 59.

32. Cf. Gadjin M. Nagao, *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya* (Tokyo, 1964), Chapter III, 18; and Paul Wilfred O'Brien, S.J., "A Chapter on Reality from the Madhyāntavibhāgaçāstra," *Monumenta Nipponica*, X:1-2, 1954, pp. 247-248.

33. Alex Wayman, "The Sacittikā and Acittikā Bhūmi," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Tokyo)*, VIII:1, Jan. 1960, p. 377.

34. Esho Mikogami makes an intriguing point in "The Problem of Verbal Testimony in Yogācāra Buddhism," *Bukkyogaku kenkyū*, Vols. 32-33, 1977, p. 3, about the passage in the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* that whether Tathāgatas arise or not, the *dharmatā* is permanent and unchanging:—the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are limited to the world of *dharmatā*. This is consistent with the Tathāgatagarbha taken as the basis of *saṃsāra*, and as the potentiality of Buddhahood, and the not-yet Buddhahood.

II. SHORT PAPERS

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Buddhism and Political Power in Korean History

by S. Keel

It is a well-known fact that in spite of, or perhaps because of, Christ's word, "My kingship is not of this world," the Christian church in the West has generally managed to maintain its ecclesiastical autonomy in the world over against the secular political authority. Thus Christians have been able to maintain their double citizenship of the earthly kingdom and the heavenly kingdom at the same time, even though at times they had to pay dear cost for this "privilege." One could observe that Buddhism, as a religion of supramundane salvation, could also have developed a similar institutional autonomy over against the secular political power. But in fact that was far from being the case, particularly in Mahāyāna countries, which led Arnold Toynbee to characterize Mahāyāna Buddhism as "a politically incompetent religion."[1]

From the very beginning, the Buddhist *saṅgha* was a rather loosely organized body of monks with no firm hierarchical structure of authority. Śākyamuni Buddha himself did not devise any such system, nor did he claim himself as the authoritarian leader of the *saṅgha* at all. The Buddha was such a humble figure that even during his life-time one of his disciples, Devadatta, was able to challenge his authority and almost destroy the unity of the *saṅgha*. The Buddha always commended the impersonal Dharma, not his own person, as the final authority his disciples should resort to, even though in the eyes of his followers the two were often inseparable. Moreover, even from the very early period of Buddhism, there was no unanimity among the monks concerning what the Dharma was; nor was there any effective way to prevent doctrinal dissension, as is evidenced by the story of a certain monk named Purāṇa who came along immediately after the First Council to challenge it and declared that he would continue to

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follow his own version of the Dharma. Despite the series of Buddhist councils, the *saṅgha* could not maintain unity due to its intrinsic non-authoritarian style of community life. Thus there did not develop in India any unified hierarchical body of universal *saṅgha* at all, comparable to the Roman Catholic Church in the West. At the same time, it is to be remembered that Indian political authorities generally tended to allow religious freedom, so that it may well have been the case that the *saṅgha* felt little conflict with the state and no clear need to assert an extra-terrestrial authority. On the whole, we could safely say that Buddhism and the political power enjoyed peaceful co-existence in India, with neither notable frictions nor particularly intimate connection either—this seems to hold true even in the case of Kushan Kaniṣka or Mauryan Aśoka. Close as their relationship with Buddhism was, it is clear that they did not make it their state religion.

When we turn our attention to the Chinese scene, however, the situation becomes different. From the ancient period of her history, the power of the ruling class in China over against the masses of peasants was direct and almost absolute, leaving no room for other institutional forces to compete with the state for the allegiance of the people. The Chinese emperor did not merely possess the secular political power but he also had cosmic religious aura as the Son of Heaven, and his government was a sacred affair. Thus, throughout Chinese history, the Buddhist *saṅgha* was never fortunate enough to be granted the kind of laissez-faire atmosphere that prevailed in the land of its origin, but was always under the tight control and surveillance of the state, whether that meant copious support or harsh suppression—the two being opposite sides of the same coin in the long run.[2]

It was under the influence of this general ethos of Chinese Buddhism that Buddhism in Korea came to be formed. Korean Buddhism has often been noted for its strong characteristic of "*hoguk pulgyo*," meaning "state-protecting Buddhism," due to the intimate connection that has traditionally existed between Buddhism and the state in Korea. The basic ideology of this *hoguk pulgyo* finds its support in such Mahāyāna scriptures as the *Inwang-gyŏng (Jen-wang Ching)* and the *Kŭmgwangmyong-gyŏng (Chin-kuang-ming Ching* or the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra)*[3]—hence their enormous popularity in Korean court circles as in the Chinese and Japanese. The fundamental idea of *hoguk pulgyo* is the belief

that the king would enjoy peace and prosperity of his state if he followed and promoted the Buddhist Dharma, particularly the study and circulation of those *sūtras* themselves—which, however, actually meant the support of Buddhism in general. While this idea of state-protecting Buddhism is not an exclusive phenomenon of Korean Buddhism, with the possible exception of Theravada Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism (which of course were formed each in an entirely different historical context from East Asian Buddhism) there seems to be no doubt that nowhere else has this belief been put into practice more thoroughly than in Korea; and nowhere else has the relationship between the state and Buddhism been more intimate than in Korea, especially during the five hundred years of the Koryŏ Dynasty (918-1392) when the Buddhist *saṅgha* had all the power and privilege as the established religion of the state. The purpose of this article is to examine the historical circumstances of this development and its significance for Korean Buddhism by focusing our attention upon the most salient developments in each of the successive periods of Korean Buddhist history.

When Buddhism was introduced into Korea in the latter half of the fourth century A.D., Korea was divided into three separate kingdoms, each forming an ancient state of a tribal confederation trying to expand its territory at the expense of the others. Among them, Koguryŏ in the north was the earliest in forming a centralized state power and it was by far the strongest of the three. It was in 372 during the reign of King Sosurim that Buddhism was officially introduced into Koguryŏ. King Sosurim maintained a friendly relationship with the Former Ch'in in northern China which had destroyed the former Yen, the enemy of Koguryŏ. It was in this political context that Fu Chien, the most powerful ruler of the Former Ch'in as well as an ardent supporter of Buddhism, sent an envoy and a monk named Sundo together with Buddha images and scriptures to Koguryŏ. It is very significant to note that in the same year King Sosurim accepted Buddhism he also established the so-called T'aehak, an academy for Confucian learning, and the next year promulgated legal codes, thus laying the foundation for a centralized state.

While Buddhism came to Koguryŏ by way of the Former Ch'in in the northern part of China, it reached the kingdom of Paekche, situated in the southwest of the Korean peninsula, from Eastern

Chin in southern China, with which Paekche was in close diplomatic alliance. As in the case of Koguryŏ, it was not a mere coincidence that Buddhism, a new religion with a universalistic ethos, was introduced into Paekche around the time when it was in the midst of consolidating the central royal authority—most notably by King Kŭnch'ogo (346-375)—over against the tribal powers with their primitive religious faith and practices.

The kingdom of Silla, being situated in the southwestern corner of the peninsula, was geographically not in a favorable position to absorb the high culture of the Chinese continent. Hence Silla became the latest recipient of Buddhism as well. Even though according to the official record of the *Samguk Sagi* [Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms] Buddhism came to Silla as early as the time of King Nulchi (417-447), it was not able to make much progress at first, apparently due to the severe opposition of the ruling aristocratic families who were still deeply rooted in the tribal religious tradition.[4] But along with the continued strengthening of the central royal power, the kings and the supporters of the court kept a constant interest in Buddhism as a new ideological force which would not merely loosen the tribal ties but also have an edifying effect on the people at large. Thus, on the occasion of the martyrdom of I Ch'a-don, a loyal minister, King Pŏphŭng proclaimed the official recognition of Buddhism in 527 A.D. His very name "Pŏphŭng" means "Flourishing of the Dharma." Earlier in 520 he had promulgated legal codes, and two years after this official recognition of the new faith he prohibited killing of life in the land. Eda Shunyū, a noted scholar on Korean Buddhism, attributes King Pŏphŭng's adoption of Buddhism to four reasons or motivations: his personal faith, edification of the people, protection of the state, and absorption of Buddhist and higher culture of the continent.[5]

This brief survey of the politi- circumstances surrounding the introduction of Buddhism into the Three Kingdoms already indicates to us the close tie that existed between Buddhism and the political power from the early period of Korean history. Eventually, among the Three Kingdoms, Silla proved the victor and accomplished the great task of unifying the peninsula in the year 688 A.D. Let us now consider in more detail what role Buddhism played in Silla in this political achievement, for it was during this period that the fundamental nature of the future relationship into

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which Buddhism and the state were to enter in subsequent history of Korea was firmly established.

It was King Chinhŭng, the successor of Pŏphŭng, who laid the solid foundation not only for the Silla state as a strong political power but also for the lasting fruitful relationship between it and Buddhism. He built many Buddhist monasteries and welcomed many foreign monks, including the eminent monk from Koguryŏ, Hyeryang, whom he appointed the *sŭngt'ong* (the chief of monks) —an act which obviously had political implications. Chinhung also legally allowed people to become monks, and he himself became a monk around the end of his life, taking the name *Pŏbun* (Dharma cloud), and the queen followed suit. This can be taken as an explicit act demonstrating the unity of *sangha* and state, the king assuming the leadership in both areas[6]—a continuation, in Buddhist form, of the tribal tradition where the chief of a tribe often coincided with the shamanistic religious leader. Buddhism, although an "advanced" religion of salvation, did not yet effect the separation of religion and state, and this is already a foreboding of the dominant type of Buddhism to come in the future, namely the *hoguk pulgyo*; Buddhism was accepted by the kings as an ideology transcending tribal barriers, but it was another matter whether it could transcend the state or the royal authority as well.

It was also during Chinhŭng's reign that the famous system of *hwarang* was organized on a national level. This was a system of recruiting fair-looking youths from noble families to train them both physically and spiritually so that they could be mobilized in the case of national emergencies, and their role, military as well as moral, was great in Silla's unification of the Three Kingdoms. What interests us most in this system was its Buddhist elements, particularly its association with Maitreya faith, for there seems to have been a widespread belief (and wish) that a *hwarang* was the incarnation of Maitreya Bodhisattva.[7] Thus, for instance, the followers of the famous *hwarang* Kim Yu-sin were called *yonghwa hyangdo* (Fragrant Followers of the Dragon Flower), *yonghwa* being the name of the tree under which Maitreya is supposed to attain enlightenment in his future rebirth here on earth from Tusita Heaven, according to the *Mirŭk hasaeng sŏngbul-gyŏng (Mi-le hsia-sheng ch'eng-fo Ching*; T. 14, No. 454).

If the *hwarang* was believed to be the incarnation of Maitreya Bodhisattva, King Chinhung himself was identified with Śaṅkha, the *cakravartin* (the universal monarch) mentioned in the *sūtra*—and the Silla state, by implication, was the pure land described there. Thus Chinhung named his sons respectively "Kŭmnyun" (Gold Wheel, one of the seven treasures of the *cakravartin*) and "Tongnyun" (Bronze Wheel). Like the famous King Aśoka, he erected monuments when he patrolled various parts of his territory, and on such occasions he would be accompanied by a monk—something which suggests that he understood his territorial expansion to be an act of conquest of truth, thus identifying *pulpŏp* (the way of Buddhism) with *wangpŏp* (the way of kingship).[8]

This policy of political mobilization of Buddhism and the spirit of religious patriotism were vigorously continued by the other kings following Chinhŭng such as Chinp'yŏng, Sŏndŏk, and Chindŏk in seventh century Silla; many of them adopted Buddhist names, such as Śuddhodana, Māyā, Śrīmālā—for themselves and their families, apparently seeking Buddhist sanctification of the royal house. Kim Ch'ŏl-chun aptly calls this period from King Pŏphŭng to Chindŏk "the period of Buddhist royal names."[9]

Behind this marriage of the court and Buddhism, however, were the outstanding Buddhist monks who offered the ideology for it. Good examples of this can be found in Wŏn'gwang and Chajang, two eminent Silla monks. Wŏn'gwang was one of the earliest Silla monks to study abroad in China. He returned to Silla in 600 A.D. at the request of the king. The most significant thing about him as a monk is the fact that he was clearly aware of the conflict between the universalistic ethic of Buddhism and the particular demand of behavior by the secular world, but he ultimately found no serious problem in compromising these two norms of behavior. This is well illustrated by the following story:

> In his thirtieth year (608) King Chinp'yŏng, troubled by frequent border raids by Ko[gu]ryŏ, decided to ask help from Sui to retaliate and asked the master to draft the petition for a foreign campaign. The master replied, "To destroy others in order to preserve oneself is not the way of a monk (śramaṇa). But since I, a poor monk, live in Your Majesty's territory and waste Your Majesty's clothes and food, I do not dare disobey." He then relayed the king's request [to Sui].[10]

And this was the very spirit underlying his so-called *sesok ogye* (five precepts for laymen) about which we have the following story: Kwisan and Ch'wihang from Saryang district came to the master's door and, lifting up their robes, respectfully said, "We are ignorant and without knowledge. Please give us a maxim which will serve to instruct us for the rest of our lives." The master replied, "There are ten commandments in the Bodhisattva ordination. But, since you are subjects and sons, I fear you cannot practice all of them. Now, here are five commandments for laymen: serve your soverign with loyalty; tend your parents with filial piety; treat your friends with sincerity; do not retreat from a battlefield; be discriminating about the taking of life. Exercise care in the performance of them."[11]

Chajang was another important figure who had decisive influence in setting the basic ethos of Silla Buddhism around this critical period. His stories are no less illuminating for us. Born of a high aristocratic family, he went to T'ang China in 636 A.D. Once on Mt. Wu-t'ai he is said to have heard while inspired the following words from Mañjuśrī Bodhisattva: "Your king is of the seed of the Indian Kṣatriya; she [Queen Sŏndŏk] had already received the Buddha's prophecy [concerning her attainment of Buddhahood] and thus has special relation [to Buddhism], and she is not like the eastern barbarian stock. . . ."[12] Coming down from the mountain, the *Samguk Yusa* continues to tell us, another significant incident happened to Chajang:

> When he passed by the side of T'ai-huo lake in China, suddenly a divine man appeared and asked him, "Why have you come here?" "To seek enlightenment," replied Chajang. The divine man paid homage and asked again, "Does your country have any difficulty?" "Our country," said Chajang, "is bordered by the Malgal [a Tungus tribe in Manchuria and eastern Siberia] in the north and by the Japanese in the south; the two countries, Koguryŏ and Paekche, invade the borders and the neighboring pirates swarm around, causing trouble among the people." The divine man said, "Your country has a woman as the king. She has virtue but not authority; this is why your neighboring countries plot [to invade your country]. You should quickly return to your country. . . . If you, upon returning to your country, build a nine-story pagoda in the monastery [the famous Hwangyong Monastery in the capital city of Silla], the neighboring coun-

tries will surrender and the nine Hans [barbarians] will come to offer tribute, so that the dynasty will enjoy everlasting peace." (T.49, p.990

It is difficult to determine how much historical truth is contained in the above stories, but their message is unmistakable and their connection with the great monk Chajang does not seem to be accidental at all. Thus far we have examined the political role and significance of Buddhism for the Silla society, particularly for the ruling class, before the unification of the peninsula. Just when Silla was emerging as a strong political power in the peninsula in the sixth and seventh centuries, Buddhism was available as the politico-religious ideology which would serve the cause of building a powerful centralized state with a sacred royal authority, and it was the genius of the Silla political leaders to get hold of that ideology in their drive to achieve the unification of the land. It is no wonder that along with this height of Silla's political power in the latter half of the seventh century we also witness the great efflorescence of the doctrinal studies of Buddhism, best represented by Wŏnhyo (617-686), who is commonly regarded as the greatest Buddhist figure in Korean history.[13] At any rate, once this political efficacy of Buddhism was proven to the Silla ruling class, there was no reason for them to question the belief in the idea of the *hoguk pulgyo*, and the solid foundation was laid for the enduring bond between Buddhism and the state in the subsequent period of Korean history.

The final period of the Silla Dynasty saw great social turmoil and unrest. The central authority of the government collapsed due to the political struggle among the central aristocrats, the poor administration of the kings and the rise of the powerful local warlords. In the end, the country was again torn into what is called the Later Three Kingdoms. Out of this political confusion the order was restored by a local warlord by the name of Wanggŏn who became the founder of a new dynasty, Koryŏ (918-1392). It was this T'aejo, as he was called later, who set the basic tone for the intimate connection between Buddhism and the dynasty for about five hundred years after him. T'aejo seems to have been well aware that formerly Silla, when it was about to achieve the unification of the Three Kingdoms, had greatly promoted Buddhism. Thus he built, for instance, the Pagoda of Nine Stories in the

city of P'yŏngyang in imitation of the famous one built by Queen Sŏndŏk in Kyŏngju, the capital city of Silla, not long before the unification. After all, it was not politically astute to disrespect the tradition that had already been deeply entrenched in the life of the people for such a long time. His attitude toward Buddhism is best expressed by one of his so-called "ten rules of exhortation": "The great task of our country was surely based upon the protecting power of the Buddhas. Therefore, build monasteries for Sŏn [Ch'an] and Kyo [Chiao], dispatch abbots and cultivators of purity, and let them carry out their work."[14] So he built numerous Buddhist monasteries in the capital as well as in the countryside and sponsored various popular Buddhist festivals. T'aejo was at the same time a firm believer in the theory of geomancy (*p'ungsu* or *feng-shui*); he attributed his success in the reunification of the land not merely to the grace of the Buddhas but also to the "earth-power" (*chidŏk*) of the mountains and rivers. Thus, even the construction of Buddhist monasteries was done according to the geomantic principles and hence those monasteries were called "*pibo sach'al*," meaning that they were designed to curb the evil forces of the geomantically unfavorable places of the country. What all this amounts to is the fact that while the dynasty had changed, Buddhism as the religio-cultural force remained without being challenged or called into question—which occurred around the end of the Koryŏ Dynasty after it had enjoyed the long period of state patronage. Also evident in this instance of T'aejo and his continuous support of Buddhism is the fact that, at least for the kings and nobles of the dynasty, Buddhism was understood primarily as the state-protecting religion, *hoguk pulgyo*, not as the supramundane truth of salvation for individuals.

Buddhism as the state religion of Koryŏ became even more pronounced at the time of King Kwangjong (949-975), who not merely initiated the civil service examination modelled after the Chinese system but also established the monk examination system parallel to it.[15] As Takahashi Tŏru points out, the idea behind this appears to have been that whereas the civil ministers serve the state through their adminstrative works the mŏnks serve it through spiritual advice and ritual performances.[16] At the same time, the two systems were designed to curb the power of the local warlords by opening up a legitimate way for them to participate in government, and to put monks, apparently not insignificant in number

and power, under the control of the state. Along with this system of *sŭngkwa*, as the monk examination was called, a clerical ranking system called *pŏpkye* was devised as well. Thus the monk who passed the examination began to climb up the ladder of the clerical ranks, and no one who did not pass it could be appointed the abbot of a monastery in principle. Throughout the Koryŏ period, this system gave a great deal of incentive to the Buddhist monks and added to their prestige as well. Many of great learining and noble birth competed in the examination for the accompanying honors. Thus to be a Buddhist monk was, unlike in the Yi dynasty later, as we shall see, a respectable career worthy for men of high ambition to pursue in Koryŏ society.

In short, what happened to Koryŏ Buddhism was that not merely did the state itself become the *dānapati* (almsgiver, patron) of the Buddhist *saṅgha*, but the latter also became part and parcel of the state bureaucratic organization. One of the most serious consequences of this was that the *saṅgha* evidently did not feel any pressing need to reach down to and serve the masses, for everything was provided by the state. Koryŏ Buddhism was bound to be an aristocratic affair predominantly oriented to the powerful and the wealthy; and what these wanted was not liberation from the world but rather worldly success and security. What was to become of Buddhism when the state withdrew its lavish support could also be predicted easily, and this was in fact what happened at the dynastic change from Koryŏ to Yi after the long period, about eight hundred years, of the continuous patronage of Buddhism by the state. State patronage of Buddhism itself would by no means necessarily mean its loss of religious autonomy. On the contrary, it is conceivable that Koryŏ Buddhism could have utilized its enormous secular power as a means for establishing strong religious autonomy and authority. But the fact that it failed to do so is painfully demonstrated by the crucial test it was to undergo in the following dynasty with the change in political power. It is now time for us to consider the abrupt turn of fate Buddhism encountered during this final period of traditional Korea.

During the Koryŏ Dynasty the Buddhist *saṅgha* had amassed enormous wealth under state patronage. There were various ways of accumulating wealth: contributions from the court and the nobles, the privilege of tax exemption, the practice of usury, and various commercial activities.[12] But when the *kongjŏnje* (public

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field system), the very foundation of Koryŏ economic order, began to break down seriously around the end of the dynasty due to the sequestering of large land holdings, called *nongjang* (manor), by powerful high officials in the capital as well as by many influential Buddhist monasteries throughout the country, it became a matter of grave concern among some officials, especially among the younger lesser bureaucrats who did not have this privilege and who, moreover, came under the influence of the newly introduced Neo-Confucianism around this time. Thus the voice of anti-Buddhist accusations, mostly economic and secular but some clearly moral and religious, began to be raised and heard openly. These accusations were heeded already at the time of King Kongmin (1351-1374) of Koryŏ, but the decisive measures were not taken until Yi Sŏng-gye took power in 1389, representing the new social force that called for land reform, pro-Ming diplomacy over against the Yüan court, and naturally the curbing of Buddhism.

Yi Sŏng-gye, who founded the new Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), was himself a rather pious Buddhist. But with the change of the social and economic structure and the shift of political power, it was inevitable that Buddhism, which had been so closely identified with the established order of the previous dynasty, had to suffer losses. Thus he abolished the tax exemption privilege of the Buddhist monasteries, banned new construction, and initiated the monk license system called *toch'ŏpche*. The anti-Buddhist recommendations by the Confucian literati and the corresponding measures taken by the kings became more and more severe as time went on. T'aejong (1400-1418) officially recognized only about 250 monasteries, confiscating the land and slaves of the others and laicizing a great many monks. In the capital only one monastery representing each sect was allowed to exist, and in the provinces only two, representing Son and Kyo, were permitted to go on. Then King Sejong (1418-1450) took even more drastic steps, consolidating the existing Five Schools of Kyo and Two Orders of Sŏn[18] into simply the Two Orders of Sŏn and Kyo (*Sŏn'gyo Yangjong*). Thus Sŏn and Kyo themselves became the names of Buddhist denominations, an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of Buddhism in any country. The number of state-supported monasteries now shrank to thirty-six, and many in the capital were converted into public buildings. Toward the end of his life, Sejong's attitude toward Buddhism suddenly turned around, and he support-

ed many pious Buddhist works, but the damage he had done was never to be repaired again. King Sejo (1455-1468) was also a devout Buddhist who lent copious support to Buddhism, but after his death an even stronger reaction set in. Thus King Sŏngjong (1469-1494), a dedicated man of Confucian learning, completely forbade people to become monks, at least lawfully. The famous despot Yŏnsan'gun put an end to whatever official relationship the state still had with Buddhism. He abolished the monk examination system altogether, destroyed the two headquarters of Sŏn and Kyo in the capital, and took other extreme measures. Belief in the ideology of *hoguk pulgyo* seems to have completely disappeared.

The interesting thing in the midst of this radical development is the fact that while all these harsh measures were being taken against the Buddhist community, we do not see any sign of serious protest or disruptive movement breaking out on the part of the monks and monasteries—a phenomenon in sharp contrast to the situation among the various Buddhist sects during the turbulent period of medieval Japan until the establishment of the Tokugawa order.[19] Suddenly stripped of the protection of kings and nobles, which the Buddhist *saṅgha* had taken for granted, it lacked its own independent capability to respond to this crisis. We could also observe that Buddhism, despite its external flourishing under the protection of the ruling classes in previous dynasties, had no truly deep roots among the common people. Perhaps it did not even feel such a need, for the kings and nobles had always been there to provide the *saṅgha* with its necessities; the only thing it had to do was to pray for their welfare in return. The monasteries themselves were the landlords, so to speak; who would have stood up for them when they were in trouble? This seems to have been the sad fate of the ideal of *hoguk pulgyo* that had once inspired the Silla state and culture.

At any rate, due to the harsh measures mentioned above and the establishment of Neo-Confucian order at the same time, Buddhism came to lose the social respect and honor which it had enjoyed for almost a millenium, and it was pushed deep into the mountains to become the concern only of country women and the lowest stratum of the society in general. To be sure, many court ladies continued to respect and support the *saṅgha*, and many hermit monks with great talent continued to nurture it throughout the generations down to the present day. But, as a whole, the past

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glory of Buddhism was gone irretrievably, and its social influence was reduced to a minimum. For a brief period during the reign of King Myŏngjong (1545-1567), when his mother Queen Munjŏng took charge of governmental affairs behind the screen, Buddhism seemed to revive under her lavish patronage and under the able leadership of the monk named Pou. The monk examinations for Sŏn and Kyo were revived and the various restrictions against Buddhist activities were removed. It was during this time that Sosan, regarded as the greatest monk of the Yi Dynasty, took the examination and began his religious career. But, once again, a violent reaction against this temporary resurgence followed, and Pou was exiled to Cheju island in the south and murdered there. Never again was Buddhism to see such a turn of fortune until around the end of the dynasty. Apparently, Pou's group failed to read the signs of the time and history, not realizing clearly what went wrong fundamentally with the Buddhist sangha of their time. Thus Buddhism was *revived* temporarily by them, but not *reformed*.

Conclusion

Through our study thus far one thing stands out very clearly regarding the relationship between Buddhism and political power in Korean history; Buddhism did not maintain nor ever develop institutional autonomy from the secular authority. In order to do that, Buddhism had to maintain a certain degree of aloofness from, or tension with, the secular world itself. Often Buddhism is charged for its "other-worldly" tendency. This may be true of Korean Buddhism as far as some individual monks are concenred, but its history shows us ironically that Buddhism as an institutional force, as the *saṅgha*, was not "other-worldly" at all but all too "worldly." The fundamental problem for Korean Buddhism was not its "other-worldliness" but rather its "over-worldliness," so much so that it became part and parcel of the secular order, lacking the spirit of autonomy that arises out of the transcendent tension Buddhism as a religion of salvation would have with respect to the world. Or, is it rather the case that Mahāyāna Buddhism, with its doctrine of the identity of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, is intrinsically unable to maintain such a tension? But the idea of the identity of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* does not mean mere conformity to the world

nor a blind affirmation of it, but rather the transcendence of the worldly spirit and the supreme freedom from every form and force of bondage, including the one arising from religion itself. Not only that, this doctrine of identity could also work in the direction of the Buddhist *saṅgha's* powerful historical awareness and affirmation of religious autonomy in this very world of *saṃsāra*.[20] At any rate, we conclude that the political failure of Mahāyāna Buddhism has nowehere been so patently illustrated as in Korea where Buddhism once saw as great a flourishing as in any other country of the world.

NOTES

1. Toynbee bases this judgment particularly upon the case of the Mahāyāna Buddhism of Northern China during the period of disunity, and its failure to utilize the "political patronage of barbarian rulers." He says: "The contrast between this political failure of the Mahāyāna in Northern China in a post-Sinic Age and the success with which the Christian Church seized and harvested its corresponding opportunities in Western Europe in a post-Hellenic Age brings out the fact that—at any rate by comparison with Christianity—the Mahāyāna was a politically incompetent religion. The patronage of the parochial princes in Northern China during the best part of three centuries, running from the break-up of the United Tsin Empire to its reconstitution by the Sui, was of no more avail than the more potent patronage of the Kushan Emperor Kanishka had been at the turn of the first and second centuries of the Christian Era. Even this royal aid failed to give the followers of the Mahāyāna a firm seat in a political saddle." *A Study of History*, IX (London, 1954), 40-41.

2. That Chinese Buddhism did not enjoy religious autonomy even during its heyday of the T'ang period is well shown by Stanley Weinstein's article, "Imperial Patronage in the Formation of T'ang Buddhism," *Perspectives on the T'ang*, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett (New Haven and London, 1973).

3. See particularly chapter 5 of *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* (henceforth abbreviated as T.) 8, No. 245; chapter 6 of T. 16, No. 663.

4. This has been pointed out by Yi Ki-baek, "Samguk sidae pulgyo chŏllae wa kŭ sahoejŏk sŏngkyŏk" [Introduction of Buddhism into the Three Kingdoms and its Social Character], *Yŏksa Hakpo*, No. 6 (1954).

5. Eda Shunyū, "Shiragi no bukkyō jūyō ni kansuru shomondai" [Problems concerning Silla's Acceptance of Buddhism], *Bunka*, No. 8 (1935), pp. 975-77.

6. This has been pointed out by Yaotani Takayasu, "Shiragi shakai to Jōdokyō" [Silla Society and Pure Land Buddhism], *Shichō*, VII, No. 4 (1937), p. 162.

7. The best study of this association of the *hwarang* system with Maitreya faith is Cho Ae-hi's "Shiragi ni okeru Miroku shinkō no kenkyū" [A Study of Maitreya Faith in Silla], *Shiragi bukkyō kenkyū*, ed. Kim Chigyŏn and Ch'ae In-hwan (Tokyo, 1973).

8. This finds a striking parallel in the first emperor of Sui Dynasty of China. In his edict he proclaimed: "With the armed might of a Cakravartin king, We spread the ideals of the ultimately enlightened one. With a hundred victories in a hundred battles, We promote the practice of the ten Buddhist virtues. Therefore We regard the weapons of war as having become like the offering of incense and flowers presented to Buddha, and the fields of this world as becoming forever identical with the Buddha-land." Quoted from Arthur F. Wright, *Buddhism in Chinese History* (New York, 1965), p. 67. The emperor Wen of Sui is later than Chinhŭng (540-576).

9. Kim Ch'ŏl-chun, "Silla sidae ŭi dual organization" [Dual Organization in the Silla Period], *Yŏksa Hakpo*, No. 2 (1952), p. 94.

10. Peter H. Lee, trans. *Lives of Eminent Korean Monks: The Haedong Kosŭng Chŏn* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 78.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79; I left out the Chinese characters from Lee's text. It is very interesting to note that according to Lee's footnotes, both Kwisan and Ch'wihang were killed in their campaign against Paekche and were granted posthumous titles by King Chin-p'yŏng.

12. *Samguk Yusa* [Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms], T. 49, No. 2039, p. 990c.

13. His biography is contained in the *Samguk Yusa*, T. 49, p. 1006c as well as in the *Sung Kao-seng Chuan*, T. 50, p. 729a.

14. This is only part of the first rule. The text of the ten rules is provided and discussed in Yi Pyŏng-do, *Koryŏ sidae ŭi yŏn'gu* [A Study of Koryŏ Period] (Seoul, 1948) from which the present passage is translated. See particularly pp. 28-48 where Yi refutes the view proposed by Imanishi Ryū that the ten rules were not established by T'aejo but were a later forgery ("Shiragisō Dōsen ni tsuite," *Tōyō gakuhō*, II, No. 2 (1912), pp. 247-63). "Sŏn (Ch'an) and "Kyo" (Chiao) refer to the two basic divisions or camps of Buddhism current at the time in Korea.

15. There is no sure record to indicate its beginning in the time of Kwangjong, but scholars generally agree in attributing its beginning, if not full practice, to him. Concerning this system, see Takahashi Tōru, "Daikaku Kokushi Ŭich'ŏn no Kōrai Bukkyō ni taisuru keirin ni tsuite" [On the National Preceptor of Great Enlightenment Ŭich'ŏn's Plan for Koryŏ Buddhism], *Chōsen gakuhō*, No. 10 (1956), pp. 119-23.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-23.

17. Concerning the temple economy of Koryŏ, see Takashi Hatada's "Kōraichō ni okeru jiin keizai," *Shigaku Zasshi*, XLIII, No. 5 (1932), pp. 557-93.

18. There are some problems regarding the names and identity of these

Tomkins, Ivan S. See under Demos, ed., 1995.
Tuck, Andrew P. 1990. *Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna.* New York: Oxford University Press.
Tucker, Gene M. 1971. *Form Criticism of the Old Testament.* Guides to Biblical Scholarship, Old Testament Series. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.
Turner, Nicholas. 1982. *Handbook for Biblical Studies.* Philadelphia: Westminster Press.
Unamuno, Miguel de. 1958. *Ensayos.* 2 vols. Madrid: Aguilar.
Weller, Friedrich. 1952-1955. *Tibetisch-Sanskritischer Index zum Bodhicaryāvatāra.* Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philologisch-Historische Klasse. Bd. 46, Hft. 3, and Bd. 47, Hft. 3. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
White, Hayden. 1978. *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
———. 1987. *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Woodmansee, Martha. 1983. "Deconstructing Deconstruction: Toward a History of Modern Criticism." *Erkennen und Deuten: Essays zur Literatur und Literaturtheorie Edgar Lohner in Memoriam.* Eds. Martha Woodmansee and Walter F. W. Lohnes. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag. 23-32.
———. 1994. "On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity." *The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature.* Eds. Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 15-28.
Wuthnow, Robert, J. D. Hunter, A. Bergesen, and E. Kurzweil. 1984. *Cultural Analysis: The Work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas.* London Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Yamamoto, Chikyo. 1990. *Introduction to Buddhist Art.* Śata-piṭaka series 358. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture and Aditya Prakashan.
Yampolsky, Phillip. 1971. *The Zen Master Hakuin: Selected Writings.* New York: Columbia University Press.

JOSÉ IGNACIO CABEZÓN

Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory

Is Buddhist Studies a discipline, or is it still in a proto-disciplinary phase in its evolution? Or is it rather a super-disciplinary entity that serves as a home for disciplines? What is the relationship of Buddhist Studies to the (sub)disciplines from which it draws? Does Buddhist Studies require homogeneity for its coherence and perpetuation as a field of academic inquiry? Does it in fact have such homogeneity? The last decade has been witness to the rise of a body of theoretical literature whose purpose it is to explore the notion of disciplinarity.[1] How do disciplines arise? What social, institutional and rhetorical practices are employed in the construction of their sense of coherence and unity? What are their natural subdivisions? How do disciplines change, and how do they respond to changes in the intellectual climate? How do they interact with one another? These are just some of the questions raised in the field that has come to be known as "disciplinary studies," and the first goal of this

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1. The most recent study, with an extensive bibliography of previous work in the field, is Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway and David J. Sylvan, eds., *Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity* (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 1993).

essay is to reflect on Buddhist Studies in light of this recent body of literature.

The second goal derives from the first and is in a sense more urgent. If, as I think is clear, divergent methodological approaches to the study of Buddhism are emerging, then the time has come for us to seriously consider these alternative methodologies and to ask what role methodological reflection should play in the field today. For the past several years different approaches to the study of Buddhism have emerged that challenge what they take to be the classical paradigm. How the latter is characterized, of course, determines the nature of the critique. In some instances classical Buddhology is portrayed as overly concerned with a specific geographical area (usually India). The domination of the field by the given area is said to have two consequences: (1) by equating the study of Buddhism with its study in the specific geographically hegemonic area, classical Buddhology has been charged with impairing the development of areas of research—Chinese, Tibetan and Southeast Asian Buddhist Studies, for example—as subdisciplines in their own right, and (2) it makes of the study of the languages and civilizations of these other areas mere tools to the study of the dominant cultural region.[2] But the critique of the classical paradigm in Buddhist Studies can take other

2. That the study of Indian Buddhism is hegemonic in this regard—that scholars of the latter consider the study of Chinese texts as worthwhile only to the extent that it serves to elucidate Indian Buddhism—is a point made most recently by T. Griffith Foulk, "Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies: An Extended Review of *Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought*," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 16.1 (1993): 93-180. The point is also made by Lancaster; see note 18. It is not difficult to see why in reading Nagao Gadjin, for example, a scholar of Tibetan Buddhism should share Foulk's view concerning the dominance of Indian / Sanskritic based scholarship in the field. In Nagao's "Reflections on Tibetan Studies in Japan," *Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture* 29 (1975): 107-128, he states that "Tibetan is no more than a complement to Sanskrit Buddhist studies, though a very important complement" (p. 112). See also de Jong's remarks concerning the centrality of Indian Buddhist texts in Buddhist Studies in his "Recent Buddhist Studies in Europe and America: 1973-1983," *Eastern Buddhist* 17.1 (1981): 82. On the relationship of the study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism in Japan, and the methodological shifts that have taken place in recent years see Matsumoto Shiro, *Tibetan Studies in Japan: 1973-1983*, Asian Studies in Japan, 1973-1983, Part II-18 (Tokyo: The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1986).

forms as well. There are those who claim, for example, that the field focuses almost exclusively on written, doctrinal texts to the exclusion of other semiotic (that is, meaning-producing) forms (e. g., oral texts, epigraphical and archaeological data, rituals, institutions, art and social practices).[3] In some instances the critique goes further, not only bemoan-

3. Many scholars in the history of the field have stressed the importance of considering more than written textual data. This has traditionally taken the form of advocating the study of epigraphy, art, ritual, culture, "Buddhist mentality," etc., alongside, or as supplements to, textual material. E. Burnouf, arguably the father of Buddhist Studies, himself used epigraphical material to shed light on the meaning of words and phrases in the texts he studied; see his extensive tenth appendix to *Le Lotus de la Bonne Loi* (Paris: Maissoneuve, 1825). On other studies of Buddhist inscriptions see J. W. de Jong, "A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America," *Eastern Buddhist* 8.1: 88; and, by the same author, "Recent Buddhist Studies" p. 98. The most recent literature, however, dissatisfied with this more moderate stance, criticizes the hegemony of the written text over other semiotic forms and attempts to show how a serious engagement with the latter undermines many of the traditional—written-text-based—presuppositions of the field. Paradigmatic of this approach is the work of Gregory Schopen. See especially his "Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman / Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit," *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 10 (1985); "The Stupa Cult and the Extant Pali Vinaya," *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 13 (1989); and "Burial '*ad Sanctos*' and the Physical Presence of the Buddha in Early Indian Buddhism," *Religion* 17 (1987): 193-225. Of course, as Schopen himself acknowledges, there are earlier instances of such a critique, most notably Paul Mus's classic study *Barabudur: esquisse d'une histoire du Bouddhisme fondée sur la critique archéologique des textes* (Hanoi: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1935; New York: Arno Press, 1978; Paris: Arma Artis, 1990). Schopen's critique is not limited, however, to the use of epigraphical and archaeological data, as can be seen from his "Monks and the Relic Cult in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*: An Old Misunderstanding in Regard to Monastic Buddhism," Koichi Shinohara and Gregory Schopen, eds., *From Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism and Chinese Religion* (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1991) 187-201, where he utilizes written texts themselves to undermine the received wisdom of classical Buddhology. Steven Collins, *Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravāda Buddhism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), considers social practices, that is, "the actual thought and practice of most Buddhists," to be indispensable to the understanding of "intellectual Buddhism": "I have tried to show that the most abstract forms of its (Buddhism's) imaginative representations—what we call its 'ideas'—are intimately connected with, and inextricable from, the presuppositions and institutional framework of Buddhist culture

ing the narrowness of the data traditionally considered (a critique of content) but also attacking the traditional means of studying the data that *is* considered (a critique of method). The latter often takes the form of a repudiation of classical Buddhist philology, seen by its detractors as a naive and scientistic approach to the study of written texts.[4] In other instances, traditional Buddhology is seen as overly narrow in its scope—in its hyperspecialization, unconcerned with broader, comparative questions and unable to enter into dialogue with the wider intellectual community.[5]

and society" (p. 265-266).

4. Examples include C. W. Huntington with Geshe Namgyal Wangchen, *The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), and Andrew P. Tuck, *Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). For a brief critique of specific methodological principles used in the philological analysis of Buddhist texts see Paul Griffiths' review of Lambert Schmithausen's *Ālayavijñāna*, in the *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 12.1 (1989): 170-177. See also John C. Holt, *Buddha in the Crown: Avalokiteśvara in the Buddhist Traditions of Sri Lanka* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) viii.

5. See, for example, Paul J. Griffiths, "Buddhist Hybrid English: Some Notes on Philology and Hermeneutics for Buddhologists," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 4.2 (1981): 18, for example, where he states that "there is absolutely no reason why Buddhology should become an hermetic tradition, sealed off from the uninitiate and passed down from master to pupil by mystical *abhiṣeka*; in that way lies extinction, or at least a self-banishment from the wider academic community." Griffiths goes on to assert that the understanding of Buddhism "goes far beyond philology" (p. 18), involving as it does the hermeneutical task, which requires that scholars restate the meaning of texts in words other than those of the texts themselves. This he perceives as leading to "some very positive results in the area of inter-disciplinary and inter-cultural thinking" (p. 21). Consider also Steven Collins' remarks in *Selfless Persons* p. 1, "I think that a great deal of contemporary philosophy, particularly in the English-language tradition, suffers from a lack of historical and social self-awareness. I want to argue that philosophical reflection should not proceed in abstraction from intellectual history and anthropology, from the investigation and comparison of cultures." David Seyfort Ruegg, "Some Observations on the Present and Future of Buddhist Studies," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 15.1 (1992): 105, encourages not only interdisciplinarity, "the need to foster contacts with specialists from other disciplines," but also "a closing of the ancient and entrenched divide between 'town' and 'gown' by attracting and holding

Reaction to this challenge has varied. In some cases, it has been ignored: a North American,[6] postmodern ripple on the otherwise calm sea, one that will dissipate with time. In others, it has brought scorn and fear: what will become of "serious" scholarship in light of these recent developments? The second goal of this essay is to explore these methodological differences and to suggest not a means of achieving reconciliation (none, I think, is forthcoming), but a way of living with these differences that averts an impending—and possibly irreparable—rift within the field.

It may be inappropriate to call Buddhist Studies a discipline, especially if we take disciplines to be exemplified by such fields as history, anthropology, art history and so forth. Analogous to the Buddhist argument concerning the self and the aggregates, it might be contended that Buddhist Studies is not a discipline because it contains disciplines as parts.[7] This, however, could simply be a question of historical evolution, for there was a time when even the classical disciplines did not seem particularly disciplinary-like. The fact that Buddhist Studies today seems a

the educated attention, interest and support of persons who are not full-time professional academics"; see also the latter's remarks concerning specialization and interdisciplinarity in "A propos of a recent contribution to Tibetan and Buddhist Studies," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 82 (1962): 322, n. 4.

6. That the critique emerges primarily out of North America can be gleaned from the sources cited in the previous four notes. Increasingly, many buddhologists based in North American institutions of higher education see themselves as having a distinctive style—a method of scholarship that is different from that which is represented by the parent discipline. Increasingly, North American scholars seek to create a self-identity by contrasting their work with that of their European and Asian colleagues. If there has yet to emerge a distinctive North American school of Buddhist Studies, it is because geographically bounded areas of specialty have yet to engage in serious conversation, so that subfields the likes of South Asian, East Asian, Southeast Asian and Himalayan Buddhist Studies remain for the most part relatively isolated, self-enclosed subunits.

7. See the distinctions made by Foulk, "Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies" p. 112, who reserves the term *disciplinary* for fields like "anthropology, history of religions, etc." Seyfort Ruegg, "Some Observations" p. 104, sees in the fact that Buddhist Studies draws on "philology, history, archaeology, architecture, epigraphy, numismatics, philosophy, cultural and social anthropology, and the histories of religion and art" not evidence of the fact that Buddhist Studies is not disciplinary, but an indication "that our enterprise is at the same time a disciplinary and a multi-disciplinary one."

strange, almost artificial and heterogeneous discipline may simply be an artifact of its relative youth. Although the academic study of Buddhism is much older than the International Association of Buddhist Studies and the journal to which it gave rise,[8] the founding of the latter, which represents a significant—perhaps pivotal—step in the institutionalization of the field, is something that occurred less than twenty years ago. Nonetheless, whether a true discipline or not—whether or not Buddhist Studies has already achieved disciplinary status, whether it is proto-disciplinary or superdisciplinary—there is an apparent integrity to Buddhist Studies that at the very least calls for an analysis of the field in holistic terms.[9] After all, we gather at meetings and international congresses in the name of that whole, however differently we may conceive of it.

Still, it must be granted that, whether due to its relative youth or not, Buddhist Studies today seems particularly hodge podge. This is due in part to the international composition of the Buddhist Studies community, and in part to the heterogeneous nature of the object of our study, Buddhism itself (on the latter, more in a moment).[10] But there are other factors—institutional ones—that also contribute to the diversity that exists within the field. It is often the case that a common pattern of insti-

8. No comprehensive history of Buddhist Studies as a discipline exists. J. W. de Jong's essay, "A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America," published in two parts, *Eastern Buddhist* 7.1: 55-106, and 7.2: 49-82, which is principally a history of Buddhist philology focused primarily on India, is an excellent, though by his own admission partial, overview of the history of the field. It contains substantial bibliographical references to other relevant studies, making it unnecessary to cite these here. See also his follow-up article, "Recent Buddhist Studies in Europe and America: 1973-1983," *Eastern Buddhist* 17.1 (1984): 79-107.

9. Not only the existence of chairs in Buddhist Studies at major universities worldwide and the fact that doctorates in the field are possible, but also the existence of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, and the fact that the latter publishes a scholarly journal, all point to the fact that buddhology is, at the very least, quasi-disciplinary in nature.

10. On the question of heterogeneity see Foulk, "Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies" pp. 102-103. Foulk discusses the hitherto most natural subdivisions of Buddhist Studies based on geographical and linguistic subspecialties, but it is clear that there are other ways of envisioning the subdivisions of the discipline, e. g., on methodological lines. Hence, there are textual-philological, anthropological, sociological, literary-critical, and art historical approaches to the study of Buddhism, all of which form part of the broader field.

tutional support provides a discipline with homogeneity. This is lacking in Buddhist Studies. True, in many Asian countries Buddhist Studies finds consistent institutional support from religious circles, but here sectarianism leads to heterogeneity of a different kind. Outside of Asia, moreover, a department of Buddhist Studies is rare.[11] Instead, buddhologists find themselves with homes in area studies centers (South Asian, East Asian, Uralic-Altaic); in centers and institutes for the study of languages, cultures, history or a combination of these (Asian, South Asian, Indian, Sanskrit, in order of ascending specificity, just to take one series of actually instantiated examples); in departments of religious studies, and even in schools of theology.[12] Unlike other disciplines—even ones that are structurally homologous to our own, like Judaic Studies—Buddhist Studies has few secular institutional homes that it can call its own.

This means that Buddhist Studies, though not unique in this regard, is in an institutionally symbiotic relationship with—perhaps even parasitic upon—other more established fields. We often still have to justify our existence by arguing for the fact that the study of Buddhism is essential to a full understanding of a phenomenon whose epistemological value (for historical, political or economic reasons) goes unquestioned. For example, we make the case that understanding Buddhism is essential to an understanding of Asia or some portion thereof[13] (in the United States the "Pacific Rim" has for some years now been the buzz-word), or that it is an essential part of the study of religion, or perhaps that it is a *sine qua non* to fathoming what is probably the most inclusive and least epistemi-

11. See Seyfort Ruegg, "Some Observations" p. 104.

12. Seyfort Ruegg, "Some Observations" pp. 106-107, discusses what he sees as some of the advantages and dangers of the varying institutional bases of support for the discipline. For example, he sees in the fact that scholars of Buddhist Studies find homes in departments of religion, philosophy and history, a possible danger: that Buddhist Studies may become "distanced if not totally divorced from the historical and philological disciplines—Indology, Sinology, etc.," that Buddhism "might find itself being organized without due regard being accorded to its historical matrix and cultural context."

13 David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Study of Indian and Tibetan Thought: Some Problems and Perspectives*, Inaugural Lecture as Professor of Indian Philosophy, Buddhist Studies and Tibetan at the University of Leiden (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967) 4, cites J. Ph. Vogel on the importance of Buddhist Studies to the understanding of India. This goes to show that this rhetorical move is neither uncommon nor particularly new. In a similar vein, Seyfort Ruegg justifies and legitimates the study of Tibetan texts on the basis of their importance to the study of Indian Buddhism (p. 43).

cally questionable category, "humanity." But whatever the "host," Buddhist Studies remains the parasite, having in only the rarest of cases the status of unquestionable episteme. This means, of course, that many (perhaps most) of us have dual allegiances. Not only does *the discipline* become increasingly diverse as it cultivates a variety of institutional relationships for its survival, but heterogeneity in the form of multiple allegiances is something that we inherit *as scholars of Buddhism*. Part of the process of our becoming socialized as Buddhologists entails negotiating institutional homes for ourselves, and this means in part learning to wear hats other than the buddhological one.

The heterogeneity of Buddhist Studies is evident not only at the institutional level but in other respects as well. Especially today we seem to share less and less by way of method, or even subject matter. As we have seen, in recent years the textual and philological ground upon which the discipline was implicitly based[14] has been the subject of increasing critical scrutiny, and the perception exists—at least on the part of the challengers—that this has left the apparently once firm foundations of the discipline, if not teetering, at least in question.[15] Anthropologists, sociol-

14. That the discipline was (and perhaps still is) based on the philological study of Buddhist texts is a principle that we find repeatedly enunciated in the literature. To take just one example, see Jacques May's remarks in "Études Bouddhiques: Domaine, Disciplines, Perspectives," *Études de Lettres* (Lausanne), Serie III, Tome 6, no. 4 (1973): 10.

15. It might be argued that the depiction of classical Buddhist philology by its detractors is an inaccurate caricature which fails to come to terms with the way actual philological-historical work is done. This may be so, but it will have to be shown to be so by the proponents of the philological method. For example, critics of classical Buddhist philology often portray the latter as a unified and monothetic whole, something that is clearly not the case historically. On different styles of Buddhist philology see Lambert Schmithausen, preface to Part I: Earliest Buddhism, in David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen, eds., *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka*, Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, vol. 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990); many of the articles in the volume also touch, though at times only implicitly, on issues related to method. (For details regarding Schmithausen's own approach to the study of Buddhist texts [at least those of Early Buddhism], see his "On Some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of 'Liberating Insight' and 'Enlightenment' in Early Buddhism," eds. K. Bruhn and A. Wezler, *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus*, Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf, Alt- und Neu Indische Studien 23 [Hamburg] 200-202.) In addition, diversity in Buddhist philology is seen in the fact that philological controversies have existed, and continue to exist, in the field. On one such controversy, that begins seriously

ogists, art historians and a new breed of textual critics, all of whom existed (or perhaps, better, subsisted) on the margins of the discipline a generation ago, are challenging the chirographic-textual-philological paradigm, and in doing so acquiring a voice that, now more central, can no longer be ignored.

In addition to the critique of philology that has emerged from within the discipline, there exists also a more general critique of editorial practices and methods of textual criticism from De Man to the present day that is virtually unknown to Buddhist Studies.[16] The literature of this

in the 1930's—the issue of whether or not there exists a precanonical Buddhism—see Seyfort Ruegg, *The Study of Indian and Tibetan Thought* pp. 10-11. Other controversies, e. g., regarding the antiquity of the Pali canon, the use of Pali and Sanskrit materials in understanding the meaning of the Buddha as a religious figure, the relationship between Buddhism and Brahmanism, the characteristics of a Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (if any), whether or not the Vinayas of the different schools derive from the *Skandhaka*—debates that are in large part philological in character—have been discussed by de Jong, "A Brief History of Buddhist Studies," pts. I and II. Whether or not the critics of classical Buddhist philology have accurately portrayed their opponents in this debate, and whether or not their arguments hit their mark, are questions that can only be decided within the methodological debate itself. At the very least, there does exist a widespread perception (at least on the part of challengers) that a gauntlet has been thrown.

16. To cite just a few of the more important sources (some critical of classical philology, some writing in its defense): Paul De Man, "The Rhetoric of Blindness," *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983); Paul Bove, "Variations on Authority: Some Deconstructive Transformations of the New Criticism," *The Yale Critics: Deconstruction in America*, eds. Jonathan Arac, Wlad Godzich and Wallace Martin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983); G. Thomas Tanselle, "The Editing of Historical Documents," *Selected Studies in Bibliography* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979); and by the same author, *A Rationale of Textual Criticism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989); Jerome J. McGann, *A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); and by the same author, *The Textual Condition*, Princeton Studies in Culture / Power / History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). Recent literature on the philological method not actually part of the aforementioned debate includes William Proctor Williams and Craig S. Abbott, *An Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual Studies* (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1985); Peter L. Shillingsburg, *Scholarly Editing in the Computer Age* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986); *Textual Criticism Since Greg: A Chronicle 1950-1985* (Charlottesville: University of

broader critique, at once more extensive and subtler, is in many ways more devastating to classical Buddhist philology than that which arises from within the field itself. But this is not the place to rehearse these arguments. Suffice it to say that there is a growing perception that the critique of the chirographic-textual-philological paradigm upon which classical Buddhist Studies is based has meant that in the eyes of many scholars the discipline no longer has a common methodological base.

Given the lack of consensus in regard to method—in its general form a fairly recent phenomenon—it might seem natural to seek commonalty not in "how" we do what we do, but in "what" we do, that is, in the object of our study. Is not *Buddhism* our common concern, and does this fact not give the field its coherence? This is nominally true, but Buddhism is itself an artificial construct whose apparent unity and solidity begins to crumble almost immediately upon analysis. Is Buddhism text-based doctrine or behavior-based praxis? Is it what the clergy does or what lay people do? What was done then or what is done now? What happens in Tibet or in Japan? Of course, it is all of these things, but that is tantamount to admitting the multivalent character of our subject matter. To say that we all work on Buddhism is not to point the finger at similarity but at difference.

Now it might be thought that I will be arguing here for the reconstitution of Buddhist Studies around some new and as yet unperceived common core.[17] But this is not my intention. The coherence of Buddhist Studies as a field of inquiry does not require consensus as to method or subject matter—just the opposite. Now that the cat of difference is out of the bag, what will guarantee the stability and longevity of the discipline is not the *insistence on homogeneity*, which in any case can now only be achieved through force, but instead by *embracing heterogeneity*. To embrace difference, moreover, implies more than the passive and irenic acceptance of the polarities that exist within the field. The superficial tolerance of other methods or areas of specialty is no longer sufficient. The embracing of difference that I see as being necessary entails more than the organization and promotion of interdisciplinary and cross-cultural panels at conferences like those of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. The investigation of specific Buddhist themes from different disciplinary, geographical and historical perspectives is a desideratum, to be sure, and even this much has yet to be fully realized in the field.[18] More, however, is called for. Embracing difference involves as well a new mode of discourse within Buddhist Studies that focuses on method: a conversation that is critical, dialogical, and at times unabashedly polemical. For this to occur, however, two preconditions must be met: we must acknowledge (a) that the discipline has indeed changed, that it is no longer what it used to be,[19] and (b) that what is different about it is something that is worth exploring, taking the challenges seriously enough to make them the subject of conversation. This, of course, implies eschewing the kind of conservatism that considers

Virginia Press, 1987); and E. J. Kenney, *The Classical Text: Aspects of Editing in the Age of the Printed Book* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

17. The heterogeneous and artificial nature of Buddhist Studies as a discipline is not something new. If it appears to be so, it is because of the new forms of criticism that have recently emerged. That there exists "a singular lack of coordination" and "seriously divergent attitudes" in the field of Tibetan Studies is a point that was made by D. Seyfort Ruegg more than thirty years ago; see his "A propos of a Recent Contribution to Tibetan and Buddhist Studies," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 82 (1962): 320.

18. This is true despite a call for greater cross-cultural and interdisciplinary work in the field throughout the decades. Seyfort Ruegg, again more than thirty years ago, bemoaned the arbitrary compartmentalization of Tibetan Studies into "a 'philosopher's Tibetology'—or a historian's, a sociologist's etc."; see "A propos of a Recent Contribution" pp. 320-321. The issue is taken up by him once again in his *The Study of Indian and Tibetan Thought*, p. 5, where he argues against the distinction between the philosophical, religious and sociological in Buddhism. In that same essay (p. 21) he stresses the importance of psychology, semiology, sociology and religious studies for a full understanding of Tantra. Michel Strickmann, "A Survey of Tibetan Buddhist Studies," *Eastern Buddhist* 10.1 (May, 1977): 141, argues, analogously, that it is impossible to fully understand the Buddhist Tantras in India "without considering the abundant Chinese sources and the work of Japanese scholars who know them well." Lewis Lancaster, "The Editing of Buddhist Texts," *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization: Essays in Honor of Herbert V. Guenther on His Sixtieth Birthday* (Emeryville, N.Y.: Dharma Publishing, 1977) 145-151, argues for the value of Chinese translations in the editing of Sanskrit texts. Examples of such calls for greater cross-cultural and interdisciplinary work are, of course, plentiful in the literature, despite the fact that they have in large part gone unheeded.

19. In this regard, what Clifford Geertz has said of anthropology rings just as true of Buddhist Studies: "Something new having emerged both 'in the field' and 'in the academy,' something new must appear on the page . . . if it [the discipline] is now to prosper, with that confidence shaken, it must become aware" (*Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988] 148-149).

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ignoring methodological differences to be the most effective strategy for dealing with them. In its most insidious manifestation this ignorance of difference takes the form of a paternalism that simply refuses, through the sheer force of will or the exercise of power, to acknowledge the existence of viable alternative methodological perspectives and styles of scholarship. A more palatable form, which nonetheless brings an end to the conversation just as effectively, we might term "isolationism." Here the existence of different theoretical perspectives is acknowledged but considered trivial, in that these views are seen as having little if any impact on one another. This latter solution to the problem of methodological heterogeneity consists simply of continuing to do what one has always done, while paying lip service to the fact that others may be doing things differently. A third obstacle to the emergence of a critical dialogue on method is skepticism in regard to theory generally. From this perspective second-order reflection on theoretical and methodological issues is considered to fall outside of the purview of the field: a distraction to the "real" work of the buddhologist. "When time[20] is so precious, why waste it on speculation of this sort?" Each of these responses fails to take the challenge and implications of difference seriously. We exist today in an atmosphere where the methodological direction(s) of the field

20. The issue of "time" is quite central to the entire discussion of method. Many of the issues dealt with below can be reformulated in temporal terms, that is, as problems related to time (or lack of it). For example, lack of time is an often-cited justification for hyper-specialization (geographical, linguistic, methodological): "There is simply not enough time to gain expertise in more than one cultural area or historical period: to learn all of the necessary languages, to be both a good philologist and a good anthropologist." Time (for training students, for doing research) is always limited, and this means that choices must always be made. Choosing one option excludes pursuing others. What this means, then, is that the rhetoric of time limitation is ultimately translatable into language concerning priorities. To say that there is insufficient time to specialize in more than a single geographical area is tantamount to saying "I will give priority to India over China" (or vice versa); or to saying "It is more important to have greater knowledge of one geographical area than lesser knowledge of two (or more)." Likewise, using the rhetoric of time limitation as justification for avoiding methodological questions reduces to giving priority to nonmethodological, first-order discourse. Hence, the fact that there is not enough time for *x* translates into the fact that *y* must take priority. In another, as yet unfinished, essay related to this issue I use Mikhail Bakhtin's notions of "chronotopes" as a way of periodizing the development of Buddhist Studies.

are in contention. Not to speak to these issues by retreating in reactionary, isolationist or skeptical ways is in effect to give up one's vote: to forsake the opportunity of allowing one's voice to be heard.

The alternative, as I have mentioned, is to enter the methodological debate in a way that is both critical and dialogical. To do so is not only to accept the fact of methodological heterogeneity but also its implications. The different theoretical approaches to the study of Buddhism challenge each other and demand not only mutual respect but mutual response.

Of course, such a dialogue must begin with an identification of the different perspectives. One of the best entrees into the identification of the variant styles of scholarship is not through their sympathetic depiction, but through their caricature in stereotypes. These stereotypes are often constructed in such a way that specific styles of scholarship are associated with specific racial/ethnic, national, religious and gender characteristics. Like all stereotypes, they are falsehoods: racist, sexist and generally exhibiting the type of intolerance to which we as human beings are unfortunately heir. But exist they do. My purpose in listing some of these now is not so much to directly criticize them, though this needs to be done, but to utilize them as a venue for identifying the different methodological perspectives on which they, in their grotesque way, are based. For better or for worse, let us proceed.

1. Critical distance from the object of intellectual analysis is necessary. Buddhists, by virtue of their religious commitment, lack such critical distance from Buddhism. Hence, Buddhists are *never* good buddhologists.[21] Or, alternatively, those who take any aspect of Buddhist doctrine seriously (whether pro or con) are scientifically suspect by virtue of allowing their individual beliefs to affect their scholarship. Good scholarship is neutral as regards questions of truth. Hence, evaluative / normative scholarship falls outside of the purview of Buddhist Studies.
2. Interesting and / or serious Buddhist Studies only takes place in the northern hemisphere (and substitute for "northern hemisphere" any one of a number of geographical areas: Europe, North America, Japan and so forth).
3. North Americans are poor philologists; when they rely on primary

21. For the opposite view, see May, "Etudes Bouddhiques" p. 18: "As for the practice of the religion itself, it can certainly be combined with academic erudition. This is frequently the case in Japan . . ." (my trans.)

textual material at all, they do so in an uninformed, extravagant and frivolous way as a means of substantiating overly broad hypotheses that are, in any case, of dubious scientific interest. Their philological naïveté makes them turn to questions of theory rather than substance, and this in turn makes them prone to the dogmatic acceptance of the latest methodological fad.

4. German and earlier French scholarship is so obsessed with the minutiae of textual criticism that it is incapable of achieving any kind of broad overview of the meaning of individual texts, much less an understanding of Buddhist doctrine / praxis in broad terms. Scholars from these traditions often lack knowledge of *modern* Asian languages; their scholarship is usually of the arm-chair variety, devoid of any contact with living traditions. This leads them to dogmatically dismiss the value of oral traditions of textual transmission and to disregard the popular and nonliterary aspects of Buddhism. In their superficial treatment of texts they are uninterested in—and in any case incapable of—critically assessing the philosophical validity and broader implications of Buddhist doctrine.

5. Continuing east, Indian scholarship, encumbered by years of neo-Vedantist influence, is incapable of perceiving Buddhism as a distinct entity; and even in the rare instances when it does, it is neither systematic, critical nor historical.

6. Chinese scholarship is, in its Taiwanese variety, pietistic, sectarian, at most *only* historical, and in any case consists primarily of the careless republishing of out-of-print editions. On the mainland, it is hostage to the imprimatur of Marxist-Maoist ideologues.

7. Japanese scholarship consists entirely of philological work of insignificant worth, or, alternatively, of cataloguing, indexing and lexicography; in no instance do we find anything "creative" or "innovative" in Japanese scholarship.

8. Anthropologists, archaeologists, epigraphers and art historians are textually, and often historically, uninformed. If they were not, they would be doing what the rest of us are doing.

9. And finally, feminist criticism (and some would say the scholarship of women generally) must be tolerated but, consisting chiefly of subjective evaluations and emotional appeals with no basis in rigorous scientific principles, is not to be taken seriously.

Now there are various ways of gleaning from these caricatures the different perspectives on methodological issues that today divide the field. One such way consists of identifying the perspectives or vantage points

from which the above stereotypes emerge by identifying the voices that speak them. Broadly, we encounter two schools of thought operative here. One we can call *positivist*, the other *interpretivist*.

Positivists conceive of texts—whether linguistic (written or oral), or cultural (behavioral, artistic, etc.)—as the beginning and end of the scholarly enterprise.[22] In its philological variety, positivism sees a written text as complete and whole. It maintains that the purpose of scholarly textual investigation—and the use of science as a model for humanistic research here is always implied[23]—is to reconstruct the original[24] text (there is *only one* best reconstruction): to restore it and to contextualize it historically to the point where the author's original intention can be gleaned.[25] The principles of textual criticism represent an established,

22. That the notion of text can be more broadly construed, as I have done here, to include oral material, religious behavior (e. g., ritual, pilgrimage, etc.) and art, should by now be a fairly familiar move. Critics often overlook the fact that written texts are not the only objects of the positivist enterprise. Positivist anthropology, for example, uses "texts" of a different sort (cultural artifacts such as rituals or kinship patterns) to similar ends as philological positivism. If our focus is on the latter in this essay, it is only because it is the positivism of the philological variety that has become the object of recent critical scrutiny, and not because philological positivism is the only form to be found in the academy, even in Buddhist Studies.

23. Seyfort Ruegg, "A propos" p. 320, is careful to use the word "science" in quotation marks when referring to work "guided by principles derived from the study of Tibetan sources." Others, however, continue to operate under the assumption that philology is *wissenschatlich* in very much of a positivist sense of the term.

24. The relationship between philology and the quest for origins goes beyond the search for the original ur-text, the autograph. In some instances philology has been seen as the key to recovering primitive or original Buddhism as a whole. E. Burnouf, for instance, believed that the latter could be reconstructed based on an analysis of the commonalties between Pali and Sanskrit texts; see his *Introduction a l'histoire du Bouddhisme Indien, Tome* I (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1844) p. 11; and also de Jong, "A Brief History," pt. I, p. 73.

25. One of the clearest brief statements regarding the "methods of philology" to be found in the Buddhist Studies literature is Seyfort Ruegg's in "A propos of a Recent Contribution" p. 322. See also, J. W. de Jong, "De Studie van het Boeddhisme, Problemen an Perspectieven" (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1956); in English translation, "The Study of Buddhism: Problems and Perspectives," *Buddhist Studies by J. W. de Jong,* ed. Gregory Schopen (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979) 15-28. The difference between the approach of Seyfort Ruegg and the extremist position being characterized here

fixed and finely tuned scientific method; hence, there is no need for further methodological reflection.[26] To reconstitute the text in this way is to make it available in a neutral, untampered-with and pristine fashion. This is not only sufficient and worthwhile, it is in any case all that is achievable, even in principle. Once the text has been reconstituted in this way, its meaning unfolds from within itself, without any need for interpretation. The goal of scholarship is to allow texts to speak for themselves. Scholars are not multifaceted prisms through which texts pass and refract. They are mirrors on which texts reflect and congeal into wholes. It is the text and at most its historical context that should be the sole concern of the scholar: the end-point of the scholarly enterprise. To

is that the former acknowledges the validity and worth of other forms of analysis not philological. It is, however, true that Seyfort Ruegg in that same essay (p. 322) excludes "comparative and general studies" from Tibetology and Buddhology proper. The latter disciplines—"whose methods and 'programme' . . . can in the last analysis be determined only by intrinsic criteria" (p. 321)—he perceives as "necessary prerequisites" for, but distinct from, the former type of work. Moreover, Seyfort Ruegg sees philology as providing "a vital nucleus in this diversified field" (that is, in Tibetology). From this it can be surmised that for Seyfort Ruegg—at least for the Seyfort Ruegg of 1962—Tibetology and Buddhology proper are philological disciplines, and that these philological disciplines form the basis and core for other methodological approaches to Tibetan civilization and Buddhism, respectively. A similar position is held by de Jong, "The Study of Buddhism" p. 16, where he sees philology, that is, the study of Buddhist literature, as being fundamental and

> the most important source of knowledge of Buddhism. Buddhist art, inscriptions and coins have supplied us with useful data, but generally they cannot be fully understood without the support given by the texts. Consequently, the study of Buddhism needs first of all to be concentrated on the texts which have been transmitted, and, indeed, it [Buddhist Studies] only made good progress after Buddhist philology had been established on a sound basis.

De Jong, too, is more moderate than the extremist position being characterized here in that he sees other research strategies, e. g., direct contact with Buddhist cultures, as being necessary to an understanding of Buddhism.

26. Consider as an example of the rhetoric of the finality of method the following words of Nagao Gadjin, "Reflections on Tibetan Studies in Japan" p. 112: "Since approximately fifty years ago, when Yamaguchi Susumu and others returned to Japan from study in Europe, the method of studying the combined Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese versions has been established, and is now generally accepted by scholars."

go beyond them—and in most instances this means even considering the opinion of what later interpreters in the tradition have to say—is to go beyond the author's intention. It is to pollute scholarship with personal bias, either one's own or those of others.[27] In the words of Clifford Geertz, the role of the *text positivist* "dissolves into that of an honest broker passing on the substance of things with only the most trivial of transaction costs."[28]

Interpretivists believe that texts, though the starting point of scholarship, are not ends in themselves. They maintain that interpretation infuses every part of humanistic scholarship, even apparently "neutral" tasks such as textual criticism and lexicography. There is, for the interpretivist, no escape from subjective contamination, no preinterpretive moment.[29] Interpretivists eschew the notion that there is a single achiev-

27. What I am characterizing here as philological positivism is of course closely linked to the nineteenth century hermeneutical tradition as represented by Schleiermacher and Dilthey (what Gadamer calls "romantic hermeneutics"). See Andrew P. Tuck, *Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and also Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev. edition (New York: Continuum, 1993) pt. 2.

28. Geertz, *Works and Lives* p. 145.

29. An interesting analysis of the way in which scholars' subjective methodological and theoretical presuppositions have affected their results is to be found in de Jong's historiographical discussion of the Western scholarly study of the Buddha "legend." In his "The Study of Buddhism," and more extensively in "A Brief History of Buddhist Studies," he shows how the interpretive strategies of figures like Senart, Kern and Oldenburg molded their conception of the Buddha as a mythical / historical figure. Not content simply to point out the variation in the perceptions concerning the Buddha, de Jong himself proposes a method for its resolution, namely greater reliance on the methods of historical criticism; in particular, he believes that comparison to non-Buddhist sources can yield the historical truths in the traditional accounts of the life of the Buddha. As in the former cases, it is likely that this method, rather than yielding new "facts" concerning the Buddha's life, is simply reflective of de Jong's own scholarly style and presuppositions. See his "The Study of Buddhism" pp. 25-26. Enigmatically, he ends this latter essay by claiming that no historical approach to the study of Buddhism is possible, "because in the spiritual life of India the historical dimension is of much less importance than it is in Western civilization" (p. 26). Implicit here is the presupposition that Western scholarly methods employed in the study of Buddhism must correspond to the world view in which Buddhism existed and evolved—an

able text that represents an author's original intention.[30] Every move in the philological process represents an instance of personal choice, and these choices have their consequences.[31] Given the intensely subjective character of humanistic scholarship, we have no choice but to reflect methodologically on what we do, indicating to readers our theoretical presuppositions and providing them with reasons for why we have chosen certain methodological options over others. A scholar's signature must appear not only on the title page, but throughout the entire work through the manifest exposition of his or her subjectivity.[32]

Interpretivists are usually not content simply to engage in a negative critique of what they perceive to be the scientistic dogmas of positivists. They want to go further and to propose certain positive theses of their own. For example, interpretivists often wish to assert that texts, far from being the end-point of scholarly praxis, are the starting points for further

almost theological stance. Leading de Jong beyond pure philology as the sole method, he comes to the conclusion that "the most important task for the student of Buddhism is the study of Buddhist mentality. That is why contact with present-day Buddhism is so important, for this will guard us against seeing the texts purely as philological material and forgetting that for the Buddhist they are sacred texts which proclaim a message of salvation" (p. 26). Though never rejecting the importance of philology, it is clear from this passage that de Jong sees philology as incomplete and in need of being supplemented by other methods. How easy—and how inaccurate—it would be, on the basis of his other writings, to characterize de Jong, the consummate philologist, as a positivist. If there is one lesson to be learned from this discussion it is that the positivist / interpretivist distinction I am drawing here is only heuristically useful, and that methodological affiliation in the real life of practicing scholars is a more complex phenomenon than we have access to using such a simplified model.

30. For a devastating critique of the notion that the only goal of textual criticism is achieving a text that represents the author's intention, see McGann, *The Textual Condition*, ch. 3.

31. For an actual example of the choices that confront the editor of a text, and of the consequences of those choices on how the text is understood, see McGann, *The Textual Condition*, ch. 1. Although McGann would probably not want to be considered an interpretivist in some senses of the term, it is clear from his writings that he opposes the "editor-as-technical-functionary" model of textual scholarship that is paradigmatic of positivism, or what he calls "empiricism."

32. As an interesting counterpoint to this view, see David Macey's characterization of Foucault's view of authorial subjectivity in *The Lives of Michel Foucault* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993) xiv-xvi.

reflection. The fact that a written text, a ritual or a work of art is (or was) meaningful is an indication of the fact that it can teach us broader lessons beyond itself: that it can, for example, be a source for developing more general principles, theories or laws that concern what people believe or how they behave.[33] Some interpretivists would go so far as to claim that texts can even serve as sources of normative insight about the world by serving as sources for the evaluative assessment of claims concerning truth, beauty and human well-being.[34] Given that all scholarship is "refractory," asks the interpretivist, why not admit to the creative role of the investigator and celebrate, as it were, this creativity and freedom in scholarship itself?

It should be clear from the way in which I have characterized these two paradigms—the positivist and interpretivist—that they are themselves caricatures. They are, to borrow a phrase from Max Weber, "ideal types" that are rarely, if ever, instantiated in real life. For example, few philologists today consider their work to be completely objective[35]; and few scholars with interpretivist leanings are willing to abandon philological standards of accuracy and rigor. Hence, pure positivists and interpre-

33. Collins, *Selfless Persons*, sees the comparative project in which he is engaged, for example, as capable of illuminating our own "inherent concerns and presuppositions, and perhaps the general nature of human thought (if such exists)" by "acting as a mirror to our own thinking" (pp. 2-3). And John C. Holt, *Buddha in the Crown: Avalokiteśvara in the Buddhist Traditions of Sri Lanka* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), suggests that the process of the transformation of religious symbols might be found in religious traditions other than Buddhism, so that he sees his work as uncovering "principles of religious assimilation generally." I myself make an analogous claim about scholasticism in *Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

34. Seyfort Ruegg, "Some Observations" p. 105, for example, sees the Buddhist world view as making normative contributions to ethics; see his n. 1 for relevant bibliography concerning this issue.

35. Consider Lambert Schmithausen's remarks in *Buddhism and Nature*, Studia Philologica Buddhica Occasional Papers Series VII (Tokyo: The International Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1991) p. 2, sec. 2: "As a scholar I am expected to deal with my subject-matter in an objective way. If this were to mean without emotional concern, and without a personal standpoint, I have to admit failure in advance." Nonetheless, Schmithausen makes it clear that having a personal standpoint and being emotionally concerned does not prevent scholars from engaging in their task "as objectively as possible" (p. 2, sec. 3.1).

tivists are fictions, but though fictions there are some heuristic advantages in considering them. Their most important function for our purposes is to serve as reagents that distill the attitudes of the previously mentioned stereotypes, bringing them down to their most basic forms. In addition—if I may be allowed to extend the chemical analogy a little further—they serve as foci around which to crystallize the fundamental methodological issues over which buddhologists today tend to differ. What are these issues?

The necessity of methodological reflection[36]

This has already been dealt with above to a large extent. That there are fundamental issues in the discipline that have yet to be fully explored is, in any case, what much of this essay is about. The need for methodological debate in a discipline comes about when there emerges a critical mass of scholars who perceive themselves as engaging in research strategies that are substantively different from those that preceded them. This leads them to formulate their new method in more precise terms, distinguishing it from what came before; ultimately, it leads them to question the previous paradigm's hegemony, validity or both.[37]

Those familiar with the work of Thomas Kuhn may conclude, wrongly, that I am here predicting or advocating some kind of paradigm shift in Buddhist Studies. It is not my intention, however, to forecast, much less to argue for, an end to philology as a mode of scholarship.[38] This essay is rather a call for conversation and mutual understanding between different views on key issues that I perceive to be representative of different styles of contemporary scholarly praxis. Not to engage in methodological reflection and debate at this point, however, could indeed polarize the field, whether or not this inevitably results in a paradigm shift. In general, however, I do not believe that the Kuhnian model for

36. This is not, strictly speaking, a methodological, but rather a theoretical (or meta-methodological), issue. It is a claim *about* methodology (that it needs to be more fully discussed) rather than an issue *in* methodology proper.

37. To question the hegemony of a previous paradigm is to demand a voice alongside the latter; to question its validity is to demand an end to the previous mode of scholarly praxis altogether.

38. Indeed, I have argued in print for the importance of textual studies, and for the fact that methodological speculation should occur alongside such studies and not replace them. See my "On Retreating to Method and Other Postmodern Turns: A Response to C. W. Huntington," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 15.1 (1992): 134-144.

change within disciplines—essentially agonistic, one mode of discourse defeating another—is the only viable one. An alternative is the critical-dialogical model I am setting forth here, the result of which is not the wholesale triumph of one view over another, but the mutual, albeit critical, understanding of perspectives.

The question of objectivity

At a previous meeting of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Paris I had the great fortune to have dined with a one of those rare colleagues who holds close to a positivist view on the issue of objectivity. In his characterization of it, it went something like this. In working with a Buddhist (or indeed any kind of classical) text, scholars can and should be devoid of—or rather, since this is something that must be cultivated, "void themselves of"—all bias and prejudice, allowing the text to speak for itself. This critical distance, though difficult to achieve, is attainable through training and sustained effort. The result is the total eradication of all subjective elements in the scholarly enterprise, so that one becomes "the disinterested observer, wherein one strives to bracket one's own opinions and agendas and applies the methods of historical criticism."[39] This is essential if scholarship is to be scientifically sound. Religious commitment to the text one is studying necessarily clouds judgment and prevents the scholar from achieving the kind of neutrality that is necessary to presenting the text as it was originally written and understood.[40] When confronted with difficult philological decisions—for example, key textual emendations or questions of authorship that run counter to the doctrines of the tradition—allegiance to the religious world view one is investigating prevents the scholar with a faith commitment from making the appropriate decision.[41] Therefore, Buddhists can never achieve the kind of pure objectivity that is called for in scholarly research on Bud-

39. See, e. g., Foulk, "Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies" p. 173. An attempt to come to terms with and to dispel some of the prejudices that have infiltrated the field of Indian Studies is found in Johannes Bronkhorst, "L'Indianisme et les préjugés occidentaux," *Études de Lettres* (Lausanne) (April / June 1989): 119-136.

40. On some of the tensions between being Buddhist and studying Buddhism in a Japanese context see Foulk, "Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies" pp. 106-108. See also Paul J. Griffiths' caricature of the Buddhist buddhologist in "Buddhist Hybrid English" pp. 21-22.

41. See Paul Griffith's remarks in his review of Schmithausen's *Ālayavijñāna*, p. 173.

dhist texts.[42] For this same reason scholars should refrain from relying on "native informants," lest scholarship become tainted by the bias that is endemic to traditional exegesis.[43] As a corollary, the study of the modern spoken languages of Asia, if necessary at all, are to be given low priority.

At the other end of the spectrum from this view is what we might call the hyper-subjectivist or constructionist position. It claims that a scholar's own subjectivity infiltrates every aspect of his or her work. Texts cannot speak for themselves because they do not exist objectively. It is the reader that creates or constructs a text in the very act of reading. Versions of this view are to be found in the writings of Paul De Man,[44] and more recently in a book by Jerome McGann.[45] A text exists only in the act of reading, and when scholars read a text, they do not glean an author's intention, but, as it were, only their own. Rather than a scholar being a mirror that reflects an author's original intention, it is the text that serves as a mirror for the scholars' own concerns: their personal and social situation. Objectivity is a myth, as is the notion of a set of standards or criteria on the basis of which to arbitrate between competing interpretations. In De Man's words, "[reading] is an act of understanding that can never be observed, nor in any way prescribed or verified."[46]

42. It is sometimes maintained, as a corollary to this view, that even the mere exposure to living traditions is enough to contaminate the scholar's judgment, and should therefore be avoided.

43. It is interesting to note that despite the fact that Japanese Buddhist Studies has inherited many of the positivistic tendencies of its European counterpart, the Japanese do not exhibit this allergy to contact with the cultures they study. Tibetan Buddhist Studies in Japan, for example, began with the travels of Japanese scholars to Tibet; and Nagao Gadjin marks 1961, the year when three Tibetan informants came to Japan, as a turning point in Tibetan Studies in that country. See his "Reflections on Tibetan Studies in Japan," *Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture* 29 (1975): 107-128. See also Matsumoto, *Tibetan Studies in Japan* p. 10.

44. See, for example, De Man, "The Rhetoric of Blindness."

45. Jerome J. McGann, *The Textual Condition*. McGann's version of textuality differs from De Man's in that it is less idealist and more materialist, emphasizing the social and historical dimensions of the act of reading. Both theorists, however, fall into the constructionist camp.

46. "The Rhetoric of Blindness" p. 107. For McGann (*The Textual Condition* p. 10) the fact of interpretational variety is due not only to the situational diversity of readers, but is something that inheres within texts themselves.

The true subjectivist is a relativist.[47]

My purpose here, and in this paper as whole, is not to suggest a resolution to the question of objectivity, or even a direction for a critical dialogue on this or other issues. This is of course impossible both to predict and to prescribe. It is something that will instead evolve in response to the interests and needs of scholars. My goal is simply to point out that methodological differences on this question (and the others that follow) do exist, and to suggest that their discussion is an essential part of the critical dialogue on method that is needed in the discipline.

Interpretation and creativity

To consider *fully* the disciplinarity of a field like Buddhist Studies, which this paper does not purport to do, requires an investigation of its intellectual sociology. What social processes are involved in becoming employed as a buddhologist, in the granting of tenure and in the making of reputations? What books and articles get published and how is this decided? How are students supported and trained[48]? In brief, what criteria are operative in deciding what constitutes knowledge, and how is this knowledge institutionally transmitted and disseminated, and to whom? These issues are too complex to treat here in their entirety. It is however possible to use the discussion of interpretation and creativity as a venue—or perhaps "excuse"—for examining one somewhat contained issue: the nature of acceptable research.[49] Guidelines—usually implicit—

47. A critique of the notion of the objectivism implicit in Western scholarship on Nagarjuna is to be found in Tuck, *Comparative Philosophy*. Though not as radical as the position outlined here, and though rhetorically repudiating relativism, Tuck's view that all reading is isogetical leaves one with the impression that the various Western interpretations of Nāgārjuna that he analyzes are *solely* the result of the relative paradigmatic and psychological "site" of various scholars, making him effectively a relativist. See also Johannes Bronkhorst's review (and criticism) of Tuck on this very issue, "On the Method of Interpreting Philosophical Sanskrit Texts," *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* 67.3 (1993): 501-511, though it might be argued that Bronkhorst's rejection of the fact that knowledge is culturally embedded in fact goes too far, risking a fall into the extreme of positivism.

48. May's "Études Bouddhiques" is dedicated in large part to setting forth principles along the lines of which the training of students should be based.

49. An interesting attempt to prescribe what constitutes valid research, or in his words, "true progress of Tibetan Buddhist studies as a highly developed field of scholarly inquiry," is Michel Strickmann's bibliographical article, "A Survey of Tibetan Buddhist Studies," *Eastern Buddhist* 10.1 (May, 1977):

In theological discourse the authorial subject speaks or writes from within a specific religious world view; that is, theological authors explicitly situate themselves within a specific tradition. In its standard form, Buddhist theology presupposes—or, alternatively, argues for—the validity of the doctrinal claims of Buddhism,[57] the value and significance of its art[58] and/or the efficacy of its practices; it also utilizes these as the essential raw materials of the discourse itself. Theological discourse need

value of doctrinal, more broadly religious, aesthetic or methodological claims. Normative discourse can then be further subdivided in terms of where authorial subjects situate themselves in such discussions: it is theological when authors locate themselves within a religious tradition, and philosophical when they either locate themselves outside of a specific religious world view or are rhetorically neutral on their religious location. Methodological reflection then becomes a specific kind of philosophical discourse that instead of focusing on primary Buddhist artifacts (doctrines, rituals, art, etc.) focuses on second-order issues pertaining to how these artifacts are to be studied. But again, the distinctions between the three modes of discourse is not always clear-cut. And it is frequently the case that a single work will shift between these different modes. A good example of this is a recent work of Anne C. Klein, *Meeting the Great Bliss Queen: Buddhists, Feminists and the Art of the Self* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), in which she is self-consciously engaged in both methodological and theological reflection. Another example is Lambert Schmithausen's *Buddhism and Nature*. Though principally a philological and historical work, whose goal it is to "describe and analyze, as *objectively* as possible, the attitude of the Buddhist tradition toward nature" (p. 2, sec. 3.1, my emphasis), there are definite normative dimensions to Schmithausen's work, in that he sees Buddhist speculation on nature as contributing to the discussion of the contemporary problem of environmental destruction and pollution. Schmithausen also sees another goal of his work to be that of making "contemporary Buddhists aware of the multifacetedness and ambivalence of their tradition in order to have them lay stress, consciously, on those strands which favor a positive attitude toward nature consonant with present day requirements" (p. 56, sec. 63.1).

57. See, for example, Gunapala Dharmasiri, *A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God* (Antioch, CA: Golden Leavs, 1988 [rpt.]).

58. See Marilyn M. Rhie and Robert A. F. Thurman, *Wisdom and Compassion: The Sacred Art of Tibet* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1991). A critical review of the work exists in David Jackson's "Appropos a Recent Tibetan Art Catalogue," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde sudasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie*, Band 37 (1993): 109-130. The latter is in many ways a critique of the former's—sometimes overt, sometimes unacknowledged—theological (Jackson calls them "Geluk-centric" and "theocratic"), myth-creating and idealizing agenda.

not always be dogmatic, however, since it sometimes engages doctrines and practices in critical ways[59]; but whether dogmatic or critical, theology situates itself within a particular religious perspective.[60]

In contrast to theology, philosophical discourse *does not* situate itself within, say, the Buddhist tradition. Though concerned with the normative evaluation of Buddhism, it is not grounded in a specifically Buddhist religious world view.[61] Finally, methodological discourse too can be normative. When it is so, it can be situated either within[62] or outside[63] of a specific Buddhist religious world view, and rather than taking specific Buddhist artifacts (doctrines, rituals, etc.) as its direct subject matter, it is instead chiefly concerned with the assessment of options in their study.[64]

59. The work of Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shiro might be considered paradigmatic of what I am here calling critical Buddhist theology. See Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, eds., *Critical Buddhism: A Critical Appraisal*, a forthcoming anthology and study of the work of these two figures. N. David Eckel's somewhat ambiguous remarks in "The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 62.4 (1994): 1099, might be interpreted as a call for the possibility of a critical Buddhist theology situated in the academy.

60. It is conceivable, however, that such a perspective be non-Buddhist. A critique of Buddhism that situates itself within a Christian perspective is equally theological. See, for example, Steve Odin, *Process Metaphysics and Hua-yen Buddhism: A Critical Study of Mutual Penetration vs. Interpenetration* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1982).

61. Exemplary of this approach is the work of Paul Griffiths; see his *On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem* (La Salle, Il.: Open Court, 1986), and *An Apology for Apologetics: A Study in the Logic of Interreligious Discourse* (Maryknoll, N. Y.: Orbis Books, 1991).

62. See Rita M. Gross, *Buddhism After Patriarchy: A Feminist History, Analysis and Reconstruction of Buddhism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); and Anne Carolyn Klein, *Meeting the Great Bliss Queen: Buddhists, Feminists and the Art of the Self* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).

63. See, for example, Tuck, *Comparative Philosophy*.

64. Although the set of distinctions I have drawn here between theology, philosophy and methodology represents one way of conceptualizing the differences between these three modes of discourse, it is not the only one. Christian theologians have discussed this issue for some time—in the context of the debate concerning whether or not theology belongs in the secular academy, to cite just one example. As all three of these underrepresented forms of discourse become more prevalent in Buddhist Studies, as I think they will, we would do well to consider the latter literature in a serious manner.

To summarize, from the positivist point of view, normative forms of discourse—like the three just outlined—fall outside of the scope of Buddhist Studies. From the interpretivist perspective, on the other hand, there does exist a place within the academy for these modes of analysis.[65] Normative forms of discourse are paradigmatic examples of creative scholarship in that they use texts as points of departure for the investigation of broader issues—issues such as the truth or falsity of various claims, or their implications.

The question of the author's original intention

An ancient Buddhist painting, now in a museum, is "restored" using the latest technology; a ritual never before performed in public is enacted before cameras so that the scholar may film it and preserve it "before the tradition is lost"; the textual scholar publishes the definitive critical edition of a tantric manuscript based on all known recensions and utilizing all known fragments. Do we have in these various enterprises the preservation and presentation of the various authors' original intentions? The question is not so easily answered. As the narrator in one of Guenther Grass's recent books says, there is the finest of lines between restoration and forgery.

The positivist will want to argue that every text has a single definitive and final meaning, and that this represents the author's original intention. Recapturing this is the goal of textual scholarship. Interpretivists will respond variously. Some will want to repudiate the notion of authorial intention altogether. What authors intend, if they intend anything at all, is rarely static and monothetic: authors frequently change their minds, even in the very process of writing. And even if authorial intention were capturable in principle, it is doubtful whether an academic, scholarly format of presentation is what Buddhist authors had in mind. The repudiation of authorial intention will be seen by some pessimistically—we are forever doomed to living within the closed world of our own interpretations; and by others optimistically—this gives us license to manipulate texts in creative ways. Interpretivists of another ilk will want to grant the possibility of multiple interpretations, while rejecting the notion that anything goes. For the latter there must exist ways to arbitrate

65. Of course classical Buddhist texts are themselves theological in their mode of discourse. Contemporary examples by Western scholars are more difficult to identify. Some of the writings of Anne Klein, Stephen Batchelor, Robert Thurman, and Rita Gross come to mind.

between competing interpretations; here authorial intention may be one, though not the only, factor in judging adequacy.

In principle, a critical dialogue on authorial intention could of course lead to some kind of resolution or consensus on the issue; but, as with most complex issues of method, if this occurs at all it will most likely occur only locally—in the context of individual self-contained conversations. But the point of a critical dialogue on questions of method is not of course to reach final and universal consensus. Rather, it is to converse, and in so doing to clarify our own and others' positions on important issues, *for* ourselves and others.

Beyond written texts

It is interesting that disciplines that pride themselves on critical distance from their object of study often implicitly incorporate many of its assumptions and presuppositions without being aware of the fact that this is the case. Buddhist Studies is no exception here, uncritically recapitulating in its scholarly literature many traditional Buddhist presuppositions.[66] Nowhere is this more evident than in the discipline's focus on the written, doctrinal text as the principal object of investigation.[67] This

66. In Indian / Tibetan Buddhist Studies a prime example is to be found in the adoption of the fourfold *siddhānta* schema as an explanatory mechanism. In the academic study of Indian philosophy the same can be said to be true of the classical "six systems." On the former see my "The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Siddhānta in Tibetan Buddhism," *Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota*, eds. Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan (San Francisco: Buddhist Books International, 1990) 7-26; and on the implications of adopting the six *darśana* framework as normative see Tuck, *Comparative Philosophy* pp. 16-30. Strickmann, "A Survey of Tibetan Buddhist Studies" pp. 140-141, discusses the implications of Western scholars uncritically adopting a fourfold division of the Tantras as found in later traditional exegesis. Foulk, "Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies" p. 108, speaks of the recapitulation in Western scholarship of sectarian Japanese interests, and (p. 113) of the ways in which "conclusions reached in Japanese Buddhist theology are carried over into ostensibly critical Western scholarship without being recognized and tagged as coming from a normative tradition"; see also pp. 136 and 145 of that same essay for yet other examples of the phenomenon being described here.

67. That the written text is not an entity that can be isolated and considered separate from other semiotic forms is a point that was made as early as P. Mus's classic study, *Barabudur*. More recently, the same point has been made by Steven Collins and Gregory Schopen (see note 3).

emphasis on the conceptual, chirographic and doctrinal seems to be in large part inherited from monastic Buddhism itself, where we often find a rhetoric that emphasizes the study of texts and the doctrines found in them over the study of other semiotic forms. Be that as it may, it is indisputable that written texts and the doctrines they teach have received a disproportionate amount of attention in the scholarly literature of the field. There may be good scholarly reasons for this, but these will have to be given, and no longer simply assumed, in the critical dialogue on method that I envision. This is especially true given the fact that critics have, from within the discipline itself, begun to challenge what they perceive to be the monopolization of the field by the written text, and especially by doctrinally oriented scholarship.[68] There is today a call for the increased investigation of alternative semiotic forms—oral and vernacular traditions,[69] epigraphy,[70] ritual,[71] patterns of social and institutional

68. It is no accident, for example, that when J. W. de Jong wrote his masterful "A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America," he should have put the "main emphasis . . . on philological studies."

69. Recently, Anne C. Klein has explored the importance of "oral genres" in one school of Tibetan Buddhism in her *Path to the Middle: Oral Madhyamika Philosophy in Tibet, the Spoken Scholarship of Kensur Yeshey Tupden* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). On the rise and fall of vernacular texts of the Theravāda tradition as the objects of European scholarly study see Charles Hallisey, "Roads Taken and Not Taken in the Study of Theravāda Buddhism," in Donald S. Lopez, ed., *Curators of the Buddha*.

70. See note 3.

71. What Michel Strickmann sees as essential to the understanding of the Buddhist Tantras, others have seen as essential to Buddhist Studies as a whole. "To make their bare bones live will require a powerful supplement drawn from both Tibetan scholastic and ritual literature and from direct observation (or, indeed, participation). Until Tibetan philology has been durably wed to Mercury in a series of such studies, it would be unwise to imagine that we understand the real import of the later Tantras." "A Survey of Tibetan Buddhist Studies," *Eastern Buddhist* 10.1 (May, 1977): 139; see also p. 141, where he sees the study of iconography as essential to an understanding of the Tantric tradition. On the importance of ritual in Ch'an Buddhism see Robert H. Sharf, "The Idolization of Enlightenment: On the Mummification of Ch'an Masters in Medieval China," *History of Religions* 32.1 (1992): 1-31; and T. Griffith Foulk and Robert H. Sharf, "On the Ritual Use of Ch'an Portraiture in Medieval China," *Cahiers d'Extrême-Asie* 7 (1993-94): 149-219.

evolution,[72] gender,[73] lay and folk traditions,[74] art, archaeology and architecture. Moreover, many of the critics who push for greater scholarly emphasis on the nondoctrinal are asking for more than merely a voice, since part of the critique is that the study of alternative semiotic forms directly impinges on, and challenges, the validity of the strictly chirographic-doctrinal paradigm. The claim is not simply that the investigation of other semiotic forms should exist alongside the study of doctrine as it is found in written texts, but that doctrine itself cannot be fully understood independently of culture in the broad sense of the term.[75] The critique is really a call for greater balance and holism within the field; it is not only a demand that equal recognition be given to new areas of research, but a call for an integrated and mutually interpenetrating research program aimed at the understanding of Buddhism as a multifaceted entity. It is, in effect, a critique of methodological isolationism.[76]

72. See note 3; also, Hallisey, "Roads Taken and Not Taken" p. 51.

73. See note 79.

74. Consider the words of the anthropologist Stan Mumford, *Himalayan Dialogue: Tibetan Lamas and Gurung Shamans in Nepal* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989): "Tibetan Lamaism, as one of the world's great ritual traditions, could then be understood as a process that emerges through dialogue with the more ancient folk layer that it confronts, rather than as a completed cultural entity represented in the texts" (p. 2); or again, "The textual language . . . cannot determine the meaning of these rites. Each time they are enacted or commented upon they incorporate traces of local folk consciousness that are embedded in the lived experience of the valley" (p. 12). See also, S. J. Tambiah, *The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets*, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology 49 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Richard Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere, *Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), and the review of the latter by Vijitha Rajapakse, *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 13.2: 139-151; George D. Bond, *The Buddhist Revival in Sri Lanka: Religious Tradition, Reinterpretation and Response* (Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1988).

75. For a description of what such a holistic approach might look like in the study of "a single temple or monastic complex," see Michel Strickmann, "A Survey of Tibetan Buddhist Studies" p. 142.

76. For a discussion of this issue in regard to Tibetan Buddhist philosophic studies see my "On the *sGra pa Shes rab rin chen pa'i rtsod lan* of Pan chen bLo bzang chos rgyan," *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* 49.4 (1995).

The relationship of Buddhist Studies to the larger academic community

In much contemporary critical literature in the field we increasingly find Buddhology characterized as a provincial discipline—ignorant of emerging theoretical developments in related fields, and reluctant to enter into conversation even with the most natural of dialogue partners (e. g., Indology, Sinology etc.). The perceived isolationist tendencies of the discipline are seen as fostering a kind of intellectual hermeticism that makes buddhological scholarship increasingly less relevant to the larger academic community. Two types of remedies are called for. On the one hand, we find a call for greater cultural contextualization, where the objects of study of the field (written texts, institutions, art, rituals etc.) are investigated not only against a particular Buddhist background, but vis a vis the larger cultural context in which those objects—and Buddhism itself—exist; hence, for example, the attempt to consider classic questions of Chinese Buddhism in the broader context of Chinese intellectual history,[77] or the attempt on the part of anthropologists to situate Buddhism as "part of a large social and cultural system."[78]

On the other hand, we find in the recent critical literature an insistence on the fact that buddhologists need to become more conversant with theories, methods and forms of analysis current in the academy. This has led to studies (and to calls for studies) that emphasize, for example, comparative, cross-cultural analysis,[79] feminist criticism,[80] deconstruction,[81]

77. See Peter N. Gregory, ed., *Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought*, Kuroda Institute Studies in East Asian Buddhism 5 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987); and the review by Foulk, "Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies." Bernard Faure, *La volonté d'othodoxie dans le bouddhisme chinois* (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1988) 11, also sees the importance of "placing Ch'an in its political-religious context," of discussing its relationship with other Buddhist schools, and "with other currents in Chinese religions" (my trans.), although the latter gets dealt with only marginally by him in that particular work. See also Richard Gombrich, "Recovering the Buddha's message," in Ruegg and Schmithausen, eds., *Earliest Madhyamaka* p. 20.

78. Anthropologists have in fact emphasized this direction in scholarship early on. See, for example, Manning Nash, et. al., *Anthropological Studies in Theravada Buddhism*, Cultural Report Series 13 (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Area Studies, 1966). For a more recent study that attempts to do this in the Tibetan cultural area see Stan Mumford, *Himalayan Dialogue*.

79. Much of this work is to be found in the area of comparative philosophy in, for example, the pages of *Philosophy East and West*. See also the volumes in the recent series from SUNY Press, Toward a Comparative Philosophy of

and literary criticism.[82] To give heed to these trends in the broader intellectual sphere is seen as being profitable to Buddhist Studies in two ways. Intellectually, it is said to bring life to the discipline by suggesting new problems, and new perspectives on old ones; it is also said to give the discipline a voice in current debates and ultimately to help the field by demonstrating that the data from Buddhist cultures is relevant to the conversations that are taking place in the broader intellectual community.

The views just outlined clearly emerge out of an interpretivist framework. The positivist response to this kind of schoiarship is that it is faddish and that it dilutes the scholarly worth of the discipline. It is sufficiently difficult to gain the expertise necessary to engage in sound scholarship on Buddhist texts, and to impart that knowledge, without requiring of the buddhologist forays into new and unproven areas of investigation. Given that buddhological expertise confined to a narrow geographical

Religion. Other works with this emphasis include Chris Gudmunsen, *Wittgenstein and Buddhism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977); C. W. Huntington's introduction to *The Emptiness of Emptiness*; Robert A. F. Thurman's introduction to *Tsong kha pa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Steven Collins, *Selfless Persons*.

80. See the work of Anne Carolyn Klein, Diana Paul, Nancy Schuster, and Rita Gross; for more complete bibliographical references see the volume of essays edited by me, *Buddhism, Sexuality and Gender* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).

81. See Anne Carolyn Klein, *Meeting the Great Bliss Queen*; Roger Jackson, "Matching Concepts: Deconstructionist and Foundationalist Tendencies in Buddhist Thought," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 52.3 (1989): 561-589; Bernard Faure, *The Rhetoric of Immediacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

82. The methods of literary criticism are implicit in a variety of studies that employ and analyze categories such as orality, narrativity and rhetoric. In addition to previous references (Klein and Faure) see also Paula Richman, "Gender and Persuasion: The Portrayal of Beauty, Anguish and Nurturance in an Account of a Tamil Nun," and Miriam L. Levering, "Lin-chi (Rinzai), Ch'an and Gender: The Rhetoric of Equality and the Rhetoric of Heroism," in José Ignacio Cabezón, ed., *Buddhism, Sexuality and Gender*; also Robert E. Buswell, Jr., "The 'Short Cut' Approach of *K'an-hua* Meditation: The Evolution of a Practical Subitism in Chinese Ch'an Buddhism," in Peter N. Gregory, ed., *Sudden and Gradual*. Stan Mumford's *Himalayan Dialogue* relies heavily on the work of the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. See also William R. LaFleur, *The Karma of Words: Buddhism and the Arts in Medieval Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

area and time period is already pushing human limits to the extreme, how can we expect worthwhile scholarship to emerge from the pens of buddhologists who attempt broader forms even of intracultural contextualization, not to speak of cross-cultural comparative analysis. Underlying these generally pragmatic arguments, however, is the positivist's general skepticism concerning methodological novelty. Even if they were to accede to the practical possibility of these forms of analysis, positivists would reject them on principle, for interpretive methodologies of this kind distort the objects being studied, forcing them into preconceived theoretical molds. Moreover, *what is* so truly creative and original, asks the positivist, about appropriating the theories developed in other disciplines to buddhological ends? Is this not a form of methodological parasitism that shows little by way of innovation? If capitulation to the current fads in theory is the price of admission into the broader conversation, then perhaps better to send one's regrets.

Politics and the study of Buddhism

In addition to the challenges already mentioned, there has emerged in recent years another category of criticism not yet discussed, one that insists on the fact that politics (and, perhaps more generally, the analysis of power) is relevant to the study of Buddhism in a variety of ways. Most of these works are founded on one or both of the following methodological presuppositions: (1) that cultures are political entities, and (2) that scholarship (for example, the scholarship that takes a Buddhist culture as its object) is never politically neutral, either in its constitution or in its repercussions. The scholarly study of another culture—or of a specific aspect within a culture, e. g., Buddhism—should therefore (a) take into account "the features of asymmetry, inequality and domination"[83] that exist within that culture, (b) reflect on the fact that the scholar's work is affected by the power differential that exists between the two societies interacting (that of scholars and that of the society that is the object of their study), and (c) become aware of the fact that scholarship can itself affect subsequent societal attitudes and political policies.[84]

83. Sherry B. Ortner, *High Religion: A Cultural and Political History of Sherpa Buddhism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 12.

84. In this regard it is no accident that the first lines of Stan Mumford's *Himalayan Dialogue* should read, "A Highly reflexive mode of cultural interpretation is emerging, as cultural anthropologists recognize the impact they have on the societies they study and in turn find themselves being transformed internally by their informants" (p. 11).

Although the implications of this form of analysis are only now just beginning to be felt in Buddhist Studies,[85] its impact has had tremendous—and often devastating—consequences in other fields of study.[86] Like the study of most of Asia, the academic study of Buddhism as we know it is the heritage of a colonialist and missionary past. These activities have utilized scholarship as a means of consolidating power over other peoples, and although scholarly praxis has come a long way since the time when it was an overt instrument of such activities, critical theorists of the political sort often maintain that scholarly analysis continues to recapitulate its colonialist past. Some would go so far as to claim that it can never fully be divested of this heritage.

The nature of the relationship between a scholar and the culture that he or she studies may be different today, but economic and political power gradients still exist, and these must be taken into account in the very act of scholarly analysis. Scholarship in its widest sense (including admission to, or exclusion from, scholarly organizations; the publication and dissemination of information about religious liberty, or lack of it, etc.) can have tremendous consequences in the socio-political realm. Scholarship is a powerful mode of legitimation that can influence political events. At the same time, political institutions influence scholarship: by granting or refusing visas, allocating or withholding research funds, and so forth.

In short, the critiques of colonialism, neocolonialism, orientalism, and those that explore more broadly the relationship between power and knowledge, are beginning to challenge Buddhist Studies in new ways. If their claims are valid, it will mean not only reassessing the present of the field in terms of its political past, but also considering the future moral implications of its present.

As is the case with other fields, the response of buddhologists to such a challenge will undoubtedly vary. Some will maintain that socio-political analysis of this sort is reductionistic. In its preoccupation with power and control as motivating forces, it leaves no room for other human motivations, and in any case denies in a naive fashion the possibility of

85. See Lopez, ed., *Curators of the Buddha*; Christopher Queen and Sally King, eds., *Engaged Buddhism* (Albany: SUNY Press, forthcoming); T. Tillemans, "Où va la Philologie Bouddhique?" forthcoming in *Études de Lettres* (Lausanne).

86. Consider the way in which Edward Said's *Orientalism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) has already affected fields like contemporary Indian and Islamic Studies, for example.

objectivity. Others will maintain that politics has no place in the academy; that scholars simply report what is true. Scholarship may be used for political ends, but that is beyond the control of scholars; and in any case, is it not better that political bodies give support to and utilize fact rather than propagandist fiction?

Conclusion

What I have just described are some of the issues around which the critical dialogue on method will, I believe, take place. This list, however, is more impressionistic than complete. As I have already mentioned, it is of course impossible to predict, much less to prescribe, the agenda of this conversation or the turns that it will take. The issues and their resolutions (if any) are not predetermined. It is for this reason that I have refrained from couching the above discussion in a rhetoric that makes it appear as though the answers are there on the surface, just waiting to be had. I do not believe this to be so, and although I myself have formed some rather strong opinions in regard to many of these questions—something that has probably not gone unnoticed—I still remain baffled by others. Moreover, if I have chosen to frame these issues using extremist positivist and interpretivist views as foils, it is because (a) in the emerging critical literature in the field there already exists a tendency to characterize each other's positions in these ways; (b) many of these characterizations are the result of the ways in which we caricature and stereotype each other; and (c) the use of extremes to frame issues is heuristically useful, a very Buddhist device. If I have not opted for the Buddhist solution—by suggesting that the middle way is the way to go in each of these cases—it is because I believe these issues are complex enough that they are unamenable to moderate, middle-way types of solutions in all cases. Be that as it may, this is something that only future conversation itself can determine. But as Bakhtin has noted, a conversation can begin only when a monologue has ended, and so I end mine here with the hope that whether or not everything I have said is true, it is nonetheless provocative enough to act as the impetus for such a conversation.

63/5

Morality in the *Visuddhimagga*

by Damien Keown

This paper is intended as an explanatory analysis and summary of Buddhaghosa's discussion of *sīla* in Part One of the *Visuddhimagga*. It was produced originally for my own use but I hope it may be of some benefit to those who, like myself, found Buddhaghosa's layout and discussion of the subject difficult to penetrate. I have commented only on those points which seemed to me to be of interest, and do not dwell on every section, since there is much that can be passed over without comment.

The *Visuddhimagga* contains the longest sustained analysis of *sīla* to be found within the Small Vehicle. It is divided into three parts, one each devoted to morality (*sīla*), meditation (*samādhi*), and wisdom (*paññā*), respectively, and the work as a whole takes the form of a commentary on its opening verse, which is as follows:

> When a wise man, established well in morality
> Develops consciousness and wisdom,
> Then as a *bhikkhu* ardent and sagacious
> He succeeds in disentangling this tangle.[1]

The first part of the *Visuddhimagga*, the *Sīlaniddeso*, represents in volume approximately only 7% of the whole work,[2] the remainder being divided almost equally between the *Samādhiniddeso* and the *Paññāniddeso*.

The *Sīlaniddeso* itself consists of 161 paragraphs[3] and can be divided into two sections. The first of these extends from vv. 1–15 and is in the nature of a preamble, while the second, running from v.16 to the end, begins the examination of *sīla* proper. Verse 16 poses seven questions concerning *sīla* and the remaining verses consist of answers to these questions. This is

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the standard method of analysis that Buddhaghosa also applies to Part Two of the *Visuddhimagga* on *samādhi*, about which he asks eight questions (3.1), and Part Three on *paññā*, about which he asks six questions (14.1).

	Question	Answer in verse	Summary
The 7 questions at v.16	(1) What is *sīla*?	17–18	*cetanā, cetasikā, saṃvara, avītikkama*
	(2) In what sense?	19	Etymology.
	(3) What are its		
	(i) Characteristic	20–22	(i) Composing
	(ii) Function		(ii) Action to stop misconduct
	(iii) Manifestation		(iii) Purity of body, speech, & mind
	(iv) Proximate Cause		(iv) *hiri* & *ottappa*
	(4) Benefits	23–24	(i) non-remorse (ii) as D.ii.86 (iii) as M.i.33
	(5) How many kinds?	25–142	19 divisions of 1.2.3.4. and 5 kinds. Total of 56 varieties.
	(6) What is the defiling of it?	143–160	tormness, etc. (*khaṇḍādibhāva*)
	(7) What is the cleansing of it?		untormness, etc. (*akhaṇḍādibhāva*) (see below p. 72 for an explanation of these 2 terms)

Verses 1–15 are a preamble and verse 161 is the concluding verse.

FIGURE 1

Plan of the discussion of *sīla* in Chapter 1 of the *Visuddhimagga* verses 16–161

Figure 1 sets out the structure of the discussion in verses 16–161. Of the seven questions asked, we will only discuss numbers 1, 3, and 5, which deal with definitions and the major classifications. The remaining questions relate to etymology (Q.2), the benefits of morality (Q.4), and the contrast between the sufferings of the immoral and the perfection of the virtuous monk (Q.6&7).

Turning, then, to Q.1, "What is morality?" (*kiṃ sīlan ti*), we find the answer given in the form of a fourfold classification, which also occurs at *Paṭisambhidāmagga* 1.44. This is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 2. The first two divisions relate to the Ten Good Paths of Action (*dasakusalakammapatha*), which are:

1. Abstention from taking life (*pāṇātipātā veramaṇī*);
2. Abstention from taking what has not been given (*adinnādānā veramaṇī*);
3. Abstention from sexual misconduct (*kamesu micchācārā veramaṇī*);
4. Abstention from lying (*musāvādā veramaṇī*);
5. Abstention from abusive speech (*pisuṇāya vācāya veramaṇī*);
6. Abstention from slanderous speech (*pharusāya vācāya veramaṇī*);
7. Abstention from idle talk (*samphappalāpā veramaṇī*);
8. Non-covetousness (*anabhijjhā*);
9. Non-malevolence (*avyāpāda*);
10. Right views (*sammā-diṭṭhi*).[4]



FIGURE 2

The divisions of *sīla* according to *Vsm* 1.17ff

The first division, *cetanā*, is defined as the volition present in the abstention from infringements against the first seven of these. The second division, *cetasikā*, is the abstinence itself, i.e., the condition of one who observes the final three, thereby remaining in the state of non-covetousness (*anabhijjhā*), non-animosity (*avyāpāda*), and having right views (*sammādiṭṭhi*). The significance of the split-up of the ten *kammapathas* into groups of seven (*re:cetanā*) and three (*re:cetasikā*) lies in the division of the *kammapathas* into groups of 3 of body, 4 of speech, and 3 of mind.[5] The first seven *kammapathas* relate to bodily and vocal actions, and an act of volition is necessary to inhibit their performance. The final three *kammapathas*, however, relate to what might be called dispositions or properisities of character, within which the element of volition is inappropriate. Having right views, for example, is not simply a question of volition. By making this distinction, it seems Buddhaghosa wished to highlight the role of *cetanā* among the other 51 *cetasikadhammas*, to bring out the importance of volition in moral actions.

As well as abstention, it should be noted that Buddhaghosa includes the fulfilment of duty (*vattapaṭipattiṃ*) as part of *sīla*, under the first aspect of *sīla*, as *cetanā*.[6] The duties he has in mind are referred to later in the *Visuddhimagga* (6.60). These relate to the responsibilities of a monk for the smooth running of the monastery. We may quote the relevant passage:

> Also, reception of visitors must be attended to on seeing a visiting bhikkhu, and all the remaining duties in the *Khandhakas* must be carried out, too, that is, the duties of the shrine terrace, the duties of the Bodhi-tree terrace, the duties of the *Uposatha* house, the duties of the refectory and the bath house, and those to the teacher, the preceptor, visitors, departing bhikkhus, and the rest.

We learn from the *Sammoha-vinodanī* (297) that besides these duties there are 82 minor duties (*khuddakavattāni*) and 14 major duties (*mahāvattāni*). It is not specified what these are, but we may assume they relate to activities of a domestic nature, similar to those mentioned above.

The third division of *sīla* is restraint (*saṃvara*), which has five aspects, as shown in figure 2. This consists of restraint, assisted by the four virtues of mindfulness (*sati*), knowledge (*ñāṇa*), patience (*khanti*), and energy (*viriya*), and also by the

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important category of the *pātimokkha*. This last item incorporates the 227 rules of monastic discipline into Buddhaghosa's definition of morality, and, in fact, he places it at the top of the list.

The fourth and final division, the non-transgression of precepts of morality that have been undertaken, adds little to the other three, since all of the precepts, whether for a monk or for a layman, are undertaken voluntarily. There seems to be no special technical meaning implied by the compound, *samādinnasīla*, used here.[7] In the *Atthasālinī*, Buddhaghosa takes into account those cases where no particular precept has been taken but where, nevertheless, one refrains from performing a bad action because it is not fitting to one's birth, age, or experience, etc., (*jātivayabāhasaccādi*). This is known as restraint in spite of the opportunity being available (*sampattavirati*).

Leaving question 1, we may now consider question 3. This enquires as to the characteristic (*lakkhaṇa*), the function (*rasa*), the manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*), and the proximate cause (*padaṭṭhāna*) of *sīla*. These four questions represent the standard Abhidhammic strategy for arriving at a taxonomy of entities (*dhammas*). As a system of definition, according to Mrs. Rhys Davids,[8] they are similar to the post-Aristotelian scheme of genus, species, property, and accident. Each of the four terms is defined briefly by Buddhaghosa in the *Atthasālinī* (63):

> *Lakkhaṇa* means the specific characteristic (*sabhāva*) or the general characteristic (*sāmaññā*) of various things (*dhamma*). *Rasa* means function (*kicca*) or achievement (*sampatti*). Manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) means mode of manifestation (*upaṭṭhānākāra*) or effect (*phalam*). Proximate cause (*padaṭṭhāna*) means the preceding cause (*āsannakāraṇa*).

They are defined in slightly more detail by S.Z. Aung in his Introduction to the *Compendium of Philosophy* (p. 13):

> Now, in Buddhist logic adequate analysis of any *datum* includes an examination of its (1) characteristic mark (*lakkhaṇa*), (2a) function (*kicca-rasa*), (2b) property (*sampatti-rasa*), (3a) reappearance as phenomena (*upaṭṭhānākāra-paccupaṭṭhāna*), (3b) reappearance as effect (*phala-paccupaṭṭhāna*), and (4) proximate cause (*padaṭṭhāna*).[9]

Buddhaghosa applies this fourfold method of analysis to all three parts of the *Visuddhimagga*, in each case as his third question.

The most important of the four defining factors is the characteristic (*lakkhaṇa*). This is subdivided into the specific characteristic, or "own-being," (*sabhāva*) and the general characteristic (*sāmañña*), a feature which can be shared by many different entities. *Svabhāva* came to be used synonymously with *svalakṣaṇa*, and the two are given as equivalents by Vasubandhu.[10] These two terms are then contrasted by the same author with characteristics shared by many different dharmas (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), for example, that all conditioned things (*saṃskṛtadharmas*) are impermanent (*anitya*), without self (*anātmaka*) and involve suffering (*duḥkha*).

In short, a *sabhāva* may be defined as the unique defining characteristic of a *dhamma*. Within this general definition, different schools formulated their own definitions more precisely as they delineated their philosophical positions. Thus, the concept of *svabhāva* was of central importance for the Sarvāstivāda, playing, as it did, a central role in its thesis of the existence of past and future entities. And, the same notion (*svabhāva*) became the focal point of the attack by the Madhyamaka on the realism of the Small Vehicle.[11]

For the Theravāda, the recognition of the *sabhāva* of a *dhamma* meant that *dhamma* had been penetrated intellectually and accurately cognised. By being thoroughly comprehended, it was neutralised as a source of delusion or attachment. Dhammapāla tells us that:

> When the specific and general characteristics of anything are experienced, then that thing is experienced according to reality.[12]

By recognition of the real constituents of a thing, false conceptions can be dispelled, just as the analysis of the individual into components (*khandhas*) dispells the illusion of a self (cf. *Visuddhimagga* 11.27–119).

Applying this fourfold method of analysis to *sīla*, then, Buddhaghosa comes up with the following definitions. The characteristic (*lakkhaṇa*) is said to be "composing" (*sīlana*), which is explained as "the co-ordination of bodily action, etc., and the

foundation of good states."[13] This characteristic is the identifying feature of *sīla* in all its manifestations, regardless of what categories it may be analysed into, just as visibility (*sanidassanattaṃ*) is the inseparable characteristic of the *rūpāyatana*.

The function of *sīla* is twofold: it is action that stops misconduct (*dussīlya*) and also the achievement (*sampatti*) of the quality of blamelessness (*anavajjaguṇa*). This distinction amounts to saying only that (1) morality (*sīla*) is opposed to immorality (*dussīlya*), and (2) that morality includes blamelessness as one of its features.

The proximate cause of *sīla* is also twofold, consisting of remorse (*ottappa*) and shame (*hiri*). *Hiri* is defined as that which shrinks away from something, and is said to be synonymous with another word meaning shame, *lajjā*. *Ottapa* is defined as "glowing," and is a synonym for agitation at evil.[14] The principal contrasts between the two terms are set out below, according to the *Atthasālinī* (trans. pp. 164–7).

Hiri	*Ottappa*
—Has a subjective origin	—Has an objective cause — fear of criticism
—Influenced by the self	—Influenced by the world
—Rooted in the intrinsic nature of shame	—Rooted in the intrinsic nature of fear
—Has the characteristic of respectful obedience	—Has the characteristic of viewing a fault with timidity and fear
Example	
Seeing a worthy person when obeying the calls of nature (*uccāra-passāvādiṃ karonto*)	Being observed (in a wrongful act) by the clairvoyant powers of monks and brahmins.
To be avoided out of	
Consideration of high birth, the dignity of one's teacher (*satthar*), the greatness of one's inheritance, and the honour of one's fellow brethren (*sabrahmacari*).	Self-accusation, accusation by others, punishment and evil destiny.

Buddhaghosa also uses the image of two iron balls, one hot and burning, representing *ottappa*, and one covered in faeces (*gūthamakkhito*), representing *hiri*. Neither is to be grasped by the wise man (*paṇḍito*).

The opposites of these two terms are defined in the *Abhidharmakośa* (11.32a). *Ahrī* is disrespect (*ahrīr agurutā*). The *Bhāṣya* expands: "A lack of veneration (*apratīśatā*), lack of fearful submission (*abhayavaśavartitā*) with regard to the qualities of oneself and others." According to 32ab, *anapatrāpya* or *atrapā* is the dharma that causes a man not to see the dangerous consequences of sin (*avadye 'bhayadarśitvam atrapā*). According to another opinion, which is similar to that of Buddhaghosa, *ahrīkya* is said to be absence of shame with regard to oneself in the commission of an evil action, and *anapatrāpya* is the absence of shame with regard to others.[15]

The emphasis placed upon *hiri* and *ottappa* as the consequences of failure in morality and therefore as incentives to moral conduct is a measure of the pressure exerted on a monk to conform to the ideal. That this pressure is mainly social and not spiritual can be seen from the above table, under the examples and the final section, which lists the reasons for avoidance. There has always existed a well-established ideal of how a monk should behave and conduct himself, as described, for instance, by Buddhaghosa in verse 48:

> Furthermore, a bhikkhu is respectful; deferential; possessed of conscience and shame; wears his inner robe properly; wears his upper robe properly; his manner inspires confidence whether in moving forwards or backwards, looking ahead or aside, bending or stretching; his eyes are downcast; he has (a good) deportment; he guards the doors of his sense faculties; knows the right measure in eating; is devoted to wakefulness; possesses mindfulness and full awareness; wants little; is contented; is strenuous; is a careful observer of good behaviour; and treats the teachers with great respect.

In addition, almost one-third of the 227 *Pātimokkha* rules (the 75 *sekhiyā dhammā*) are devoted to matters of dress, deportment and general etiquette. In the context of such formalised patterns of behaviour, there always exists the fear of making a

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faux pas or failing in some way to live up to the ideal, with the consequent embarrassment this entails. This fear manifests itself in various ways: on an unconscious level, loss of face may be symbolised in dreams of appearing undressed or improperly dressed, or being discovered in some other kind of embarrassing situation. We have seen that Buddhaghosa mentions catching sight of a worthy person when obeying the calls of nature. In his study of Sinhalese Buddhist monks, Michael Carrithers records a dream by one monk in which he found himself bathing in the presence of young women and was overcome with shame (*lajjāva*).[16]

We may also note here the connection between moral impurity and physical impurity, a connection now well established in anthropological literature.[17] Biological metaphors for intellectually based schemata, such as purity versus impurity, are very common, and the association between excrement and sin was made several times by one of Carrithers' informants (a monk).[18] We have already noted Buddhaghosa's image of an iron ball smeared with faeces representing *hiri*.

We turn now to the final question that concerns us here, namely question 5, which asks "How many kinds of *sīla* are there?" (*katavidhaṃ c'etaṃ sīlan ti*). The answer is given in 19 paragraphs, consisting of groups of from one to six units following the customary *Abhidhamma* method, giving a total of 56 varieties. We will deal with the points of interest in these in order.

The first dyad, "keeping and avoiding," ties in with the twofold division of function (*rasa*) mentioned above (1.21). "Keeping" (*cāritta*) is accomplished by faith and energy, while "avoiding" (*vārita*) is accomplished by faith and mindfulness (*sati*). The second dyad brings in the rules of the *Pātimokkha* and Vinaya, and the third harks back to the definition of *sīla* as volition (*cetanā*).

The fourth dyad deals with morality that is practised through craving (*taṇhā*) for rebirth as a god, or that is practised in the mistaken belief that *sīla* produces purification (*sīlena suddhīti*). The fifth dyad refers to temporary and lifelong morality (*kālapariccheda / yāvajīva*), perhaps referring to the last item in the fourfold division of Figure 1 (*avītikkamo*).

The sixth dyad introduces the distinction between morality

that is limited by gain and that which is not; that is to say, in the former category a person will transgress a training precept if he stands to gain materially from so doing, whereas in the latter category even the thought of transgressing does not arise.

The seventh dyad introduces an important distinction, which is, unfortunately, not pursued very far by Buddhaghosa. He introduces two classifications, namely mundane (*lokiya*) and supramundane (*lokuttara*). The former is subject to defects (*sāsava*), whereas the latter is not (*anāsava*), and while the former brings about an improvement in future lives (*bhavavisesāvaha*), the latter brings about escape from becoming (*bhavanissaraṇa*). The *lokuttarasīla* belongs to the plain (*bhūmi*) of "reviewing knowledge" (*paccavekkhaṇañāṇa*). We learn from *Visuddhimagga* 22.21 that there are 19 kinds of *paccavekkhaṇañāṇa*, made up of five types possessed by each of the three candidates for enlightenment (*sotāpanna, sakadāgāmin* and *anāgāmin*) and four possessed by the Arhat. The five things reviewed are the Path, the blessings obtained by it, the defilements abandoned, those still to be abandoned, and nibbāna. The Arhat lacks the category of defilements yet to be abandoned, which gives a total of 19. The process of reviewing takes place after passing from one *jhāna* to another.[19]

The contrast here is between the four stages of the supramundane path (*lokuttara-magga*) of the *sotāpanna*, etc., and the other three spheres of the *kāma-, rūpa-*, and *arūpāvacaras*. The four higher types of person (the *sotāpanna*, etc.) have turned their backs on the three lower worlds of sense, form, and the formless, and direct themselves steadfastly toward nibbāna. They are engaged upon a higher ideal (*lokuttaraṃ cittaṃ*) and, consequently, their morality is of the higher kind (*lokuttaraṃ sīlaṃ*).[20]

Passing on to the triads, the first (VSM 1.33) divides *sīla* into inferior (*hīna*), medium (*majjhima*) and superior (*paṇīta*), by reference to four factors: (i) the enthusiasm with which it is undertaken, (ii) the motive for its practice, whether fame, merit or nibbāna, (iii) whether defiled by self-praise, and (iv) motive once again, this time for continued existence (*bhagabhagatatthāya*), for one's own deliverance (*vimokkhatthāya*), or for the deliverance of all beings (*sabbasattavimokkhatthāya*).

The second tetrad (VSM 1.140) divides *sīla* into the four

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groups of precepts, for bhikkhus, *bhikkhunīs*, novices (*sāmaṇera*), and the laity.

The third introduces an interesting fourfold division, which unfortunately is not discussed at length. The first classification is "natural morality" (*pakatisīla*), which is the non-transgression (*avītikkamo*) on the part of the people of Uttarakuru.

Uttarakuru is the mythical Northern continent, which, with the other three great continents (*mahā-dīpa*), viz., Jambudīpa, Apara-Goyāna, and Pubba-Videha, and the 4 x 500 smaller *dīpas* surrounding the great ones, constitute a *cakka-vāḷa*, or world system. Uttarakuru is described at length at D.iii.199 as a land of peace and plenty whose rulers honour the Buddha. Thus, *pakatisīla* must refer to the ideal condition when there is no immorality among the whole of the population, and, consequently, no need for moral precepts and instruction.

How the inhabitants of Uttarakuru achieve their moral character is not clear, and we are given no clue as to whether it is innate or learned. We learn from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* IV.3 that there is no undertaking (*samādāna*) of moral rules there, and hence no Prātimokṣa discipline, but neither is there the intention to commit offences. The Kurus, along with hermaphrodites and eunuchs, form an anomalous group who are insusceptible to indiscipline. Greed, hatred, and illusion exist in Uttarakuru, but are infrequently encountered, since there is no private property, the people are gentle (*snighda*) because there is no reason for displeasure (*āghāta*), and there is nothing to give rise to demerit (*apāpāsayatvāt*) (IV.82d). Nor is there any occurrence of the ten *akuśalakarmapathas* (IV.83a). Despite this, according to *Aṅg.* iv.396, the Kurus are inferior to the men of Jambudīpa in courage, mindfulness, and in the religious life. On the other hand, however, they excel even the *Tāvatiṃsa* gods in four things: they have no greed (*amamā*); no private property (*apariggahā*); they have a fixed term of life (*niyatāyukā*) of one thousand years, after which they are reborn in heaven; and they possess great elegance (*visesabhuno*).

The second classification is "customary morality" (*ācārasīla*), i.e., the particular rules of conduct of a locality (*desa*), a clan (*kula*), or a sect (*pāsaṇḍa*). Thirdly there is "necessary morality" (*dhammatāsīla*), e.g., when the *Bodhisatta's* mother feels no sexual desire during pregnancy (D.ii.13). Finally, there is "mo-

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for what constitutes an acceptable doctoral dissertation topic, and for that matter criteria for research funding evaluation and even tenure and promotion decisions, are often good indicators of the ethos of a field. A generation ago in the United States it may have been possible to submit as fulfillment of the research requirement for the doctorate, or as the subject of a postdoctoral research grant, work that was strictly philological in character: undertaking a critical edition of a text, say. If this was ever the case, it is even rarer today. In our time, such work is considered to lack a certain originality and creativity that is an essential characteristic of scholarly research. Ironically, this is due in large part to the picture that many philologists have themselves painted of their own specialty. Philological work is seen as lacking originality because it is believed—falsely it seems to me—to consist of the mechanical reconstitution of another author's work. Hence, the editing of texts, the compilation of anthologies, and even translations, are perceived by the most extreme critics to be just one step removed from plagiarism.[50]

True research, so the story now goes, is creative. That is, it contains an element of novelty: the defense of a clear thesis that is not only new but significant. Hearkening back to our discussion of interpretivism, this requires the full involvement of the scholar not only in the text, but beyond it as well, utilizing the text as an object of interpretation with the goal of achieving results that are broad and general in scope. Ideally, the research should shake the field from within, and the waves from the "splash" should be felt outside of it as well. It is probably clear that this

128-149. Here Strickmann attempts to distinguish real scholarship from "gaudy productions" that, "hardly relevant to the study of Buddhism," are "tracts telling harassed Americans how to relax." Unfortunately, Strickmann never cites examples of the latter, nor does he ever disclose his criteria for including and excluding the works that he does. One is to surmise from his rhetoric that the list of "gaudy productions" consists of all those works to which he does not grant his imprimatur. What I find most interesting about Strickmann's article is not the actual scholarly canon he attempts to "catalogue," but the fact that it represents a prime locus for the investigation of the sociology of knowledge in one subfield of Buddhist Studies: a site for exploring one scholar's attempt at delineating what constitutes valid research, clouded in a rhetoric that makes it appear as though that scholar's own subjectivity has no part to play in the process.

50. In the United States, to take the example with which I am most familiar, it is almost inconceivable to imagine that tenure would be granted solely on the basis of text-critical work, or even on the basis of a well-received annotated translation.

notion of creativity is modern,[51] and—at least in the way I have characterized it here—particularly North American, based as it is on a kind of hyper-individualism. But it is also clear that such a model of what constitutes adequate research has been received warmly and is functionally normative in geographically diverse institutional settings outside of North America as well.[52]

In the United States and Canada today[53] we operate with this as the ideal of what constitutes real research in the field of Buddhist Studies. There are reasons for this that go beyond the realm of the merely intellectual. For about a decade or so, buddhologists in North America have found employment in increasing numbers in departments of religious studies and schools of theology. Often this has meant that we have had to expand our pedagogical repertoire beyond courses in Buddhist Studies to accommodate the curricular needs of these institutions. In addition, we increasingly find ourselves in conversations with colleagues whose specialty lies outside of the discipline of Buddhist Studies. Our de facto professional organization has become the American Academy of Religion, an institution that stresses broad and interdisciplinary research. The editorial bodies of academic presses seek work that has "broad appeal," is "original," and "cutting-edge." And finally, it is in accordance with the standards (often only implicitly) set forth by these various institutional bodies that tenure and promotion decisions are made. All of these factors have contributed to what we might call the diversification of the buddhologist: a movement away from classical Buddhist Studies based on the philological study of written texts, and toward the investigation of more general, comparative and often theoretical issues that have implications (and audiences) outside of Buddhist Studies. Some colleagues have

51. On this point see my *Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994) 83-87.

52. To cite just one example, I know of several Tibetan scholars who have chosen not to seek doctorates at Indian universities precisely because of the requirement that they undertake research that is innovative, something they consider anathema—a betrayal of the tradition.

53. I am not unaware of the dangers of generalizing about the patterns of scholarship in large geographical areas. My goal here is not to speak for my colleagues in the United States and Canada; many will undoubtedly disagree with what I have to say. Nor is it my intention to imply that North American scholarship is homogeneous; it is certainly not. With these caveats, however, it does seem to me possible to venture upon some general remarks about patterns of scholarship, like the ones that follow.

resigned themselves to this situation: a set of circumstances that must be tolerated for the sake of gainful employment. Others—and I count myself in this camp—have found the pressure to greater diversification intellectually stimulating, affording an opportunity to enter into broader conversations where Buddhist texts are one, but not the only, voice.

Be that as it may, it is clear that this latter model of what constitutes adequate research, based as it is on an interpretivist paradigm, represents a clear departure from a positivist program of exclusively textual scholarship. What kind of dialogue will arise as a result of these methodological differences concerning the nature of adequate research? This, of course, remains to be seen.

The question of normative discourse

Related to the questions of objectivity and creativity, though not reducible to either one, is the issue of the appropriateness of normative discourse.[54] The classically positivist position that I have outlined above maintains of course that there is no room for evaluative assessment in Buddhist Studies. Perceiving its own discourse to be value-free and neutral, positivism operates under the assumption that the role of the scholar is to mirror, rather than to evaluate, textual meaning.[55] In addition, *philosophical* positivism—where all normative questions pertaining to religious matters are considered either meaningless, undecidable or

54. The question of objectivity has to do with self-identity and normative commitment rather than with discourse. It is possible, for example, that a scholar be a committed Buddhist and not write from an overtly theological perspective (although in the present context the question of objectivity deals precisely with whether or not there is always an *implicit* theological agenda even in such writing). The question of creativity is broader than that of normative discourse, and in a sense contains it, since normative discourse can be considered one instance of interpretive creativity.

55. It is interesting that in his characterization of the scholarship of the 18th century Jesuit missionary Ippolito Desideri, de Jong ("A Brief History," pt. I, pp. 65-66), in his preoccupation with the philological and descriptive dimensions of Buddhist Studies, should have overlooked the fact that Desideri's chief interest in Buddhism was polemical, that is to say *normative*. It is motivated by a desire to engage Tibetan Buddhism philosophically and religiously that Desideri delved into the Buddhist religion and gained the expertise that he did. If, as Petech and Tucci state, Desideri managed to fathom the intricacies of Tibetan (principally dGe lugs pa) Buddhism in ways that even later scholars could not, it is not in spite of, but *precisely because of*, his interest in normative issues.

both—exerts a different kind of pressure in the direction of ignoring the implications of the normative claims of Buddhist texts. But even when the latter is not operative as an assumption, *philological* positivists consider the issue of the truth of religious claims, and even issues of aesthetics and literary worth—of texts, practices, art forms and methods—as necessarily clouding judgment, and as leading to the infiltration of personal bias and prejudice into scholarship. By contrast, as we have seen, interpretivists believe that, far from meaningless, forms of discourse that bring to light the full significance of texts—as normative discourse, for example, does—represent the epitome of the scholarly enterprise: its fulfillment. Ascribing to the view that all scholarship is necessarily evaluative, interpretivists claim that there is no escape from subjective assessment. Hence, *all* scholarship is normative; and those that admit to its normativity in exploring the philosophical implications of texts are simply being more candid.

At the very least three forms of discourse are objects of contention in this debate: religious or theological, philosophical, and methodological.[56]

56. The dividing line between these three is not always very precise. For example, some authors, ostensibly writing as philosophers, often exhibit theological presuppositions in their writings. Be that as it may, the distinctions between the three forms of discourse I discuss below seem to me valuable. Foulk, "Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies" p. 112, opts for another method of distinguishing theology from Buddhology (that is, from Buddhist Studies as an academic discipline). Buddhist theology, he states, is "the study of divine things or religious truth as it is carried on within a normative tradition," while Buddhology is "'objective' (non-normative)." Such a definition, despite his use of quotation marks around the word *objective*, is problematic. As we saw from the discussion of objectivity above, scholars increasingly question the existence of "objective" scholarship. Buddhology, as the academic study of Buddhism, may have *different* presuppositions from Buddhist theology, but—so the critique goes—the former is based as much on subjective and normative presuppositions as the latter. Moreover, Foulk's distinction, by excluding overt forms of normative discourse from Buddhology (this is reiterated on p. 172 of his essay), implies that philosophical and normative methodological treatment of issues in the field falls outside of Buddhist Studies / Buddhology proper. Ironically, it implies that his own essay—in large part normative—cannot be considered a piece of buddhological scholarship. Rather than conflating normativity and subjectivity (and then defining the academic study of Buddhism in terms of its objectivity), it seems to me preferable to distinguish normative from descriptive forms of scholarship (historical, philological, etc.) discursively, that is, in terms of whether a particular work deals *explicitly* with the assessment and determination of the truth

rality due to previous causes" (*pubbahetukasīla*), which is morality acquired by pure beings, such as Mahākassapa and the *Bodhisatta* in previous births.

The fourth tetrad (1.42) deals with *sīla* as restraint (*saṃvara*) to be practised by the monk in accordance with the *Pātimokkha*. It is the lengthiest section devoted to any single topic, and accounts for 89 of the 161 paragraphs of the *sīlaniddesa*. The four main divisions of *sīla* under this section are (i) *Pātimokkha-saṃvara*, (ii) restraint of the senses (*indriya-saṃvara*), (iii) livelihood purification (*ājīvapārisuddhi*), and (iv) concerning requisites (*paccaya-sannissita*). There follows a lengthy explanation (*vinicchayakathā*) of these four items, which lists in detail various kinds of conduct to be avoided by the monk, including all those censured in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* (Vsm 1.83).

The two remaining questions, 6 and 7 from *VSM* 1.16, relate to the defiling and purification of *sīla*. The image of a cloth is introduced at 1.143 by way of illustration. The defiling of *sīla* is said to be like a tear in a piece of cloth. This relates to the breaking of any of the training precepts (*sikkhāpadā*), meriting the imposition of any of the seven penalties, from expulsion for life (in the case of *pārājikā* offences) downwards. Repeated offences are compared to blotches or stains on the cloth. The motives for committing the offences are gain and fame, etc., (*lābha-yasādi*); or else they are committed under the influence of the seven bonds of sexuality (*sattavidhamethunasaṃyoga*). The untornness (*akhaṇḍādibhāva*) of *sīla* is accomplished by the complete non-breaking of the training precepts, by making amends for those that have been broken, by the absence of the seven bonds of sexuality, and by the non-arising of vices such as anger (*krodha*), enmity (*upanāha*), and contempt (*makkha*), etc. (1.151).

The image of stained or torn cloth provides a contrast with Buddhaghosa's description of the robes of the ideal monk, which are carefully arranged and, one might imagine, clean (above p. 11).

Summary

Let us attempt to draw some brief conclusions from Buddhaghosa's discussion. His original definition (*VSM* 1.17f), as illustrated in Figure 2, relates in large part to the non-performance of certain actions. These actions are classified either as paths of action (*kammapatha*) or the code of rules of the community of monks (*pātimokkha*). As well as actions that must not be performed, there are duties to be fulfilled (1.17). What all this boils down to is a list of rules to be followed from motives of remorse (*ottappa*) and shame (*hiri*). The various classifications Buddhaghosa introduces relate not so much to *sīla* as to the variety of practitioners and motives, which constitutes the major part of the answer to question 5, "How many kinds of morality are there?." At the core of Buddhaghosa's conception of *sīla*, therefore, there exists the idea of specific actions; these may be (i) avoided if evil (the first seven *kammapathas*), (ii) performed if good (the duties), or (iii) become the object of a disposition towards avoidance or performance (the final three *kammapathas*). This conception of *sīla* is in line with that found in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, as particular actions that are (there) to be avoided.

We have been able to move at some speed through the *Sīlaniddeso*, since, despite the detail provided by Buddhaghosa, the harvest in terms of a deeper understanding of *sīla* is disappointingly sparse. He skimps on what are for us the most promising areas, and goes into great detail, e.g., from verse 42 onwards, about minute monkish matters of deportment and trivial infringements of the Vinaya, amplified by anecdotes and etymologies. Of other classifications we are given only the bare bones. However, from the dry and disconnected classifications Buddhaghosa gives us we can assert the following facts about *sīla*:

1. It is the volition (*cetanā*) not to perform certain actions, or the abstention from performing them.
2. It involves both restraint (*saṃvara*) and fulfilment.
3. It is motivated by *ottappa* and *hiri*.
4. It is of different kinds according to the motives of its practitioners and their state of development.

Reduced to its most basic form, it would appear as in the following diagram:



It is clear that Buddhaghosa is concerned almost exclusively with the morality of the monastic life. He makes no specific reference to the *pañcasīla*, which are the standard observances of a lay Buddhist, and the duties he includes as part of *sīla* relate only to monastic duties. Furthermore, he brings the 227 rules of the *Pātimokkha* underneath the umbrella of *sīla*, thereby effectively excluding the lay practitioner. It must be remembered, however, that the *Visuddhimagga* is primarily a meditation manual, and is therefore directed at the monastic and not the lay community. Accordingly, Buddhaghosa's analysis must be seen as relating not to the entire category of *sīla*, which would also include the lay ethics so frequently discussed in the *Nikāyas*, but only to the moral requirements of the monastic life.

1. *Sīle patiṭṭhāya naro sapanno, cittaṃ paññaṃ ca bhāvayaṃ, ātāpi nipako bhikkhu, so imaṃ vijaṭaye jaṭaṃ* (S.i.13). I have relied on Ñāṇamoli's translations throughout, sometimes, as here, with slight modifications.

2. I am confining myself here to Chapter 1 of the *Sīlaniddesa*, i.e., the chapter that deals specifically with *sīla*. Chapter 2 is devoted to a description of the ascetic practices *(dhutaṅga niddesa)*.

3. In the edition of the Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 41, ed. H.C. Warren and revised by Dharmanda Kosambi, published by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1950.

4. There is another list of ten good deeds *(dasa-kusala-kamma)*, which, although not of canonical origin, is widely known in Śrī Laṅka (see R.F. Gombrich, *Precept and Practice* [Oxford: OUP, 1971] p. 74, p. 251 n. 9). This list begins with the three *puññakiriyavatthūni (dānaṃ sīlañ ca bhāvanā)* and includes the whole of morality under the second item *(sīla)*. The final item, right views, is common to both lists. The canonical list of *kammapathas* can be found at various locations, e.g. D.iii.269, Vin.v.138, S.ii.168, etc.

5. See *Nettipakaraṇa* 43 for the division of the *kammapathas* into two groups of seven and three.

6. . . . *vattapaṭipattiṃ vā pūreniassa cetanā*. (1.17)

7. The only occurrence of the word *samādinna* listed by the PTS Dictionary is at A.ii.193, where the meaning of "undertaken" is identical.

8. Quoted by S.Z. Aung in the *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 213 n. 3.

9. Cf. Part IX.7,3 of the *Compendium*.

10. *Abhidharmakośa* VI.14.

11. For a full discussion of the term *svabhāva* and its relation to cognate terms, such as *bhāva, abhāva* and *niḥsvabhāva*, see P.M. Williams, *Language and Existence in Mādhyamika Buddhist Philosophy* (unpublished D.Phil. thesis: Bodleian Library, Oxford, 1978), Chapter 3.

12. *Paramattha-mañjūsā* 276, quoted by Ñāṇamoli in *The Path of Purification*, p. 309 n.62.

13. 1.20. "*. . . yad etaṃ kāyakammādinaṃ samādhānavasena kusalānaṃ ca dhammānaṃ paṭiṭṭhānavasena . . .*"

14. *Atthasālinī* 124: "*Hiriyatī ti hiri, lajjāy' etaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Tehi eva ottapatī ti ottappaṃ, pāpato ubbegass' etaṃ adhivacanaṃ.*"

15. These two terms are included as two of the Seven Noble Treasures *(ariya-dhana)*, the list being: faith *(saddhā)*, morality *(sīla), hiri, ottappa*, learning *(suta)*, self-denial *(cāga)*, and wisdom *(paññā)*. They are also said *(Atthasālinī* 124) to be the last two of seven strengths *(bala)*, the first five being faith, energy *(viriya)*, mindfulness *(sati)*, meditation *(samādhi)*, and wisdom *(paññā)*.

16. M. Carrithers, *The Forest-Dwelling monks of Laṅka: an historical and anthropological study* (unpublished D. Phil. thesis: Bodleian Library, Oxford 1977) pp. 239–243.

17. See Mary Douglas' classic work, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966).

18. P. 198. ". . . I grew filthy from the excrement of these transgressions." P. 199. ". . . I committed innumerable *saṅghādisesa* faults as well as minor ones: like one stuck deep in a pit of excrement." Carrithers writes: ". . . the preoccupation with *sīla* has great psychological consequences. The theme of cleanliness and dirt plays a great part in monks' dreams, as it does in their daily lives: village temples, as well as hermitages, are conspicuous by their cleanliness and tidiness. (. . .) It is not surprising that cleanliness, and fastidious observance of the rules of discipline — metaphorical cleanliness — sometimes become ends in themselves." (p. 67)

19. There are several references to *paccavekkhaṇañāṇa* in the *Visuddhimagga* (see Ñāṇmoli's index) and also in the *Compendium* (see Introduction p. 58 on *paccavekkhaṇā-vasitā*).

20. The states *(dhammā)* of the *sotāpanna*, etc., are described in the final section of the first part of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī (trans.* pp. 74–89), dealing with states that are good *(kusala)*.

ON *PĀRĀJIKA*

Ann Heirman

The Buddhist monastic discipline consists of a certain number of precepts to be followed and procedures or ceremonies to be performed. The precepts to be followed by monks and nuns are collected in a work called Prātimokṣa and are recited at the bi-monthly *poṣadha* ceremony. The Prātimokṣa is twofold: the one for monks consists of eight categories of precepts, that for nuns of only seven. The most important class contains the *pārājika*[1] precepts, four for monks, eight for nuns: abstention from sexual intercourse, stealing, taking human life, lying about one's spiritual achievements; and, only for nuns: having physical contact below the armpit and above the knee, being together with a man and doing eight wrong things[2], concealing a grave offence of another nun, and persisting in accompanying a suspended monk. Committing any of these acts entails a *pārājika* offence and leads to a permanent, lifetime exclusion from the Order.

All extant Vinayas to a large extent agree on the contents of a *pārājika* and on the consequences for anyone committing such an offence. Nevertheless, a clear etymological explanation of the term *pārājika* is not at all obvious. Up to the present day, several hypotheses based on Pāli, Prakrit and Sanskrit sources have been suggested. In order to determine whether or not the Vinayas surviving in their Chinese translation can give them a broader basis, we can confront these hypotheses with the explanations of the term *pārājika* found in these Chinese Vinayas.

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1 Variant: *pārājayika* (F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid-Sanskrit Dictionary*, p.342, s.v. *pārājika*).

2 According to T(aishō) 1428 (*Szu-fen Lü*, Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, = Dharma), p.716a24-27, touching the hand, touching the clothes, going to a secret place together, being in a secret place, talking together, walking together, leaning against one another, and making appointments. The eight wrong things differ slightly from Vinaya to Vinaya.

Let us first have a look at the information given in the *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravāda (= Mā-L.) school[3] and in the Pāli Vinaya:

The Mā-L. school: Roth, *BhīVin(Mā-L.)*, p.85, §123, gives the following explanation: *pārājiketi pāraṃ nāmocyate dharma-jñānaṃ / tato jīnā ojīnā saṃjīnā parihīṇā / tenāha pārājiketi /*, translated by É. Nolot in *Règles de discipline des nonnes bouddhistes*, (Paris 1991), p.68 [tr.]: '"Excluded" [*pārājikā*] means: one calls "the other side" [*pāraṃ*] the knowledge of the Dharma; she is separated from it, deprived of it, totally devoid of it, cut off from it [*jīnā ojīnā saṃjīnā parihīṇā*]: therefore it is said that she is excluded'.

From the above, it is clear that the Mā-L. school sees *pārājika* as a compound of *pāra*, 'on the other side' (= *dharmajñāna*) and of *jīna*, 'deprived of'. In this context, G. Roth, 'Terminologisches aus dem Vinaya der Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins', ZDMG 118, 1968, pp.334-48 (= Roth, 1968), p.342, points to the Jaina technical term *pārāñcika*, identified by a Jaina commentary as a derivation of *pāra*, 'on the other side': Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya, V.4971: *pāraṃ-tīraṃ gacchati yena prāyaścittenāṣevitena tat pārāñcikaṃ*[4], translated by Roth, *ibid.* [tr.]: 'The fulfilled expiation

3 Written in a transitional language between Prakrit and Sanskrit (see G. Roth, (ed.), *Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya, including Bhikṣuṇī-Prakīrṇaka and a summary of the Bhikṣu-Prakīrṇaka of the Ārya-Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin* (Patna 1970) [= *BhiVin(Mā-L.)*], pp.iv–lvi).

4 Quotation based on S.B. Deo, *History of Jaina Monachism from Inscriptions and Literature* (Poona 1956), p.377. — Related to the term *pārāñcika* is the term *pārāñciya* (Deo, *op. cit.*, p.378; Roth, 1968, pp.342–3) Earlier U. Wogihara, *Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Zweiter Teil: Lexikalisches aus der Bodhisattvabhūmi (Leipzig 1908), pp.34–5, had already pointed to the connection between the Buddhist term *pārājika* and the Jaina term *pārāñciya*. He considers the Jaina term to be a derivation of *parā(ñ)c* and, as S. Lévi, 'Observations sur une langue précanonique du bouddhisme' (*Journal Asiatique* 10ième Série, XX, 1912, pp.495–514), later states that, via an intermediate form **pārācika*, one came to *pārājika*. — Concerning the phonetic relation between *pārāñciya* and *pārājika*, see also P. Thieme, 'Indische Wörter und Sitten' (ZDMG 93, 1939, pp.105–37), p.137; *Kleine Schriften* (Wiesbaden 1971) II, p.792 (addendum 1939).

5 R.P. Kangle (ed.), *The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, Part I (Bombay 1969), p.125, III,19.13: . . *.hasta-pāda-pārañcikaṃ vā kurvataḥ pūrvaḥ sahasa-daṇḍaḥ* (transcription by Roth, 1968, p.342), translated by Kangle, *op.cit.*, Part II (Bombay 1972), p.248: '[For one. . .] causing dislocation of the hand or foot, (the punishment shall be) the lowest fine for violence'. The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra is a detailed legal code, expounding the powers of the state. The text is traditionally attributed to Kauṭilya, a minister of King Candragupta, founder of the Mauryan dynasty, at the end of the fourth century BCE (see Kangle, *op. cit.*, Part III (Bombay 1965), p.59).

6 Wogihara, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp.34–5 (see n.4) and S. Lévi, *op. cit.*, pp.505–6, already suggested that *pārājika* is a derivation from *parāñc*, *parāc*, 'turned away from'. Via the intermediate form **pārācika* one then comes to *pārājika*. Lévi concludes [tr.]: 'The **pārājika* offences would be those that cause a total and definitive separation from the Saṅgha'.

because of which he ends up on the other side, that is *pārāñcika*'. Both the Mā-L. school and the Jaina commentary explain the term as being derived from *pāra*. Nevertheless, the original meaning of the term remains obscure. Roth, *ibid.*, further points to the term *pārañcika*, used in R.P. Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*[5], and seen as a 'dislocation (of a hand or a foot)' [tr.]: 'Given the meaning "turned away, separated" present in *parāñc*, *pārañcikaṃ* could very well point to a kind of physical injury that consists of bringing the limbs out of their normal position by turning them away from the parts of the body or from the body that supports them, as a result of which they are left without function'[6]. The term *pārājika* is thus, according to Roth, connected to the term *pārañcika* and is the result of a phonetic evolution. Only the later commentators concentrate on the second part of *pārājika*, proposing secondary etymological explanations based on *√ji* and *√aj*. We will return to this later. For the moment we can state that the explanation of the term *pārājika* as proposed by Roth perfectly coincides with the theme

ecapitation' as found in the Pāli Vinaya and several Chinese inayas: for a monk or nun, the committing of a *pārājika* of-nce equals a decapitation. As a decapitated person can never gain stand up and function as a human being, a monk or nun ommitting a *pārājika* offence permanently falls back and can ver again function as a member of the Buddhist community[7].

Pāli Vinaya: Oldenberg, *Vin* III, *bhikkhuvibhaṅga*, p.28, anslated by I.B. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline* I (London 38, 1992), p.48: *'Is' one who is defeated*[8] means: as a man with s head cut off cannot become one to live with that bodily nnection, so is a monk indulging in sexual intercourse not a ue) recluse, not a (true) son of the Sakyans: therefore he is lled *one who is defeated*'.

This explanation is found after the first *pārājika* precept for onks (i.e. sexual intercourse). The explanations following the her *pārājika* precepts are parallel.

The Chinese Vinayas display the following explanations:

Mahī. *bhikṣuvibhaṅga*, p.4c21-23: *'Pārājika*[9] implies that one ls back; it implies that one is bad; it implies that one cuts off

This can also be applied to the Jaina community (see Roth, 1968, p.342). ther, it is to be noted that in the *pārājika* precepts of all the Vinayas, the m *pārajikā* is always followed by the term *asaṃvāsa* (H. Oldenberg (ed.), *aya Piṭakaṃ* III, London 1881, 1993, p.23ff.) /*asaṃvāsya* (Roth, *BhīVin(Mā-L)*, 6, §114ff.)/ 不(得)共住 (T 1421, *Mi-sha-sai Pu Ho-hsi Wu-fen Lü*, Mahīśāsaka naya = Mahī. p.4b4ff., T 1425, *Mo-ho-seng-ch'i Lü*, Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya = hā. p.235c17ff., Dharma, p.571a23–24ff., T 1435, *Shih-sung Lü*, Sarvāstivāda naya = Sarva. p.2a26–27ff., T 1442, *Ken-pen-shuo-i-ch'ieh-yu Pu P'i-nai-ye*, ikṣuvibhaṅga of the Mūlasarvāstivādins = Mūla. p.629c28ff.), i.e. (the guilty kṣu or bhikṣuṇī) can no longer live in the community; one is disconnected m the community. See also A. Heirman, 'Some Remarks on the Definition of onk and a Nun as Members of a Community and the Definition of "Not to in Community"', (*Indian Journal of Buddhist Studies* 7, 1995, pp.1–22), pp.4–9.

9 *pārājika*.

波羅夷 [po-lo-i]

T3/5

one's head; it implies that one is no longer a śramaṇa'.

Mahā. *bhikṣuvibhaṅga*, p.23b23-c2: *Pārājika*[9*] implies that one falls away from the knowledge of the doctrine[10] and that one does not share in the fruits of the Path[11]. This is called *pārājika*. In this way [it is applied to] the subsequent knowledge[12], the conventional knowledge[13], the knowledge of the awareness of another[14], the knowledge of frustration, of the origin, of cessation and of the Path[15], the knowledge of the destruction of impure influence[16] and the knowledge of non-origination[17]. One falls away from these knowledges and does not share in the fruits of the Path. This is called *pārājika*. Furthermore, *pārājika* implies that one falls away from Nirvāṇa and that one does not share in the fruits of realisation[18]. This is called *pārājika*. Furthermore, *pārājika* implies that one falls away from pure conduct[19] and that one does not share in the fruits of the Path. This is called *pārājika*. Furthermore, *pārājika* is an offence one may have

10 *dharmajñāna*, i.e. the knowledge of the Four Noble Truths in the realm of desire (see H. Nakamura, *Bukkyōgo Daijiten* (Tokyo 1981, 1985), p.594, s.v. 十智). It is the first knowledge of a series of ten when following the Buddhist Path. Also the other nine knowledges are mentioned in the Mahā (see nn.12–17 inclusive).

11 *mārgaphala*, the fruits or rewards of the various stages of attainment, i.e. *srota-āpanna*, *sakṛdāgāmin*, *anāgāmin* and *arhat*.

12 *anvayajñāna*, i.e. the knowledge of the Four Noble Truths in the realms of form and of formlessness (Nakamura, *op. cit.*, p.594 s.v. 十智 and p.1291, s.v. 未知智).

13 *saṃvṛtijñāna*, i.e. the knowledge of things conventionally accepted to be true in the realm of desire (Nakamura, *op. cit.*, p.594, s.v. 十智 and p.1004, s.v. 等智).

14 *paracittajñāna*.

15 *duḥkhajñāna*, *samudayajñāna*, *nirodhajñāna* and *mārgajñāna*, i.e. the knowledges concerning the Four Noble Truths.

16 *kṣayajñāna*.

17 *anutpadajñāna*.

18 I.e. the fruits or rewards of the various stages of attainment (see n.11).

19 *brahmacarya*.

committed, but that one is not allowed to confess or to repent of. Therefore, it is called *pārājika*'.

Dharma, *bhikṣuvibhaṅga*, p.571c6-6: 'Why is it called *pārājika*[9*]? It is as if one cuts off someone's head and he cannot stand up again. This is also to be applied to a bhikṣu. If he commits such an offence [i.e. a *pārājika*], he cannot again become a bhikṣu. Therefore it is called *pārājika*'.

Sarva, *bhikṣuvibhaṅga*, p.2c16-18: '*Pārājika*[9*] implies that the fall is without an equal. The offence is corrupt and serious. If one commits such an offence, the fall is without an equal, one is no longer called a bhikṣu, one is no longer a śramaṇa and one is no longer a Śākya disciple. One loses the capacity of a bhikṣu'.

Mūla, *bhikṣuvibhaṅga*, T 1442, p.630c6-10: '*Pārājika*[20] is the most serious and the most hateful offence. It is reprehensible and inadmissable. If a bhikṣu commits [such an offence], he is no longer a śramaṇa and he is no longer a Śākya disciple. He loses the capacity of a bhikṣu and he goes against Nirvāṇa. He falls back. Defeated, he cannot be saved. It is as if one cuts off the top of a *tāla* tree[21], this tree cannot grow again. In the same way, one cannot flourish, grow or increase. Therefore it is called *pārājika*'.

Although the explanations in the Chinese Vinayas are not completely parallel, essentially they all say the same thing: whoever commits a *pārājika* offence falls back for ever. It is striking that two Chinese Vinayas (Mahī and Dharma), like the Pāli Vinaya, compare the committing of a *pārājika* offence to a decapitation, while in the Mūla, it is compared to a 'decapitation' of a *tāla* tree.

From the above, it is clear that the theme 'decapitation' is to be found in several Vinayas. This points to an initially common understanding of the term *pārājika*. Very soon, however, the original understanding of the term was lost and commentators or

20 波羅市迦 [po-lo-shih-chia]

21 I.e. a palmyra tree or fan palm (Borassus flabelliformis) (see M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p.444, s.v. *tāla*).

translators concentrated on the second part of the term. This can be seen in Buddhaghosa's?[22] commentary on the Pāli Vinaya (fifth century CE), Smp I, p.259: *pārājiko ti parājito parājayaṃ āpanno*, translated by Horner, BD I, p.38, n.3: (*pārājika* is) 'defeated, fallen on defeat'. Buddhaghosa? thus considers the term *pārājika* to be derived from *parā-* √*ji*, 'to be defeated'[23]. As long as there is no better explanation, Horner[24] supports the idea of 'defeat', as can be seen in her translations (see above). She thus agrees with T.W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts* (Delhi 1975), Part I, p.3, n.2, who also have a preference for Buddhaghosa's? explanation and translate the term *pārājika* as 'involving defeat'. With the exception of T 1442/3 — a late translation of the *bhikṣu-* and *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mūlasarvāstivādins (beginning eighth century CE) — no Chinese Vinaya, however, mentions the idea of 'defeat'. Even in the Pāli Vinaya, this is not found. Moreover, since not even one context allows us to say that a monk or nun is defeated by something or someone, the suggestion of *pārājika* being a derivation of *parā-* √*ji* seems very unlikely.

Accepting the idea of 'defeat', Horner, Rhys Davids and Oldenberg reject the opinion of E. Burnouf[25], who considers

22 According to O. von Hinüber, *A Handbook of Pāli Literature*, (Berlin–New York 1996), p.109, it is not at all certain that Buddhaghosa is the compiler of the Samantapāsādikā.

23 The idea that a monk or nun committing a *pārājika* has been defeated and cannot be saved anymore is also found in the Chinese Mūla, T 1442 *bhikṣuvibhaṅga*, p.630c8–9 (= T 1443, *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, p.914a1) (see above). Also the Tibetan Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya supports this idea (see E. Waldschmidt *Bruchstücke des Bhikṣuṇī-Prātimokṣa der Sarvāstivadins* (Leipzig 1926, Wiesbaden 1979), p.71).

24 See Horner, BD I, p.xxvi: 'Although it may be grammatically incorrect to refer *pārājika* to *parā-ji*, to my mind no more convincing derivation has so far been put forward'.

25 E. Burnouf, *Introduction à l'histoire du buddhisme indien* (Paris 1876 pp.268–9 [tr.]: '[. . .] which I derive from *parā* (retro) and *adj* (abiger[e]), "offenc

nārājika to be a derivation from *parā- √aj*, meaning to 'exclude one who is guilty)'. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg argue that the Vedic *√aj* 'to exclude' is not found in Pāli texts and is never, even in Vedic texts, combined with the prefix *parā*, This is ontested by O. von Hinüber ('Die Bestimmung der Schulugehörigkeit buddhistischer Text nach sprachlichen Kriterien', in H. Bechert (ed.), *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur* I (Göttingen 1985), p.62, n.14), who points to ne fact that forms derived from the Vedic *√aj* are attested in Pāli texts. Following H. Smith (*Saddanīti, la grammaire pali d'Aggavaṃsa* V, 2 (Lund 1996), p.1601, s.v. *pārāji*), von Hinüber, *ibid.*, says that the term *pārājika* is, without any doubt, a erivation from **parā- √aj*, meaning 'to chase away'[26]. Early in the Pāli tradition, the term is then no longer understood by the Buddhists themselves. However, this hypothesis encounters some roblems. First, in the explanations of the term *pārājika* given by the Vinayas, the idea 'to chase away' is never present. Instead, it is said that a monk or nun 'falls away from': 墮(Mahī. Sarva), 退沒墮落(Mahā), 墮落崩倒(Mūla). Secondly, the common term sed to express 'to exclude permanently from the Order' is the Sanskrit term *√naś*, Pāli *nassati*[27], Chinese 滅 (擯)[28]. Although the dea 'to chase away' does not seem impossible in the context of a *pārājika* offence, the above-mentioned problems throw some doubt on the hypothesis that *pārājika* is derived from *parā- √aj*.

Summarising, we can say that Roth's etymological explanation of the term *pārājika* as derived from *parā(ñ)c*, 'turned

which excludes, thrusts back" he who is guilty of it'. His opinion is followed by R.C. Childers, *Dictionary of the Pali Language*, p.333, s.v. *pārājiko*.

16 See also von Hinüber, *A Handbook*, p.10: 'The rules of the first group are called "(rules referring) to expulsion (from the *saṃgha*)" using the Vedic verb *parā-aj* found in Pāli only in this context and therefore no longer understood by the Buddhists themselves at a rather early date'.

17 See Horner, BD I, p.xxvii; III (London 1938, 1993), p.28, n.4; C. Kabilsingh, *A Comparative Study of Bhikkhuṇī Pāṭimokkha* (Varanasi/Delhi 1984), p.51.

18 See Nakamura, *op. cit.*, p.1357, s.v. 滅羯磨.

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away from', finds support in the Chinese Vinayas (Mahī, Dharma and Mūla) and in the Pāli Vinaya. Von Hinüber's opinion that *pārājika* is derived from *para- √aj* cannot be excluded, although no explanation of the term in the Vinayas supports this hypothesis. Etymologies based on *parā- √ji* or on *parā*, 'on the other side' and *jīna*, 'deprived of', have to be seen as secondary attempts to explain the term *pārājika*.

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Buddhist Law According to the Theravāda-Vinaya
A Survey of Theory and Practice

"Wait, Sāriputta, wait! The Tathāgata will know the right time. The teacher will not prescribe any rule (*sikkhāpadaṃ paññāpeti*) to his pupils, he will not recite the Pātimokha as long as no factors leading to defilement (*āsavaṭṭhāniyā dhammā*) appear in the order (Vin III 9.26-30)." This is the answer of the Buddha to Sāriputta's worries that harm may be done to the order, if no rules of conduct are prescribed in time. And Sāriputta further points out that some of the buddhas of the past neglected this very duty with disasterous results: Their teaching suffered a quick decay and an early disappearance.

This passage underlines three important points: first, the significance of Buddhist ecclesiastical law. For without *vinaya* there is no order (*saṃgha*), and without the community of monks there is no Buddhism.[1] Consequently the vinaya-texts are the last ones lost, when Buddhism eventually disappears.[2] Secondly, the rules of conduct must be promulgated by the Buddha himself. He is the only law giver, and thus all rules, to which every single monk has to obey, are thought to go back to the Buddha. The third point is that the rules are prescribed only after an offence has been committed. Thus rules are derived from experience and based on the practical need to avoid certain forms of behavior in future. This means at the same time that the cause for a rule is always due to the wrong behavior of a certain person,[3] and consequently there is no existent system of Buddhist law.

1. There are of course exceptions: S. Lienhard, "Buddhistisches Gemeindeleben in Nepal," *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna-Literatur*, Part 1, AAWG 149 (Göttingen: 1985) 261-274.
2. Cf. CPD s.v. *antaradhāna*, and add to the references given there: Sv 898.18-899.26=Ps IV 115.10-116.26; Mp I 88.11-89.16; cf. Sp 13.6=Sv 11.17.
3. The first offender ever is the monk Upasena, Vin I 59.1-34, cf. Sp 194.1 and Sp 213.11-19 on *apaññatte sikkhāpade*, and MN I 444.36–445.25.

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The arrangement of texts in the Theravāda canon underlines the importance of Buddhist law, for it is contained in the first part of the Tipiṭaka, the "basket of the discipline" (Vinaya-piṭaka) followed by the "basket of the teaching" (Sutta-piṭaka). This sequence is found already in the well-known account of the first council held at Rājagaha (Rājagṛha) immediately after the death of the Buddha according to the Buddhist tradition. This account, which forms an appendix to the Vinaya-piṭaka (Vin II 286.16-287.28), mentions several texts arranged in the same way as the contents of the Tipiṭaka described by Buddhaghosa in his commentaries in the 5th century C. E.[4] There, of course, the third part of the canon, which is considerably later than first two parts, namely the "basket of things relating to the teaching" (Abhidhamma-piṭaka) has been added.

In spite of the prominence of texts containing Buddhist ecclesiastical law, they seem to have been formulated somewhat later than the Sutta-texts.[5] At any rate, law always occupied the first place in the hierarchy of texts, even in the division and arrangement preceding the Tipiṭaka; the "nine parts" (*navaṅga*) of the teaching[6] begin with sutta, that is, with the Pātimokkha(-sutta). This text, called either Pātimokkha or simply Sutta in the Tipiṭaka, and Pātimokkhasutta in post-canonical times[7] is the very core of Buddhist law.

The Pātimokkhasutta contains 227 rules in the Theravāda tradition and slightly different numbers in other extant *vinaya* traditions.[8] These rules are arranged according to the gravity of the respective offense.

4. The arrangment of the Tipiṭaka is found at the beginning of the commentaries to the three parts of the Tipiṭaka respectively: Sp 18.1-19; Sv 16.31-17.16; As 6.13-9.14.
5. O. v. Hinüber, *Der Beginn der Schrift und frühe Schriftlichkeit in Indien*, AWL 11 (1989) 41-54; cf. also the formula *dhamma vinaya*, never **vinaya dhamma*: This sequence, however, may also be due to rhythmical considerations: O. v. Hinüber, *Untersuchungen zur Mündlichkeit früher mittelindischer Texte der Buddhisten*, AWL 5 (1994) 16.
6. O. v. Hinüber, "Die neun Aṅgas. Ein früher Versuch zur Einteilung buddhistischer Texte," WZKS 38 (Orbis Indicus. Festschrift G.Oberhammer) (1994): 121-135.
7. O. v. Hinüber, "Vinaya und Abhidhamma" StII (Festschrift für G. Buddruss) (in press).
8. The relevant material for easy comparison has been collected in W. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa on the Basis of Its Chinese, Tibetan, Sanskrit and Pāli Versions* (Santiniketan: 1955) (review: Kun Chang, JAOS 80 [1960]: 71-77).

A transgression of any of the first four rules leads to the irrevocable expulsion from the order. This is why these rules are called *pārājika* "relating to expulsion."[9] The first three rules deal with a breach of chastity (*methuna-dhamma*[*pārājika*], Vin II 286.25; Sp 516.2; 1393.24; *methunapārājika*, Sp 1382.24), with stealing (*adinnādāna*[*pārājika*], Vin II 286.32; Sp 303.18; 1393.25 "taking what has not been given"), and murder (*manussaviggaha*[*pārājika*], Vin II 286.37; Sp 476.7; 768.22; 1393.25 "species 'man'") respectively. These are immediately obvious offenses, which one might find in any law code. The fourth and last one of this group, on the other hand, needs some explication. It deals with monks, who make the false claim to possess supernatural powers (*uttarimanussadhamma*, Vin II 287.5; Sp 480.22 "things superhuman"). At first glance it might seem rather surprising that this claim could result in the expulsion from the order. This draws attention to the high importance given to meditative pratices, which, according to the belief of the time of early Buddhism, would ultimately lead to the acquisition of supernatural, magical powers. Obviously some safeguard was needed against false ascetics in the order, who might do considerable damage to the Buddhist order by shaking the faith of the lay community, on which the Buddhists depended.[10]

While the name given to the first group of offenses is easily understood, the designation of the second group comprising 13 offenses called Saṃghādisesa has been discussed repeatedly without any convincing result so far.[11] According to the Theravāda exegetical tradition the word means "(an offense, which is atoned by seeking) the order (*saṃgha*) at the beginning and at the end" (*saṃgho ādimhi c'eva sese ca icchitabbo assa*, Sp 522.3=Kkh 35.20 quoted Sadd 791.26). This tentative "etymological" translation, which would not be possible on the basis of the form of the name as used in other Vinaya schools, means that the length of the punishment, which is a temporary expul-

9. O. v. Hinüber, *Die Sprachgeschichte des Pāli im Spiegel der südostasiati-schen Handschriftenüberlieferung*, AWL 8 (1988) 3, note 2. The correct interpretation of *pārājika* may be preserved at Vin V 148.15* quoted Sp 260.3-5; but: *parājito parājayaṃ āpanno*, Sp 259.17.
10. On the interpretation of this rule see D. Schlingloff, "König Aśoka und das Wesen des ältesten Buddhismus," *Saeculum* 36 (1985): 326-333. Even if a monk had attained *uttarimanussadhamma*, he was not allowed to communicate this fact to people outside the order: Pācittiya VIII, Vin IV 25.13.
11. É. Nolot, "Sāṃghāvaśeṣa-, Saṃghātiśeṣa- Saṃghādisesa-," *Bulletin d'Études Indiennes* 5 (1987): 251-272, referring also to previous literature.

sion from the order, has to be determined by the assembly of monks.[12] Though the pertinent procedure has been described at great length in a later part of the Vinaya,[13] it is not fully understood in every detail as yet.

Again the first five offenses relate to sexual misbehavior: Losing semen otherwise than while sleeping, touching a woman, making a sexual remark, trying to seduce a women, or acting as a matchmaker. The next offenses Saṃghādisesa VI and VII concern the compound (*vatthu*) for building either a cell for a single monk (*kuṭi*), or a "great" monastery (*mahallaka vihāra*). This has to be commissioned by the order. The construction of the building itself is the topic of a later rule, Pācittiya XIX. The rules Saṃghādisesa VIII-XII relate to inner conflicts of the order. Among them is the famous one on "splitting the order" (*saṃghabheda*), Saṃghādisesa X.[14] The last rule regulates certain misbehavior of monks towards laymen.

Both offenses of the third group called "undetermined" (*aniyata*) relate to sexual misbehavior of a monk, who stays together with a woman either in an open place or under one roof. Depending on his actions he may be liable to either Pārājika I, Saṃghādisesa II-V or Pācittiya XLIV, XLV. It is legally interesting that the monk is considered guilty, if a trustworthy laywoman (*saddheyyavacasā upāsikā*) who is the very woman involved accuses him. Following the Pātimokkha, no further evidence is needed. The early commentary,

12. This seems to be meant by *śeṣe*, cf.: *nirṇaye vayaṃ pramāṇaṃ, śeṣe rājā, Mṛcchakaṭika*, act IX (before verse 39) "in evaluating the evidence we (the judge) are the authority, for the rest (i. e. the sentence) [it is] the king," cf. *śeṣe* (so read) *pramāṇaṃ tu bhavantaṃ, Mahābhārata* III 53.21 (Nalopākhyāna). In Mṛcch this is said by the judge at the end of the trial of Cārudatta, which shows that investigation and judgement are clearly separated.

13. Cullavagga chapters I-III, Vin II 1.5-72.29.

14. T. Ohtomo, "Interpretations of Sikkhāpada, in the case of Saṃghādisesa X," *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies), 19.2 (1971): 831-834 (in Japanese); H. Bechert: The Importance of Aśoka's so-called Schism Edict," *Indological and Buddhist Studies. Volume in Honour of J. W. de Jong on his 60th Birthday* (Canberra, 1982): 61-68, and "On the Origination and Characteristics of Buddhist Nikāyas, or Schools," *Premier Colloque Étienne Lamotte (Bruxelles et Liège 24-27 septembre 1989)* (Louvain-La-Neuve, 1993): 51-56; K. R. Norman, "Aśoka and Saṅghabheda," *Studies in Original Buddhism and Mahāyāna Buddhism in Commemoration of F. Watanabe* (Kyoto: 1993) 9-29; S.Sasaki, "Buddhist Sects in the Aśoka Period (I)—The Meaning of the Schism Edict," *Bukkyō Kenkyū* (Buddhist Studies) 18 (1988): 181-202; (II)—Saṃgha-bheda (1), *Ibid.* 21 (1992): 157-176.

however, the *Suttavibhaṅga* adds (and thus at the same time mitigates the rule) that it is necessary, too, that the monk does not deny having committed the respective offense.

Here we find one of the basic principles of early Buddhist law as laid down in the Pātimokkha: that the monk involved has to admit his intention to commit an offense. Consequently the moral standards of the monks are supposed to be very high. Speaking the truth is taken more or less for granted here as in Brahmanical tradition, where it is thought that brahmins speak the truth by their very nature. Given the high esteem for truth necessarily found in oral cultures such as early Buddhism or that the Veda, it is surprising that telling a lie is considered only as a Pācittiya offense (see page 6).

The fourth group of offenses comprises the largest number, altogether 122 divided into two groups: 30 rules concerning "expiation by giving up (something)" (*nissaggiya pācittiya*) and 92 rules called "pure expiation" (*suddha pācittiya*), because some ecclesiastical punishment is imposed.

The 30 Nissaggiya rules are of particular interest as they shed some light on the property a monk was allowed to hold. These rules concerning property are divided into three sets of of ten rules. The first deals with robes, the second with mats and material used to make them, and includes the important Nissaggiyas XVIII and XIX forbidding trade and the possession of any "gold or silver," i. e. money (*jātarūparajataṃ*, Vin III 237.36**), to which the *Suttavibhaṅga* gives a farsighted explanation: "or whatever is used (*ye vohāraṃ gacchanti*, Vin III 238.3)" thus including even paper money, if not credit cards.

In spite of this rule monks did own the financial means even to build monasteries at their own expense (*attano dhanena*, Vin IV 48. 21) as it is said in the commentary to Pācittiya XIX. It is not clear from the Vinaya-piṭaka how this was handled. Probably a layman attached to the monasteries managed the finances owned by the monks. This rule is one, if not the, earliest reference to "riches" in the possession of individual monks. At the time of the *Samantapāsādikā* it was usual that monks controlled their financial means. This is shown by his liability to pay damages in case any property belonging to the order was lost through his negligence.[15]

15. O. v. Hinüber, "Über drei Begriffe der buddhistischen Rechtssprache: issāravatā, giyā und bhaṇḍadeyya," IT 7 (1979): 275-279. Property of monks

The third and last set of ten Nissaggiyas deals with the alms bowl and miscellaneous items such as medicine or the forbidden appropriation of things given to the whole saṃgha (*saṃghika lābha*) by an individual monk.

The "pure" Pācittiyas comprise 92 rules in the Theravāda-Prātimokkha and 90 in the Sarvāstivāda-Prātimokṣasūtra. The latter number seems to be the original one, for a few Pācittiyas have been split into two rules by the Theravādins or are counted in such a way, giving rise to some doubt about their originality. The initial arrangement of the rules in groups of ten has thus been obscured somewhat. The groups themselves are named after the first rule in a group.[16]

The consequences of transgressing a Pācittiya are not clear. The name of this group of offenses, which has been borrowed from Vedic ritual language,[17] points to some kind of atonement (*prāyaścitta: pācittiya*), but no further details seem to be given in the legal texts of Theravāda.[18]

It may be sufficient to mention only a few of these offenses as examples. The very first rule concerns telling lies, and therefore is again one of the universal rules like Pārājika I-III. Here again the Buddhist law is near to concepts of the Veda. For the Vedic Dharmasūtras teach the same, e. g. *ahiṃsā satyam astainyam / maithunasya ca varjanam*, Baudhāyana 2.18.2 "non-violence, truth, not stealing, and avoiding sexual intercourse." Even the formulation of this Pācittiya shows that it is has been taken over by the Buddhists from some earlier source because instead of the typical Buddhist wording,[19] for

is listed in Sp 290-294; 1244ff; cf. also G. Schopen, *JIABS* 14.2 (1991): 312ff.

16. The structure of the Pātimokkha will be discussed in detail in an article under preparation.

17. On the explication of the name *pācittiya* see O. v. Hinüber, "Die Bestimmung der Schulzugehörigkeit buddhistischer Texte nach sprachlichen Kriterien," *Schulzugehörigkeit* . . . (as above note 1) 64ff., cf. H. Matsumura, AO 51 (1990): 67, note 17; very rarely also the form *pācattiya* occurs: O. v. Hinüber, *The Oldest Pāli Manuscript. Four Folios of the Vinaya-Piṭaka from the National Archives, Kathmandu*, AWL 6 (1991) 22; on Jaina evidence: C. Caillat, *Les expiations dans le rituel ancien des religieux jaina*, Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Séries In-8°, Fascicule 25 (Paris: 1965) 16.

18. On the classification of transgressions: É. Nolot, *Règles de discipline des nonnes bouddhistes*, Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Fascicule 60 (Paris: 1991) 384-386.

19. This wording is shared with Jaina legal literature, where rules begin with *je bhikkhu* . . .

which there is no correspondence in Vedic literature: "if a monk . . . (should do this or that) . . ." (*yo pana bhikkhu* . . .), a different formula is applied here: "if there is a conscious lie, it is an offense requiring expiation" (*sampajānamusāvāde pācittiyaṃ*, Vin IV 2.14**).

At the same time this wording is much simpler than the usually very careful, if at times somewhat clumsy, formulation of rules in the Pātimokkha: "Whatever monk should intentionally deprive a being of the class 'human' of life or should seek somebody who brings the knife to him (i. e. to the man to be killed), or should praise death, or should incite (someone) to death saying: 'Hello there, my man, of what use to you is this evil, difficult life? Death is better for you than life,' or should deliberately and purposefully in various ways praise death or should incite anyone to death, he is also liable to expulsion and not in communion," Pārājika III (Vin III 73.10**-16**, translation after I. B. Horner). Obviously this is an attempt to describe all possible conditions leading to a certain offense in a very comprehensive way. The struggle with the language and a certain awkwardness of the syntax underline the fact that the authors were not accustomed to this kind of legal formulation when they attempted to achieve something new and innovative in the history of Indian law. The rules laid down in the Pātimokkha seem to be the first attempt at a truly legal description of the facts in India.

It is only in the Pācittiya that violating living beings (*ahiṃsā*) other than man is referred to: Pācittiya XI concerns plants (*bhūtagāma*, Vin IV 34.33**), and much later in Pācittiya LXI animals (*pāṇa*, Vin IV 124.25**) are mentioned. In contrast to murder both these offenses do not result in expulsion from the order, not even to a temporary suspension of the rights of a monk, as does a Saṃghādisesa offense. This underlines the superior position held by man, who is considered to stand high above any other living being. This remarkable feature of Buddhist anthropology is also mirrored by the Dhamma: only men are able to become buddhas.

The last rule to be mentioned of this group is Pācittiya XIX concerning the erection of a monastery (*mahallaka vihāra*), already referred to above in connection with Saṃghādisesa VI and VII. This example suggests that rules once included into the Pātimokkha can never be dropped. The building described here seems to be a very simple, if not primitive, type of monastery. As soon as the monasteries developed into larger complexes, it became impossible to follow or even use this rule any longer. As a consequence the exact meaning seems

to have been forgotten very soon, already at the time when the old commentary, the *Suttavibhaṅga*, was formulated because the explanations given here clearly show that many details were no longer fully understood. The same fact can be deduced from the attempts to create a comprehensible text by reformulating the rule, as did some of those schools who use Sanskrit in their Prātimokṣasūtras. However, the exact meaning of this rule remains obscure.[20]

Although evidently obsolete for a long period, perhaps even for more than two millennia, this rule has been kept because it was considered impossible to change or update the Pātimokkha promulgated by the Buddha himself: *suttaṃ hi appaṭivattiyaṃ*, Sp 231.27 "for it is impossible to reverse the (Pātimokkha)sutta." This opinion cannot have prevailed at all times, because the Pātimokkha as we have it today, must have been formulated by the order at an early date, and not by the Buddha. Very soon, however, in the history of Buddhism the assembly of monks decided not to touch the text anymore. The refusal to change even the "minor rules" (*khuddānukhuddakāni sikkhāpadāni*)[21] hinted at in the pertinent discussion at the council of Rājagaha (Rājagṛha) (Vin II 287.29-288.15, cf. DN II 154.15ff.) could indicate the end of the freedom for any changes of the Pātimokkha.[22]

A set of only four rules follows this large group. As these offenses have to be pointed out only by the monk who has committed them, they are named Pāṭidesaniya "pertaining to confession."

The final group of rules in the Pātimokkha comprises 75 items and relates to appropriate behaviour (which would also apply to any layman) such as walking around properly dressed, avoiding talking while eating, etc. They are called Sekkhiya "pertaining to training." All these rules are formulated in the same way: "I shall not put my hand into my mouth while I am eating. This (rule) pertaining to training must be kept," Sekkhiya XLII (Vin IV 195.10**). The contents, arrangement, and number of these rules, which contain an interesting, though

20. D. Schlingloff, "Zur Interpretation des Prātimokṣasūtra," ZDMG 113 (1963): 536-551, particularly p. 542ff.
21. Although it is not clear, what exactly is meant by these rules, it seems that Pācittaya LXXII, Vin IV 143.17* uses this expression in reference to the *Pātimokkhasutta*. The Pācittiyas are called *khuddaka*, Sp 735-7*; 886.2*; 213.18. Cf. also J. Dhirasekera, "The Rebels Against the Codified Law in Buddhist Monastic Discipline," *Bukkyō Kenkyū* (Buddhist Studies) 1 (1970): 90-77.
22. The reason given is quite interesting: changes might confuse the lays: Vin II 288.17.

difficult, and probably popular vocabulary, sometimes vary considerably from one Vinaya school to another. In fact, this set seems to be a later addition[23] because the Pātimokkha is occasionally referred to in the canon as "These more then 150 rules, which are recited every half month—I cannot keep them" (*sādhikaṃ idaṃ bhante diyaḍḍhasikkhāpadasataṃ anvaddhamāsaṃ uddesaṃ āgacchati nāhaṃ bhante etthā sakkomi sik-khituṃ*, AN I 230.17-19 etc., Mp II 346.29). The figure 150 only makes sense, if the 75 Sekkhiya-rules are excluded: 4 Pārājika + 13 Saṃghādisesa + 2 Aniyata + 30 Nissaggiya + 92 (originally 90) Pācittiya +4 Pātidesanīya = 145 (143), to which the seven "methods to settle a dispute" (*adhikaraṇasamatha*) are added at the very end of the Pātimokkha. These seven methods are only enumerated without any further explanation and are found in the second part of the Vinaya-piṭaka, the *Khandhaka*, divided into twenty chapters called "large section," *Mahāvagga*, and "small section," *Cullavagga* respectively.

The first part of the Vinaya-piṭaka, the Pātimokkha briefly described so far, has been built around the rules for the behaviour of individual monks and nuns. This section of the Vinaya-piṭaka is called *Suttavibhaṅga* "explanation of the (Pātimokkha-)sutta."[24] Each single rule is embedded in a text of identical structure throughout the whole *Suttavibhaṅga* comprising four parts, the names of which are found in the account of the first council, and again, though slightly different, in the much later commentary on the Vinaya-piṭaka, the *Samantapāsādikā*.

According to the Theravāda tradition, the first two Piṭakas were recited and thus recognized as canonical at the first council immediately after the death of the Buddha. When Mahākassapa as the leading monk asked Upāli the most learned monk in *vinaya* to recite the texts comprising Buddhist law, he did so by inquiring about the place (*nidāna*, Vin II 286.27), where a rule was prescribed, about the person concerned (*puggala*, Vin II 286.27), and about the topic of the rule (*vatthu*, Vin II 286.27).[25] These three points, which constitute the

23. In contrast to all other groups the number of the Sekkhiyas is not given in the introduction to their recitation: Vin IV 185.1; 206.31; 207.15. This points to the fact that their number was not as strictly fixed as that of all the other offenses.
24. The existence of the Pātimokkhasutta also as a separate text is guaranteed by Khh. It is referred to as a separate text at Spk II 203.12; Vibh-a 32.30.
25. This passage is quoted in Sp 14.5-7.

introductory story to a rule, are also designated as a whole as *vatthu* (Sp 29.16) "topic, introductory matter" in the commentary. These stories have been invented much later than the rules proper were formulated, for they are at times based on gross misunderstandings of the contents of a given prescription.[26]

The introduction regularly ends with the sentence: "you should, monks, recite this precept (*sikkhāpada*)." The precepts themselves are called *paññatti* (Vin II 286.28) in the Vinaya-piṭaka in contrast to *mātikā* (Sp 29.16) in its commentary. Sometimes the content of a precept as originally formulated is considered incomplete and has to be supplemented. After the Buddha had ruled: "if a monk should take something away that has not been given, which is considered as theft . . ." certain monks held the view that "refers to inhabited places, not to uninhabited places" (. . . *bhagavatā sikkhāpadaṃ paññattaṃ taṅ ca kho gāme no araññe*, Vin III 45.30). Consequently the Buddha had to specify the rule as "if a monk should take something away that has not been given from an inhabitated or from an uninhabitated place (*gāmā vā araññā vā*, Vin III 46.16**), which is considered as theft. . . ." This method of expanding a definition is called "secondary prescription" (*anupaññatti*, Vin II 286.28). The commentary further explains that these specifications may be used either to strengthen (*daḷhataraṃ karonti*, Sp 228.5)[27] or to loosen (*sithilaṃ karonti*, Sp 227.34) a rule depending on whether a precept is based on what is considered as an act or a behavior "to be avoided by all" (*lokavajja*) such as theft or murder, or "to be avoided because of a precept" (*paṇṇattivajja*, Sp 228.1) such as Pācittiya XXXIIIff. "eating as a group of monks," which is an offense only for monks. In this latter case additional rules mitigate the original one by giving exceptions, in the case of Pācittiya XXXIIIff., no less than seven times (!).

In contrast to this opinion found in the *Samantapāsādikā*, the commentary on the Pātimokkha, the *Khaṅkhāvitaraṇi*, gives a slightly different explanation to *anupaññatti*. Without referring to "avoided by all" and "avoided because of a precept," the *Khaṅkhāvitaraṇi* states that an additional rule may either "cause an offense" (*āpattikara*, Kkh 24.37) as in Pācittiya XII, or "restrict an offense" (*anāpattikara*, Kkh 24.38) such as the addition "if not in sleep" (*aññatra supinantā*, Kkh

26. This has been discussed in detail by D. Schlingloff in the article mentioned in note 20 above.
27. It was not always clear which of the two catagories applies, as in the case of Sekkhiya I: Sp 890.10-12.

24.38 = Vin III 112.17**), which restricts the "consciously losing semen . . . is a Saṃghādisesa," referring to Saṃghādisesa I, or, as a third, possibility support an offense (*āpattiupatthambhakara*, Kkh 24.39), for which Pārājika II concerning theft as discussed above is quoted.

This difference of opinion on *anupaññatti* separates both commentaries and consequently is an interesting hint at the development of juridical thinking in Theravāda, a field that still awaits investigation.

In contrast to the account of the first council, the *Samantapāsādikā*, which does not know *anupaññatti* as a separate entry in the division of the *Suttavibhaṅga*, next mentions the "commentary explaining individual words" (*padabhājaniya*, Sp 29.16). This is the technical term for the explanation of the Pātimokkha found in the *Suttavibhaṅga* based on a way of legal thinking much more developed than in the Pātimokkha proper. Therefore it seems rather significant that no mention is made of this part of the *Suttavibhaṅga* in the account of the first council since this might indicate that this account dates back to a time when the *padabhājaniya* did not yet exist.

Next the offense proper (*āpatti*, Vin II 286.28: Sp 29.17: so read with note 7) is mentioned that is Pārājika, Saṃghādisesa, etc., and only in the commentary does a further technical term follow, the "intermediate offense" (*antarāpatti*, Sp 29.17).[28] This designates a somewhat lighter form of the offense than the one contained in the rule itself, and it applies when only part of the conditions are met that would normally result in committing a certain offense. For example, if a monk intends to steal an object, he may secure the help of a second person (*dutiya*), fetch a basket to carry the object, etc. In spite of his intention to steal, it is only "wrong doing" (*dukkaṭa*) if he does not go beyond these preparations. Even if he touches the object or starts shaking it (*phandāpeti*), it is still one of the stages defined as *antarāpatti*, but now, if he shakes it, it is already a "grave offense" (*thullaccaya*). Only if the monk actually moves the object (*ṭhānā cāveti*), is the offense (*āpatti*) defined as theft (*adinnādāna*, Vin III 47.34-48.4).[29]

28. The meaning given s. v. *antarāpatti* in the CPD is wrong, and corrected s. v. *āpatti*, ifc. It has to be kept in mind that this word has two meanings: 2. "offense committed, while being suspended because of an offense committed earlier," for which see Cullavagga I, II and note 36 below.
29. Cf. J. D. M. Derrett, "Adattādānam: Valuable Buddhist Casuistry," IT 7 (1979): 181-194.

At the end of this casuistry a final section is added giving the conditions of freedom from punishment (*anāpatti*). The monk, who was the first to commit the relevant offense (*ādikammika* "the first committer"), is never liable to punishment. Thus the Roman rule *nullum crimen sine lege* was formulated here at a rather early date in India.[30] The same applies for the concept of penal responsibility; mentally disturbed monks (*ummattaka*) are not punishable. This is the framework for all precepts from Pārājika to Sekkhiya with the exception, of course, of the "methods to settle a dispute" at the very end of the Pātimokkha.

The individual groups of offenses are separated from each other by very short texts, which are used only for the recitation of the Pātimokkha once a fortnight. These texts state, for example, that the 30 Nissaggiya rules have been recited, that no monk has violated them, and that the assembly is consequently pure, which means that no one has committed an offense.

An old paragraph shows how the Pāttimokkhasutta was recited: All monks of a certain area (*gāmakkhetta* and not *simā*!) assemble and ask a monk, who knows the text by heart (*yassa vattati, taṃ ajjhesāma*). While the text is recited (*bhaññamāne*), an offense committed is dealt with according to law (*yathādhammaṃ yathāsatthaṃ*) (MN III 10.8-16). Thus it is the very purpose of the recitation to secure the ritual purity of the order by making sure that all precepts contained in the Pātimokkha have been kept.

This rather broad outline of the *Suttavibhaṅga* may be sufficient, although only the first part, the "great commentary" (*mahāvibhaṅga*) has been taken into consideration so far. The structure of the much shorter second part, the "nuns' commentary" (*bhikkhunivibhaṅga*) is basically the same. The text is neither read nor studied frequently, partly because the order of nuns ceased to exist long ago, as it is well known.[31] It should be noted, however, that part of the rules for monks are also valid for nuns, as "common (*sādhāraṇa*) precepts," such as the four Pārājikas.[32] Thus there are altogether eight Pārājikas for nuns, although only the four additional rules are actually given in the Bhikkhunī-Pātimokkha. In a more complicated way the 17 Saṃghādisesa for nuns are put together: 10 are specific for nuns, and Saṃghādisesa V, VIII, IX of the monks are to be inserted after Saṃghādisesa VI of the nuns, and Saṃghādisesa X-XIII of the monks are inserted between Saṃghādisesa IX and X of the nuns according to the commentary (Sp 915.34-38).

As the rules valid for nuns are much stricter than those for the monks, there is usually a higher number of precepts to be kept: 8 Pārājikas, 17 Saṃghādisesas, 30 Nissaggiyas, 176 Pācittiyas, and 8 Pāṭidesaniyas. Together with the number of Nissaggiyas, those of the Sekkhiyas and of the Adhikaraṇasamathas are identical for both monks and nuns. The rules for nuns are no longer recited. The introduction to the recitation of the Pātimokkha explicitly states: "The instruction of nuns does not take place, as they do not exist any longer."[33]

In the same way the *Suttavibhaṅga* is built around the Pātimokkha, the structure of the second part of the Vinaya, the "great" and the "small sections" (*Mahāvagga, Cullavagga*) is, at least to some extent, determined by "legal formulas" (*kammavācā*). These formulas have to be recited to transact legal business in the order, such as appointing a certain monk to be in charge of the distribution of cells and beddings to monks arriving at a monastery, or to instruct the nuns, etc.[34] The admission of new members to the order is also regulated by *kammavācās*. The wording of these formulas is fixed exactly, down to the correct pronounciation of single sounds; for phonetic mistakes such as pronouncing a labial instead of a nasal in *saṃghaṃ* versus *saṃghaṃ*

30. H. Hecker, "Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze in der buddhistischen Ordensverfassung," *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee* 10 (1977) 89-115, particularly p. 97; cf. the discussion of *ādikammika*, Sp 610.6-611.4.

31. Cf. e. g.: T. Bartholomeusz, "The Female Mendicant in Buddhist Sri Lanka," *Buddhism, Sexuality, and Gender*, ed. J. I. Cabezón (Delhi: 1992) 37-01, and P. Skilling, "A Note on the Bhikkhunī-saṅgha (II): The Order of Nuns after the Parinirvāṇa," *Pāli-Sanskṛta-Vijākār. Mahāmakuṭarāja Vidyālay* 2436 (Bangkok: 1993) 208-251.

32. Other precepts are "not common" (*asādhāraṇa*) and consequently apply either to monks or to nuns. Therefore these offenses, though committed by a monk or a nun, disappear in case of a change of sex: *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, ed. S. Lévi (Paris: 1907) 55.5; cf. O. v. Hinüber: *Vinaya und Abhidhamma*, as above note 7, at the end.

33. The relevant text is found in *The Patimokkha*, Trans. Ñāṇamoli (Bangkok: 1966) 9; the procedure is described at Kkh 12.6-14.2 and Sp 794.20-798.17.

34. A single monk can hold up to 13 functions (Sp 578.28, cf. Sp 1163.16), if he is able (*vyatta*, Sp 578.26 on Vin III 158.23) to do so. These functions are enumerated at Vin V 204.29-33, cf. Sp 1411.25-28 quoted Sp-ṭ II 344.15-18 ad Sp 578.28; also Sp 1195.22ff.=1396.6; further on *bhaṇḍāgārika*, Sp 354.21 and on *vihāracārika*, Sp 357.9ff.

would result in the invalidity of a legal act.[35] This dates back to the time of early Buddhism and to the days of orality when the spoken word was considered valid. No documents were known either to confirm an ordination or to be used as evidence in Buddhist law.

While the *Suttavibhaṅga* regulates the behaviour of individual monks, the *Khandhaka* describes the procedures to be transacted by the order. The first and longest chapter recalls the foundation of the Buddhist saṃgha and deals with the rules for the lower (*pabbajjā*) and higher ordination (*upasampadā*). The following chapters comprise the rules for the recitation of the Pātimokkha, for spending the rainy season, etc. There are altogether ten *Khandhaka*s, which form the *Mahāvagga*.

Between these ten and the second set of ten *Khandhaka*s found in the *Cullavagga*, which are enlarged by the two appendices containing the accounts of the first two councils held at Rājagaha (Rājagṛha) and Vesālī (Vaiśālī) respectively, there is no clear cut division. The only superficial difference may be seen in the fact that legal matters become increasingly involved in the *Cullavagga*. Thus far not much efford has been made to investigate and to understand the legal system described in these parts of the Vinaya.

The first three chapters of the *Cullavagga*, the *kamma-kkhandhaka* "section on legal acts," *parivāsa-kkhandhaka* "section on probation," and *samuccaya-kkhandhaka* "section on miscellaneous matters" deal mainly with procedures resulting from Saṃghādisesa offenses. If a monk has committed such an offense, he loses certain rights for a certain period, after which he can become a full member of the order again. This matter can get rather complicated if a monk commits a second, or third offense while on probation,[36] and in addition conceals them for a certain period, which in itself results in a particular form of punishment. Consequently the rules given in the relevant chapters are quite involved, and at times; it is a bit difficult not to get confused when reading these texts.

We are quite well informed about the consequences of a Saṃghādisesa. It is, however, not entirely clear how the procedures described

35. O. v. Hinüber, "Das buddhistische Recht und die Phonetik des Pāli. Ein Abschnitt aus der Samantapāsādikā über die Vermeidung von Aussprachefehlern in *kammavācās*," StII 13/14 (Festschrift W. Rau) (1987): 101-127. - For more recent times cf.: F. Bizot, *Les traditions de la pabbajjā en Asie du Sud-Est*, AAWG 169 (1988).

36. Such an offense is called *antarāpatti*, see note 28 above.

in *Cullavagga* II and III relate to certain special cases mentioned in *Cullavagga* I. Here, five kinds of misbehavior together with five different legal procedures against them are named,[37] which, strangely enough, all result in the same consequences,[38] although one of them "expulsion (from a place)" (*pabbājaniyakamma*, Vin II 9.29-15.28)[39] results from Saṃghādisesa XIII, while the "suspension because of the refusal to give up a wrong view" (*pāpikāya diṭṭhiyā appaṭinissagge ukkhepaniyakamma*, Vin II 25.9-28.17) relates to Pācittiya LXVIII. This, like many other problems in the Vinaya, still requires detailed investigation.

A minor point mentioned in this section deserves some attention, although it seems to be rather marginal at a first glance. When the Buddha asks Sāriputta and Moggallāna to drive away the Assajipunabbasuka monks from the Kiṭāgiri, that is, to execute an "expulsion from a place" (*pabbājaniyakamma*), these prominent monks are afraid to do so, because those monks are "fierce and violent" (*caṇḍā . . . pharusā*, Vin II 12.34ff. = III 183.1ff.). Therefore the Buddha recommends that Sāriputta and Moggallāna should not go alone, but take with them a large group of monks. This is one of the very few passages where the difficulties to enforce a decision are mentioned.[40]

On the whole, the Vinaya-piṭaka contains much information on theory, e. g. the very elaborate section on the "settling a dispute" (*samatha-kkhandhaka*, Vin II 73.3-104.11, cf. MN II 247.2-250.21 with Ps IV 42.13-46.25), which is a long and extremely detailed explanation of the corresponding key words found at the end of the Pātimokkha as mentioned above. Unfortunately, however, it is not explicitly stated, in which particular case which method for settling the respective dispute is to be applied. Nowhere is an example given for the entire procedure, beginning with the committing of an offense and describing the complete hearing within the order, with the final verdict and the eventual punishment. Even the commentary is not very

37. A corresponding list is found at AN I 99.4-8, which is explained at Mp II 164.32-165.7.

38. These are described repeatedly in the same wording Vin II 5.5-15 etc.; a special case is mentioned Vin II 22.12-23.2: *āpattiyā adassane ukkhepaniyakamma*.

39. The definition given for *pabbājaniyakamma* in the PED is not correct.

40. A similar case is the infliction of Brahmadaṇḍa, Vin II 290.19-21. It needs a minister of king Mahāsena (334-361) to defrock (*uppabbajesi*) a monk accused of a pārājika (*antimavatthu*), Mhv XXXVII 38ff.

informative in this respect, although a few additional details are provided, which will be discussed below.

The tenth and last section of the *Cullavagga* proper dealing with legal matters contains the account of the foundation of the order of nuns. Thus the structure of the *Khandhaka* corresponds in this respect to the *Suttavibhaṅga*, which is concluded by the *Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga*.

The very last and probably latest part of the part of the Vinya-piṭaka is an elaborate and difficult handbook called *Parivāra* on how to handle the material accumulated in *Suttavibhaṅga* and *Khandhaka*. It is quite evident that this text is a compilation of separate, occasionally over-lapping short texts, sometimes in verse, mostly in prose. It is only in the *Parivāra* that some kind of hearing is introduced and briefly discussed in chapter X, the "further summary in verses" (*aparaṃ gāthāsaṃgaṇikaṃ*, Vin V 158.2-159.24) and chapter XI, "section on reproof" (codana-kaṇḍa, Vin V 160.2-162.23). Three parties are named: a *codaka* "one who puts forward a reproof or accusation," a *cuditaka* "one who is reproofed or accused," and an *anuvijjhaka*[41] "an investigator." The latter has to be impartial and should be careful not to arouse anger in either party, who, in their turn, have to speak the truth etc. Again nothing is said about the contents of such a hearing in the Vinaya-piṭaka itself. It is only the commentary that offers some information. For here the "investigator" (*anuvijjhaka*) is defined as an "expert in law" (*vinayadhara*), who sits to decide a case (*adhikaraṇa*)[42] that has been brought before the assembly of monks (*saṃghamajjhe otiṇṇaṃ*, Sp 1360.3ff.).

Thus only comparatively late legal literature yields some, though mostly somewhat vague, information on the actual working of Buddhist law in practice. This of course is a problem faced by all students of Indian law. For just as the Vinaya-piṭaka describes theory rather than practice, so do the Dharmaśāstras. Information about the practical application of Hindu law in court is rarely referred to, and mostly found in literature outside the realm of Dharmaśāstra such as Sanskrit

41. This is the correct form of the word: CPD s. v.
42. This word is used only for ecclesiastical cases (cf. Sp 593.24-595.5), the corresponding expression for secular law being *aṭṭa*, derived from Sanskrit *artha* with Dravidian or Sinhala desaspiration: O. v. Hinüber, "Drei Begriffe . . .," as in note 15 above, p. 278 note 12. The meaning of Sanskrit *adhikaraṇa*, even in a legal context, is slightly different; cf. PD s. v.

drama, where the well known *Mṛcchakaṭika* may serve as an example.[43]

Information on Buddhist law as laid down in the Vinaya-piṭaka, on the other hand, can be gathered from random references in the commentaries (*aṭṭhakathā*) on the Vinaya-piṭaka such as the *Samantapāsādikā* or the *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī*, a commentary on the Pātimokkha, or even in commentaries on other parts of the Tipiṭaka. As the vast commentarial literature has not been made easily accessible by adequate indices, the following examples are by no means the result of a systematic search. Although better and clearer evidence still hidden somewhere in the *Aṭṭhakathā* may surface in the future, it may be useful to translate some relevant passages for easier reference.

Resuming what has been stated repeatedly, though briefly in the *Parivāra*, the *Samantapāsādikā* describes in some detail how a legal expert (*vinayadhara*, cf. Vin I 169.7) has to act with respect to persons who bring a case before him and with respect to the Vinaya-rules he is going to use.[44] Once a case (*vatthu*) is brought before the assembly of monks (*saṃghamajjhe*, cf. *vinayadharo saṅghamajjhe pucchati*, Kkh 89.23), plaintiff (*codaka*) and accused (*cuditaka*) have to be asked, whether they are going to accept the final verdict (*vinicchayena tuṭṭhā bhavissatha*, Sp 590.1ff., cf. Vin V 224.16ff.). Only if both agree can the investigation begin.[45] In case, however, they answer "if we like it, we shall accept [the verdict]," they should be sent away to worship a stupa, and the whole matter should be handled in a dilatory way, until both parties are worn down (*nimmada*) and apply again for a hearing. Only after having sent them away thrice should the hearing finally begin (Sp 590.4-10).

On the other hand, the assembly of monks may be unable to handle the case, because their majority is either shameless or incompetent (*alajji-, bāla-ussanna-*, Sp 590.10-15, cf. Vin V 224.19-21). In the

43. P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra* Vol. 3 (Poona: 1973) 279, refers to act IX of that drama. Information on law suits from a much later time is given by J. Duncan M. Derrett, G. D. Sontheimer, and G. Smith, *Beiträge zu indischem Rechtsdenken* (Wiesbaden: 1979) 61ff. (on Maharashtra), and by R. Lariviere, "A Sanskrit Jayapattra from 18th Century Mithilā," *Studies in Dharmaśāstra*, ed. R. Lariviere (Delhi: 1984) 49-80 (on Bihar).
44. The qualities of a *vinayadhara* are described at length at Sp 871.29-875.29.
45. Monks, who were disenchanted with a decision of king Kaṇirājānutissa (89-92) even tried to murder him, for which they were thrown into a precipice (*pabbhara*): Mhv XXXV 11 cf. note 62 below.

first case, a committee has to be formed (*ubbāhikāya*, Sp 590.11, cf. Sp 1197.21-25 on Vin II 95.29).[46] In the case of incompetence, legal experts have to be invited, who are to be agreed upon by both parties (*sabhāga*, Sp 590.12, cf. Sp 1354.28-31). These have to decide according to *dhamma-vinaya-satthusāsana* "teaching-discipline-prescription of the teacher (i. e. the Buddha)"(Vin V 224.21ff.), which means following the *Samantapāsādikā* according to the "true cause" (*bhūtaṃ vatthu* : *dhamma*, Sp 590.15ff.), to "reproof and remonstration" (*codanā, sāraṇā*: *vinaya*), and finally to a "correct motion and a correct proclamation" [47] (*ñattisampadā, anussāvanasampadā : satthusāsana*, Sp 590.16ff.). Thus the rather general terms "teaching" etc. get a very technical and specific meaning in this particular Vinaya context.

When finally a group of monks capable and competent to decide the case has been established, the hearing proper can begin with the plaintiff (*codaka*) stating his case, which then has to be examined with all necessary care (*upaparikkhitvā*, Sp 590.19), before a verdict in accordance with the true facts (*bhūtena vatthunā*, Sp 590,19) is reached and made known. This has to be done in a rather simple form of a motion followed by a single proclamation (*ñattidutiya*, Vin V 220.3, cf. Sp 1395.24-32).[48] It is noteworthy that no document such as a *jayapattra* is mentioned to be issued as written proof for the winning party.[49]

Further, it is stated that an incompetent and shameless monk cannot blame another monk who is acting as a *codaka*. If he should approach the order with such an intention, his complaint has to be dismissed (*ussojetabba*, Sp 590.26) without any hearing. On the other hand a modest but incompetent monk has to be given guidance (*nayo*, Sp 591.1) when he brings his case forward.

Once the plaintiff and the accused have stated their respective case, the legal expert has to decide without rashness (*sahasā avinicchinitvā*, Sp 235.29) and has to take the following six points into consideration: 1. the facts (*vatthu*), 2. the Pātimokkha (*mātikā*), 3. the commentary on the Pātimokkha (*padabhājaniya*), 4. "the three sections" (*tikepariccheda*),[50] 5. the "intermediate offense" (*antarāpatti*),[51] 6. the conditions, under which there is no offense (*anāpatti*) (Sp 235.22-236.22). Having considered all this and having taken all these facts and conditions as his guiding principles (*suttaṃ*, Sp 236.23), his verdict is irrefutable as if the Buddha himself had been sitting in court as a judge and had passed the verdict (*vinicchayo appativattiyo. buddhena sayaṃ nisiditvā vinicchitasadiso hoti*, Sp 236.26ff.). For the Buddha has decided many disputes himself and has given hints (*lakkhaṇe*) how legal experts should decide in future (Sp 272.2-7).[52]

Although all this advice may be of some help for a monk who has to decide a case in agreement with the Vinaya, it is still not clear how such business was really transacted. The following episode related in the *Samantapāsādikā* gives at least an impression how this could have been done:

> A certain monk in Antarasamudda took a well formed coconut, turned it, and made it into a drinking cup polished like mother-of-pearl. Then he left it behind and went to Cetiyagiri. Another monk went to Antarasamudda, stayed in the very monastery, saw the cup, took it away with the intention to steal it, and went to Cetiyagiri, too. The monk who originally owned the cup saw the other monk drinking rice-gruel and asked: "Where did you get that?"—"I brought it from Antarasamudda." He said: "This is not your property. It has been stolen," and dragged him before the assembly of monks. There they did not get a decision and went to the Mahāvihāra. There the drums were beaten (to assemble the monks). An assembly was held and the hearing (*vinicchaya*) began. The Elders, who were experts in the Vinaya, decided that it was theft. A member of this assembly was the Elder Godha, the Abhidhamma expert, who was at the same time an expert in the Vinaya. He spoke thus: "Where has he stolen this cup?"—"It was stolen in Antarasamudda."—"How much is its value there?"—"It is worth nothing, because coconuts are split there, their contents is eaten, and the shell is thrown away, being considered as something like wood."— "What is the value of the manual labour of the monk there?"—"A penny (*masaka*) or even less than a penny."—"Indeed the Buddha has prescribed somewhere a Pārājika with regard to a penny (*māsaka*) or even less than a penny."—This being said there was a unanimous approval: "Excellent, excellent, well spoken, well decided!"

46. This is one of the *adhikaraṇasamathas*: "by committee."
47. On "motion" and "proclamation" cf. O. v. Hinüber, Das buddhistische Recht mentioned above in note 35.
48. This verdict is not mentioned in the enumeration of *ñattidutiya kamma*, Sp 1396.1-6.
49. This is usual in Hindu law; cf. R. Larivière mentioned in note 43 above.
50. They are defined as: 1. *atikkantasaññī*, 2. *vematiko*, 3. *anatikkantasaññī*, Sv-nt I 135. 22-24: The example quoted is Nissaggiya I, Vin III 197.15-18.
51. See note 28 above.
52. Cf. the *vinayamahāpadesa*, Sp 230.33-233.2, where Vin I 250.36-251.6 (Sp 1103.25-1104.30) is quoted.

> And at that time when the king Bhātiya left the city to worship the stupa, he heard this noise and asked: "What is it?" Having heard everything as it had happened, he had the drum beaten in the city: "As long as I live, a case decided for monks, nuns, or householders by the Elder Godha,[53] the Abhidhamma expert, is well decided. I put [persons] who do not abide by his decision under the jurisdiction of the king."(Sp 306.29-307.22).

The context of this paragraph is a long discussion on many aspects of theft, in this particular instance on the different value of an object at different places. This value again is crucial to determine the gravity of the respective theft. According to Vin III 59.14-30 (quoted Vin V 33. 23) one of the conditions resulting in a Pārājika after an object has been moved (*thānā cāveti*) is that the value of that object has to be at least five pennies (*pañcamāsako vā atireka-pañcamāsako vā*, Vin III 54.16). If the value is less than five, but more than one penny (*atirekamāsako vā ūnapañcamāsako vā*, Vin III 54.22) it is a "grave offense" (*thullaccaya*); if it is a penny or even less (*māsako vā ūnamāsako vā*, Vin III 54.27) as in the case quoted from the *Samantapāsādikā*, it is only "wrong doing" (*dukkaṭa*).

This story is dated by the Sinhalese king mentioned, who may be Bhātikābhaya (C. E. 38-66).[54] Two points deserve special attention. First the case is decided by a monk, who is not primarily an expert in the Vinaya, but in "philosophy," Abhidhamma. His opinion and decision is not only appreciated in this paragraph, he is quoted again thrice as an authority in different legal matters such as the following:

"Somebody decapitates someone else, who is running quickly in a battle, and the corpse continues to run. A third person causes the running corpse to fall by a blow: Who is guilty of a Pārājika? Half the Elders say the one, who interrupts the walking; the Elder Godhaka, however, the expert in Abhidhamma, says the one who has cut the head"(Sp 478.16-20).

It is remarkable that these are monks discussing the possibility of a Pārājika in a battle, perhaps not only in theory. For they might have had in mind monks in arms such as those mentioned in the *Sāsanavaṃsa* in much later times.[55]

Perhaps it is not a coincidence that monks knowledgeable in Abhidhamma were particularly apt to decide Vinaya cases, because the way of thinking in both, Buddhist philosophy and law, shows some similarities: the latter may have served as a model for the former in which case the Abhidhamma is based on the application of the methods developed in juridical thinking and on material drawn from the Suttas.[56]

In contrast the Sutta experts do not seem to have enjoyed any particular reputation for their knowledge of the Vinaya,[57] as the following episode demonstrates, which at the same time shows, how a quarrel could start in the saṃgha:

> At one place an expert in the Vinaya and an expert in the Sutta were living together. Once the monk, who was an expert in the Sutta, went to the toilet and left some of the water for rinsing in the respective pot. The legal expert went to the toilet later, saw the water, left and asked the monk: "Venerable sir, did you put the water there?"— "Yes, venerable sir."— "Dont you know that this is an offense (against Vin II 222.21)?"— "No, I do not know."— "There is, venerable sir, an offense."— "If there is an offense, then I shall confess it."— "If you acted without knowing and intention, there is no offense." Consequently he (the Sutta expert) was of the opinion that his offense was no offense. The legal expert, however, told his pupils: "Although the Sutta expert has committed an offense, he does not know it." The pupils said to the pupils of the Sutta expert: "Although your teacher has committed an offense, he does not know that it is an offense." They (the pupils of the Sutta expert) went and informed their teacher. He said: "In the first place the legal expert said it is no offense, now he says it is an offense. Obviously he is telling a lie." They (the pupils of the Sutta expert) went away and said (to the pupils of the legal expert): "Your teacher is a liar." Thus the quarrel grew. Then the legal expert got the permission (from the order) and transacted the formal act of suspension (*ukkhepaniyakamma*) against (the Sutta expert), because he did not recognize an offense (according to Vin II 21.5-22.11 with Sp 1148.23-1149.10).

53. The exact form of the name of the Elder is not clear. The tradition has Godatta, Godha(ka), Goda, Gotta, and Godaṇa.
54. E. W. Adikaram, *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo: 1953) 86ff. The date may have to be postponed by sixty years; cf. H. Bechert in the introduction to the reprint of W. Geiger, *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times* (Stuttgart: 1986) XX. However doubts about these new dates are raised in the review by R. Gombrich, OLZ (1990): 83ff.

55. Cf. note 86 below.
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The introductory story to the first Saṃghādisesa for nuns (Vin IV 223.4-224,4) offers an interesting example how the order, in this particular case, even the one of the nuns, settled disputes with laypeople. A certain layman had given some type of building (*uddosita*)[61] to the nuns. After his death his two sons inherited his property and divided it between them. That very building devolved upon the son, who did not favor Buddhism. Consequently he tried to take the building away

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> And at that time when the king Bhātiya left the city to worship the stupa, he heard this noise and asked: "What is it?" Having heard everything as it had happened, he had the drum beaten in the city: "As long as I live, a case decided for monks, nuns, or householders by the Elder Godha,[53] the Abhidhamma expert, is well decided. I put [persons] who do not abide by his decision under the jurisdiction of the king."(Sp 306.29-307.22).

The context of this paragraph is a long discussion on many aspects of theft, in this particular instance on the different value of an object at different places. This value again is crucial to determine the gravity of the respective theft. According to Vin III 59.14-30 (quoted Vin V 33. 23) one of the conditions resulting in a Pārājika after an object has been moved (*thānā cāveti*) is that the value of that object has to be at least five pennies (*pañcamāsako vā atireka-pañcamāsako vā*, Vin III 54.16). If the value is less than five, but more than one penny (*atirekamāsako vā ūnapañcamāsako vā*, Vin III 54.22) it is a "grave offense" (*thullaccaya*); if it is a penny or even less (*māsako vā ūnamāsako vā*, Vin III 54.27) as in the case quoted from the *Samantapāsādikā*, it is only "wrong doing" (*dukkaṭa*).

This story is dated by the Sinhalese king mentioned, who may be Bhātikābhaya (C. E. 38-66).[54] Two points deserve special attention. First the case is decided by a monk, who is not primarily an expert in the Vinaya, but in "philosophy," Abhidhamma. His opinion and decision is not only appreciated in this paragraph, he is quoted again thrice as an authority in different legal matters such as the following:

"Somebody decapitates someone else, who is running quickly in a battle, and the corpse continues to run. A third person causes the running corpse to fall by a blow: Who is guilty of a Pārājika? Half the Elders say the one, who interrupts the walking; the Elder Godhaka, however, the expert in Abhidhamma, says the one who has cut the head"(Sp 478.16-20).

It is remarkable that these are monks discussing the possibility of a Pārājika in a battle, perhaps not only in theory. For they might have

53. The exact form of the name of the Elder is not clear. The tradition has Godatta, Godha(ka), Goda, Gotta, and Godaṭa.
54. E. W. Adikaram, *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo: 1953) 86ff. The date may have to be postponed by sixty years; cf. H. Bechert in the introduction to the reprint of W. Geiger, *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times* (Stuttgart: 1986) XX. However doubts about these new dates are raised in the review by R. Gombrich, OLZ (1990): 83ff.

had in mind monks in arms such as those mentioned in the *Sāsanavaṃsa* in much later times.[55]

Perhaps it is not a coincidence that monks knowledgeable in Abhidhamma were particularly apt to decide Vinaya cases, because the way of thinking in both, Buddhist philosophy and law, shows some similarities: the latter may have served as a model for the former in which case the Abhidhamma is based on the application of the methods developed in juridical thinking and on material drawn from the Suttas.[56]

In contrast the Sutta experts do not seem to have enjoyed any particular reputation for their knowledge of the Vinaya,[57] as the following episode demonstrates, which at the same time shows, how a quarrel could start in the saṃgha:

> At one place an expert in the Vinaya and an expert in the Sutta were living together. Once the monk, who was an expert in the Sutta, went to the toilet and left some of the water for rinsing in the respective pot. The legal expert went to the toilet later, saw the water, left and asked the monk: "Venerable sir, did you put the water there?"— "Yes, venerable sir."— "Dont you know that this is an offense (against Vin II 222.21)?"— "No, I do not know."— "There is, venerable sir, an offense."— "If there is an offense, then I shall confess it."— "If you acted without knowing and intention, there is no offense." Consequently he (the Sutta expert) was of the opinion that his offense was no offense. The legal expert, however, told his pupils: "Although the Sutta expert has committed an offense, he does not know it." The pupils said to the pupils of the Sutta expert: "Although your teacher has committed an offense, he does not know that it is an offense." They (the pupils of the Sutta expert) went and informed their teacher. He said: "In the first place the legal expert said it is no offense, now he says it is an offense. Obviously he is telling a lie." They (the pupils of the Sutta expert) went away and said (to the pupils of the legal expert): "Your teacher is a liar." Thus the quarrel grew. Then the legal expert got the permission (from the order) and transacted the formal act of suspension (*ukkhepaniyakamma*) against (the Sutta expert), because he did not recognize an offense (according to Vin II 21.5-22.11 with Sp 1148.23-1149.10).

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from the nuns, who in turn asked the judges (*vohārike mahāmatte*, Vin IV 223.27), whether they owned the building or not. The case is decided in favor of the nuns, because the judges are well aware of the fact that the deceased layman had donated the building to the nuns. The case, however, does not end here, but escalates, for the impious son of the pious layman starts molesting and abusing the nuns after he lost the case (*parājito*, Vin IV 224.4). Again the nuns turn to the judges. As a result the layman is fined (*daṇḍāpesuṃ*, Vin IV 224.8), but he does not leave it at that, and viciously gives land next to the building donated by his father to a "heretical" sect (*ājīvika*) and asks these Ājīvikas to molest the nuns. For that he is put in jail by the nuns. Now Buddhist laypeople start to worry about these litigious nuns: "First they took the building, then they had him fined, thirdly they had him put in jail, now they might see to it that he will be executed" (Vin IV 224.13-15). At that point the Buddha is asked and he rules that nuns are not allowed to bring a law suit against laymen (Vin IV 224.25**-28**). The technical word for "litigious(?)" used in the rule of the Pātimokkha is *ussayavādikā*, Vin IV 224.25**. This seems to have become obsolete very soon, and already the old commentary on this rule in the *Suttavibhaṅga* explains this word by the common term used in secular law for "adversary" in a law suit: *aṭṭakārikā*, Vin IV 224.30 with Sp 906.23.

At a much later date the *Samantapāsādikā* enters into a lengthy discussion on the behaviour of nuns in court, beginning with an interesting remark that a law suit is called *aṭṭa* "case," if it refers to secular law in contrast to the ecclesiastical term *adhikaraṇa* The word *aṭṭa* is defined as "what is decided by judges" (*vohārika-vinicchayo*, Sp 906.24).[62] The corresponding term used in Buddhist ecclesiastical law, on the other hand, is *adhikaraṇa* "case, dispute" (Sp 906.25). Further in contrast to a singular secular term for "adversary" (*aṭṭakāraka*) the ecclesiastical "plaintiff" (*codaka*), and "accused" (*cuditaka*) are well distinguished. While a secular "judge" is called *vohārika*, an *anuvijjhaka* decides in ecclesiastical law.[63]

62. Cf. note 42 above. The term *aṭṭa* is also used, when king Kaṇirajānutissa (89-92) decides a case concerning an *uposatha*-house: *uposathāgāra-aṭṭa*, Mhv XXXV 10 (Mhv-t 640,21ff.); cf. note 45 above. Moreover *aṭṭa* survives as a legal term in South East Asian Dharmaśāstras.

63. Cf. *codaka-cuditaka-anuvijjhaka*, Sp 879.28ff., cf. Vin II 248.16-249.28 quoted Vin V 190.8-16 and AN V 79.9-81.15. There is a long *codanādivinicchayakathā* in the *Pāḷimuttakavinayavinicchayasaṅgaha-Vinayālaṅkāraṭṭhakathā Be* (1960) chap. 31, 309-330. At a very early period the ecclesiastical terminology seems to have been slightly different: *codaka* "plaintiff" contrasts with *adhikaraṇe āpanna* (AN I 53.34ff., Mp II 101.13) instead of *cuditaka*. In Sanskrit *codaka* etc. have a different meaning.

64. An *āyuttaka* "official (to administer law)" is sent to a village at the request of villagers: Spk III 61.1-25; cf. CPD s. v. *āyuttaka*; on travelling *vinayadharas* see Sp 1354.28-31.

This shows that both systems of the law, secular and ecclesiastical, had their own terminology, or more precisely, that the Theravāda Buddhists created their own system of legal terminology differing from the one common in India and used in the Dharmaśāstras. Moreover the Theravāda terminology and the whole legal system seems to be the superior one, as far as that can be ascertained given the present state of research.

In the same way as the terminology used in secular and Buddhist ecclesiastical law respectively is not uniform, the procedure to settle a dispute differs considerably. The secular law suit described in the commentary on the dispute between the nuns and the impious layman is fairly simple. Although it seems impossible at present to find out anything about the legal background to this description in the *Samantapāsādikā*, it is not unlikely to think of one of the Dharmaśāstras.

A hearing in secular law is simply described as: "after the evidence (*kathā*) has been heard, after the judges (*vohārika*) have reached a verdict (*vinicchaya*) and one party (*aṭṭakārika*) has been defeated (*parājita*), the hearing has come to an end (*aṭṭapariyosāna*, Sp 907.24ff.).

The commentary then continues that it is forbidden for nuns to start a law suit on their own initiative: "if a nun, when she sees the judges coming, states her evidence (*kathā*), this is wrong doing (*dukkaṭa*) for that nun" (Sp 907.9). Perhaps this means that judges (*vohārika*) could be approached any time, even when met by chance. On the other hand judges were sent to villages to administer justice,[64] and they could act on their initiative and bring persons to court (*ākaḍḍhati*): "if she goes into the presence of judges (*vohārika*) being summoned by the bailiffs (or "servants of the adversary": *aṭṭakārakamanussa*), who have come either in person or sent a messenger saying: 'Come!'. . .(Sp 908.11-13)."

The judges are not obliged to hear the evidence of both parties to reach a decision, if the case is known to them: "if the judges (*vohārika*) have heard about an ecclesiastical case (*adhikaraṇa*), which has gone through the correct procedures (*gatigata*), they may say, after they have seen the nun and her adversary(*aṭṭakāraka*): 'You need not

give evidence (*kathanakicca*), we do already know that matter,' and they may give [their verdict] deciding (*vinicchitvā*) by themselves (Sp 907.27-30)."

This also shows how secular and ecclesiastical law interlock. The evidence given within the order (*saṃgha*) can be used immediately without further hearing. There seems to have been, however, one restriction: This was possible only, if the "correct procedure" (*gatigata*) has been followed by the order. Quite casually some important information is included about the correct procedure to be followed when a case was decided in the order. The relevant term (*gatigata*) is mentioned once in the Vinaya itself (Vin II 85.3) without further explanation, which, most fortunately, is provided by the *Samantapāsādikā*: "not a correct procedure (Vin II 85.3) means: not having been decided (*avinicchita*) twice at that very place (i. e. in one and the same monastery) (Sp 1192.24ff.)." Originally, it seems, *gatigata* has been restricted to one particular way of settling disputes namely "by majority" (*yebhuyyasikāya*, Vin II 84.20-85.14). At the time of the commentary, that is in the 5th century C. E., it was universally applied to all kinds of disputes as a kind of safeguard against errors and wrong decisions. This was indeed necessary, as the Vinaya does not know of any possibility of appeal in an ecclesiastical case because this was technically impossible. Once the order had decided, there was no higher authority that could be invoked as the next higher legal level. Therefore a wrong decision by a legal expert accepted by the Saṃgha really was a disaster, as vividly described in the *Samantapāsādikā:* "for if a legal expert (*vinayadhara*) thus decides a case in excitement etc.,[65] the order in that monastery splits (*dvidhā bhijjati*), and the nuns depending upon the instruction [of the monks in that monastery] divide into two parties, and so do the laypeople and the donors. Their tutelary deities also split in the same way. Then beginning with the deities of the earth (*bhummadevatā*) up to the Akaniṭṭhabrahmas [the gods] split (Sp 1368.19-24)." In short, a wrong decision by a *vinayadhara* soon reaches "cosmic" dimensions.

Against this, a second hearing of the same case by the same persons seems to be a somewhat weak safeguard against errors and a serious restriction of the possibilities of the adversaries. In contrast to this the

65. This is one of the wrong ways of behavior for a *vinayadhara*: CPD s. v. *agati*, 2.

Dharmaśāstras usually know of three legal levels,[66] though details vary of course as the Dharmaśāstra texts were composed at different places and at different times. Interestingly, the legal tradition of Theravāda, which has hardly ever been used for tracing the history of law in India so far, describes a much more complicated system of legal levels in secular law in the commentary on the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* of the *Dīghanikāya*:[67] "The old laws of the Vajjis (DN II 74.10) means: Formerly the kings of the Vajjis did not say: 'seize that thief!' if somebody was brought and shown to them: 'This is a thief!' but they handed [the case] over to the arbitrators (*vinicchayamahāmatta*). If these decided that he was not a thief, he could go free; if he was a thief, they would not say anything themselves, but hand him over to the judges (*vohārika*) (Sv 519.10-14)." Then follow the *suttadhāra* (Sv 519.15), who according to the subcommentary is a *nītisuttadhāra* "the one, who is an expert in the guidelines for making a decision." The next is the *aṭṭakulika* or *aṭṭhakulika* (Sv 519.16), which seems to be an expression similar to the *kula* or *pañcakula* of the Dharmaśāstras.[68] Unfortunately the meaning of this Pāli word remains obscure. The subcommentary explains: "eight important persons born into eight traditional families and abstaining from wrong procedures" (Sv-pṭ II 161.12-14), which sounds rather fantastic. For the first part of the compound seems to be *aṭṭa* "case" rather than *aṭṭha* "eight."

The next higher legal level is the "general" (*senāpati*, Sv 519.17) and the viceroy (*uparāja*, Sv 519.17), before the accused is presented to the king himself. Here the text continues: "if the king decides that he is not a thief, he is released, if, however, he is a thief, the 'book of the tradition' (*pavenipotthaka*) is consulted. There it is written 'who

66. J. Jolly, *Recht und Sitte* (Strassburg: 1896) 134, and Kane, *History*, as in note 43, vol. III, 280-284.

67. Already G. Turnour (1799-1843) referred to this text as early as in 1838 according to R. Fick: *Die sociale Gliederung im nordöstlichen Indien zu Buddha's Zeit* (Kiel: 1897) 70, note 1 (rev.: S. Konow, *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* [1898] 325-336). Fick has very carefully collected all the relevant material concerning jurisdiction from the Jātakas, which, of course, do not reflect the conditions at the time of the Buddha. Further it has to be kept in mind that Fick's book is based only on Ja I-V; Ja VI was not yet published at the time of his writing.

68. According to Kane, *History*, as above note 43, vol. III, 282ff.

does this has to be fined in that way.' The king compares his deed to that and fines him accordingly[69] (Sv 519.18.21)."

Thus the king as the last and highest legal level is at the same time the seventh in the line, if the passage is to be understood that way. The commentary on the *Aṅguttaranikāya* also refers to the "old law of the Vajjis" and says: "the kings acted according to the old traditions, investigated (*parikkhitvā*) themselves, surrounded by the *aṭṭakulika*, the general (*senāpati*) and the viceroy, consulted the 'book of tradition' (*paveṇipotthaka*), and punished accordingly (Mp IV 11.23-12.1)." Following this text it seems that three of the "legal levels" were councilors of the king. This is nearer to the evidence of the Dharmaśāstras and perhaps also nearer to reality. For it is not impossible that the commentary on the *Dīghanikāya* intends to demonstrate how during an earlier and, of course, better period law had been administered much more carefully than this was done during the days of the commentator.[70]

A third text again gives a slightly different description of a hearing. For the commentary to the *Majjhimanikāya* says: "just as in a country, where a case (*aṭṭa*) begins, it reaches the village headman (*gāmabhojaka*),[71] if he cannot decide ([vi]*nicchetuṃ*, so read), the district officer (*janapadabhojaka*), if he is unable, the 'great official for arbitration' (*mahāvinicchaya-amacca*), if he is unable, the general (*senāpati*), if he is unable, the viceroy (*uparāja*), if he is cannot decide, it reaches the king. After the king has passed his verdict (*vinicchitakālato*) the case (*aṭṭa*) does not go to any other [instance]. For by the word of the king [the case] is solved (*chijjati*)[72] (Ps II 252.8-14)."

69. The king also can correct wrong decisions: "having sat one day (in court) deciding a wrongly decided case [*dubbinicchituṃ aṭṭaṃ vinicchinanto*, Thūp 236.10ff.], he stood up very late . . ."

70. It should be kept in mind that the commentaries were composed in the Mahāvihāra not long after the time of king Mahāsena (334-361), during which this monastery suffered much from the injustice of that king; see below.

71. A. N. Bose, "The Gāmabhojaka in the Buddhist Birth Stories." IHQ 13 (1937): 610-616, and R. Fick, as note 67 above, index s. v.

72. An older and quite different sequence of legal levels is found in the *Suttavibhaṅga* on Pārājika II dealing with theft: "king of the whole earth, king of a country (*padesarāja*), ruler of a district (*maṇḍalika*), border chief (*antarabhogika*), judge (*akkhadassa*), high official (*mahāmatta*)" (Vin III 47,1ff. with Sp 309.3-15): All these persons can inflict punishment (*chejjabhejja*). It is interesting to note that the word for "judge" *akkhadassa* corresponds to Sanskrit *akṣadarśa(ka)*, which according to the PD occurs in grammatical literature only, and is not attested in juridical literature: Mahābhāṣya ad Pāṇini 8.4.2, Kāśikā ad Pāṇini 8.4.49. A further instance in

In contrast to the commentaries the historical texts such as the *Mahāvaṃsa* contain much less information about secular law.[73] For instance it is said of king Udaya I alias Dappula (812-828): "judgments that were just he had entered in books and (these) were kept in the royal palace because of the danger of violation of justice" (Mhv XLIX 20, trsl. W.Geiger). These are the "books of tradition" (*paveṇipotthaka*) known to the commentaries a few centuries earlier. This is an interesting confirmation of the information on jurisdiction described in the commentaries, which shows that this evidence at least to a certain extent mirrors the actual way law was administered. At the same time this points to the fact that there seem to have been collections of precedents.[74]

The evident interest of the commentaries in secular law is easy to understand. Although members of the order were not entitled to accuse laymen, they were nevertheless forced from time to time to seek the protection of a court, and they were able to do so. For without even naming any culprit, which was forbidden in the Vinaya, they could induce a court to issue a statement such as: "we shall punish anybody committing such and such a crime in such and such a way." The crime in question could be stealing property of the order, which was now protected without going to court if a theft occured. This crime would be persecuted at the initiative of the court now, and the culprit was punished without further involvement of the order (Sp 909.27ff.).[75]

Offences committed within the order were no less dangerous than threats from the outside, such as theft or the willful destruction of property belonging to the order. For within the order the monks had no power at all to enforce their decision on dissenting monks. This is particularly true when it was necessary to remove a monk from the

Buddhist literature has escaped the PD Budhasvāmin: *Bṛhatkathāśloka-saṃgraha* XX 194, cf. Vāk 4.1954, p. 89; cf. also: *kumāraka, dharmiṣṭha, akṣadarśa, gaṇaka, mahāmātra*, Abhis-Dh 87.9.

73. Geiger, *Culture of Ceylon*, as note 54 above, § 139.

74. Similar collections are mentioned by R. Okudaira, "The Burmese Dhammathat," *Laws of South-East Asia. Volume I: Premodern Texts*, ed. M. B. Hooker (Singapore: 1983) 35.

75. Although all this is said in reference to nuns this paragraph in the Vinaya-piṭaka and in the Samantapāsādikā, it is also valid for monks: *yo cāyaṃ bhikkhuninaṃ vutto bhikkhūnaṃ pi es' eva nayo*, Sp 909,29ff.; cf. also Sāriputta's *Pāḷimuttakavinayavinicchayasaṅgaha-Vinayālaṃkāraṭikā Be* (1960) 433. 12ff., where this paragraph is quoted from Sp. 908.23ff. substituting the word *bhikhu* for *bhikkhunī* in the *Samantapāsādikā*.

order. In this respect only the king and his police can help, who did so since the times of Aśoka, as is well known from his inscriptions.[76] In much later times efforts of Sinhalese kings to restore the order within the saṃgha are rather well documented by the katikāvatas surviving from mediaeval times.[77]

Earlier interferences of Sinhalese kings are related in *Dīpavaṃsa* and *Mahāvaṃsa*. One crucial point occurred in the reign of king Mahāsena (334-361/274-301, Dīp XX 66-74, Mhv XXXVII 4ff.), when the monks of the Abhayagirivihāra succeded in persuading the king that their Vinaya was superior, and that the monks of the Mahāvihāra were following wrong practices. This resulted in a major crisis of the Mahāvihāra, during which the monks even had to abandon their monastery temporarily after losing royal support.

The commentary on the *Mahāvaṃsa* gives some of details on this dispute: "the Abhayagiri monks had deviated from the clearly formulated word of the Buddha in the Vinaya-piṭaka, in *Khandhaka* and Parivāra, by changing the wording and the interpretation (*atthantara-pāṭhantarakaraṇavasena*) and split from the Theravāda." Then follow a few of the controversial points, some of them of considerable consequence as they refer to the ordination procedure (*upasampadā*) (Mhv-ṭ II 676.20-677.5). Unfortunately all this is stated in a very general way in this commentary. Therefore it is not possible to get a very clear idea how far the Abhayagiri and the Mahāvihāra Vinaya really differed in wording or interpretation. Luckily, however, there is one passage in the *Samantapāsādikā*, where the differences in wording in both Vinayas are discussed, and where the relevant sentence is quoted in both versions.[78] This is the commentary on Saṃghādisesa VIII, which deals with unjustified accusations of a Pārājika offense (Vin III 163.21**-

76. Relevant material has been dicussed in the articles mentioned in note 14 above. According to Mhv V 270 (cf. Sp 61.4) monks were expelled (*uppabbājapayi*) from the Saṅgha by Aśoka because of *micchadiṭṭhi*.

77. N. Ratnapala, *The Katikāvatas. Laws of the Buddhist Order of Ceylon from the 12th Century to the 18th Century. Critically Edited. Translated and Annotated.* Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft Bei-heft N (München 1971). Regulations for the Siamese order provided by Rama I are preserved in the *Kotmāi Trā Sām Duang*, chapters 28 and 29: Y. Ishii, "The Thai Thammasat," *Laws of South-East Asia*, as note 74, p. 147.

78. This discussion referring to a dispute within the Sinhalese order only, has been omitted from the Chinese translation of the *Samantapāsādikā*: P. V. Bapat and A. Hirakawa, *Shan-Chien-P'i-P'o-Sha. A Chinese Version by Saṅghabhadra of Samantapāsādikā*, Bhandarkar Oriental Series 10 (Poona: 1970) 387.

26**). The introductory story relates, how the monk Dabba Mallaputta is accused by the nun Mettiyā of raping her, which is an offense against Pārājika I. The accusation turns out to be unfounded, and the Buddha rules that the nun Mettiyā should be expelled (*nāseti*).[79]

Now in the commentary the problem is discussed at some length, whether the nun was expelled with the consent (*paṭiññāya*) of Dabba Mallaputta or not. If Dabba had consented, he was instrumental in the punishment (*kāraka*), which would have been a fault of his (*sadoso*). Again at the time of king Bhātiya there was a dispute between the Abhayagiri and the Mahāvihāra monks referring to this very point. As both fraternities were unable to settle their dispute, they brought it before the king, because no other higher instance was available to them: "The king heard [that they were unable to settle their dispute], brought the Elders together and appointed an official (*amacca*) named Dīghakārāyana, who was a brahmin, to hear the case. This official was indeed wise and an expert in foreign languages. He said: 'The Elders should recite their text.' Then the Abhayagiri monks recited their text: '*tena hi bhikkhave Mettiyaṃ bhikkhuniṃ sakkāya paṭiññāya nāsetha*.' The official said: 'In your opinion (*vāde*), reverend sirs, the Elder is the agent and has committed a fault (*sadoso*).' Then the Mahāvihāra monks recited their text: '*tena hi bhikkhave Mettiyaṃ bhikkhuniṃ nāsetha* (Vin III 162.38).' The official said: 'In your opinion, reverend sirs, the Elder is not the agent and without fault. Here, what has been said last, is correct. For the experts, whose views are found in the commentaries (*aṭṭhakathā*) had deliberated that . . . (Sp 583.5-15)."

This is a rare, if not unique instance, because the texts of both Vinayas, the one of the Abhayagiri and the Mahāvihāra, are quoted. Both texts are exactly parallel and differ only by the insertion of two

79. "Revocation" (*nāsanā*) refers to novices (*samaṇeras*) according to Pacittiya LXX (Vin IV 139.18**-34**, cf. the definition at Sp 870.35-871.4 and Sp 1013.1; 1014.10-1015.4) and also to nuns (*bhikkhunī*). For Mettiyā commits an offense against Saṃghādisesa VIII of the monks, which is also valid for nuns (*dve duṭṭhadosā*, Sp 915.34). In contrast to the Saṃghādisesas for monks, however, those for nuns include "expulsion" (*nissāraṇā*, Vin IV 225.7), which refers to the five offenses discussed in *Cullavagga* I (Vin II 1-28) (*pabbājaniyakammādi*, Sp 1147.14). These include *ukkhepaniyakamma* (Vin II 21.5-25.7), which is identical with *saṃvāsa-nāsanā* (Sp 582.22ff.). Thus it is correct to use the term *nāsetha* here referring to Mettiyā. This shows that nuns and novices are equal before Buddhist ecclesiastical law, at least in certain respects. Both are also subject to *daṇḍakamma*: for novices, Vin I 84.14ff.; for nuns, Vin II 262.29ff., though the punishments called *āvaraṇa* are different for both novices and nuns.

words in the Abhayagiri-Vinaya. If any conclusion can be drawn from this evidence of a single sentence, both Vinayas may have been largely identical, as one would expect anyway. Neverthess the difference, however slight, is legally quite significant.[80]

This dispute had to be settled by a secular judge, because there is no higher authority the monks of two different monasteries could turn to. In spite of the secular nature of the court, the ultimate victory of the Mahāvihāra—of course, because the *Samantapāsādikā* after all is a Mahāvihāra text—is due to the opinion expressed in earlier commentaries. Therefore it has to be supposed that the said brahmin, altough he should have been an expert in the Sanskrit Dharmaśāstras rather, was also versed in Buddhist law. This could be the reason for the remark that he knew foreign languages.[81] For, if he was able to decide a case according to Buddhist law, he should have at least some training in Pāli, if not in Sinhalese Prakrit as well, because the commentaries were not yet translated into Pāli during the reign of king Bhātiya according to the Buddhist tradition.

Problems of this kind arose time and again within the saṃgha in Ceylon. The reforms of king Parakkamabāhu I. (1153-1168) trying to put an end to these confrontations by uniting the saṃgha are well known. Still conflicts involving ecclesiastical and secular law did not cease to exist in Ceylon or in other parts of the Theravāda world. Thus far the relevant material found in printed texts, specifically the commentaries to the Vinaya, has never been collected systematically. This is true also for Vinaya texts existing only in manuscript form so far, or for inscription and documents.

Leaving aside the efforts by kings or by modern secular governments[82] to guarantee the purity of the saṃgha by removing monks not

80. Adikaram, as in note 54 above, p. 88, quotes this text in a rather imprecise way.

81. On an actual language problem in the hearing of a case concerning a fire, which started in a monastery, where monks from different parts of South East Asia were living: Royal order of May 22, 1642, in *The Royal Orders of Burma, A.D. 1598-1885*, ed. Than Tun Vol. I (1983) 124. Kyoto 1983-1986, Vols. I-V: Order of May 22, 1642: I(1983), p.124, cf. I(1983), p. 119: April 29, 1641. All references to this collection given here refer to the English summary. This case is also of interest as it shows that monks were subject to secular law; cf. R. Okudaira as in note 74 above, p. 28.

82. Cf. e. g. H. Bechert, "Neue buddhistische Orthodoxie: Bemerkungen zur Gliederung und zur Reform des Sangha in Birma," *Numen* 35 (1988): 24-56, where the text of the law for ecclesiastical jurisdiction of 1980 can be found on p. 51-56. The laws for the order in Thailand are found in *Acts on the Administration of the Buddhist Order of Saṅgha* [sic] *B.E. 2445 (1902), B.E. 2484 (1941), B.E. 2505 (1962)* (Bangkok: 1989). In accordance with articles 18 and 25 the "council of Elders" (*mahatherasamāgama*) has filled the frame described by the law of 1962 with regulations for the order: *Kath mahātherasamāgam chapáp di' 11 (B. S. 2521: A.D. 1978)* (Bangkok 2522 : 1979).

complying with Vinaya rules, or by having them reordained, a few concluding remarks may be made on a very famous dispute, which kept the kings of Burma busy for about a century. This is the so called *ekaṃsika-pārupaṇa*-controversy, which extends over the better part of the 18th century in Burma. It is described at some length in Paññāsāmin's Sāsanavaṃsa, which was adapted into Pāli in C. E. 1861 from a slightly earlier Burmese version of C. E. 1831[83] (Sās 118-142 / Sās-trsl. 123-144), and resumed by M. Bode and again at great length by N. Ray[84]: In C. E. 1698 a monk named Guṇābhilaṅkāra ordered his disciples to cover only the left shoulder when entering a village. This was thought to be an offense against the "correct behavior while collecting alms" (*piṇḍacārika-vatta*, Vin II 215.6-217.35), where it is said that a monk should enter a village well covered (Vin II 215.33ff.).[85] The party of Guṇābhilaṅkāra became known as the "group that covers one shoulder" (*ekaṃsikagaṇa*), and the traditionalists as the "well dressed (or: well covered) group" (*pārupanagaṇa*) (Sās 118ff. / Sās-trsl. 124). After a bitter feud, which at times was intensified by a conflict between forest dwellers (*araññavāsin*) and village dwellers (*gāmavāsin*), during which the village dwellers even took up arms (*saṃnahitvā*, Sās 119 / Sās-trsl. 125) to drive the forest dwellers away from the villages back into the forest,[86] the matter was finally settled in C. E. 1784 by king Bodawpaya (1782-1819) in favor of the traditionalists (*pārupanagaṇa*). His predecessors had vacillated between both parties and consequently conflicting decrees had been issued in course of the 18th century. These royal orders, which are preserved at least in part, underline the

83. V. B. Liebermann, "A New Look at the Sāsanavaṃsa," BSOAS 39 (1976): 137-149.

84. M. Bode, *The Pāli Literature of Burma* (London: 1909) 65-76; N. Ray, *An Introduction to the Study of Theṛavāda Buddhism in Burma* (Calcutta: 1946) 217-236.

85. The correct way of wearing the robe is also included in rules for a monastery in 10th century Ceylon: "Tablets of Mahinda IV at Mihintale," *Epigraphia Zeylanica* 1 (1904-1912) 99, lines 9-15. The inscription refers to the Sikakaraṇi, the text of which is given loc. cit. in note 5.

86. See note 55 above.

importance of the Vinaya dispute, which seems to have been a rather important topic of politics at times.[87]

Though the dispute is interesting in itself, it may be sufficient here to concentrate on its end, because some royal orders extant supplement the evidence found in the *Sāsanavaṃsa*.[88] Early in C. E. 1784 King Bodawpaya summoned both parties to present their views, after the leader of the "one shoulder group," at that time Atulayasaddhammarājaguru, who had been the preceptor of King Mahadhammayaza (1733-1752), had written to the king from his exile and stated his views he thought were supported by the *Cūḷaganthipada*: "'a fold of the robe (*civara*) has to be bound as a chest cover above the outer robe (*saṃghāṭi*).' Novices should put their upper robe (*uttarāsaṅga*) on one shoulder when entering a village and bind a chest-cover" (Sās 135 / Sās-trsl. 138). Thus the "one shoulder group" finally found some textual evidence supporting their view, what they had needed badly during an earlier hearing under King Singu (1776-1781) (Sās 129f. / Sās-trsl. 133) without finding it.[89] Here suddenly a new Vinaya text is mentioned, and Paññāsāmin a bit viciously implies that it had been forged under king Sane (1698-1714) by a layman bribed by monks of the "one shoulder group" (Sās 119 / Sās-trsl. 124).

Of course Atula's claim is challenged at once and upon examination it turns out that he had—intentionally (?)—mixed up the old *Vinayagaṇṭhipada* with the *Cūḷaganthipada* (Sās 136 / Sās-trsl. 139). Consequently the king ruled that the *pārupanagaṇa*, led at that time by Ñāṇavilāsasaddhammarājādhirājaguru,[90] who had been made head of the saṃgha on June 3, 1782,[91] was correct, and thus the *ekaṃsikagaṇa* was suppressed once for all. This was made public by the proclamation of a series of royal orders.[92] It can be inferred from the evidence contained in these orders that Atula had been in exile

87. *Royal Orders of Burma*, as mentioned above in note 81.
88. This is particularly important for the Pāli Sāsanavaṃsa, which, according to Liebermann p. 148 omits a "key sentence" from its source of 1831 relating the end of this conflict. This sentence, most unfortunately, is not communicated in that article.
89. Cf. the series of royal orders issued between February 24, 1780, and November 23, 1780, on the lacking scriptural evidence, *Royal Orders III* (1985) 82-84.
90. The Sasanavaṃsa gives his name as Ñāṇābhisāsanadhajamahadhammarājaguru, Sās 134 / Sās-trsl. 135.
91. *Royal Orders IV* (1986) 11.
92. *Royal Orders IV* (1986) 47-52: April 21-26, 1784.

since the reign of king Hsinbushin (1773-1786), when he was summoned to court on April 21, 1784. The next document of April 25, 1784, confirms that he had based his views on the *Cūḷaganḍi* (sic) already during the reign of Alaung-paya (1752-1760), and the document continues that Atula and his followers were supposed to be sent into exile again in 1784, but before that he was sentenced to collect fodder for elephants in the woods together with his followers.[93] In a last document dated April 24, 1784, the king revokes all these punishments at the request of high ranking monks.

It is not entirely clear which Vinaya texts exactly Atula used to support his opinion. Of course an old *Cūḷaganthipada* is referred to together with a *Majjhima-* and a *Mahāganthipada* by Sāriputta in the introduction to his *Sāratthadīpanī*, a 12th century commentary to Buddhaghosa's *Samantapāsādikā*.[94] However, all these Ganthipadas were written in Sinhalese, and Sāriputta mentions only one in Pāli, the *Vinayaganthipada*.

According to the *Sāsanavaṃsa* Atula was asked about his *Cūḷaganthi* by his adversaries: "Is your *Cūḷaganthipada* quoted as a support [for certain views] in the great Vinaya subcommentaries (i.e. *Vajirabuddhiṭīkā*, *Sāratthadīpanī*, *Vimativinodanī*)?"—"It is quoted in the three great Vinaya subcommentaries as a support."—"If this is so, how then can it be said in the *Cūḷaganthipada*: 'This has been said in the *Saratthadīpanī*; this had been said in the *Vimativinodanī*?' For [the *Cuḷaganthi*] being later than the three great subcommentaries, the three great subcommentaries are quoted as a support [in the *Cūḷaganthi*] (Sās 138 / misunderstood Sās-trsl. 141)." Consequently Atula is defeated on the grounds of chronology: An earlier text cannot possibly quote from a book composed at a later date.

Thus the *Cūḷaganthi*, of which Atula produced a copy during the hearing of his case, belongs to the late Vinaya literature, and cannot be identical with the much earlier Sinhalese *Cūḷaganthipada*. Which text is it then? So far this was not known, until F. Bizot, EFEO Chiang Mai, drew my attention to the manuscript Or 9238 of the British Library, which comprises 17 fascicles (*phūk*) copied in Khmer script in C. E. 1793 and bearing the title *Guyhatthadīpanī Cūḷaganthisaṅkhepa*

93. This kind of punishment is meationed much earlier as *udaka-dāru-vālikādinaṃ āharāpanaṃ*, Sp 1013.22.
94. W. B. Bollée, "Die Stellung der Vinaya-Ṭīkās in der Pāli-Literatur," *XVII. Deutscher Orientalistentag, July 21-27, 1968, in Würzburg*. ZDMG Supplementa I, 3. Wiesbaden 1969, p. 833, and CPD: Epilegomena 1.2.10.

"the abbreviated version of the small text on knotty points [in the Vinaya] called lamp [elucidating] the hidden meaning." This manuscript, which quotes from the *Majjhima-* and *Cūḷagaṇṭhipada*, is incomplete. Fascicles 1 , 2, and 12 are lost and even fascicle 17 does not contain the end of the text. Luckily the continuation is found in the *Cūḷagaṇṭhipadamahāvagga* copied in C. E. 1836 and preserved at Vat Sung Men in Phrae (North Thailand).[95] This manuscript comprises another sixteen fascicles without reaching the end of the text. In addition to this large Vinaya text there is further a *Mahāgaṇṭhipadamahāvagga* in the same monastery in fifteen fascicles and also copied in C. E. 1836,[96] which obviously contains only a fraction of the complete text, perhaps less than 10%, for it ends with the Uruvelā-Kassapa episode right at the beginning of the *Mahāvagga*. The enormous length of these text seems to be due to extensive quotations borrowed from well known earlier Vinaya literature. However, now and then new opinions seem to have been inserted, which show that these texts in fact provide new and potentially very interesting material for the late history of Buddhist law. As the *Sāsanavaṃsa* quotes one sentence verbatim from the *Cūḷagaṇṭhi*, it is not impossible to verify if the *Cūḷagaṇṭhipada* of the British Library and Vat Sung Men are identical to Atula's text.

Indeed the relevance of *Mahā-* and *Cūḷagaṇṭhipada* seems to be considerable for Buddhist law in Burma in the recent past. For, as Shway Yoe (alias Sir James George Scott: 1851-1935) writes, there were rival parties following the "Mahagandi" and "Sulagandi" respectively during the second half of the last century. This dispute centered on a controversy over simple or luxurious life styles of monks: "faction feeling runs so high that street fights between scholars of these two sects are very common, and often so embittered that the English authorities have to interfere to restore peace in the town, for the laity takes sides with equally bitter animosity."[97]

Thus there will never be an end to Vinaya controversies as long as the sāsana continues to exist. Research in these matter is still quite in its infancy and has hardly really started. Rich material is buried in printed editions and probably also in manuscripts. Inscriptions from

95. The reference number is 01-04-028-00, roll no. 49.
96. The reference number is 01-04-027-00, roll no. 49.
97. Shway Yoe, *The Burman. His Life and Notions* (London: 1910) 149 (reprinted with a biographical sketch of the author by J. Falconer [Arran: 1989]).

Theravāda countries and royal orders from Burma have not been used so far. The latter contain many interesting details on the possible interrelation of ecclesiastical and secular law evident already in older literature. For although judges are advised to use a dhammathat and are even provided with copies,[98] a Buddhist legal expert (*vinayadhara*) decides about the real estate of two monasteries on May 14, 1720,[99] by referring to documents(?), in this particular case most probably to landgrants dated C. E. 1654 and C. E. 1444 (!) repsectively. The royal order confirms his decision.

Thus the working principles of legal procedures seem to have been fairly stable over a long time. And if a royal order of June 17,1784, proclaims that the rainy season (vassa) in that year had begun on July 1,[100] this brings us back right to the *Mahāvagga* of the Vinaya-piṭaka.

All this rich, hardly explored history of law quite different and independent from Hindu Dharmaśāstras is at the same time a considerable intellectual achievement of Indian culture. Only in the very recent past the first steps to understand or even to discover the elaborate system that seems to underly Buddhist legal texts have been taken.[101] This aspect has not been touched in the present discussion, which tried to concentrate only on the Theravāda legal tradition leaving aside the Vinaya of other schools, which at least as far as the Mūlasarvāstivādins are concerned, have an equally rich heritage of texts mainly preserved in Tibetan.[102] Once all this will have been thoroughly researched, Buddhist, and perhaps particularly Theravāda law[103] might

98. *Royal Orders I* (1983) 24: June 23, 1607.
99. *Royal Orders II* (1985) 73.
100. *Royal Orders IV* (1986) 62.
101. H. Bechert, "Laws of the Buddhist Saṅgha: An Early Juridical System in Indian Tradition," lecture given at the symposion on Recht, Staat und Verwaltung im klassischen Indien, Munich, July, 1992; O. v. Hinüber, "The Arising of an Offence: *apattisamutthāna*. A Note on the Structure and History of the Theravādavinaya," JPTS 16 (1992): 55-69.
102. G. Schopen's "Doing Business for the Lord: Lending on Interest and Loan in the Mūlasārvāstivāda-*vinaya*" has succeeded in finding influences of Dharmaśāstra on a Vinaya, which sheds new and quite unexpected light on the history of Buddhist law. Dharmaśāstra influence can be felt perhaps in Vibh-a 382.29-383.32, where it is said that there is a difference in offenses such as murder or theft depending on the person against whom it is directed.
103. Theravāda law seems to have been held in high esteem among Buddhists, as can be deduced from the fact that the *Samantapāsādikā* was translated into Chinese and taken over by the Dharmaguptaka school; cf. note 78 above.

stand as a major Indian contribution to culture in general.[104] Today usually Indian indigenous grammar is cited and Pāṇini quoted, or Brahmagupta is named in the field of mathematics.[105] Law, legal literature, and juridical thinking of the Buddhists are passed over in quite unjustified silence in this context, even in a purely Indian context; for in the slim, but highly stimulating volumes contributed by J. D. M. Derrett to the History of Indian Literature or to the Handbuch der Orientalistik[106] Buddhist law is omitted, and the Vinaya as a law book is well hidden in the volume of the History of Indian Literature on Pāli literature. This will certainly change once the system of Buddhist law is understood, and it can be achieved only by a comprehensive investigation first of all into the legal terminology,[107] which is the key to understand the development and history of Buddhist law.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAWG	*Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*. Philologisch-historische Klasse. Dritte Folge
Abhis-Dh	*Abhisamācārikā Dharmāḥ* ed. B.Jinananda. Patna 1969
AN	*Aṅguttara-nikāya*
AO	*Acta Orientalia*

104. Cf. W. Rau, "Indiens Beitrag zur Kultur der Menschheit," *Sitzungsberichte der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main*. Band XIII, No. 2. (Wiesbaden: 1975).
105. Cf. D. Pingree, "History of Mathematical Astronomy in India," *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, Vol. 15 (New York: 1978) 533-633.
106. *Dharmaśāstra and Juridical Literature* (Wiesbaden: 1973); *History of Indian Law (Dharmaśāstra)* (Leiden: 1973). Later J. D. M. Derret has devoted some studies to Buddhist, though not to Theravāda law, e. g.: *A Textbook for Novices. Jayarakṣita's «Perspicuous Commentary on the Compendium of Conduct by Śrighana»*. Publicazioni di Indologica Taurinensia XV (Torino: 1983).
107. Here a recent Ph. D. thesis from Göttingen deserves to be mentioned: P. Kieffer-Pülz, *Die Sīmā. Vorschriften zur Regelung der buddhistischen Gemeindegrenze in älteren buddhistischen Texten* (Berlin: 1992).

AWL	Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz. *Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse*
BEFEO	*Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*
CPD	V. Trenckner, *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, Vol. I (1924 -1948), Vol. II (1960-1990), Vol. III, 1 (1992), Vol. III, 2 (1993). Copenhagen
DN	*Dīgha-nikāya*
IHQ	*Indian Historical Quarterly*
IT	*Indologica Taurinensia*
Ja	*Jātaka(-aṭṭhavaṇṇanā)*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JPTS	*Journal of the Pāli Text Society*
Kkh	*Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī*
KZ	*(Kuhns) Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*
Mp	*Manorathapūraṇī*
OLZ	*Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*
PD	*An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles*. Poona 1976ff.
PED	T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, *The Pāli Text Society's Pāli-English Dictionary* (London) 1921-1925
Sadd	*Saddanīti*
Sās	*Sāsanavaṃsa*
Sp(-ṭ)	*Samantapāsādikā(-ṭīkā: Sāriputta: Sāratthadīpanī)*
Spk	*Sāratthapakāsinī*
StII	*Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik*
Sv	*Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*
Vin	*Vinaya-piṭaka*
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*

Pāli texts are quoted according to the editions mentioned in the Epilegomena to the CPD, if not stated otherwise.

the original hypothesis of this article. Gustav Roth's extensive work with the texts of this *nikāya* leads him to conclude (in 1966): "I would call this language the Prakrit-cum-quasi-Sanskrit of the Ārya Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins. . . . The regular recurrence of Prakrit forms shows that they cannot be taken for grammatical mistakes. They belong to the stock of the language. . . . This coexistence of Prakrit and Sanskrit forms side by side has to be acknowledged as the new type of a language through and through composite in its nature."[32] By 1970, when Roth's edition of the Bikṣuṇī-Vinaya of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins appeared, his position on the language and grammar of this *nikāya* remained fundamentally consistent with his earlier conclusions.[33] My grammatical notes in *Buddhist Monastic Discipline* tend to confirm Roth's judgment. That the language of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin text appears to be distinct unto itself, coupled with a number of Śaikṣa-dharmas that appear in no other Prātimokṣa texts of the various *nikāyas*, lends credence to the supposition, noted above, that this text was extremely ancient. In light of the other materials presented, it is not unreasonable to assume that this may well have been the root Vinaya text expanded upon by the future Sthavirans. Since the Mahāsāṃghika trunk schools developed in a lineage separate from that of the Sthavira *nikāyas*, it is imperative to see how, if at all, the Sthavira *nikāyas* may have expanded the root Vinaya text. While the Theravādins are certainly less ancient historically than the Mahāsāṃghikas, their complete Vinaya is no doubt the earliest of all the preserved versions of the Sthavira schools. As such, its additional Sekhiya-dhammas (in Sanskrit Śaikṣa-dharmas) are exceedingly important.

No less than twelve rules in the Pāli Pātimokkha have no counterpart in the Sanskrit Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin text. These include numbers 3, 4, 16, 18, 20, 30, 31, 33, 40, 42, 54, and 68.[34]

Rule 3 reads:

supaṭicchanno antaraghare gamissāmīti sikkhā karaṇīyā /

["I shall go well covered amongst the houses," is a precept that should be observed.]

Rule 4 reads:

supaṭicchanno antaraghare nisīdissāmīti sikkhā karaṇīyā /

["I shall sit down well covered amongst the houses," is a precept that should be observed.]

[32] Gustav Roth, "Bhikṣuṇīvinaya and Bhikṣu-Prakīrṇaka and Notes on the Language," *Journal of the Bihar Research Society* 52, nos. 1–4 (January–December 1966): 38–39.

[33] Roth, *Bhikṣuṇī-Vinaya*, pp. lv–lxi.

[34] The Pāli text is adapted from the Venerable Ñāṇamoli Thera, ed. and trans., *The Pātimokkha: 227 Fundamental Rules of a Bhikkhu* (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1966). The translations are mine.

Rule 16 reads:

na kāyappacālakaṃ antaraghare nisīdissāmīti sikkhā karaṇīyā /

["I will not sit down amongst the houses shaking the body," is a precept that should be observed.]

Rule 18 reads:

na bāhuppacālakaṃ antaraghare nisīdissāmīti sikkhā karaṇīyā /

["I will not sit down amongst the houses shaking the arms," is a precept that should be observed.]

Rule 20 reads:

na sīsappacālakaṃ antaraghare nisīdissāmīti sikkhā karaṇīyā /

["I will not sit down amongst the houses shaking the head," is a precept that should be observed.]

Rule 30 reads:

samatittikaṃ piṇḍapātaṃ paṭiggahessāmīti sikkhā karaṇīyā /

["I shall accept alms food up to the brim (of the bowl)," is a precept that should be observed.]

Rule 31 reads:

sakkaccaṃ piṇḍapātaṃ bhuñjissāmīti sikkhā karaṇīyā /

["I shall eat alms food respectfully," is a precept that should be observed.]

Rule 33 reads:

sapadānaṃ piṇḍapātaṃ bhuñjissāmīti sikkhā karaṇīyā /

["I shall eat alms food uninterruptedly," is a precept that should be observed.]

Rule 40 reads:

parimaṇḍalaṃ ālopaṃ karissāmīti sikkhā karaṇīyā /.

["I shall separate the morsels into (little) balls," is a precept that should be observed.]

Rule 42 reads:

na bhuñjamāno sabbaṃ hatthaṃ mukhe pakkhipissāmīti sikkhā karaṇīyā /

["I shall not put the whole hand in the mouth when eating," is a precept that should be observed.]

laxity on the basis of the mention of only one of the ten points (i.e., the possession of gold and silver) in their council record. He writes, "Consequently, even on the single point of discipline which the Mahāsāṃghikas mention in their recitation of the council of Vaiśālī, their Vinaya turns out to be infinitely more lax than the Pāli Vinaya."[6] However, even a cursory study of the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya reveals that all ten points are included therein, and Bareau documents this carefully using the Chinese version of the text (*Taishō* 1425). He concludes about the Mahāsāṃghikas: "If they do not speak of the 9 other customs, this is not because they approved of them, since they implicitly condemn them elsewhere. . . . The 9 customs of the monks of Vaiśālī, therefore, could not have been one of the causes of the schism which separated the Mahāsāṃghikas from the Sthaviras, as the Sinhalese chronicles affirm and, following them, certain historians of Buddhism. In fact, the two sects were in accord on this point, as M. Hofinger has well shown."[7] A study of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin texts preserved in Sanskrit yields a similar result.[8] In addition, the Mahāsāṃghikas could not be considered to be eastern dwellers (i.e., Prācīnaka, in Sanskrit the same title as the Vṛjiputrakas), as Hofinger would like to maintain (by adjusting the geographical tension theory of Przyluski[9] so as to categorize the Sthavira, Mahīśāsaka, Dharmaguptaka, and Sarvāstivādin *nikāyas* as western dwellers). On this point, Bareau asserts, "It is without doubt imprudent to draw conclusions on the primitive geographical redress of the sects from indications as fragmentary as those furnished by our recitations."[10] Although Demiéville has serious doubts about the historicity of the Vaiśālī council, he makes the following suggestions: "For my part, I cannot refrain from seeing in the tradition relative to the council of Vaiśālī, above all, a reflection of this conflict between rigorism and laxism, between monasticism and laicism, between 'sacred' and 'profane', which traverses all the history of Buddhism and which, *after having provoked the schism between the Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas,* is expressed later by the opposition between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.[11] Despite Demiéville's aggressive claim to the contrary, there is nothing in any of the Vinaya council accounts of the various *nikāyas* that attests to the separation of Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas at this point. Bareau confirms the absence of sectarianism quite assertively when he proclaims: "The primitive version is, as M. Hofinger has well shown, anterior to the first schism which separated the Mahāsāṃghikas from the Sthaviras"[12]

[6] Demiéville, p. 275.

[7] Bareau, *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques,* p. 78.

[8] See Charles S. Prebish, *Buddhist Monastic Discipline: The Sanskrit Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mūlasarvāstivādins* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), pp. 70, 80, 88, and 90.

[9] See Jean Przyluski, *Le Concile de Rājagṛha* (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1926–1928), pp. 309–14.

[10] Bareau, *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques,* pp. 82–83.

Although the famous *daśa-vastūni* (or "ten points") and the council of Vaiśālī seem effectively eliminated from the historical actuality of the initial schism in Indian Buddhist history, the notorious five theses of Mahādeva remained a primary causal factor in scholarly arguments. Convinced that the first *saṃghabheda* was historically removed from the Vaiśālī council, Bareau developed a new theory, one that turned on (1) the notion that laxity on the part of the future Mahāsāṃghikas developed *after* the Vaiśālī council (although it is not precisely clear just how this laxity develops), and (2) the five theses of Mahādeva. Moreover, it postulated a noncanonical council held at Pāṭaliputra in the year 137 A.N., from which the schism emerged. Bareau's theory is presented in full on pages 88–111 of *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques* and, until 1977, was rather widely accepted as a brilliant and ingenious solution to a knotty Buddhological problem. In 1977, Janice J. Nattier and I criticized Bareau's theory, suggesting in its place first, that

> Mahādeva has nothing to do with the primary schism between the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sthaviras, emerging in a historical period considerably later than previously supposed, and taking his place in the sectarian movement by instigating an internal schism within the already existing Mahāsāṃghika school. Second, that the sole cause of the initial schism in Buddhist history pertained to matters of Vinaya, but rather than representing a reaction of orthodox Buddhists to Mahāsāṃghikas laxity, as maintained by both Demiéville and Bareau, represents a reaction on the part of the future Mahāsāṃghikas to unwarranted expansion of the root Vinaya text on the part of the future Sthaviras.[13]

The argument concerning Mahādeva's five theses is complex[14] and, until quite recently, has not received much additional attention. Lance Cousins, however, has published a fresh, new discussion of the five points, dividing their historical development into three phases,[15] and confirming our hypothesis that the five points of Mahādeva were not involved in the first schism. Cousins's article additionally utilizes important material on the Pudgalavādins, published by Thich Thien Chau[16] and Peter Skilling,[17] not available to earlier researchers.

[12] Bareau, *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques,* p. 86.

[13] Charles S. Prebish and Janice J. Nattier, "Mahāsāṃghika Origins: The Beginnings of Buddhist Sectarianism," *History of Religions* 16, no. 3 (February 1977): 238–39.

[14] See Prebish and Nattier, pp. 250–65, for a full exegesis of the argument.

[15] Cousins, pp. 27–60.

[16] Thich Thien Chau, "The Literature of the Pudgalavādins," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 7, no. 1 (1984): 7–16, and "Les Réponses des Pudgalavādin aux Critiques des Écoles Bouddhiques," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 10, no. 1 (1987): 33–53.

[17] Peter Skilling, "The Saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛta-Viniścaya of Daśabalaśrīmitra," *Buddhist Stu-*

Charles S. Prebish

ŚAIKṢA-DHARMAS REVISITED: FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF MAHĀSĀṂGHIKA ORIGINS

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In current Buddhology, there are two primary but opposing hypotheses to explain the beginnings of Indian Buddhist sectarianism. The first, advocated by André Bareau, presumes the schism that separated the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sthaviras to have resulted from disciplinary laxity on the part of the future Mahāsāṃghikas, coupled with concerns over five theses predicated by the monk Mahādeva. The second hypothesis, more recently promulgated by Janice J. Nattier and myself, suggests that the initial schism resulted not from disciplinary laxity but solely from unwarranted expansion of the root Vinaya text by the future Sthaviras.

One of the major features of the second thesis revolves around the degree to which it can be demonstrated that the Sthaviras may have expanded the root Vinaya text. A comparison of two very early Vinayas, by the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins (in Sanskrit) and by the Theravādins (in Pāli), amply shows that the two texts bear remarkable coincidence in all but one category: the Śaikṣa-dharmas. In that category, the Mahāsāṃghika text posits sixty-seven items, while the Theravāda text posits seventy-five.

To date, no scholars have addressed this circumstance with specificity. Consequently, in this article, I examine the Śaikṣa-dharmas of the Prātimokṣa-sūtra of each *nikāya*, isolating the divergent rules and relating them to the significant, major concerns expressed at the second council of Vaiśālī, an arguably historical event that pre-dated the actual sectarian split in early Indian Buddhism by no more than a few decades. I argue that the divergent rules in the two *nikāyas* demonstrate an attempt on the part of the future Sthaviras to circumvent a potential *saṃghabheda* (split in the community) by making more explicit the general areas of

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disagreement that precipitated the second council. In so doing, they inadvertently provoked the split they were so diligently trying to avoid.

Prior to Marcel Hofinger's *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī* (published in 1946), it was rather ordinary to assign the beginnings of Buddhist sectarianism to the events surrounding the council of Vaiśālī and to conclude that the initial schism that separated the Mahāsāṃghikas from the Sthaviras in early Indian Buddhism resulted from the dual problematic of disciplinary laxity on the part of the future Mahāsāṃghikas and the famous five theses of the monk Mahādeva focusing on the nature of the arahant. This council has received a substantial amount of consideration in the scholarly literature,[1] and the bulk of it does not need to be rehearsed here. Nor is it necessary to consider new information regarding the date of the historical Buddha that casts fresh light on the specific date of the Vaiśālī council.[2] What does need to be considered is a review of the most recent general conclusions regarding the Vaiśālī council.

With the possible exception of R. O. Franke and Paul Demiéville,[3] virtually all scholars agree that the Vaiśālī council was a historical event. While Hofinger states it quite directly: "The council of Vaiśālī is not a fiction," Bareau is indirect: "We see, therefore, that the hypothesis of the historicity of the council of Vaiśālī appears as much more defensible than the contrary hypothesis."[4] Several Vinayas (namely, the Mahāsāṃghika, Sarvāstivādin, Theravādin, and Dharmaguptaka texts) even identify the site of the council as the Vālukārāma monastery, although this may be a later addition. Further, all sources agree that the primary focus of the event was the now well known issue of the ten illicit practices of the Vṛjiputraka *bhikṣus* who dwelled in Vaiśālī. Nonetheless, there is serious disagreement on the interpretation of the council proceedings. While Hofinger has admirably traced the rejection of all ten points in the Pāli Prātimokkha,[5] Demiéville aggressively pursues the thesis of Mahāsāṃghika

[1] See especially Marcel Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī* (Louvain: Bureaux du Muséon, 1946); André Bareau, *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955); Paul Demiéville, "A propos du concile de Vaiśālī," *T'oung Pao* 40 (1951): 239–96; and Charles S. Prebish, "A Review of Scholarship on the Buddhist Councils," *Journal of Asian Studies* 33, no. 2 (February 1974): 239–54.

[2] A summary of the basic argument regarding the new approach to Buddha's historical dating is best revealed by Richard Gombrich's article "Dating the Buddha: A Red Herring Revealed," in *Die Datierung des historischen Buddha*, pt. 2, ed. Heinz Bechert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), pp. 239–59, in which Gombrich dates the death of the Buddha to around 405 B.C.E. (actually between 411 and 399). A concise statement of the position on the Vaiśālī council, dating the council to 70–80 years after Buddha's death, is Lance S. Cousins's "The 'Five Points' and the Origins of the Buddhist Schools," *The Buddhist Forum*, vol. 2, ed. Tadeusz Skorupski (New Delhi: Heritage, 1992), pp. 27–31 and 54–60.

[3] Refer to R. O. Franke, "The Buddhist Councils at Rājagaha and Vesālī as Alleged in Cullavagga XI, XII," *Journal of the Pali Text Society* (1908), p. 70; and Demiéville, p. 258.

[4] See Hofinger, p. 249, and Bareau, *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques*, p. 87.

[5] Hofinger, pp. 216 (and nn. 1–3) and 217 (and nn. 1–7).

Rahula's first visit to India was for two months in 1925-6, an abortive attempt to pursue his education there. He returned when he led a party on pilgrimage in 1934-5. When they visited Kusinara, the site of the Buddha's passing away, he had a brief vision of the Buddha. He returned again, in 1941-2, to study at Calcutta University under Professors B M Barua and Surendranath Das Gupta, but after six months this too was aborted when the war forced the university to close.

Before this he had resumed his formal education by entering the University College of Colombo in 1935, the first monk to do so. He read for a BA in Indo-Aryan languages – the degree was in those days awarded by London University. His subsequent doctorate has been mentioned above.

Rahula's radicalism led him in the 1930s into association with socialists and increasing involvement with politics. Though he never joined a political party, he was associated in 1935 with the founding of the Lankā Sama Samāja Pakṣa, which was to be the main socialist force (nominally, indeed, Trotskyist) in Sri Lanka for the next half-century; and it was he who invented the party's name, which means Ceylon's Party for an Equal Society.

Throughout the 1940s Rahula's life centred on the monastic university (*piriveṇa*) Vidyalankara, where he was appointed to a teaching position in 1942. A group of the monks who taught there was extremely active in public affairs and Rahula was so eminent among them that his name became a household word among the Sinhalese. The conservative politicians who led the country, notably D S Senanayake (who in 1948 became the first prime minister of independent Ceylon), argued that monks should keep out of politics. This Rahula and his friends vigorously contested. He was a leading spirit behind what has become known as the 'Vidyalankara Declaration' (1946), a statement, unanimously approved by the teaching staff, in which politics is equated with public welfare and monks are said to have not merely a right but a duty to become involved. In the same year he published *Bhikṣuvāge Urumaya* (*The Heritage of the Bhikkhu*), a book originally based on a public speech, in which he put the same argument at length, with much historical evidence that monks had taken a leading part in public life in pre-colonial Ceylon. The first sentence in the book is 'Buddhism is based on service to others.'

In 1947 a general election preceded Independence. Rahula was active in the campaign on behalf of the LSSP. He was briefly arrested for picketing during a general strike. On his way to a meeting where he was to speak against the future President, J R Jayewardene, he was beaten up by drunken thugs. Much later in life he became friendly with Jayewardene and responsibility for the assault was never finally determined.

Soon after Independence Rahula became disaffected from the Marxist parties. He found them too much under foreign influence and he accepted neither their opposition to religion nor their insistence on the need for violent revolution. He joined a group of people who were looking for a 'middle way' in politics between capitalism and communism and was a founder (Joint Secretary) of the Mahajana Peramuna (Popular Front), which was the precursor of the SLFP, the 'democratic socialist' party founded by S W R D Bandaranaike in 1951. Indeed, its first manifesto is in his handwriting, though it is unclear whether he alone was responsible for its wording.

In later life he never renounced or regretted his socialist associations. He considered that his erstwhile 'progressive' friends had been corrupted by power and had betrayed the cause. In 1971, when the SLFP and LSSP ruled in coalition, there was a partly violent revolution by the younger generation which was suppressed with great brutality and loss of life. Rahula put his sympathies on record when in 1974 he dedicated the English edition of *The Heritage of the Bhikkhu* 'To the memory of those thousands, bhikkhus

and others, who sacrificed their lives in the political struggle in Ceylon in 1971'.

When in 1950 he was given a French government scholarship to study in Paris, Rahula in effect left politics, but he returned later to play a part in public life. He was so happy studying in Paris that he did not revisit Sri Lanka for 15 years, returning in 1965 for his higher ordination into the Kalyāṇi section of the Siyam Nikāya. (On this occasion he was also accorded the title Supreme Master of Buddhist Scriptures (*Tripiṭakavāgīśvarācārya*), with the entitlement to prefix his name with Śrī.) In 1966 he accepted appointment as Vice-Chancellor of Vidyodaya. This had until recently been a monastic university. Rahula opened it to women and was proud of making this controversial move a success. He resigned and returned to Paris in 1969. He only gave up his flat there in 1974, when he moved to London, where he was based till 1985. In 1981 the Sri Lankan government asked him to establish a new institution of graduate studies in Buddhism, the Pali and Buddhist University. Soon afterwards he began to set up in Kotte, on land near the Sri Lankan parliament given to him by the government, what was at the same time a home for himself and a research institute based on his library.

In the last thirty years of his life, Rahula was loaded with international honours. At home in Sri Lanka, he saw himself as a kind of rajguru, entitled to advise the government in public as well as in private. Unfortunately, despite his wisdom and sincerity, he was politically naive, for he stuck to the advice of the ancient texts and equated good politics with virtue. Thus, having a clear conscience that he was anything but a racist, he could not see that a Sinhala Buddhist patriotism which had been courageous and appropriate in the 1940s would be differently construed in the civil war of the 1980s and 1990s. However, his sympathy for the weak and oppressed never failed.

He was, as he intended, a true son of the Buddha.

Maurice Walshe 1911–1998 [1]

George Sharp

MAURICE WALSHE's funeral took place in the Amaravati temple at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of Monday 4 May. Many of his old friends were there, perhaps seeing this aspect of his life for the first time, and the abbot Ajahn Viradhammo invited a number of them to speak. Without exception everyone took pleasure in reminding us of Maurice's dry wit and fondness for puns and limericks. Garry Thomson, Honorary Vice President of the Buddhist Society and English Sangha Trust member, aired a philosophical speculation Maurice would very much have enjoyed: 'Maurice Walshe does not exist', and by this humour, for a brief time he was brought back to life in fond memory. But perhaps the most memorable moment took place ten days earlier when the body was carried into the chapel and laid down with face exposed. Seeing our old friend's corpse was a shock. We were contemplating a thing once animated, once a person, now dead, once the Maurice Walshe we knew now utterly gone. And to touch that cold, putty-like flesh was all the confirmation of the fact one could ever need. But my own emotional response was one of joy to see his body there, in that beautiful little chapel, at the end of a long and fruitful life, surrounded by monks and nuns of the Order he had, for so long, sought to establish in this country.

They stood in silent respect regarding the truth of the death against the backdrop of the glass sleeping Buddha, and I thought the scene quite beautiful, and it seemed to me

[1] See Obituaries, *The Middle Way* 73:1 (May 1998), p. 57.

nearly 400 pages, his Ph.D. thesis for the University of Ceylon, was based on Pali and Sinhala sources, of which very few had been translated (nor have many been translated since). Although his acceptance of his sources' point of view may strike one now as rather uncritical, especially with regard to the earliest period, as a source of information the book has hardly been superseded. It is a landmark in Buddhist historiography.

Rahula lived in Paris for over 20 years, and for most of that time he worked under the supervision of Professor Demiéville to produce an annotated French translation, the first into any modern language, of Asanga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Paris, 1971; 2nd edn, 1980). This work involved the use of Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese, and Rahula acknowledged considerable help from French scholars with the latter languages. Unfortunately, his intention to produce an English version never materialized. Most of his other strictly academic writing (the other kind will be noticed below) was collected in *Zen and the Taming of the Bull* (London, 1978).

Just as Rahula lived large parts of his life outside the study, his influence as a scholar extended far beyond his own books. In 1964-5, on the initiative of Professor Edmund Perry, Rahula spent an academic year teaching at Northwestern University, near Chicago, and he returned there often over the next decade. Perry has written: 'Rahula, merely by his occasional presence at learned society meetings and his leadership of seminars at other universities, has exemplified a standard and introduced a conscience into America's competitive market of books on Buddhism.'

His knowledge of the classical Buddhist literature, which he began to acquire at a very early age, was justly described by Demiéville as incomparable; Professor Lamotte held him in similar esteem. (Not only for his learning: he once showed me a charming letter from Lamotte. I cannot quote it verbatim but in effect that great scholar wrote to him that while I may read many texts, it is you who have understood what I am after, the essence of Buddhism.) In London he became a close friend of Miss I B Horner, then President of the Pali Text Society, and spent many hours at work with her on some of her later publications. He accepted her invitation to become a vice-president of the Society and served in that capacity until his death, attending at least one meeting of its Council each year even after he had moved back to Sri Lanka. In the finest academic tradition both Eastern and Western, he never begrudged time to a sincere student. During the period when he lived in London, he gave me countless hours, reading Pali with me and answering innumerable questions. He was punctilious without pedantry, critical without harshness, constantly interesting and always full of gentle humour.

Rahula was born on 9 May 1907 in the village of Walpola – Sri Lankan monks are always known by the name of their natal village, besides their Pali Buddhist name conferred at ordination – in the Galle District in south-eastern Ceylon (as the country was then known).[1] He was the youngest of ten children and his father was approaching 60 when he was born. His father's name was Hettigoda Gamage Don Karolis de Silva and his mother's name was Haththotuva Gamage Silinduhami. His father was a well-to-do farmer, probably the largest landowner in the village, high-caste (*goyigama*) but not aristocratic. Rahula's eldest brother became the village headman (as possibly his father had been before him). The father was educated and practised *āyurveda*, astrology and exorcism. Two of Rahula's brothers also became exorcists (*yakādurā*); another became

[1] I owe many of the facts in the rest of this article to Rahula's biography by Gunadasa Liyanage. The Sinhala version, *Valpola Rāhula Hāmuduruvō*, was published in Colombo in 1994, the English version, entitled *On the Path*, in Colombo in 1995. I have used the latter. The tone of the book is rather hagiographic. Such words as 'probably' in my account reflect uncertainties in my reading of this biography, which is sometimes vague.

famous as a doctor of *āyurveda* and as president of the Astrologers' Association of Ceylon.

Rahula's name at birth was Hettigoda Gamage Don Hendrick de Silva. When first ordained, he was given the name Dhammadassi. He took the name Rahula on his own initiative in 1928 because he felt that he loved the Buddha like a son.

Rahula attended school for only three years. He refused to return to the village school after the headmaster tried to cane him unjustly. He received his education at home from his father and, both before and after ordination, at the village temple.

He was ordained in 1920, at the age of 13. Soon after ordination, he made an attempt to leave but then settled into monastic life. However, he moved from the village temple of Walpola to the chief temple in the area, Paragoda. There lived the Venerable Paragoda Sumanasara, who, he later said, 'laid the foundation' of his life. Sumanasara was a learned scholar and also an activist concerned to promote social welfare. Rahula did not follow him only in these two callings. In 1925 Sumanasara decided that circumstances made it impossible for him wholly to follow the rules for fully ordained monks as he understood them, so he reverted to the status of novice. Later in life he took this further and reverted to lay status, which suggests that he might have been excessively scrupulous. Be that as it may, it could well explain why Rahula chose to remain technically a novice until he was 58.

Some time after Rahula became his pupil, Sumanasara decided to take a group of pupils, including Rahula, and follow the ascetic lifestyle of 'forest hermits'. This meant, for example, that the group ate only food they had collected by begging. Once, Rahula accompanied his teacher on a long pilgrimage on foot. He thus had experience of the 'austere practices' (*dhutanga*) now relatively rare in the Sri Lankan Sangha.

Sumanasara had contacts with the Sinhala press, and these led Rahula in the same direction. While still in his teens he contributed articles on monastic discipline to a paper called *Simhala Jātiya*, and this in turn led to his first visit to Colombo, in 1925. Over the next ten years Rahula was an amazingly active publicist. In 1927, for example, he delivered 750 sermons. He also produced a large number of articles about Buddhism, many of which appeared as pamphlets. These were extremely radical and unpopular with the conservative majority in the Sangha. He took a purist line, arguing against many current Buddhist practices, including *Buddha pūjā* and other activities to 'make merit'. In this purism he was following the 'forest hermit' tradition and perhaps was influenced too by Protestant criticisms of Buddhism. He also preached against caste and accepted food from *rodi*, the nearest equivalent in Sinhala society to Hindu untouchables. He was well aware of Gandhi and associated with his Sri Lankan admirers.

In 1927 he settled in Colombo and did mission work in the slums. This was soon followed by a spell of similar activity up in Nuwara Eliya, in the central highlands. But after this, Rahula's base in Sri Lanka for the rest of his life was always in or near Colombo.

45 years ago and the John Crook who now holds the Lin Chi lineage and leads Ch'an retreats. What unites the two men? Is it memory? Perhaps, but first we have to resolve the koan of memory itself. Is it cause and effect, a relentless knock-on from one action to the next? Perhaps, but the answer seems strangely inadequate. Ultimately, the book thus presents us with a new koan: a man standing in the present yet taking photographs of himself 45 years ago, and doing so against a background of long-vanished people and places. Nothing remains – and yet nothing has departed. Where could it go? The images are still there, sharp and clear as the Hong Kong moon. Let us share them and be grateful.

DAVID FONTANA

SHORT NOTICES

THE WAY IS WITHOUT FLAW: Teachings of John Garrie Roshi, Sati Press, 1998, pp. 155, £11.50 (inc. post). Obtainable from: Kemps Cottage, Winsford, Minchead, Somerset TA 24 7HT.

GESTURES OF THE BUDDHA, by K I Maties, Chulalongkorn University Press, 1998. ISBN 974 635 068 4, pp. 295, £7 (inc.post). Obtainable from: Hamley Consultancies, 59 Rylewood Road, London SE27 9LZ.

BUDDHA OF INFINITE LIGHT: The Teachings of Shin Buddhism, The Japanese Way of Wisdom and Compassion, by D T Suzuki, Shambhala,1998, ISBN 1 57062 301 5, pp. 95, £13.99.

The Way is Without Flaw is a collection of teachings and homilies. There is a short biographical note on the author, John Garrie, now an elderly man, whose training had its roots in Theravada as well as in Zen. A Taoist influence is also sometimes evident.

It is easy to see why some of those who heard these teachings wanted to give them a permanent record. Their good qualities are manifest, as is the odd touch of eccentricity. This book would be helpful to anyone trying to sustain a practice without direct access to a teacher.

Gestures of the Buddha is a study in Theravada iconography. It offers a full treatment of the ways in which the Buddha is represented, dealing with differentiation by posture and gesture. The book should be useful to visitors to galleries and temples who want to learn how to 'read' the Buddha-images they find there. It is nicely produced and illustrated and good value for money.

Buddha of Infinite Light is a revised edition of Suzuki's *Shin Buddhism* published in 1970. It claims to be a much more accurate rendering of the text, originally derived from poor tape-recordings. It will be of interest to students of Pure Land. It is handsomely produced.

R W F

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OBITUARIES

Venerable Dr Walpola Rahula

MW AUG 199 VOL 73 #0

Professor R F Gombrich

THE VENERABLE DR WALPOLA RAHULA,[1] who died in Colombo on 19 September 1997, was one of the outstanding Buddhist monks and personalities of this century. Both his public and his private life were rich, zestful and generally of great benefit to others. He achieved eminence in both scholarship and politics as a preacher and as a teacher. His vast range of friends and admirers excluded no category of humanity, and he was as much at ease with the humblest as with the famous. Sociable by temperament and committed to philanthropy, he spent much time in solitude and lived alone for half his life. He could enjoy life's comforts and pleasures but did not need them. He was extraordinarily intelligent and extraordinarily kind.

Outside Sri Lanka he was best known, and will be long remembered, for his scholarly and academic activities. His little introduction to Buddhism, *What the Buddha Taught* (Bedford, 1959; 2nd edn. with selected texts, 1967), originally written in English and since translated into more than a dozen languages (including Sinhala), has been one of the most successful introductions to the Dhamma ever written, and may well be the best. Naturally, its exposition is entirely in line with the Theravāda tradition, and its emphases meet modern expectations of a rational and egalitarian approach to religion. However, Rahula was no sectarian. In 1967, at the request of its Secretary-General, he presented to a meeting of the World Buddhist Sangha Council in Colombo a statement of nine 'Basic Points unifying the Theravāda and the Mahāyāna', which was accepted unanimously – a more modest and far better successor to Olcott's 'Buddhist Catechism'. In his later years, as a symbol of his Buddhist inclusivity, he normally wore in private life the robe of a Chinese monk.

It is, however, the style of the book, even more than its content, that has made it pre-eminent. Rahula did really believe that the Dhamma was *ehipassiko*, something everyone was invited to inspect for themselves. As a young man (and before he had received any Western-style education), he broke with tradition by inviting questions at the end of his sermons. When he came to teach abroad, he made good his claim that in order to explain Buddhism it is neither necessary nor desirable to use foreign words. The very title of the book is, after all, a rendering (in my view, the best rendering) of the word 'Dhamma'. This illustrates both Rahula's readiness to innovate and his scorn for pretentiousness and pomposity.

Communicating Buddhist ideas to as many people as possible was certainly at the centre of Rahula's concerns. But as an author he was no mere popularizer of established truths. Perhaps his most enduring contribution to scholarship was his *History of Buddhism in Ceylon: the Anurādhapura Period* (Colombo, 1956). This pioneer work of

[1] His full title in English, as recorded on the title page of his biography (see fn. 2), was the Venerable Aggamahapandita Professor Dr Walpola Sri Rahula, Chancellor of Kelaniya University, Supreme Master of Buddhist Scriptures. However, for most of his life he was happy to be known as plain Rahula, the style I have adopted in the rest of this article.

techniques and forms from British legislative practice but, even without the British example, I think the 19th century kings would have developed as much legislative power as their Siamese contemporaries. But in both countries it was less a constitutional entitlement of royalty than a status which they had to earn. Thalun's legislation achieved posthumous recognition because history remembered him as a purveyor of peace and plenty. The 19th century kings were hard put to emulate his reputation when their kingdom was disappearing in slow motion to the British. The last king to rule over the whole of "Burma proper" and the last king who could claim to be a *cakkavattin* without provoking guffaws was Badon. My analysis of Badon's legislative practice is a convenient place to end this account of Burmese institutional rivalry over law and its legitimacy. Shortly after his succession Badon promulgated a short Royal Order on legal matters [ROB 3-3-1782]. All but one of the twelve sections confirm "business as usual"—the popular maxims that relieve indebtedness continue to apply, fees for judges and lawyers should be fixed, and the hereditary succession of village chiefs should continue. The twelfth section, where the king allows property to be inherited by the parents and grandparents before it escheats to the crown, may involve a change in the existing law but it is a concession against the royal interests—a generous gesture by a newly enthroned king. This business-like Order is typical of the rajathats produced by earlier kings. But 13 years later, after Badon had purified the sangha and revamped its disciplinary structure, he promulgated a unique rajathat that is his own contribution to the long debate over control of the law texts. ROB 28-1-1795 was widely circulated during and after his reign, and drawn to the attention of judges and ministers by several later Orders. Modern scholars have long been aware of its importance, and two full translations of it exist.[84] In legal content it adds nothing to his accession order 13 years earlier, but in presentation it is something else. It is a monument of Buddhist scholarship, a compilation of legal lists from canonical sources, Jataka stories with some legal or ethical bearing and provisions from the Vinaya which the laity should emulate. It is the king's response to the claim that Burmese law should be obeyed

84. Kyin Swi, 1965, "The Judicial System in the Kingdom of Burma," diss., SOAS (thesis #22 held at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Library); Than Tun, 1983, "The Royal Order (Wednesday 28 January 1795) of King Badon," *Ajia Afurika Gengotenyo Bunkyo* 26: 153-201.

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because it is Buddhist. His implied message is:Yes—Burmese law is Buddhist, but this does not mean that only learned monks like Khemacara can justify law in terms of Buddhism. Nor does it imply the Committee view that Buddhist law must be written in Pali. I, your king, am fully capable myself of linking the Buddha-dhamma to dhammathat and rajathat. Was he capable? Was he sufficiently well-versed in the scriptures to make the Royal Order's allusions to 21 different canonical jataka or to take passages from all over the Sutta pitaka and the commentaries? It gives every impression of having been drafted by a monk, and I strongly suspect the hand of the Maungdaung sayadaw, who among his other duties was a sort of Poet Laureate to Badon. But if it was ghost-written on Badon's behalf, this was kept uncharacteristically quiet. Evidently it was important to portray the order as the king's own work.

There are no clear victors in the institutional rivalry which I have been discussing. The lawyers succeeded against Thalun in one sense— D7 and D8 never became uniquely official sources of law—but lost to him in another—the 18th century lawyers recognised the posthumous legitimacy of Thalun's legislation. The monks succeeded in one sense—Khemacara put the Buddhist legitimacy of the law at the center of 18th century debate—but lost in another—Badon successfully challenged the sangha's claims to be the sole judge of whether law was sufficiently Buddhist. The kings succeeded in establishing a right to posthumous legislative competence, but the right was only available to kings posthumously judged to have been successful. Such muddled compromise is typical of any country's constitutional history. The U. K. and U. S. A. have a tradition of enshrining the compromise in a Bill of Rights or Constitution—a binding document which is then interpreted legalistically. In Burma this did not happen. Instead of a single constitutional convention they had an ongoing constitutional conversation. To contribute to the "dhammathat and rajathat" genre was to join in that conversation. Its ostensible topic was the relationship between Buddhism and law.

LAW AS ART

18th Century Dhammathats showing the influence of the "Committee for the Promotion of Pali Dhammathats"

Names of committee members appear in bold type.

Regnal Years	dhammathat	King author	Head of Sangha genre
1733-52		*Rajadhipati*	*Kyaw Aungsanta Sayadaw*
	D18	Khemacara	Burmese prose
	D10	Buddhinkura	Burmese prose
1752-60		*Alaungpaya*	*Shin Atula*
	D11	Letwe Nandasithu	Burmese prose
	D12	Bhummajeya	Burmese prose
	D13	Twinthinwun	Burmese verse
1760-3		*Naungdawgyi*	*Taungdwin Sayadaw*
	D14	**Tejosara**	Pali
1763-76		*Sinbyushin*	*Candovara*
	D16	Twinthinwun	Burmese verse
	D17	Twinthinwun	Burmese verse
	D15	**Myat Aung**	Pali verse
	D19	**Myat Aung**	Pali verse
	D20	**Myat Aung**	Pali verse
	D24	Sonda Sayadaw	Pali verse
1776-81		*Singu*	*Manle Sayadaw*
	D21	Letwethondara	Burmese verse
	D22	Chaunggauk Sayadaw	Pali verse
	D23	Chaunggauk Sayadaw	Pali
	K44	1st Monywe Sayadaw	Pali
1781-1819		*Badon*	*1st Maungdaung Sayadaw*
	D25	Ketuja	Pali
	D26	Panam Wungyi	Burmese verse
	D28	Pe Thi	Burmese verse
	D29	Candasu	Burmese verse
	D30	Shwe Po	Burmese verse

did it have? For fifty years dhammathat production was shifted dramatically from plain Burmese prose into the exotic channels of Pali prose, Pali verse and Burmese verse. Between 1733 and 1758 all four dhammathats produced were in Burmese prose: between 1758 and 1819 only one of the fifteen dhammathats produced was in Burmese prose. It is all too easy to be seduced by conspiracy theories and to see the inspiration of the committee behind each of these works. But by Badon's accession in 1781 the movement had probably developed its own momentum. By then each of the authors associated with the Committee had advanced their career in the Order or in public service. "If you want to get ahead, write an antiquarian dhammathat" must by then have seemed like plain common sense. I give details of these authors and their works in the form of a table, which fails to highlight the striking role played in the politics and literature of the period by high ranking monks who disrobed in middle age at the king's invitation in order to serve him as minister. Myat Aung had not risen far within the Sangha before disrobing and producing his three Pali dhammathats. But the Chaunggauk sayadaw,[80] author of D22 and D23, and the Maungdaung sayadaw[81] are good examples of this startling phenomenon. The latter was King Badon's MDRG when in April 1784 he brought a century of dispute and intrigue to an end by purging the sangha of the one-shoulder tendency. Atula was sentenced to death by exposure in the northern forests, but reprieved the next day. Instead he and his sizable band of followers were forcibly disrobed and thereupon disappear from history.[82]

What did the Taungdwin sayadaw's committee achieve? Ultimately their side won and the one-shoulder faction was eliminated, but the

80. Shin Saddhamanandi 1736-93. Disrobed in 1775 and subsequently was awarded the military (!) title "Balaraja" and the administrative title "Atwinwun." In addition to the dhammathats he wrote poetry in Burmese, including "On the Characteristics of Great Men," and the *Suttavaddha Niti*, a collection of edifying ethical and legal material from the Pali Canon.

81. Myat San 1753-1833. Monastic name Nanabhivamsa. MDRG under Badon and master mind of the resolution of the shoulder dispute, until he disrobed in 1812 at the king's invitation. Under his lay title, Mahadhamma Thingyan, he wrote or co-wrote more than 40 works, including the three most crucial sources for 18th century history: *The Glass Palace Chronicle, the Literary History of 1820* and the *Thatthana Wuntha Sadan*, the source of the later and better known *Sasanavamsa*. He perfectly exemplifies the maxim that history is written by its winners.

82. ROB 25-4-1784; ROB 27-4-1784 describes the cunning ruse which Badon adopted to supply them all with lay clothing at no expense to himself.

credit for this belongs entirely to Badon, a king strong and determined enough to intervene. The dangers of relying on the king to purify the sangha were underlined when Badon later pressed his own unique Buddhist theology on the sangha. The Committee did not affect the practice of the legal profession. No matter how many elegant works of antiquarian legal scholarship they produced, they were not going to persuade the Burmese lawyers to exchange courtroom badinage in Pali or address the judge in perfect Burmese verse. The immediate effect of their campaign was to draw a distinction between "working dhammathats" in Burmese prose and "antiquarian dhammathats" in verse or Pali. The only dhammathat to be produced in Burmese prose between 1758 and 1800 is intended as a working lawyers' reference book on inheritance "to enable one to grasp the subject at a glance, just like a bee who gathers pollen to convert to honey."[83] 110 of its 134 sections are taken straight from D11 and D12, which shows that authors concerned with practical legal purposes ignored the recent antiquarian material and went back to consult the Burmese prose dhammathats of the early 18th century. The Committee did, however, produce an unintended longer term effect. Their activities were eventually to persuade the British that Burmese law texts were arcane, obscure and impractical. When the colonial government arranged for some dhammathats to be printed in the early 1880s, the four works chosen were all Committee productions: Myat Aung's three Pali dhammathats and one of Lankasara's Burmese verse texts. Exposure to these four works went a long way to persuade the British that Burmese pre-colonial law had been unchanging, backward looking and obscure. It deepened the contempt which the British felt for the institutions of Mandalay and therefore encouraged them in the wanton destruction of the social system in which Burmese Buddhist Law had flourished. However this story, which explains much of Burma's present *anomie*, falls outside the scope of this paper.

How did the Committee fare in their campaign against legislation? Inevitably, as the Konbaung dynasty developed a stronger bureaucracy, it came to exercise something nearer and nearer to legislative power. In the second half of the 19th century King Mindon clearly borrowed

83. This simile is more usually applied to the behavior of monks on their early morning alms round. Perhaps a hidden metaphor is intended: as lay donors have cooked rice ready to give to the monks, so this book has legal information pre-cooked for all who need it.

died, and been replaced on the committee by the Sinde sayadaw,[78] who was twenty years younger and an equally fervent two-shoulder protagonist.[79] Tejosara was the first to complete his assignment: his *Shin Tejosara Shwe Myin* in Pali [D14] was completed in 1760 "having," as the preface boasts, "been solicited by the Prime Minister." The next three committee works came out under the name of Myat Aung: *Vannadhamma Shwe Myin* in Pali [D15] in 1768, *Vinicchaya Pakasani* in Pali [D19] in 1771 and *Manuvannana* in Pali [D20] in 1772. It is the second of these works in particular which clarify the aims and objectives of the committee:

> This is in accordance with what the ancient dhammathats say on the subject. These ancient authorities are taken exception to by the compilers of [D7 and D8] as being inconsistent with the Vinaya. The present compiler has, to avoid adverse criticism, merely mentioned what the ancient jurists have laid down. Monks have, in the Vinaya, their own rules to go by, and these will be given later. (D:1.397 [D19])

> Dhammathats like [D7] and others qualify the statement that a lay pupil shall not inherit from a *rahan*. This rule is inconsistent with the Vinaya and I have attempted to reconcile them. Readers must use their own discretion in the application of these rules. (D:1.406 [D19])

The Committee is in general concerned about the interface between Vinaya and dhammathat and in particular has a quarrel with Kaingza's two legal works. The Committee shared with the 17th century legal profession a hostility towards the legislative ambitions of Thalun, Kaingza and the Taungpila sayadaw. But they had different reasons for their hostility. The lawyers and the king were engaged in rivalry over who should control law. Unlike the similar rivalry in 17th century England, there were no constitutional implications. The lawyers did not want a constitutional monarchy but simply a wide selection of texts from which to argue. *Manugye* gave them the kind of dhammathat they needed, and thereafter they conceded Thalun's right to legislate. His posthumous reputation was his winning card: his reign was

78. See D20 s.II and III; translated in Browne, 1879, preface, *The Manoo Thara Shwe Myeen* (Rangoon) 2.
79. Shin Nanasadhamma, the Sinde sayadaw (1744-1816). He was one of nine elders honored after Badon's final resolution of the shoulder dispute, and served on Badon's twelve man Committee of Monastic Discipline.

remembered as a period of firm government at home and peace abroad. The Committee's objection is more principled: ancient texts are always to be preferred to modern texts, and the issue of legitimacy is to be decided on grounds of textual authenticity, rather than legislative competence. They can avoid criticizing King Thalun outright: the claim to legislate is obviously a misunderstanding caused by the unfortunate use of the Burmese vernacular in Kaingza's *Maharajathat* [D8]:

> Kaingza's [D8] has been misunderstood and applied to cases in a manner never contemplated by him, because it was written in Burmese. Unless a dhammathat is written in Pali, it cannot retain its original meaning. The rules of law are the contents, and the Pali language the proper container. [D19, Exordium]

King Thalun attempted a new style of legitimating argument. "Obey law because I, the king, say so." The 18th century lawyers appear to be saying "Our professional practice a century after Thalun is to recognize his reforms as valid." The Committee, fighting a rear-guard action, says "Obey law because it is old. Obey law because it is in Pali. Obey law because expert monks certify it as being authentic." The Committee, in short, wants law to be legitimated for exactly the same reasons that Buddhism is legitimated as the true religion and the Mahavihara traditions of Sri Lanka as the true form of Buddhism. But if law is to be obeyed because it is Buddhist, what is to be done with well-established Burmese rules which have no Canonical origin? Khemacara hoped such cases did not exist: if you kept on looking through the Buddhist literature you would eventually find a scriptural model. Forty years later, in *Rajabala*, one of the Pali dhammathats influenced by the Committee, the distinction is drawn between law (presumably originating in the Buddhist scriptures) and local custom (which refers here to a rule applicable all over Burma):

> It is only in compliance with local custom that the son-in law is required to serve his parents-in-law three years before he may leave them. (D:2.319 [D23])

The Taungdwin sayadaw's campaign to promote the dhammathat as work of art and monument to classical scholarship was certainly responsible for the five works I have mentioned. What other effects

scholarship (the citation of earlier dhammathats) with the conventions of religious scholarship (the appeal to the Pali canon and its commentaries). Its implied message is that Burmese law is, after all, Buddhist law, and the sangha must therefore be the ultimate judge of what is proper.

In 1752 begins a new reign, a new dynasty and a new approach to monastic discipline. King Alaungpaya, the founder of the Konbaung dynasty, appointed Atula, a prominent one-shoulder monk, as his MDRG. The appointment led to the production of an important law text, the *Atula pyatton*. This is a case-book, a collection of law reports "compiled from the pleadings of fifty lawyers and twenty five judges," the common denominator of which is that a monk, or group of monks, appears as plaintiff or defendant. As MDRG, Atula was the conduit through which monks were summoned to appear in court,[74] and he must have arranged to be sent written reports of all the cases which crossed his desk. Sometime after the incoming king replaced him in 1760, Atula edited these records into a single manuscript. This work, or some other aspect of Atula's tenure in office, stimulated an energetic counter-reaction by the two-shoulder monks which manifested itself in the production of several new dhammathats in Pali and Burmese verse. I shall examine these "antiquarian" legal works shortly. First we must consider why Atula was regarded as a *legal* threat, and why the battle should be fought around *legal* literature. The important dhammathat produced in Alaungpaya's reign was *Manugye* [D12], the best-known and most accessible of all the Burmese dhammathats. To know *Manugye* is, in a sense, to know the whole genre, since it is as much an encyclopedia of legal argument as a through-composed textbook. Whether its author was a lawyer before being appointed minister in charge of the capital city moat is unknown. But in true legal fashion he prefers the virtue of all-inclusiveness to the principle of non-contradiction. It offers in Burmese prose a storehouse of different rules on each issue without expressing a preference between them. And yet, on the important points where Thalun attempted to legislate, it does not cite material that contradicts Thalun's approach. If *Manugye* represents what lawyers thought in the

Jataka, Sujata Jataka, Sambhula Jataka, Garudhamma Jataka and Buddha's sermon to Uggaha. These references typically end with a phrase like this: "Therefore the rule laid down in the dhammathat is in perfect concord with the doctrine contained in the sacred writings" [D2.307].
74. ROB 5-9-1757.

1750s, it is evidence that they had changed their practice in accordance with Thalun's wishes. Retrospectively, Thalun's assertion of a power to legislate was proving successful. The *Kitti dhammathat kyaw* was evidently a last ditch and unsuccessful attempt to set the clock back to the 16th century. But if Thalun's assertion of a power to legislate was now proving successful, this could have sinister implications for those monks who were out of favor in palace circles. If previous kings successfully asserted a right to change secular law by legislation, why should they not assert a right to change the text of the Vinaya, or at least the interpretation of the text of the Vinaya, by legislation? No one minds a royal purification of the sangha as long as the king enforces your version of orthodoxy. What frightened the two-shoulder monks under Alaungpaya was the prospect of a purification with the wrong guys in charge.

This is the background to the formation of the group of two-shoulder monks whom I shall call "the Committee for the Promotion of Pali Dhammathats." The senior monk and leading light of this group was the Taungdwin Sayadaw.[75] During the last years of Alaungpaya's reign, he encouraged Lankasara,[76] one of his pupils who showed talent as a poet in the Burmese language, to apply it to versifying the old dhammathat traditions. The resulting work, *Kandaw pakeinnika linga* [D13], appeared two years before Alaungpaya's death. Lankasara went on to be a one-man "Committee for the Production of Dhammathats in Burmese Verse": eight of his verse dhammathats are listed in the Burmese literary history written in the 1830s. Alaungpaya's son and successor appointed the Taungdwin sayadaw as MDRG but would not sponsor a purge on the one-shoulder monks. It was at this stage, I surmise, that the Taungdwin sayadaw set up his committee. Its initial membership comprised Candapanna and Tejosara from the sangha and Myat Aung, who had recently left the sangha for a career in government service.[77] Candapanna is mentioned by the *Sasanavamsa* as a bulwark of two-shoulder orthodoxy while Myat Aung trained under Shin Candavara, a two-shoulder luminary who was to succeed the Taungdwin sayadaw as MDRG. By 1772 the Taungdwin sayadaw had

75. Mon Phyo 1724-1762. Monastic name Shin Nana. Title as Head of Order "Nanbhidhamma lankara MDRDRG."
76. Tun Nyo 1726-1809. Monastic name Lankasara. Titles after leaving the Order: "Maha Cannsu" and "Twinthintaik Wun."
77. Listed in s.II of *Vannadhamma Shwe Myin* [D15].

not being a Buddhist scholar is like blaming the Old Testament prophets for not being Christian: Manu the hermit is a contemporary of Mahasammata the first king who lived several eons before Gautama Buddha turned the wheel of the law! "Hermits" could mean anything, from forest monks at the near end of orthodoxy to Brahmans, alchemists and animists at the far end. But I take it that in this context "the hermits" represent the lawyers with their appeal to the authority of Manu the hermit. The implied contrast is between lawyers saying "obey law because it is old" and monks saying "obey law because it is religious." By now the sangha were experts in textual history. Within a century the question of whether *Culaganthipada* was written in 13th century Ceylon or 5th century B. C. India would be, literally, a matter of life or death. To scholars who could confidently settle that question, the absence of evidence that 5th century Sri Lanka knew any dhammathat was becoming embarrassing. The subtext of Shin Uttamasikkha's message might be paraphrased thus:

> We admit that the original dhammathat is not a Theravada document in the grand tradition: its textual history does not go through first millennium Sri Lanka. But the commentaries on it are in the grand Theravada tradition, so we monks are the ultimate legal authorities as long as we can ground its content in canonical literature.

Why is it worth mentioning that Kaingza et al. did not use *Kyemin*? Because, I surmise, *Kyemin* was typical of the newly discovered dhammathats which the lawyers were busily citing in court. The sentence stands for the purification of the dhammathats, the expulsion from legal discourse of certain works popularized by lawyers in the previous century. Pronouncing an anathema on texts is one thing: making it stick is quite another. The only way to test whether Thalun in fact had the power which he asserted to control lawyer's discourse was to wait a century and see whether lawyers are still doing as Thalun had bid them.

A century after Thalun, his great-great-great grandson, the last of the Toungoo dynasty kings, occupied the throne. Two dhammathats, both written by monks but otherwise very different, were produced in his reign (1733-52). Firstly Shin Maha Buddhingura, sayadaw of the Heir Apparent's monastery, compiled the *Kitti dhammathat kyaw* [D10] which completely ignores the legal innovations of Thalun's reign. Analysis of the sections on Inheritance in the Digest reveals

neither references to nor parallels with D7 and D8, King Thalun's official dhammathats. The largest bunch of parallelisms are with *Dhammavilasa* [D4], but exactly half of the sections quoted are unparalleled in the surviving old dhammathats. This indicates that it preserves an old textual tradition otherwise lost to us; the various literary histories identify this source as *dhammathat kyaw* or *kitti dhammathat* written by eight judges between 1581 and 1599. In the 1740s Buddhingura is ignoring the reformed royal dhammathats of the previous century in order to reproduce textual traditions from 150 years before. *Kitti* is connected with the lawyers' dhammathats of the 16th century, so in practice, if not in intent, he was preferring the lawyers' claim to Thalun's claim. I have looked hard for evidence of Buddhingura's motives. If we can identify him with the *Sasanavamsa*'s "Buddhankura" of the reigns 1698-1733, then he was one of the four leading one-shoulder monks of the period, and we can speculate about an alliance between lawyers and the one-shoulder tendency. But identifying monks from a single literary reference is a mug's game. Mabel Bode warns:

> These small bibliographical puzzles, which we are not willing to leave unsolved but must waste much time in solving, result sometimes from the choice of well-known or well-sounding Pali names by theras of different epochs and their pupils, commentators and copyists, sometimes from the renaming of distinguished teachers by their royal admirers.[72]

The second dhammathat produced in this reign was *Vinnichayarasi* [D18] by Shin Khemacara, a pupil of the king's MDRG. This is my personal favorite among the Burmese law texts. While the Pali dhammathats written later in the century give off an odor of scholasticism, Khemacara, writing in simple Burmese prose, gives us an idea of what a good popular sermon of the period might have sounded like. He cites some older dhammathats—Manuyin, Manosara, Manusara, Manussika and Dhammavilasa—by name, but he wants to ground every rule in scriptural authority. When he can, therefore, he illustrates each rule with extensive and learned quotations from the Pali canon.[73] *Vinnichayarasi* combines the conventions of legal

72. Bode, 1909, *The Pali Literature of Burma* (London) 28-9.
73. In the Digest excerpts, we find quotations from the following: the *Dhammadayada Sutta*, the *Dhammapada*, the *Vinaya*, *Vessantara Jataka*, *Mahosodha Jataka*, *Mahakunala Jataka*, *Katthaharika Jataka*, *Vinaguna*

pons and yazathats" must be understood as meaning that he had access to a Law Library.

King Thalun's attempt to purify the dhammathats in the 1630's led to the writing of two of Burma's most important law books, *Manosara Shwe Myin* [D7] and *Maharajathat* [D8]. The first named work is a Pali language dhammathat, closely based on an earlier surviving work called *Manosara* [D1]. D7 was the joint work of Thalun's favorite monk, the Taungpila sayadaw, and Thalun's favorite lawyer, Kaingza, demonstrating how far things had changed since *Dhammavilasa* was composed at the end of the 12th century. It is no longer enough for the king to collaborate with a prestigious monk on a dhammathat: he must bring in a representative of the legal profession as well. Furthermore, the concept of "royal favorite" was by the 17th century becoming more bureaucratic. The Taungpila sayadaw held a distinct office, usually translated as "Royal Preceptor" or "Head of the Order." The term most often used in the 18th century was *maha dhamma raja guru*, which I shall abbreviate to "MDRG." Thalun may have intended to set up Kaingza as the legal equivalent: when he honored Kaingza with the title *Manuraja* he may have meant him to act as royal ambassador to the lawyers, as the MDRG was royal ambassador to the sangha. *Maharajathat* [D8] appeared under Kaingza's name alone, but the introduction is almost embarassingly fervent in its invocation of the MDRG's authority:

> I answered the questions relying on the guidance of the Taungpila sayadaw . . . He is like the mango tree that thrives in the verdant vale hard by the emerald cave.

In genre terms D8 is unique. Each chapter consists of about a dozen questions sent to Kaingza by the king, along with Kaingza's considered replies. The king cites popular legal maxims and enquires if they are good law. Or the king asks about reforms which have been introduced in D7 and, in effect, invites Kaingza to explain the policy behind the reform. It is partly a commentary on D7, and partly a discourse on what counts as normal legal practice and acceptable legal argument. If we translate *Manuraja* as "Attorney General" and think of Kaingza as a politician who is simultaneously head of the legal profession, then we get a clearer idea of his intentions. Note that between them Thalun, Kaingza and the Taungpila sayadaw challenged the prevailing fiction that the dhammathats could only be changed by

restoration to their original purity. They boldly state that some rules in the ancient dhammathats needed reform in current conditions, and proceeded to change them by what amounted to royal legislation. One such change concerned the effects of sworn evidence: the judge's decision could no longer be annulled if the witness suffered a catastrophe within weeks of testifying.[68] Another change abolished the right to make a will.[69]

Forty years on, these events were described in the earliest of Burma's surviving literary histories, Shin Uttamasikkha's *Pitakat Thamaing*.[70] The following passage from this under-used manuscript is my prime piece of contemporary evidence for the rivalry between lawyers and kings:

> Scholars in the reign of Hsinbyushin produced the *Dhammathat-kyaw*. The *Manosara-kye*, written in Pyumin's reign, was translated into Burmese in Hanthawaddy during the reign of "second king." During [Thalun's] reign, *Manosara kye* was re-edited into alphabetical order, and renamed *Dhammathat Shwe Kyam* by [the Taungpila sayadaw] and [Kaingza Manuraja]. They did not use the *Kyemin dhammathat kye*. These dhammathats, bedin, kalap, panci, vitak, danti and lokaniti texts are secular works which endanger the path to nirvana. Among them, three dhammathats and [some] dietary medical treatises were written by hermits, but the commentaries on them were written by scholars. Please note this fact! It is only proper and correct that these matters be laid before successive kings.[71]

What does this interesting distinction between trustworthy "scholars" and untrustworthy "hermits" signify? Blaming Manu the hermit for

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68. Okudaira, 1984, "The Role of Kaingza," *Ajia Afurika Gengo Bunka Kenkyu* 27: 183.
69. See Huxley, 1990b, "Wills in Theravada Buddhist S. E. Asia," *Receuils de la Société Jean Bodin* 62: 66. Evidence that this change happened during Thalun's reign is only circumstantial.
70. This passage is part of the last page of the manuscript printed in Burmese in Bechert, Khin Khin Su and Tin Tin Myint, 1979, *Burmese Manuscripts*, Vol. 1 (Wiesbaden) 172. I am very grateful to my colleague John Okell for the English translation, and to Dr. Lobo of the Museum für Indische Kunst, Berlin, for sending me photographs of the whole manuscript, which is catalogued under the number MIK I 4194.
71. Comparing this with a tabular dhammathat history in English, which I think represents the literary history also called *Pitakat Thamaing* written in the 1820's by the 1st Maungdaung sayadaw, "Hsinbyushin" would be Bayinnaung (1551-81), and "second king" would also be Bayinnaung (meaning the second king of Greater Toungoo?).

no control over future kings and future generations of lawyers. If his dhammathat is to succeed in replacing its rivals, it must do so on its own merits. In the early 18th century the sangha entered the competition by writing a dhammathat that puts the word "Buddhist" back into the expression "Burmese Buddhist law." The *Vinnichayarasi* [D18] is scholarly, pious and positively dripping with the latest in classical Pali scholarship. By reasserting the claim that the dhammathats are legitimated in terms of religion, it set a standard that had to be met by both 18th century lawyers and kings. But the sangha's dignified contribution degenerated into farce: the monastic community split between those who wore their robe across both shoulders, and those who left a shoulder bare. The resulting battle was fought partly over the production and control of law texts. As a result members of the sangha competed to produce the most obscure, archaic and practically useless dhammathat text.

Let us return to the late 16th century. We can identify certain dhammathats of the period, such as *Kungya* [D6], *Dhammathatkyaw* [D10] and *Kozaungkyok* as being produced by the Burmese lawyers. These works combine a fondness for legal technicalities with a concern for practicalities. Let me illustrate this with *Kungya*, which eschews any attempt at classical learning, giving us only one judgment tale derived from the Jataka and none of the lists of sons, wives, degrees of marriage etc., which clutter up the other dhammathats. The rules are stated so as to be of maximum use in settling village disputes. *Kungya* tells us that a girl who has slept with several men can chose which of them to marry, and can demand 30 ticals of silver in the event of a refusal. I assume, with the greatest respect to all concerned, that this would be more useful at village level than the learned discussion of the five types of virgin offered by the other dhammathats. *Kungya* gives us one rule (otherwise found only in a late 18th century work) which also seems typical of village life, rather than palace decorum:

> If a woman has illicit intercourse with the husband of another woman, the latter has the right to pull the ears or the top-knot of the former. If such treatment results in the loss of an ear or of the top-knot, the loser is entitled to claim the man as her husband; and if he refuses to take her to wife, he shall pay 60 ticals of silver as compensation. But if no such loss is sustained, he shall pay her 30 viss of copper. The above is the rule laid down in the dhammathats. [D:2.413]

The author, Min Pyanchi, boasts that the varied sources on which his work is based include "pyattons, pyatpons, rajathats, and the *Kyemin*, *Zalimin* and *Manussapeta* dhammathats"[D:1.5]. U Gaung's Digest paraphrases *Kungya*'s preface:

> It was written in 4 volumes . . . having for its basis an old dhammathat which contained more rules than the Manu, Mano, Dhammavilasa and Manussika dhammathats, and which was written as far back as 1 B. E. / 659 A. D. The old dhammathat was in the possession of Sadaw Mahasangharajadhamma, who resided at Pagan in the gilt monastery built by Mohnyin Mintaya, who ascended the throne of Ava in 788 B. E. / 1426 A. D.

This story of the rediscovery of an old dhammathat text kept in a Pagan monastic book chest is partially confirmed by epigraphy. An inscription of 1442 written by the Governor of Taungdwin to enumerate his pious donations confirms that a dhammathat text was held in a Pagan monastic book chest. Alas, the Governor of Taungdwin, though a nephew of Mohnyin Mintaya and married to one of Mohnyin Mintaya's daughters, founded a separate monastery from that donated by Mohnyin Mintaya himself. But I hope that I am not being overromantic when I suggest that the 1442 Pali dhammathat moved a few miles from one Pagan monastery to another, to form the basis of *Kungya*. When I speculate that this anonymous work was the first of the sources listed above by Min Pyanchi, in other words that it was called the *Kyemin* dhammathat, I probably am going too far into the fictional. But whatever sources *Kungya* drew on, they included the conversation and libraries of lawyers. When a married man becomes a monk and his wife remarries, the new husband must give way if the original husband leaves the sangha and returns to his wife. In the event of litigation, the new husband must pay the costs, but not any compensation for adultery [D:2.411]. This section reads as if it could have been extracted from a pyatton, a report of a real life case, since discussion of costs is common in pyattons but very rare in dhammathats. Other sections show a fondness for distinctions depending on lawyer's abstractions. The claim to compensation for adultery, for example, is lost with the wife's death "since a claim for compensation is not a debt" [D:2.454]. Either Min Pyanchi moved among professional lawyers, or his reference to "the authority of the pyattons, pyat-

matter of controversy until the end of the Burmese monarchy,[67] when it was superseded by the even more feudal notion of the British Crown's eminent domain. Dhammavilasa's statement is the culmination of the long, tentative process of state formation from the start of irrigation to the imperial conquests of Pagan. Whenever a local big man extended the area of his political control, whenever a channel was dug to link two separate village irrigation systems, the act was justified by some such claim as "I deserve more power over land because I am better than you." The introduction of Indian ideologies of kingship allowed this to be put in more interesting ways but, as long as the claim was made orally, it remained a slogan rather than a legal doctrine. Oral rules on land use can get quite complex, but lack enough detail to make an intellectually coherent legal package. An official dhammathat, legitimated by the prestige of the king and his most meritorious monk, is motivated to tackle these issues and to convert the king's windy rhetoric into more precisely calibrated written claims.

In its heyday Pagan sucked the early law texts in from surrounding cities. At its collapse Pagan blew its blended law texts out to its successor kingdoms and their neighbors. Between 1275 and 1317 we hear of five Thai kings who sponsor or use written law texts. To Thai kings such as these ruling over ethnically mixed populations, an official dhammathat seems to have been a necessity. Between the 14th and the 17th centuries it was these Thai kings who made all the running in S. E. Asian legal history: Mangrai's dynasty in Chiangmai produced the profusion of Lanna legal literature that has been rediscovered in the last twenty years while the Ayuthayan kings wrote much of the legislation preserved in the Three Seals Code. In Burma nothing much happened until the 16th century, when a father and son team from the obscure central Burmese city of Toungoo took it in their heads to conquer the known world. They conquered Martaban in 1541, Pagan in 1545, southern Arakan in 1546, Ava in 1555, Lanna in 1556, Ayuthaya in 1563 and Luang Prabang in 1564. Laos and Siam did not remain under Burmese control for long, but the campaigns had the effect of bringing national legal literatures back in touch with each other. The wars were fought for manpower and booty, and manuscripts, particularly those from the royal libraries of conquered kings, were fair booty. Certainly the Burmese acquired copies

67. Compare ROB 27-7-1785 and *Maharajathat*, 216.

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of Mon and Lanna legal literature during these campaigns: I guess that they also acquired law texts from Laos and Siam. But how were such texts to be regarded? Was the law they contained to be defined in ethnic terms as Thai law (and therefore inapplicable in Burma) or in Buddhist terms as universal law (and therefore to be cited in the Burmese courts)? The lawyers favored the latter approach, the king favored the former approach, and the sangha eventually adopted their own definition of legal orthodoxy. The resulting claims and counterclaims set off an explosion of dhammathat activity.

The earliest well-dated references to a legal profession appear in rajathats of 1597 and 1607. These Royal Orders regulate an existing profession, so the lawyers must have established themselves by 1500 at the latest. Where lawyers flourish, legal texts proliferate. A trainee lawyer has to acquire his own library by copying out his guru's collection of dhammathats. The more such quotable texts, the better. If written authority can be found for alternate and mutually contradictory rules, then clients whose case was hopeless acquire a text on which they can rely. They must have welcomed the "foreign" legal literature with open arms: they were plainly within the Theravada orthodoxy and plainly textually related to the dhammathats in use in Toungoo (thanks to the common origin in Pagan). Yet they added to the lawyers' storehouse of paths of justification with written rules hitherto unknown in Burma. The attitude of the legal profession between 1550 and 1620 can be summed up like this: We are going to use this interesting new material by quoting it in our courtroom arguments, and by incorporating it into our own personal dhammathats. Our normal legal practice involves treating dhammathat and rajathat as normative, and it is we, the legal professionals, who judge what shall count as dhammathat and rajathat. The royal response to this alarming call for legal autonomy was to reimpose some kind of unity on the vast variety of law texts that had flooded into Burma since 1541. The king claimed that this was his duty by analogy with his duty to impose unity on the monks when their disciplinary disputes lead to excessive fragmentation ("purification of the sangha"), his duty to present a unified account of history ("re-editing of the chronicles") and his duty to repair the ravages which time had wrought on the very words of the Buddha-dhamma ("purification of the Tipitika"). Between 1629 and 1648 King Thalun presented the world with both a purified dhammathat and an instant commentary on it. He could, and did, ensure that the new work got a wide circulation during his lifetime. But he had

More powerful than any of these, however, is the association of writing with Buddhism. The Burmese superstition that one should avoid stepping across anything written on the ground survived into the late 19th century. It was explained by saying that "Each letter is the image of a Buddha."[60] The earliest dhammathats display a delight in the technology of weaving letters into words, sentences, paragraphs and books:

> Listen, all good men, to the Dhammathat kyan which I am now making in letters, even like a garland made out of flowers. [D1, exordium]

and a touching faith in the certainty that writing brings into a dubious and disordered world:

> Recording a debt in writing is like inscribing it on a rock on the face of the earth. It is never effaced and it is against nature that such debt be forgotten. [D1, 121][61]

When did this novelty wear off, so that written law needed some form of legitimation over and above the fact that it was in writing? When writing was sufficient legitimation, texts could be written anonymously. Conversely, when we find a law text identified by the name of its author, this suggests that the author's name has been remembered because it is necessary to legitimate his text. The earliest surviving dhammathat to bear the name of a credible human author is the eponymous *Dhammavilasa* [D4], written between 1174 and 1211 by a famous monk. In the preceding section I described how Pagan sucked in literature from the surrounding older literate cities. For law notebooks, I guess that those entering Pagan from Monland were identified as "Mano" texts while those coming from Pyu and north Burman cities and from Arakan were identified as "Manu."[62] King

60. Gray 1886, "Lokaniti" footnote to s388.
61. The loss of innocence is recorded in the 18th century *Manugye* [D12] III 19-20 which lists "the 12 ways in which debtors and creditors can cheat each other over a written debt agreement."
62. For another example of the vowel shift between Mon and Burmese, compare the names of the king of Thaton defeated by the king of Pagan in 1057: in Mon he is known as "Manohari" and in Burmese he is "Manuha."

Narapatisithu commissioned[63] one of his most trusted monks to produce an official dhammathat combining the best of these earlier texts. The monk's name is Dhammavilasa, the official nature of his work is signified by calling it *shwe myin* (golden) and its incorporation of both streams of pre-Pagan text is signified by identifying it as "Manu-Mano." Hence the earliest surviving manuscript of the work is entitled *Manu Mano Dhammavilasa shwe myin dhammathat*.[64] Presumably the learned monk, who was also commissioned by the king to purify religion in Monland, wrote the work in Pali, but the palace translators must have set to work immediately. *Dhammaviiasa* texts survive in the Burmese [D4], Arakanese [D35] and Mon [M3] languages: was there once a Pyu, or even a Chin or Tai-Shan, version? I am suggesting that this important work replaced the fading effectiveness of legitimation through writing alone by an appeal to the joint prestige of the king and his most famous monk.[65] Contrary to Hla Aung, who says that "The idea of a Burmese king enacting a dhammathat was unthinkable."[66] I would call *Dhammavilasa* a royally sponsored dhammathat. The interesting question is whether the author was per-suaded by his royal patron to endorse any of the more controversial royal claims to power and influence. Would an official dhammathat differ in content from an unofficial one? Consider this passage:

> This earth has an area of 2,400,000 yojanas. But any deviation from rightful ownership, even by a hairsbreadth, is wicked. Therefore kings take possession of all the lands in the kingdom and distribute them among their people in fair shares, thus obviating strife and discord. [D4 VIII 10]

This aspect of royal power is referred to by later Burmese lawyers as the "Lordship of Land and Water." Its precise implications remained a

63. That *Dhammavilasa* was commissioned by the king is only an inference from the wide spread of the manuscript. *Pace* Forchhammer, the Kalyani Inscriptions do not state that the king commissioned the monk.
64. The British Library ms. copied in 1749. Rangoon National Library has a later manuscript entitled *Dhammavilasa Manu Mano dhammathat thamaing*.
65. Dhammavilasa's fame was guaranteed in 1475 by the description of him in the Kalyani Inscriptions. Even during his lifetime, however, his reputation was known as far off as Sri Lanka: see Barnett, 1905, "The Manavulu-Sandesaya," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*: 265.
66. Hla Aung, 1969, "The Burmese Concept of Law," *Journal of the Burma Research Society* 52: 27.

became the normal legal genre, while in Lanna and Laos the monks got the better of the argument, and the sangha won effective control of written law. But in Burma the emergence of a third competitor made the plot more complex. Sometime between the 12th and the 16th century the legal profession established itself, equipped with its own slogan summarizing legal legitimacy: "Obey law because it is Burmese." The three cornered rivalry between king, sangha and lawyers gives the legal history of the 17th and 18th century a particular interest. But this did not just concern the legitimacy of law: theories of legitimation complement each other rather than rivaling each other, since the man in the paddy field is quite capable of obeying law for mutually incompatible reasons. The real point at issue in the elite world of monks, lawyers and courtiers was constitutional, or, in Hart's language, concerned with secondary rules of recognition and change.[59] Who was in charge of the legal literature? Who could authenticate a particular text as being authoritative on Burmese law? If the king ultimately exercises this power, he will be able to legislate, to engage in social engineering, by authenticating only the texts which decide as he wants. If the monks have final say, then Burmese law texts will be viewed as sacred and inerrant: the characteristics of such strongly religious laws as the Jewish Torah and the Muslim Shari'ah. If the lawyers can control which books are authoritative, then they have become the ultimate arbiters of power within a constitutional rule of law state.

Identifying such issues as matters of constitutional law is currently unfashionable. The usual approach is to mutter darkly about oriental despots while enumerating the Sanskrit and Pali themes which S. E. Asian monarchs used to justify their absolute power. I agree that, when center-stage in the theater-state, the king milked such themes for all they were worth: he emphasized his membership of the solar dynasty, his eleven kinds of royal umbrella, and his ownership of the seven treasures of the cakkavatti monarch. But when addressing a legal audience the king could sound reasonable and restrained, the very model of a constitutional oriental despot. Kaingza's *Maharajathat* states King Thalun's claims to legal preeminence in about 1640. The king has asked Kaingza to comment on the popular maxim "that rajathat overrides dhammathat, and mutual consent overrides rajathat":

59. Hart, 1961, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford).

> I, Manuraja, submit the following answer based on learned works and authoritative precedents: Irrespective of what the dhammathats provide, what the king ordains is law and must be followed in disputes relating to property, life and injury to the human body. In these three matters what the king commands must prevail . . . Thus the rajathat should be followed if they conflict with dhammathat or other learned works. [D8 Xth Question, s.18]

This is a modest enough claim, is it not? The king claims the constitutional power to legislate in three areas: "property," which primarily means agricultural land but widens out to include the economy in general, "life," meaning his ultimate power of capital punishment as a synecdoche for punishment and criminal law, and "injury to the human body" referring to the King's Peace, his duty to put down robbers and dacoits. Why is this document not regarded as the Burmese *Magna Carta* or *Bill of Rights*? Mainly because these constitutional settlements ended a genuine political rivalry which never existed in Burma as long as the monarchy was unchallenged by any institutional competitor for power. The Peacock Throne remained the sole locus of Burmese power right up until the British consigned it to a museum. But also because it reflects a truth about the Burmese attitude to written law. Burma did not have a constitution (in the sense that contestants for power argue about the precise interpretation of clause 4 or amendment 5) because written law was seen not as something to be enforced to the last letter, but as instructions giving a general indication of policy and direction. As the king himself put it:

> All officers in charge must learn from experience because custom is different from practice, practice different from the shape of things that would be brought about, the shape is different from the idea and the idea is different from the consequences. [ROB 24-9-1598]

Between the 9th and the 12th centuries, when the move from oral to written law was underway, written law created its own legitimacy. A written text derives authority from the novel characteristics inherent in writing. It has a permanence which human experts in oral law cannot hope to achieve. As an inhuman source of law, it can claim to rise above the various forms of bias and selective statement of which human law experts can be accused. If literacy is confined to a governing elite, then it will also get some authority from this connection.

> The ancient Teachers say: This matter of the second Parajika [the law against theft] is very difficult to understand. Therefore one cannot but have tortuous and fragmentary explanations. Therefore I must now say these 25 expressions which you must carefully examine.[54]

The text proceeds to shoe-horn a great deal of monastic legalism on theft into a 5 x 5 matrix. An early Mon dhammathat mentions the 25 kinds of theft as do some later Burmese law texts, and *Manugye* [D12] manfully struggles to make sense of all of *Samantapasadika*'s Pali classifications,[55] but it is the Lanna law texts which really develop this theme. "Twenty Five Kinds of Theft" becomes one of the standard titles for a legal compendium. Sommai Premchit's catalogue lists 19 surviving manuscripts bearing this title, though he adds "They should present the standard group of 25 types of theft, with stories illustrating the different penalties for monk and for layman who commit the same offense. This sampling of the topic gives, altogether, 16 topics."[56]

The strongest proof of Buddhist influence on the law texts is almost too obvious to mention. The only two legal literatures in the world which illustrate norms in terms of stories, parables and judgment tales are the Vinaya and the law texts of Buddhist S. E. Asia. In particular neither the Hindu sastric material nor the Chinese codes nor the laws of Java and Malacca share this peculiarity. You need only dip into S. E. Asian Buddhist law texts for a page or two before encountering those tell tale words: "There was once a certain king in Benares . . ." Buddhism is half way to solving a problem that has baffled every other literate culture—how to make law books interesting.

If I have spent too long making the simple point that Hindu influence on the dhammathats has been overrated and Buddhist influence underrated, this is due to exasperation. The same point has been argued by Burmese and Indian scholars[57] for over forty years, but the myth of Hindu origins will not lie down and die. It is worth pondering why the misjudgment has become so firmly entrenched. The discovery that "dhammathat and rajathat" contains some provisions of Hindu law was publicized during the first decades of British colonialism in Burma. It coincided with and mutually reinforced the "discovery" that Buddhism was an anti-social religion uninterested in the events of this world. Both discoveries were convenient for the colonists: I would enjoy demonstrating that both were entailed by the imperatives of imperialism, but things were not quite that simple: it was King Badon (1781-1819) the last of the real old Burmese kings, who first expounded the Hindu origin of the dhammathats in writing, and the three scholars most responsible for spreading the idea worldwide were French, Swiss and Japanese. Furthermore, as a very first approximation to the truth, both discoveries have merit: the dhammathats do contain patent Hindu borrowings, and Buddhism does indeed urge a withdrawal from the worldly pursuit of wealth and sex. The pioneer legal historians qualified these original discoveries with passages that vehemently argue for the opposite,[58] but naturally such subtleties escaped the vulgar. Max Weber happened to be the most effective vulgariser of both ideas, and it is thanks to his influence that they continue to prop each other up to this day.

54. Bapat and Hirakawa 1970. 232.
55. *Mon Dhammavilasa* [M3] s3; ROB 28-1-1795 s5; *Manugye* [D12] 110-3.
56. Sommai Premchit, *et al.*, 1986, *Lan Na Literature: a Catalogue of 954 Secular Titles on Microfilm* (Chiang Mai).
57. See E Maung, 1951, *The Expansion of Buddhist Law* (Rangoon), Shwe Baw 1955, and Dev Raj Chanana, 1966, "Social Implications of Reason and Authority in Buddhism," *Indian Economic and Social History Revue* 3: 295.

The political aspects of law: Why obey it? Who controls it?

In the last section I used literary history to demonstrate that the early Burmese legal literature draws more on Buddhist than on Hindu sources. In this section I turn to political history: what role did Buddhism play in the operation of the Burmese legal system? I shall tackle two inter-linked questions, the first of which is the Weberian topic of legitimacy. What reasons were advanced to persuade the ordinary citizen, the man in the paddy field, to obey dhammathat and rajathat? My starting position is that, though the rhetoric employed by kings and monks often overlapped, we can distinguish two characteristic arguments. Kings would tend to say "Obey law because I say so" while monks would tend to say "Obey law because it is Buddhist." This distinction yields quite a useful bird's-eye-view of the last eight centuries of S. E. Asian legal history. In Siam and Cambodia the royal view prevailed, and legislation by the king

58. Forchhammer 1885 is the earliest and most detailed of the three scholars. But on page 44 he likens Burmese law and Hindu law to "the *sister* languages Sanskrit and Pali, which have a common parent but are not derived from each other."

are caricatured in the Vinaya as the *Chabbagiyyas*, "the Group of Six Monks," whose mission is to boldly roam North India breaking the rules in new ways or offering new excuses for old offenses. The monastic milieu threw up imaginative new defenses whose strength was discussed and assessed. Some of these monastic legalisms coalesced early enough to enter the Vinaya pitaka as the stories which follow the Old Commentary in the *Suttavibhanga*. Others just missed the cut and must be sought in Buddhaghosa's *Samantapasadika* or in Jayaraksita's hybrid Sanskrit commentary of the Mahasanghika school. That these two 5th century A. D. sources contain identical monastic legalisms, though they come from opposite ends of S Asia and from brands of Buddhism that had separated centuries earlier, indicates how early the non-canonical material is. It must date from the reign of King Asoka or his immediate successors. Would there be any similarity between the barrack room lawyering of monks and the law administered in the king's courts? The sangha included people who were well informed about Mauryan legal practice:

> Now at that time a certain former minister of justice who had gone forth among the monks was sitting near the lord. And the lord spoke thus to the monk: "For theft of what amount does King Bimbisara of Magadha impose floggings, imprisonment or banishment?" "For a *pada*'s worth, lord." [V III 44]

It is ironical that the scriptures of "unworldly" "non-legalistic" Buddhism might be our only source describing Indian law in the last centuries B. C.!

S. E. Asia treated these monastic legalisms as texts on which to elaborate sermons, as themes on which to play variations and as *topoi* in Aristotle's sense of "bases from which one argues." While the Hindu borrowings merge into the textual background, some of these Buddhist borrowings are elaborated into prominence. Take the 4 *agati* (the 4 courses not to be taken) which are the Buddha's equivalent of the two western rules of natural justice. All attempts to portray Buddhist legal procedure as fair must elaborate this text. The early Burmese dhammathats were content merely to mention the list, but 17th and 18th century works incorporate the agati into longer lists of

bad judicial behavior.[47] Lanna legal literature expands the list to five and tells a rather charming judgment tale "the Rishi and the Tiger" in which different animals give practical examples of each of the possible wrong judgments.[48] Siamese and Khmer dhammathats elaborate the theme into "the Words of Indra," a beautiful and moving sermon. The cure for bribery, anger and fear of high rank is "to judge in conformity with dhammathat and rajathat." The cure for ignorance is to consult the wise men, the monks and the former judges who know the law and traditions, and to study dhammathat, rajathat and niti.[49] Or take, as a prime example of monastic legalism, what the Burmese called "the 4 *padesa*," a check-list for analysis of the price of a thing which Forchhammer describes as in general use in Burmese commerce.[50] This has been adapted from a long discussion in *Samantapasadika* of an ancient but non-canonical verse listing 5 padesa.[51] These tells the Vinaya master how to value the item stolen to see whether the theft has triggered the highest penalty. Buddhaghosa's discussion of the concept of market-value is probably of more interest to economists than lawyers, but the S. E. Asian legal authors loved it. The Lanna authors keep the number 5 (which Samantapasadika almost reduces to 4) but at the cost of clarity and sense.[52] The Burmese authors whittled the padesa down to 4, but then elaborated innumerable sub-divisions of time, place, price and thing.[53] From a couple of pages away in *Samanta pasadika* comes the analysis of "25 kinds of theft" which is introduced as part of the ancient teachings:

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47. *Wageru* [D5] s194; *Maharajathat* [D8] p218 has them as the first four items in a list of 12; *Manugye* [D12] p156 has them in a list of "7 men who should not be judges."
48. Mangraisat s82 and s88 of Aroonrut Wichienkeeo and Gehan Wijeyewardane, eds., 1986, *The Laws of King Mangrai* (Canberra).
49. I am summarizing the khmer version: Leclère, 1898, *Codes Cambodgiens* (Hanoi). I understand that the Thai version in the Three Seals Code is identical.
50. Jardine 1882-3. Note to *Manuwonnana* s107.
51. In Bapat's English translation of the Chinese translation, which I am using, it is on page 234-8. Bhapat and Hirakawa, 1970, *Shan-Chien-P'i-P'o-sha* (Poona).
52. *Mangraisat*: s73 of the 1986 version published in Canberra, s 19 of the 1977 version published in *Journal of the Siam Society*.
53. *Manugye* [D12] p. 13-15. The discussion is interpolated into the tale of Manu's judgment of the *Squirrel v Rat* case.

the doctrine of "18 heads of litigation," the S. E. Asian law texts soon discarded it. They organized their legal material on a different basis, but there is evidence that in later centuries they thought the number of heads of litigation ("branches of law") lay between 29 and 32.

Thus far I have been arguing that Hindu influence on the early dhammathats is less than is usually credited. I now turn to the proposition that Buddhist influence on the early dhammathats is greater than is usually credited. My quarrel is not with Forchhammer, who has made some very perceptive comments on this question,[38] but with Lingat, who has reduced Forchhammer's wisdom to the level of vulgar generalization. Robert Lingat was an expert on the Thai dhammathats who made himself into an expert on the Hindu dharmasastric literature. In some circles he is hailed as one of this century's leading com-parative legal historians,[39] but he had no claim to expertise about the Burmese dhammathats. Consider this:

> No provision in *Wageru* is founded upon a Buddha dictum or claims authority from the Buddhist dharma . . .[40]

Let us charitably assume that the opening and closing portions of the text (which contain the Adoration of the Three Jewels, the Mahasammata story and the authors' wish to promote the interests of religion and achieve favorable rebirths) are not "provisions" in Lingat's sense. Perhaps we can discount s.5 (oath-taking in front of a Buddha image which possesses great supernatural powers), s.65 (monks giving instruction in the Tipitika are treated favorably compared with other educators) and s.156 (monks and Brahmans are immune to a charge of murder): perhaps these are too worldly. But surely s.170 claims its authority from the Buddha-dhamma? It tells the king how to decide which of two lay patrons made a particular religious donation and therefore deserves its merit. Though this in effect concerns a declaratory judgment, since the king as judge cannot physically transfer an amount of merit from one party to the other, there is every sign that this was a real legal provision, in the sense that such disputes did actually come under the king's jurisdiction. Sub-section 1 gives off the whiff of authenticity:

> If both parties founded the endowment at the same time, and if they be the king and his ministers, the king's claim shall get the preference, as he is the lord in the land.

Most fatal to Lingat's over generalization are those sections of *Wageru* taken straight from the Pali canon: "the 5 special duties owed between spouses,"[41] "the 7 kinds of wives,"[42] and the 4 *agatis* or wrong ways of judgment[43] are all "founded upon Buddhist dicta." A great deal more of such Buddhist material appears in other early dhammathats, for example "the 4 kinds of marriage" (depending on whether husband or wife is closer to an angel or beast).[44] the rule that whoever looks after you in your final illness can succeed to your goods[45] and "the 10 kinds of family protection which a young woman may have."[46]

How did this legal material get into the Buddhist canon? Some of it, though it may be presented in the Dhammapada as verses spoken by the Buddha, or in the Jataka as a sermon preached by the Buddha in an earlier incarnation, is presumably not specifically Buddha-dhamma so much as general Indian wisdom current at the time. But a large body of legal material—that which occurs in the Vinaya and the Vinaya commentaries—is uniquely Buddhist, in that it reflects the idle speculations of the early sangha. The boredom and tension of army life combine to produce "the barrack-room lawyer," the regular soldier who develops an expertise in legal tricks and dodges. The sangha, another all-male institution under rigid discipline, apparently produced the same breed of logic choppers and artful dodgers. They

38. His most helpful remarks are not in the "Prize Essay" but hidden away in *Jardine's Notes on Buddhist Law* (1882-3)(Rangoon): In his note to s145 of *Manuwonnana* he says "The *Samanta Pasadika* and Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimaggo* form the chief source of the purely Buddhistic portion of the Burmese dhammathats."

39. Jackson 1975, "From Dharma to Law," *American Journal of Comparative Law*: 490.

40. Lingat 1949, "The Buddhist Manu or the Propagation of Hindu Law in Hinayanist Indochina," *Annals of Bhandaka Oriental Research Institute* 30: 290.

41. s.33 Wageru; cf *Uggaha sutta*: A III 36.

42. s.38-40 Wageru; cf *Sujata Jataka*: A IV 91; J II 347.

43. s.194 Wageru, cf J I 260; V I 339; J II 1.

44. Found in *Manussika* [D2] and in the Burmese, Mon and Arakanese *Dhammavilasa* [D4, M3, P35] at D2:215. cf A II 57-9

45. Found applied to the laity in *Manussika* [D2], *Pyumin* [D3], *Dhammavilasa* [D4] etc. As a rule applying to monks and novices, it is in Mahavagga VIII.27.

46. This list, found in V III 139, must be the inspiration behind *Pyumin*'s [D3] list of 12 and *Manussika*'s [D2] list of 14 such protectors in D2:28.

homeland of a mythic hero retain intellectual property rights in foreign spin-offs? The Islamic cultures of S.E. Asia tell epics about Alexander the Great. The Tantric cultures of Tibet have "Caesar of Rome" as hero of their national epic. Children all over the world right now are buying merchandise associated with Aladdin. I prefer to think of these as examples of local tale-telling (from Sumatra, Kham and Hollywood respectively) on borrowed themes. By analogy, the Manu of the dhammathats is a Burmese Buddhist story on a borrowed Indian theme.

As to the internal organization of the dhammathats and the influence of *Manusmrti*'s 18 heads of *vyavahara* litigation, Shwe Baw has made a detailed examination of the topic.[36] He finds that only two of the Burmese dhammathats make any serious attempt to use the 18 heads as an organizing principle. *Dhammavilasa* [D4] uses the heads as chapter headings: its order of topics is quite close to *Manusmrti*, but it uses only 15 heads. *Wageru* [D5] uses 17 heads as chapter headings, but they differ quite substantially from the Indian list. About half of the earlier dhammathats mention the 18 heads, and some of them even enumerate them, but these works are organized on a different principle which I call the "list of lists." In the middle and later period dhammathats it is the "list of lists" which governs what little organization they exhibit. This approach derives from, and can be illustrated by, the Pali canon:

> Thus the Buddha spoke: "Young man, inasmuch as the holy disciple has forsaken the 4 polluting actions, inasmuch as he is uninfluenced by 4 evil states to commit sin, inasmuch as he eschews the 6 means of dissipating wealth, therefore freed from 14 evils and guarding the 6 quarters, he walks victorious over both worlds." [D III 190]

As Pope puts it: "I lisped in numbers, for the numbers came." Reading on, we would find that each of the "6 means of dissipating wealth" has its own list of 6 attendant evils and each of the "4 young men who seem to be friends" invoked on the next page turn out to be false friends in 4 separate ways. This 6 x 6 and 4 x 4 structure has an obvious mnemonic purpose. An even older example of the "list of lists" approach can be found in the *Patimokkha*, the bi-monthly public

36. Shwe Baw, 1955, "The Origin and Development of Burmese Legal Literature," diss., School of Oriental and African Studies (thesis #41 held at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Library).

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recital of the 227 rules of monastic discipline. At the end of the recital the monk states:

> Venerable sirs, I have recited the introduction, 4 cases of defeat, 13 cases entailing a meeting of the sangha, 2 indeterminate cases, 30 cases entailing expulsion, 92 cases entailing expiation, 4 cases that must be confessed, 75 rules of conduct, 7 ways of settling litigation.

Here the number 227 is what computer programmers would call a "checksum": if a novice has remembered the list of lists correctly, the totals of the constituent lists (as ticked off on rosary beads during the recitation, perhaps) will total 227. The Burmese and Mon dhammathats borrow this approach, but usually place the list of lists at the start of the text where it functions as a list of contents. *Mon Original* [M4] contrasts the Indian with the Burmese mode of organization in terms of roots (*mula*) and branches, a metaphor that is itself borrowed from the Vinaya:

> There are 18 origins or roots of law, 32 branches of law and 39 digests of law. There are 3 kinds of bribery, 4 agati, 3 kinds of giving, 4 kinds of wives, 7 kinds of slaves, 7 kinds of minor cases, 4 kinds of questioning cases, 1 kind of fair case. [M4, s.6, 88]

Again, the number 32 is a checksum for the list that follows, though something has gone wrong with the copyist's (or my) arithmetic.[37] By the 18th century, Burmese authors had created all kinds of numerological variants on this approach. *Manuyin* [D17] talks of "18 roots, 30 major branches and 174 minor branches," which allows for yet more lists to be added to the traditional core. Note the sophisticated "checksum of checksums" concealed within this statement: 18 + 30 + 174 = 222, an easily memorable number. The Siamese and Khmer law texts talk of ten root matters (or books of law copied from the wall at the end of the universe) which contain "the 29 heads of dispute which antiquity has handed down in the Holy dhammathat." The number 18 and its place value cognates 108, 180, 1080 etc. are auspicious in India. There are 18 puranas, 18 chapters of the *Mahabharata* and the *Bhagavad gita* and 18 traditional areas of knowledge. In S. E. Asia 18 has no such intrinsic significance. Having initially borrowed

37. In the above example, which totals 33, I presume we are meant to leave out the "one kind of fair case."

public debate in order to build a consensus of the faithful behind the written law. It was at this stage, and through this assertion of cultural independence, this popular enthusiasm for written law, that Islam became a "legalistic religion." The inhabitants of Burma, who bought the whole Indian take-away from soup to nuts, from script to religion, missed this legitimizing stage. Despite these differences, the "notebook model" explains a great deal about the development of written law in S. E. Asia. It explains the plurality of the dhammathat genre—the puzzling fact that no single dhammathat text claims to be the oldest or the most authoritative. And it explains the wide diffusion of Indian material: segments of text have been moved around through transmission of notebook material and by passing into oral wisdom as legal maxims and proverbs. Hence a paragraph originating in the *Manusmrti* or the *Samantapasadika* can find its way into the law text of a community that was unfamiliar with either book.

The earliest written law texts would have been individual notebooks compiled by bureaucrats who wanted to sound impressive when judging, by monks who needed notes on the legal status of donated property in case the king should try to confiscate it and by local regional patrons who would have to lend money's worth to their clients and settle any local disputes over debts and manpower. The source of the Sanskrit verses they translated into Pali or the vernacular may have been the *Manusmrti* itself, as brought from India by Pasupata ascetics.[31] but was more likely to have been the *Subhasita* anthologies of epigrams, aphorisms and maxims. These Sanskrit anthologies, usually attributed to Canakya or Brhaspati, contain large quantities of material from *Manusmrti*, Kautilya's *Arthasastra* and other legal texts. Most, though not all, of the Sanskrit sources of the dhammathats can be found in one or another of these anthologies. If such Sanskrit anthologies were translated into Pali and if quotations from the Pali scriptures were added to the mix, we would get something very like a 9th century Burmese notebook. But we would also get something very like the existing Burmese *niti* literature, the three surviving Pali collections which are unknown in India but have influenced the

31. The Pasupatas were an antinomian sect of Brahmans who deliberately courted pollution by travelling abroad to dwell among the barbarians. Their involvement in the notebook period is demonstrated by the inclusion of the *kapilakavrata* rites of penance (which was their social charter) in three of the early dhammathats: *Pyumin* [D3], *Kyetyo* [D35] and *Mon Dhammavilasa* [M3].

rest of Buddhist S. E. Asia.[32] I would not go quite so far as to claim that the Burmese *niti* are examples of the notebook stage of dhammathat development. A more reasonable claim is that the notebooks of the 9th and 10th centuries were the ancestors of both niti and dhammathat texts. They used a common core of material to different ends.[33] The dhammathats are aimed at an adult readership with practical problems to solve, while the niti are aimed at the schoolboy in need of short pieces of Pali verse to construe and an education in civics. Estimates of when Burma produced the Pali niti vary from the 5th to the 15th century.[34] My guess is that the notebooks crystallized into fixed texts of niti and dhammathat in the 13th and 14th centuries.

I have made the quantitative estimate that Hindu influence on the early dhammathats amounts to 4% of the whole. I must now meet the qualitative argument used by the *fin de siècle* scholars. Even if Sanskrit learning only influenced a small amount of the text, they said, it was significant because it touched on matters of legitimacy and internal organization. The dhammathats were legitimized by appealing to the name of Manu (resonant in Hindu mythology but unknown to canonical Buddhism) and were internally organized in terms of the eastric 18 heads of law. This is a case worth answering, even if some of the 19th century diffusionists pushed the argument beyond parody:

> Turning from the Ganges to the Nile, it will be found that the description given by Diodorus of the Egyptian Maues answers exactly to the account given in Burmese mythology of the ascetic Manu . . .[35]

I have summarized the Burmese version of the Manu story in section one above. The Burmese have taken a Hindu hero and grafted him into a Buddhist myth. Is the result Hindu or Buddhist? Does the original

32. Gray, 1886, *Ancient Proverbs or Maxims from Burmese Sources, or The Niti Literature of Burma* (London) translates these three old works and adds an 18th century collection.

33. *Dhammaniti*, for example, quotes a verse from *Manusmrti* on the king getting one sixth of his subjects' merit and a verse from the Vinaya listing the four kinds of slave. [Dhammaniti s281 = Manu VIII.304; Dhammaniti s177 = V IV 224] Both these texts, as we have seen, are also found in the dhammathats.

34. Sternbach, 1963, "The Pali Lokaniti and the Burmese Niti Kyan and their Sources," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 26: 329.

35. Browne, 1878, *Introduction to Manuwonnana dhammathat* (Rangoon) 1.

must have been the same: local leaders of the various rice plains chose various bits of Indian culture to adapt to their own purposes. These leaders were in competition with each other, and also had to defend their rice plain against raids from hungry non-rice growers. The defensive walls which surround the center of each of the early irrigation systems tell us that this competition was anything but peaceful. At first, local leaders were attracted to one of the Indian religions, which offer new techniques for legitimizing secular power. Then, because Indian religions are based on written texts, they chose one of the Indian alphabets, and were exposed to as much Indian classical literature as they could acquire. Finally, after several centuries had elapsed, the oral "law of the rice plain" was written down, and law began to be seen as a semi-autonomous field, a written discipline which requires its own experts and practitioners. This is "Indianization" in the narrow legal sense or, if you prefer, the second Burmese legal revolution. Why did it not take place until several centuries after the introduction of Indian script and religion? Because a variant of Occam's Razor operates in legal history: actual legal systems never get more complicated than they need to be. During the 5th century A. D. patrimonial dispute settlement by the local chief was enough to get the job done. But from the 9th century onwards, land use was becoming more intensive, kingdoms were larger and literacy more widespread: the need for a more elaborate, legalistic dispute settlement was growing.

The first legal revolution requires some kind of Marxist analysis: how do changes in agricultural production bring about changes in the legal organization of society? It is a pre-state phenomenon, which must occur at the village level: even today there are large swathes of Burma given over to slash and burn cultivation where the first legal revolution has not taken place. The second legal revolution is usually analyzed in terms of state formation and cultural diffusion: does written law increase the power of kings? Did the rice growing village pay any attention to the royal law? How did Indian religion and script spread across the Bay of Bengal? I have discussed these questions elsewhere. Let us take a different angle of approach and consider the second legal revolution not as the process by which Burmese kingdoms were formed or Indian ideas diffused, but as the process by which Burmese law was reduced to writing. Calder has just published an analysis of the early history of Islamic law describing the development of the classic Islamic legal texts.[30] Up to about 816 A. D., he says, legal discussion was purely oral. For the next fifty years the private notebook (the commonplace book or scrapbook whose contents have been accumulated over the owner's lifetime) played a crucial intermediary role. In a milieu where "a man writes down the best that he hears and memorizes the best that he writes down" it is the paragraph or segment—the single entry into a private notebook—rather than the whole text which migrates. An entry which has appealed to notebook makers in Cordoba, Qayrawan, Cairo, Baghdad and Bukhara stands more chance of survival than one that is only known to the legal enthusiasts of Cordoba. Segments of text were moved from city to city by traveling traders: it was the caravans which gave Islamic law its unity. Without these travelers the notebooks of each city would have become increasingly divergent. Even with them, local city traditions eventually solidified into the four schools of Sunni Islamic law. From about 860 A. D. some of the city archives of notebooks were edited down into through-composed full length texts—the first books of Islamic law. The transition to written law was complete when the text of these books became fixed and a consensus on legal methodology had been achieved. Thereafter legal composition took the form of commentary writing on the early books.

How much of Calder's analysis might apply to Buddhist S. E. Asia? For the period between 700 and 1300 A. D. we can, I think, treat the cities between Nakhon Si Thammarat in the Malay peninsula and Mrohaung on the borders of Bangladesh as forming a culture area comparable with the Arab Empire. There was no Caliph in S. E. Asia to impose political unity, but manuscripts could be carried from city to city by Buddhist monks, maritime traders and wandering Brahman ascetics. There are, however, significant differences. The Islamic transition was done extremely quickly, achieving a written canon in Arabic within a century whereas the S. E. Asian transition took four or five centuries before any legal texts were produced, and never reached a closure of the early legal canon: Burma kept on producing new dhammathats until late in the 19th century. The Arabs developed their own script and successfully fought off coca colaization by the older Mediterranean cultures. Reducing their oral custom to writing was part of the wholesale reinvention of "Arab oral culture" as "Islamic written culture." The 9th century Arabs needed to do this through

30. Calder, 1993, *Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence* (Oxford).

caste, pollution, ritual and penance that are meaningless in a society unconcerned with caste and uninterested in pollution. Where S. E. Asian Buddhists have borrowed from the remaining 10% of the text, they more often than not adapt the material to their own ends. Looking at the early Burmese dhammathats, I find only four cases where the dhammathats reproduce provisions of Sanskrit law unaltered. They are the substituted sister[20] and the dead bride-groom,[21] the rule that a king who protects his subjects receives a 6th part of all their merit[22] and the advice on how different *varnas* should take the oath in court.[23] There are five more examples where a Sanskrit legal list inspires a Burmese adaptation of it: the six evil practices of women,[24] the eight forms of marriage,[25] the six types of son who can inherit and the six who cannot,[26] the man with a wife from each *varna*[27] and the periods a deserted wife must wait for her husband.[28] Since the average

20. Manu VIII.204. Found in *Pyumin* [D3], *Dhammavilasa* [D4], *Wageru* [D5] and thrice in *Manussika* [D2].
21. Manu IX.69. Found in *Manosara* [D1], *Manussika* [D2], *Pyumin* [D3], *Wageru* [D5], *Long Mon Sangermano* [M1] and *Short Mon Sangermano* [M2].
22. Manu VIII.304. Found at D2:10 in *Manussika* [D2] and in *Mon Duttabaung* [M6]. However, Glucklich suggests that Buddhist notions on karma had a strong influence on the writers of the *Manusmrti*. Possibly, then, there is a Buddhist source for this rule which fed both *Manusmrti* and *Manussika*? See Glucklich, 1982, "Karma and Social Justice in the criminal code of Manu," *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 16: 59.
23. Kautilya's Arthasastra 3.11.34-7. A less detailed version is in Manu VIII.88. Found in *Long Mon Sangermano* s21, and garbled in *Short Mon Sangermano* s3.
24. Manu IX.13. Found as a slightly different list of six in three Mon dhammathats: *Wageru* [D5], *Long Mon Sangermano* [M1] and *Mon Dhammavilasa* [M3]. The Burmese *Manosara* [D1] has a list of five.
25. Manu III 20-42. A list of eight is in *Dhammavilasa* [D4]. Both give eight technical names for each form of marriage, but even allowing for the translation from Sanskrit to Pali, only two of these are similar.
26. Manu IX.158-168; *Vishnu Samhita* ch. XV. *Wageru* [D5] and *Manosara* [D1] share a version of the 12 sons. A different list is shared by *Pyumin* [D3] and *Kyannet* [D36]. *Mon Dhammavilasa* [M3] expands the list into 16 types of son. So does *Dhammavilasa* [D4], adding that "the list comes from the Pitakat," i. e. the Pali Canon!
27. Manu X.150-155 offers two schemes of division. Either the Brahman wife's son gets a special portion and the inheritance divides 3:2:1½:1 or the special portion is omitted and the inheritance divided 4:3:2:1. None of the early dhammathats mimic the first form of division. They all start from the 4:3:2:1 division, though there is considerable variation. I give fuller details of the Mon and Burmese texts in Huxley 1993, 20-21.

early dhammathat contains about 200 such rules and lists, I can offer a very rough quantitative estimate of Sanskrit influence at between 4% and 5% of the whole. This is hardly the "stricter adherence to the original text" postulated by the "photocopier model."

I propose an alternative picture of the move to written law which I call, borrowing from a recent study of early Islamic law, the "notebook model." But, before I expound this, some deep background is required. Before the arrival of Indian scripts in Burma there were already two kinds of village society using two kinds of oral law. Most of the population supported themselves by slash and burn agriculture, their legal needs fulfilled by the kind of custom that Savigny and Maine describe in the villages of mediaeval northern Europe. But by the 3rd century B. C., in favored places where the mountains met the dry plains, some villages had turned to irrigated rice agriculture. In legal terms this step is highly significant: it is as important as the difference between city and village in mediaeval northern Europe. Irrigation societies need more law than hunter-gatherer and slash-and-burn societies. A new range of social problems, such as organization of labor for large scale construction, differential access to irrigated land and agricultural credit (loans of seed-rice) has to be solved. Kinship relations become less important, while relations with neighbors are enhanced. I think of this first Burmese legal revolution as the change from oral custom to "oral law of the rice plains." We know of at least two cultures that underwent this shift: the Pyu of Burma's central dry zone and the Mon of Burma's southern coast. Recent archaeology has revealed that, among the Pyu at least, the first legal revolution (and the first permanent settlements large enough to deserve the description of "cities") occurred two centuries or more before they had any substantial exposure to Indian religion and Indian techniques of literacy.[29] The earliest evidence of Buddhism among the Pyu comes from the early 4th century. The earliest evidence of the adaptation of Indian scripts comes from the 5th century. "Indianization" in the wider sense lasted from then until the 10th century. The details of "Indianization" differed as between different irrigation cultures, but the general process

28. Manu IX.76 has 8 years if husband absent on a sacred duty, 6 years if in pursuit of knowledge, 3 years if in pursuit of pleasure. D1-D5 all mimic the text, but give different periods and different reasons for the husband's absence.
29. Stargardt, 1990, *The Ancient Pyu of Burma* (Cambridge); Higham, 1989, *The Archaeology of Mainland S. E. Asia* (Cambridge).

inconvenience and uncertainty that such interpolations cause. As Derrett puts it in the context of India:

> In erpolation could be another word for a general process, akin to fermentation, signifying that a sastra was alive.[15]

Interpolation demonstrates that the dhammathats are being preserved as legal documents for the present, not historical documents about the past.

Based on internal evidence combined with the accounts of Burmese literary histories, I treat the following as early dhammathats.[16] We have one dhammathat, *Dhammavilasa* [D4], which epigraphy confirms as being written in 12th century Pagan.[17] We have a group of works which claim to have been written before the rise of Pagan in the 11th century, such as *Manussika* [D2], *Pyumin* [D3], *Kyannet* [D36], *Manosara* [D1], *Mon Original* [M4] and *Mon Duttabaung* [M6].[18] Some elements of these works may indeed by older than the 11th century, particularly the titles and exordiums. But in the form in which they survive, they have been subjected not only to 700 years of post-Pagan "fermentation," but to the homogenizing filter of Pagan itself. Such was the prestige of 13th century Pagan with its 2,000 stupas, temples and monasteries that it sucked in all Pali scholarship from the region, refashioned it in its own image, and spat it out again. We learn of five Tai kings producing or using law texts between 1275 and 1317, the years of the Mongol invasion and the fall of Pagan. Three of them ruled over mixed populations in areas where Pagan's writ had

15. Derrett 1973.
16. For details of this procedure, see Huxley, 1993, "Thai, Mon and Burmese Dhammathats—Who influenced whom?" 5th International Conference on Thai Studies, London 1993. It will appear in *New Light on Old Thai Law Texts*, Kiscadale Asia Research Series, ed. Huxley.
17. In fact we have several *Dhammavilasa* manuscripts in Burmese, the differences between which bear mute witness to "fermentation." Furthermore, two radically different versions of *Dhammavilasa* have survived in the Mon and Arakanese languages: *Mon Dhammavilasa* [M3] and *Kyetyo* [D35]. If anyone ever has the ambition to produce critical editions of the Burmese law texts, they could start with this group of manuscripts, all of which provide variations on the same 12th century original.
18. Numbers with an M prefix refer to the Mon dhammathats published in Nai Pan Hla, 1992, "Eleven Mon Dhammathat Texts," *Bibliotheca Codicum Asiaticorum* Vol. 6. I have given details of the numbering scheme in Huxley 1993.

once run, while the other two ruled mixed populations in what is now Thailand. To the extent that our surviving *Wageru* [D5] manuscript is unaltered by "fermentation," it is one of this group: along with *The Laws of King Mangrai* it represents the spread of Buddhist law texts from Pagan to the new 14th century milieu of Thai Buddhist monarchs. In their present form these ten or so early dhammathats are written in Pali, Mon, Burmese and Arakanese. The conventional assumption that in the early 14th century they would all have been written in Pali is questionable: if King Klaewa wrote laws for his subjects in Burmese, why should the dhammathat authors not do the same?

Allowing for subsequent "fermentation," these ten early dhammathats had reached their present state by the end of the 13th century. We can think of them as standing at the beginning of five centuries of post-classical dhammathat development, or we can think of them as standing at the end of a five century long shift from oral to written law. Let us take the latter perspective for a moment. Getting a clear judgment on the relative importance of Buddhist and Hindu inputs on Burmese written law entails getting a clear picture of how the shift from oral to written law took place. Consider this brief account from the latest western history of S. E. Asia:

> The Indian law books, especially the Code of Manu (Manava-Dharmasastra), were greatly honored in Burma, Siam, Cambodia and Java-Bali as the defining documents of the natural order, which kings were obliged to uphold. They were copied, translated and incorporated into local law codes, with stricter adherence to the original text in Burma and Siam and a stronger tendency to adapt to local needs in Java . . .[19]

This implies the "photocopier model" of acquiring written law: the credulous Burmese yokel is impressed by the Indian trader's copy of *Manusmrti*; pausing only to learn the alphabet, he pops the text in a convenient photocopier, pencils in a few alterations to reflect local custom, and triumphantly proclaims the resulting document as the law of Burma. Shifting a whole society from oral to written law does not work that way. At the very fastest the process lasts a century; normally it will take several centuries. The "photocopier model" grossly overestimates the degree to which Burma and Siam have borrowed from the *Manusmrti*. 90% of this Sanskrit text concerns matters of

19. Reid, 1988, *The Land below the Winds* (London) 137.

be wrong, but the interaction of Buddhism and Law at the most general level is such a new field that we do not yet know what kind of maps will prove appropriate. My thanks to the Numata Foundation, to the University of Chicago and to this Journal for sponsoring our expedition into *terra incognita*.

The Origins of the Burmese Buddhist Law Texts

Fin de siècle scholarship[7] judged that S. E. Asian Buddhist law had a veneer of Buddhism tacked onto a solid core of Sanskrit sastric material. General reference works still reflect this original judgment with their descriptions of "the Buddhist-Hindu branch of the Hindu legal system,"[8] or "a law of Hindu origin modified in the direction of Buddhism"[9] or "the Burmese dhammathat, based on the Laws of Manu."[10] One of my Departmental colleagues (now retired) forecloses any discussion of Buddhism and Law "since Burma and Sri Lanka between them provide no literary evidence of a distinct Buddhist jurisprudence."[11] In this section I reevaluate these sweeping judgments in the light of a century's further research on Burma.[12]

We are interested in essential influence, which a recent conference[13] called "The Reception of Legal Systems," rather than in cosmetic

7. Forchhammer, 1885, "The Jardine Prize: An Essay" (Rangoon); Leclère, 1898, "Recherches sur les Origines Brahmaniques des Los Cambodgiennes," *1889-9 Nouvelle Revue Historique de Droit français et étranger* 1 (N. p.); Masao, 1905, "Researches in the indigenous laws of Siam as a study of Comparative Jurisprudence," *Journal of the Siam Society* 2: 14, and *Yale Law Journal* 15: 28.

8. Wigmore, 1928, *A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems* (Washington) 224.

9. Weber, 1954, *Law in Economy and Society*, ed. Rheinstein (London) 236.

10. Hall, 1981, *A History of S. E. Asia* (London) 292.

11. Derrett, 1973, "Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature," *A History of Indian Literature*, ed. Gonda (Wiesbaden).

12. Since Forchhammer wrote on Burma, the following basic research has been published: U Gaung's Digest of Burmese dhammathats, Than Tun's full collection of rajathats, Nai Pan Hla's eleven Mon-dhammathats and (most importantly for the study of Burmese origins) the complete Pagan inscriptions.

13. Colloque International sur la reception des systemes juridiques, Moncton, N. B, September 1992. In the next two pages I am summarizing arguments which I made in wearisome detail in my presentation to that conference: Huxley, 1994a, "The Reception of Buddhist Law in S. E. Asia," *La Réception des systèmes Juridique: implantation et destin*, eds. Doucet and Vanderlinden (Bruxelles) 139-237.

influence. Intellectual and palace circles in 18th century Burma welcomed the cosmetic salesmen of India. Sixty assorted Sanskrit works on grammar, astrology, erotics and palmistry were translated in mid-century and known collectively as the *Byakarein*: some of this material (a list of 21 types of virgin, for example) entered the later dhammathats. And in the 1790s eight Indian dharmasastras including the *Manusmrti* were brought into the royal library from Ceylon, Calcutta and Benares. They encouraged King Badon to make certain comparative conclusions, but did not influence the Burmese dhammathats. At the same time, for reasons I shall discuss in the next section, 18th century dhammathat authors competed to insert yet more obscure Buddhist knowledge into their dhammathats. The hilarious lists of "40 kinds of female flirtings" were borrowed from the Jatakas and Dhammapada in the 1740s and inserted in a dhammathat text for the first time (D2:8 [D18]). All this 18th century activity is unessential—the equivalent of the contemporary European fascination with *Chinoiserie*—but to avoid its contaminating influence I must concentrate on the earliest surviving texts. There is, alas, only one well-dated early Burmese law text: King Klaewa's edict on theft, promulgated on 6th May, 1249, is preserved in several different inscriptions and is therefore about as genuine as anything can be in this imperfect world. By offering incontrovertible proof that the Kings of Pagan drew on canonical Buddhist sources when drafting their laws, it destroys Forchhammer's theory that Buddhist influence did not manifest itself until the 17th century.[14] But it also casts doubt on modern accounts of Burma's literary history: if the edict can be labeled as a work of literature (as its contents, length and argument demand), then it predates other Burmese language documents by three centuries and suggests that literacy in the Burmese language led to literature in the Burmese language much earlier than is presently thought. This is a helpful possibility to bear in mind as I turn from legal epigraphy to legal manuscripts. The problems of dating surviving dhammathat texts will never be fully solved. Each copyist introduces interpolations, and the point at which we decide an old text has become a new text cannot be scientifically determined. We must try to forgive the

14. The whole inscription, with its discussion of kamma, punishment and their inter-relationship, is Buddhist through and through. For a specific borrowing from the Pali canon, note the "12 royal punishments" from any one of these three sources: A II 1; M III 17; Mil IV.4.15.

> the spiritual than the temporal heritage . . . Every one who is firmly established in the Buddha's teachings is entitled to become his heir and to inherit his two heritages, first the temporal by being born always a ruler in any of the three worlds, and secondly the spiritual, by the attainment of nirvana. . . . The subject of the two kinds of heritage is treated of in the *Dhammadayada sutta* of the *Sutta Pitaka*. (D1:5 [D18])[5]

Following the Buddha's temporal heritage, as elucidated in dhammathat and rajathat, is a meritorious way of life which will lead to a favorable rebirth. Following the Buddha's spiritual heritage, as elucidated in the vinaya, is for celibates only but it leads towards the greater reward. Khemacara was not always successful in his search for canonical authority:

> The 16 classes of son are seldom mentioned in the Tipitika, but it is as boundless as the ocean, and search should be made in the old writings for what is mentioned in the dhammathat. (D1:19 [D18])

And in at least one case he finds a contradiction between dhammathat and scripture:

> That wills are invalid is the rule of the dhammathats. But, according to religious teaching, children should follow the dying injunctions of their parents. (D1:71 [D18])

I suggest in later pages that Khemacara's innovations were a response to increased Burmese sophistication in bibliography and literary history. By the 18th century it was apparent from the silence of Buddhaghosa, of the *Mahavamsa* and of the texts sponsored by Parakramabahu I that Sri Lanka had never had an equivalent of the dhammathat literature. That Burma should be in possession of a key Buddhist text which was unknown to the Mahavihara required some quick thinking. Since the dhammathat cannot share in the unbroken

5. References in this form are to U Gaung, 1902, *Digest of the Burmese Law being a Collection of Texts from Thirty Six Dhammathats* (Rangoon). D1:5 indicates s.5 of the first volume; [D18] indicates the quotation in that section from the dhammathat numbered 18 in the list at pages 5 to 13. D18 is Shin Khemacara's *Vinicchayarasi*. I must apologies to readers who are upset by the lack of diacritics in my transliteration of Burmese Pali. Since they are not used when transliterating the Burmese language, I have come to regard them as visual distractions.

lineage from Upali via the Mahavihara to Burma which authenticates the vinaya; Khemacara tries to ground it in the canon as a whole.

Several books have been written about Shakespeare's attitude to law, but it does not follow that Shakespeare was a legalistic author. Likewise the fact that the Burmese found legalism in the Pali Canon does not prove that Pali Buddhism is a legalistic religion. I believe that the Pali Canon contains seeds which can, under appropriate conditions, sprout into legalistic state or royal law. But only once, in Burma between the 6th and the 13th centuries, has the Pali canon been planted in appropriate conditions at the right time. To explain all the negative cases, all the instances where the seeds of Buddhist legalism fell on stony ground, would require more than one lifetime. But the outline of a shadow of a hint of a sketch of such an explanation might look like this: In India during the 5th and 4th centuries B. C. the seeds of Buddhist legalism sprouted and grew tall among Buddhist kings and traders and in big cities. The Hindu authors of *Manusmrti* and *Arthasastra* in the 1st century A. D. redefined this early Indian law in terms of Brahmanic orthodoxy, since when the Buddhist contribution to Indian law has been obscured. In Sri Lanka caste won its competition with law to fill the niche of dispute settlement and social organization. In Thai and Khmer traditions (which paid lip service to Brahmins without having many proper Brahmins) law came under the king's control from the start. In China a highly sophisticated set of ideas for and against law were in circulation long before the arrival of Buddhism. Buddhism could affect Chinese law on the margins, but could not shape the direction of Chinese debate. But why is Tibetan law not more Buddhist than it is? Why does it not borrow more from the vinaya or from the Sutta pitaka's quasi-legal lists? Publication and analysis of the Tibetan law texts lags thirty or forty years behind S. E. Asia[6] and until the basic work has been done it is unwise to speculate. But here is a very tentative suggestion. If the legal texts found at Tun Huang represent the earliest period of Tibetan legal writing, then perhaps they were written by scribes who were not particularly Buddhist in orientation. Perhaps Tibet took its law from the north, from the jumble of cultures trading along the Silk Route, and its religion from the south, from the Buddhist monasteries of Kashmir. These broad speculations of mine will probably turn out to

6. Before Professor French started publishing, I would have said "lags two or three centuries behind."

s30 Premier, Judge, Assistant Minister and City Officer enter the stage from left and march across it with all solemnity.

s31 Before the intermission begins, the ministers discuss with all seriousness *dhammathat*—customary law, *rajathat*—King's decisions, and *pyatton*—Law Court Decisions.

s32 Music of Exit and Drums of appearance are played and as soon as the music is over, the king appears on the throne. (ROB 1-3-1822)[4]

Once ascetics, ministers, the legal texts and the King himself have made their appearance, the intermission begins, followed soon afterwards by the first play of the night. The point I emphasize is that in the conventions of the puppet play the serious discussion of written law is used as a synecdoche for government in general. The puppets, as well as the intellectual elite, are legalistic.

Was Burmese legalism inspired by Buddhism? Burmese intellectuals could not have conceived any alternative. The Pali Canon, along with such quasi-canonical works as the Sri Lankan chronicles, Buddhaghosa's commentaries and the *Questions of King Milinda*, offered all the science, history, epistemology and sociology that Burma had. It would have been as difficult for Burma to think of law in non-Buddhist terms as for Aquinas or Kant to think of philosophy in non-Greek terms. The early kings of Pagan took a legal decision which intensified this Buddhist influence. The Tai kings who founded the cities of Vientiane and Chiang Mai promulgated short legal codes to attract population to their new cities in an early example of what we now call "Law and Development." As a result, Laotian and Lanna law is conceived as starting with Fa Ngum and Mangrai, these city-founding kings. Legal historians, analyzing these codes from outside, may find that they draw extensively on sources older than the kings who wrote them. But from inside the cultures, the codes are perceived as *new law* for a new kingdom. The early kings of Pagan took the opposite approach. Their recognition of dhammathat as the prime source of Pagan law amounted to a promulgation of *old law* for a new kingdom. The dhammathats, though they are written by named authors, are conceived as editions of the age-old law text which is written on the walls at the boundary of the universe. Many

4. Than Tun warns that this rajathat may have been written later in the century than the date it bears. Citations in the form "ROB date" are to Than Tun, 1984-90, *The Royal Orders of Burma, A. D. 1598-1885*, Vols. 1-10 (Tokyo).

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of the dhammathats are introduced by the tale of Mahasammata and his clever judge Manu whose fallibility leads him to become a recluse, to travel to the boundary of the universe, and to bring back to the king the text of the dhammathat. A rich stew of influences has cooked up this story. The canonical account of Mahasammata in *Agganna sutta* [D III 80-98] is the most obvious ingredient: we can also taste hints of the *Arthasastra*, of early Burmese (and probably pre-Buddhist) hermits and shamen, and of the king's role as epistemological validator (what the king does not know is not worth knowing). Presenting the dhammathats as new editions of old texts enabled a ready made hermeneutic to be applied to them. Vinaya dharas had spent well over a millennium developing techniques to understand the vinaya pitaka as an old text. These techniques could be immediately applied to the elucidation of the dhammathats. The passage from oral to written law usually poses massive problems as a culture struggles to evolve techniques for interpreting the new-fangled law texts. Just such problems had to be faced in Chiang Mai and Vientiane. But in Pagan, the vinaya dharas had already developed techniques for written law which could easily be applied to the "old law" of the dhammathats. Writers of new dhammathat editions and sub-commentaries on the vinaya shared the same tools. By the 17th century we can identify authors who worked in both genres. Here is another sense in which law for the laity in Burma is more Buddhist than in Siam, Laos or Cambodia.

In the early 18th century a fascinating work appeared which pioneered an alternative treatment of the relationship between the dhammathats and Buddhism. Shin Khemacara in his monumental *Vinicchayarasi* dhammathat attempted to demonstrate that every rule in the dhammathats could be traced to a source in the Pali canon. His theological justification was as follows:

> The law of inheritance is also mentioned in the sacred books; hence inferences may be drawn as to what the law would be according to the sacred writings by comparison with the dhammathats and vice versa. The Buddha . . . has two kinds of heritage to bestow on his children, the temporal and the spiritual. Such temporal happiness as is enjoyed by the rulers of the brahma, deva or mundane worlds . . . are obtained by them only through observance of the rules he has laid down; hence indirectly the temporal welfare of every inhabitant of the three worlds is a heritage bestowed on him by the Buddha. The spiritual heritage is the spiritual bliss, secured by the attainment of arhatship and nirvana. The Buddha spoke more in praise of

legalism, but also pushed the process further than its S. E. Asian neighbors. By the early 19th century, just before the start of colonial encroachment, Burma was more legalistic than its Buddhist neighbors. Since this claim is certain to annoy Thai and Khmer scholars, I must carefully define what I mean by it.

Contemporary legal philosophers get very excited about the adjective "autonomous": a society is more legalistic (is nearer to the ideal of a *rechtsstaat*) the more its legal system can be described as autonomous. "Autonomy" in this usage combines two different arguments. On the one hand autonomous law has prevailed over such competing techniques for organizing society as caste, feudalism, bribery and bureaucracy. On the other hand by ceasing to be one of the contestants in society it has become the prize to be contested. "Autonomous law" is seen as the battleground on which different social groups can contest their different visions of society. The U. S. Supreme Court, for example, has the function of recasting political and ethical disagreements over racism or abortion into law suits that may be disposed of legalistically. Burma did not have the precise equivalent of the Supreme Court, nor did it have a written constitution, but in the third section of this paper I argue that Burmese law became the battleground on which the king, the sangha and the legal profession could contest their respective claims. To mention the Burmese legal profession is to introduce another sense in which Burmese legalism outstripped its Thai, Khmer and Indian neighbors: Burma was the only country in South or South East Asia to develop a legal profession independently of European influence. This is an important measure of legalism, since a society will only invent lawyers when there are enough law jobs to be done. Though this may sound like a truism, it took the genius of Max Weber to point it out. In the pages that follow I am critical of Weber's sociology of Buddhism: his sociology of law, however, remains my constant inspiration. In Burma in the year 1800 "law" was considered essential for any society operating at a level higher than the village. It is "law" which defines the balance of power between the village and the city, "law" which regulates all important economic matters through its rules on debt and access to agricultural land and thus "law" which dictates the patterns of stratification and patron—client politics. The king was the power in the land, but to bring a matter before the king for decision entailed presenting it as a law-suit with the assistance of lay lawyers (the *she-ne*) or monk-lawyers (the *vinaya-dhara*). The pithy

phrases I want to use, such as "legalistic oriental despotism" or "constitutional absolute monarchy" or "dictatorial rechtsstaat," sound paradoxical. But they embody the truth that Burma, which could not imagine any alternative to absolute monarchy, nonetheless went much further than its neighbors in solving "the problem of total power."[3]

The sources I use reflect the views of Burma's intellectual elites. It is now almost impossible to reconstruct the *mentalité* of the pre-colonial villager in the paddy field. There are hints that Burma's popular culture was equally legalistic. Judgment tales (stories of clever villagers who won fame and fortune by their skill in dispute settlement) were the second most popular theme of stories and puppet shows. These puppet shows, the carriers of popular Burmese culture, were closer to Wagner's *Ring-cycle* than to *Punch and Judy*. Each puppet show lasted for three days and was preceded by an overture telling of First Things, of how the world, humanity and civil society were created. A Royal Order survives which stipulates the contents of the overture in some detail. In the hope that it reflects the view from the village as well as that from the king, I summarize it here. "On the premier show the music begins with odes to air, fire and rain before the lady spirit medium makes her appearance." After she has sung some of the 37 Major Choruses (a number associated with the cult of the *nats* or indigenous spirits of the locality), three potted shrubs are brought on stage to represent the hedge that marks the boundaries of the universe. We see tableaux of supernatural beings—the Naga "serpent" and the Garuda "bird," followed by a pair of ogres. Next comes wild life—a frightened monkey looks down from a tree top, an elephant enters stage left, a tiger stage right, and then a horse stands up, trots, and gallops past a palace that has appeared stage right. Enter the first human puppet—he is a wizard seen mixing herbs and roots into a paste. Soon he is dancing faster and faster until he levitates out of view through a "neck hole" above the stage. In his wake he leaves civil society:

> s28 The palace, or throne, is on the right of the stage: when there are two kings in a story, another throne is placed on the left of the stage.
> s29 A hermitage, when necessary, appears near the second palace.

3. I have taken this phrase from Ghokale, 1966, "Early Buddhist Kingship," *Journal of Asian Studies* 26: 20.

texts of the shari'a (al-Shafi'i's *Risala* and al-Shaybani's *Asl*, for instance) are related to the *Qu'ran*, then pre-colonial Burmese Buddhism and pre-19th century middle eastern Islam can be counted as equally legalistic. This conclusion would be directly opposed to Max Weber's views on Buddhism, which have become conventional wisdom, but that does not cause me undue dismay. We are all iconoclasts now. Most of my contemporaries in S. E. Asian studies seem to spend most of their time complaining that the standard textbooks have got it wrong. We are midgets standing on the shoulders of giants, but we persist in believing that by kicking the giant hard enough in the neck we can persuade it to face the other way.

My source material is the legal literature of Burma, a surprisingly large amount of which survived in manuscript form into the 20th century. The great majority of the texts were written between the 16th and the 19th centuries, but under normal conditions Burmese manuscripts perish after about 150 years. The older the text, the more copyings it has passed through: we possess three radically different manuscripts of a popular dhammathat written as late as the 1750s. About a quarter of the material has been printed, and about a tenth of it has been translated into English. The manuscripts are to be found in libraries and private collections across Burma, and also in the libraries of London, Berlin and Japan: no systematic comparison and analysis of them has yet been carried out. The two more important genres of legal literature were *rajathat* (written in the vernacular languages of Burmese, Mon, Arakanese and Tai-Shan) and *dhammathat* (written in both Pali and the vernaculars). Rajathat emanated from the palaces and ministries of the capital city: they were the less ephemeral of the commands issued by the king. It would be misleading to think of them as legislation in our modern sense, but one or two of them circulated widely and retained some authority after their author's death. Dhammathat could be written by anyone—we have biographical information on about forty dhammathat authors: monks lead the field, followed by laymen holding royal appointments, from the Prime Minister through the Clerk-in-charge-of-the-Royal-Boats down to minor officials in obscure provincial towns. The members of Burma's legal profession, the *she-ne*, also contributed, as did more than one retired general. At least twenty dhammathats were written in verse. Burma's two most famous 18th century poets composed dhammathats in the vernacular, while some of the authors who wrote in Pali verse form had country-wide reputations for their learning. The less important

genres of legal literature were *pyatton* meaning jataka-type stories of clever judges and their tricks of the trade, *pyatton* in its other sense of a collection of actual law reports which were sometimes "vanity published" by the judge involved, *niti* literature made up of Indian wisdom verses in Pali which were translated into Burmese from the 18th century on, and *rajadhamma* literature which listed the duties of kings, the details of coronation ritual, the proper care of a white elephant and kindred topics. When combined with some inscriptions from 13th century Pagan and a few items of evidence from the Buddhist cities of first millennium Burma, this legal literature allows us to reconstruct Burmese legal history from the time of the first fixed irrigation systems in the last few centuries B. C. to the present day.

Legal anthropologists propose the general rule that irrigated rice growers are more legalistic than wheat or maize farmers.[1] The construction of dams and tanks creates problems of regulating access to water which tend to be solved through law rather than through kinship or caste. Evidence from all over mainland S. E. Asia confirms this hypothesis: the irrigators down in the valley, whether Khmer, Thai, Vietnamese or Burmese, have produced an elaborate legal literature while the slash and burn cultivators up in the hills have not. Leach tells us of a parallel dynamic in which the irrigators are Buddhist while the hill people are "animist" or "shamanic."[2] This coincidence suggests a link between Buddhism and legalism, but does not prove it: entirely different factors may simultaneously have pushed the rice growers towards law and towards Buddhism. However, once Buddhism had been adopted by the S. E. Asian elite and once they had chosen to adopt a S. Indian alphabet already used as a medium for Buddhist literature, the trends towards Buddhism and legalism mutually reinforced each other. Burma, which opted for Buddhism much earlier than Cambodia or Thailand, was the center of these developments. It has long been recognised that the law texts of Bangkok and Phnom Penh draw on a source written in 13th century Pagan. It now seems likely that the same is true of the law texts of Chiang Mai, Vientiane and Luang Prabang, though they may also have drawn on Tai codes composed before the Tai crossed the Mekong on their journey south. Burma not only led the way in combining Buddhism and

1. Hoebel, 1954, *The Law of Primitive Man*, (Harvard) 291; Newman, 1983, *Law and Economic Organization*, (Cambridge) 187.
2. Leach, 1954, *Political Systems of Highland Burma* (London) 56.

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ANDREW HUXLEY

Buddhism And Law—The View From Mandalay

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Buddhism and Law—a new problem

In his contribution to this volume Professor v. Hinüber elegantly demonstrates that Pali Buddhism is a legalistic enterprise. The vinaya-dhara (the monks who had been trained in vinaya expertise) wrote for and argued with each other in an idiom that most closely resembles the glossators on the *Digest* of 13th century Europe and the early jurists of 10th century Islam. They talk and think like lawyers, even if the vinaya in action lacks some of the features which we nowadays expect from a legal system. The vinaya-dhara were experts in interpreting the sangha's collective intention and possessed a monopoly on the ordination of new recruits into the sangha. Thus, if we think of the sangha anthropomorphically, they are its super-ego and its reproductive organs, while the abidhammist meditators are its heart and soul. The conclusion I draw from v. Hinüber's article is that the vinaya is nearly as central to the Buddhist religion as the shari'a is to Islam. If we were to rank religions in order of legalism, Theravada would come at the legalistic end of the scale, near to Islam and far from, for example, Taoism. But on a direct comparison, Islam appears more legalistic, more concerned with regulating the day to day activities of its adherents, than the Theravada: it is possible to be a Buddhist without adhering to the vinaya but it is impossible to be a Muslim without following the shari'a. Burma presents a challenge to these generalizations about legalism and Buddhism. In Burma this gap between Islam and Theravada has narrowed—perhaps even to the point of disappearance. In pre-colonial Burma the monks adhered to the vinaya while the laity adhered to its own distinctive legal literature, known to the Burmese as "dhammathat and rajathat" and to the British as "Burmese Buddhist law." My main aim in this article is to persuade you that this law for the laity is, in a deep sense, Buddhist. If I can establish that dhammathat and rajathat are related to the dhamma-vinaya of the Pali canon in much the same way as the classic

stand as a major Indian contribution to culture in general.[104] Today usually Indian indigenous grammar is cited and Pāṇini quoted, or Brahmagupta is named in the field of mathematics.[105] Law, legal literature, and juridical thinking of the Buddhists are passed over in quite unjustified silence in this context, even in a purely Indian context; for in the slim, but highly stimulating volumes contributed by J. D. M. Derrett to the History of Indian Literature or to the Handbuch der Orientalistik[106] Buddhist law is omitted, and the Vinaya as a law book is well hidden in the volume of the History of Indian Literature on Pāli literature. This will certainly change once the system of Buddhist law is understood, and it can be achieved only by a comprehensive investigation first of all into the legal terminology,[107] which is the key to understand the development and history of Buddhist law.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAWG	*Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*. Philologisch-historische Klasse. Dritte Folge
Abhis-Dh	*Abhisamācārikā Dharmāḥ* ed. B.Jinanada. Patna 1969
AN	*Aṅguttara-nikāya*
AO	*Acta Orientalia*

104. Cf. W. Rau, "Indiens Beitrag zur Kultur der Menschheit," *Sitzungsberichte der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main*. Band XIII, No. 2. (Wiesbaden: 1975).
105. Cf. D. Pingree, "History of Mathematical Astronomy in India," *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, Vol. 15 (New York: 1978) 533-633.
106. *Dharmaśāstra and Juridical Literature* (Wiesbaden: 1973); *History of Indian Law (Dharmaśāstra)* (Leiden: 1973). Later J. D. M. Derret has devoted some studies to Buddhist, though not to Theravāda law, c. g.: *A Textbook for Novices. Jayarukṣija's «Perspicuous Commentary on the Compendium of Conduct by Srighana»*. Publicazioni di Indologica Taurinensia XV (Torino: 1983).
107. Here a recent Ph. D. thesis from Göttingen deserves to be mentioned: P. Kieffer-Pülz, *Die Sīmā. Vorschriften zur Regelung der buddhistischen Gemeindegrenze in älteren buddhistischen Texten* (Berlin: 1992).

AWL	Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz. *Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse*
BEFEO	*Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*
CPD	V. Trenckner, *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, Vol. I (1924 -1948), Vol. II (1960-1990), Vol. III, 1 (1992), Vol. III, 2 (1993). Copenhagen
DN	*Dīgha-nikāya*
IHQ	*Indian Historical Quarterly*
IT	*Indologica Taurinensia*
Ja	*Jātaka(-aṭṭhavaṇṇanā)*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JPTS	*Journal of the Pāli Text Society*
Kkh	*Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī*
KZ	*(Kuhns) Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*
Mp	*Manorathapūraṇī*
OLZ	*Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*
PD	*An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles*. Poona 1976ff.
PED	T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, *The Pāli Text Society's Pāli-English Dictionary* (London) 1921- 1925
Sadd	*Saddanīti*
Sās	*Sāsanavaṃsa*
Sp(-ṭ)	*Samantapāsādikā(-ṭīkā: Sāriputta: Sāratthadīpanī)*
Spk	*Sāratthapakāsinī*
StII	*Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik*
Sv	*Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*
Vin	*Vinaya-piṭaka*
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*

Pāli texts are quoted according to the editions mentioned in the Epilegomena to the CPD, if not stated otherwise.

"the abbreviated version of the small text on knotty points [in the Vinaya] called lamp [elucidating] the hidden meaning." This manuscript, which quotes from the *Majjhima-* and *Cūḷagaṇṭhipada*, is incomplete. Fascicles 1 , 2, and 12 are lost and even fascicle 17 does not contain the end of the text. Luckily the continuation is found in the *Cūḷagaṇṭhipadamahāvagga* copied in C. E. 1836 and preserved at Vat Sung Men in Phrae (North Thailand).[95] This manuscript comprises another sixteen fascicles without reaching the end of the text. In addition to this large Vinaya text there is further a *Mahāgaṇṭhipadamahāvagga* in the same monastery in fifteen fascicles and also copied in C. E. 1836,[96] which obviously contains only a fraction of the complete text, perhaps less than 10%, for it ends with the Uruvelā-Kassapa episode right at the beginning of the *Mahāvagga*. The enormous length of these text seems to be due to extensive quotations borrowed from well known earlier Vinaya literature. However, now and then new opinions seem to have been inserted, which show that these texts in fact provide new and potentially very interesting material for the late history of Buddhist law. As the *Sāsanavaṃsa* quotes one sentence verbatim from the *Cūḷagaṇṭhi*, it is not impossible to verify if the *Cūḷagaṇṭhipada* of the British Library and Vat Sung Men are identical to Atula's text.

Indeed the relevance of *Mahā-* and *Cūḷagaṇṭhipada* seems to be considerable for Buddhist law in Burma in the recent past. For, as Shway Yoe (alias Sir James George Scott: 1851-1935) writes, there were rival parties following the "Mahagandi" and "Sulagandi" respectively during the second half of the last century. This dispute centered on a controversy over simple or luxurious life styles of monks: "faction feeling runs so high that street fights between scholars of these two sects are very common, and often so embittered that the English authorities have to interfere to restore peace in the town, for the laity takes sides with equally bitter animosity."[97]

Thus there will never be an end to Vinaya controversies as long as the sāsana continues to exist. Research in these matter is still quite in its infancy and has hardly really started. Rich material is buried in printed editions and probably also in manuscripts. Inscriptions from

95. The reference number is 01-04-028-00, roll no. 49.
96. The reference number is 01-04-027-00, roll no. 49.
97. Shway Yoe, *The Burman. His Life and Notions* (London: 1910) 149 (reprinted with a biographical sketch of the author by J. Falconer [Arran: 1989]).

Theravāda countries and royal orders from Burma have not been used so far. The latter contain many interesting details on the possible interrelation of ecclesiastical and secular law evident already in older literature. For although judges are advised to use a dhammathat and are even provided with copies,[98] a Buddhist legal expert (*vinayadhara*) decides about the real estate of two monasteries on May 14, 1720,[99] by referring to documents(?), in this particular case most probably to landgrants dated C. E. 1654 and C. E. 1444 (!) repsectively. The royal order confirms his decision.

Thus the working principles of legal procedures seem to have been fairly stable over a long time. And if a royal order of June 17,1784, proclaims that the rainy season (vassa) in that year had begun on July 1,[100] this brings us back right to the *Mahāvagga* of the Vinaya-piṭaka.

All this rich, hardly explored history of law quite different and independent from Hindu Dharmaśāstras is at the same time a considerable intellectual achievement of Indian culture. Only in the very recent past the first steps to understand or even to discover the elaborate system that seems to underly Buddhist legal texts have been taken.[101] This aspect has not been touched in the present discussion, which tried to concentrate only on the Theravāda legal tradition leaving aside the Vinaya of other schools, which at least as far as the Mūlasarvāstivādins are concerned, have an equally rich heritage of texts mainly preserved in Tibetan.[102] Once all this will have been thoroughly researched, Buddhist, and perhaps particularly Theravāda law[103] might

98. *Royal Orders I* (1983) 24: June 23, 1607.
99. *Royal Orders II* (1985) 73.
100. *Royal Orders IV* (1986) 62.
101. H. Bechert, "Laws of the Buddhist Saṅgha: An Early Juridical System in Indian Tradition," lecture given at the symposion on Recht, Staat und Verwaltung im klassischen Indien, Munich, July, 1992; O. v. Hinüber, "The Arising of an Offence: *āpattisamuṭṭhāna*. A Note on the Structure and History of the Theravādavinaya," JPTS 16 (1992): 55-69.
102. G. Schopen's "Doing Business for the Lord: Lending on Interest and Loan in the Mūlasārvāstivāda-*vinaya*" has succeeded in finding influences of Dharmaśāstra on a Vinaya, which sheds new and quite unexpected light on the history of Buddhist law. Dharmaśāstra influence can be felt perhaps in Vibh-a 382.29-383.32, where it is said that there is a difference in offenses such as murder or theft depending on the person against whom it is directed.
103. Theravāda law seems to have been held in high esteem among Buddhists, as can be deduced from the fact that the *Samantapāsādikā* was translated into Chinese and taken over by the Dharmaguptaka school; cf. note 78 above.

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Ālayavijñāna

(Store-Consciousness)

Original Conception found in Theravāda Pali Canon

BY THE VENERABLE DR. WALPOLA RAHULA

IN the *Yogācāra* (= *Vijñānavāda*) School of Buddhism, *ālayavijñāna* is one of the most important doctrines developed by Asanga (4th century A.C.) He divides the *vijñānaskandha* (Aggregate of Consciousness), the fifth of the five *skandhas*, into three different aspects or layers, namely, *citta*, *manas* and *vijñānā*. In the *Theravāda Tipiṭaka* as well as in the Pali Commentaries, these three terms—*citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna*—are considered as synonyms denoting the same thing.[1] The Sarvāstivāda also takes them as synonyms.[2] Even the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, which is purely a Mahāyāna text, calls them synonyms[3] although their separate functions are mentioned elsewhere in the same *sūtra*.[4] Vasubandhu too in his *Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* considers them as synonyms.[5] Since any one of these three terms—*citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna*—represents some aspect, even though not all aspects, of the fifth Aggregate *vijñānaskandha*, they may roughly be considered as synonyms.

However, for Asanga, *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* are three different and distinct aspects of the *vijñānaskhanda*. He defines this Aggregate as follows:

"What is the definition of the Aggregate of Consciousness (*vijñānaskandha*)? It is mind (*citta*), mental organ (*manas*) and also consciousness (*vijñāna*).

"And there what is mind (*citta*)? It is *ālayavijñāna* (Store-Consciousness) containing all seeds (*sarvabījaka*), impregnated with the traces (impressions) (*vāsanāparibhāvita*) of Aggregates (*skandha*), Elements (*dhātu*) and Spheres (*āyatana*). . . .

"What is mental organ (*manas*)? It is the object of *ālayavijñāna*, always having the nature of self-notion (self-conceit) (*manyanātmaka*) associated with four defilements, viz., the false idea of self (*ātmadṛṣṭi*), self-love (*ātmasneha*), the conceit of "I am" (*asmimāna*) and ignorance (*avidyā*). . . .

"What is consciousness (*vijñāna*)? It consists of the six groups of consciousness (*ṣaḍvijñānakāyāḥ*), viz., visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*)

[1] In the *Vibangha* (PTS) p. 403, to the question *katamāni satta cittāni* "What are the seven minds?" the answer is: *cakkhu-viññāṇaṃ, sota-ghāna-jivhā-kāyaviññāṇaṃ, manodhātu, manoviññāṇadhātu.* So *citta*, *mano* and *viññāṇa* are synonymous. Dhs. also (p. 209, § 1187) to the question *katame dhammā cittā?* gives the same answer as the above in *Vibhanga*. *Visuddhimaga* p. 452 says: *viññāṇaṃ cittam manoti atthato ekaṃ.* See also *Dīgha Nikāya* I, p. 21; *Saṃyutta Nikāya* II, pp. 94-95; *Vibhanga* p. 87.

[2] *Cittaṃ mano'tha vijñānam ekārtham.* Kośa, II, 34.

[3] *Cittaṃ vikalpo vijñaptir mano vijñānam eva ca ālayaṃ tribhavaśceṣṭā ete cittasya payayāḥ.* Lankā, p. 322.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 46: *Cittena ciyate karma, manasā ca viciyate, vijñānena vijānāti, dṛśyaṃ kalpeti pañcabhiḥ.*

[5] *Cittaṃ mano vijñānaṃ vijñaptiś ceti paryāyāḥ.* *Viṃśatikā*, p. 3.

and mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*). . . ."[1]

Thus we can see that *vijñāna* represents the simple reaction or response of the sense-organs when they come in contact with the external objects. This is the uppermost or superficial aspect or layer of the *vijñānaskandha*. *Manas* represents the aspect of its mental functioning, thinking, reasoning, conceiving ideas, etc. *Citta*, which is here called *ālayavijñāna*, represents the deepest, finest and subtlest aspect or layer of the Aggregate of Consciousness. It contains all the traces or impressions of the past actions and all good and bad future potentialities. The *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* also says that *ālayavijñāna* is called *citta* (Tibetan *sems*).[2]

It is generally believed that *ālayavijñāna* is purely a Mahāyāna doctrine and that nothing about it is found in the "Hīnayāna." But in the *Mahāyānasaṅgraha*[3] Asanga himself says that in the Śrāvakayāna (=Hīnayāna) it is mentioned by synonyms (*paryāya*) and refers to a passage in the *Ekottarāgama* which reads: "People (*prajā*) like the *ālaya* (*ālayarata*), are fond of the *ālaya* (*ālayārāma*), are delighted in the *ālaya* (*ālayasammudita*), are attached to the *ālaya* (*ālayābhirata*). When the Dharma is preached for the destruction of the *ālaya*, they wish to listen (*śuśrūṣati*) and lend their ears (*śrotraṃ avadadhati*), they put forth a will for the perfect knowledge (*ājñācittaṃ upasthāpayati*) and follow the path of Truth (*dharmānudharmapratipanna*). When the Tathāgata appears in the world (*prādurbhāva*), this marvellous (*āścarya*) and extraordinary (*adbhuta*) Dharma appears in the world."

Lamotte identified this *Ekottarāgama* passage with the following passage in the Pali *Aṅguttaranikāya* (A II, p. 131): *Ālayarāmā bhikkhave pajā ālayaratā ālayasammuditā, sā Tathāgatena anālaye dhamme desiyamāne sussūsati sotaṃ odahati aññācittaṃ upaṭṭhāpeti. Tathāgatassa bhikkhave arahato sammāsambuddhassa pātubhāvā ayaṃ paṭhamo acchariyo abbhuto dhammo pātubhavati.* (Mankind are fond of the *ālaya*, O bhikkhus, like the *ālaya*, rejoice in the *ālaya*; with the *Tathāgata* they pay honour to the *Dhamma*, they listen and lend an attentive ear to perfect knowledge. When, O bhikkhus, a Fully Enlightened Liberated *Tathāgata* appears in the world this marvellous and extraordinary *Dhamma* appears in the world).

Besides this *Aṅguttara* passage, the term *ālaya* in the same sense is found in several other places of the Pali Canon.[4] The Pali Commentaries explain this term as "attachment to the five sense-pleasures",[5] and do not go deeper than that. But this also is an aspect of the *ālayavijñāna*.

In the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* the term *tathāgatagarbha* is used as a

[1] *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Pradhan ed. Visva-Bharati, 1950) pp. 11-12. The same definitions of *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* are given briefly in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* p. 174 (XIX, 76): *Cittaṃ ālayavijñānam, manas tadālambanam ātmadṛṣṭyādisaṃprayuktam, vijñānaṃ ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ.*

[2] *Saṇdhinirmocanasūtre*, texte tibétain, édité et traduit par Etienne Lamotte, Louvain et Paris, 1935, pp. 55, 185.

[3] *Mahāyānasaṅgraha*, traduction Lamotte, p. 26.

[4] E.g. *Majjhima Nikāya* I, p. 167; *Saṃyutta Nikāya* I, p. 136; Vinaya I, p. 4.

[5] *Ālayarāmāti sattā pañcasu kāmaguṇesu ālayanti.* *Majjhima Nikāya* Commentary II, p. 174. *Ālayarāmāti sattā pañcakāmaguṇe alliyanti* (*Samantapāsādikā*, *Mahāvagga vaṇṇanā*, Colombo, 1900, p. 153). *pañcakāmaguṇālaya*, *Visuddhimagga* p. 293.

synonym for *ālayavijñāna*,[1] and is described as "luminous by nature" (*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*) and "pure by nature" (*prakṛtipariśuddha*) but appearing as impure "because it is sullied by adventitious defilements" (*āgantukleśopakliṣṭatayā*).[2] In the *Aṅguttaranikāya*[3] *citta* is described as "luminous" (*pabhassara*), but it is "sullied by adventitious minor defilements" (*āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ*).[4] One may notice here that *ālayavijñāna* (or *tathāgatagarbha*) and *citta* are described almost by the same terms. We have seen earlier that the *Saṇdhinirmocana-sūtra* says that *ālayavijñāna* is also called *citta*. Asanga too mentions that it is named *citta*.[5]

It is this *ālayavijñāna* or *citta* that is considered by men as their "Soul," "Self," "Ego" or *Ātman*.[6] Here we may remember, as a concrete example, that *Sāti*, one of the Buddha's disciples, took *viññāṇa* (*vijñāna*)[7] in this sense and that the Buddha reprimanded him for this wrong view.[8]

The attainment of Nirvāṇa is achieved by "the revolution of *ālayavijñāna*" which is called *āśrayaparāvṛtti* or *ālayaparāvṛtti*.[9] The same idea is conveyed by the expression *ālayasamugghāta* "uprooting of *ālaya*" which is used in the Pali Canon as a synonym for Nirvāṇa.[10] Here we should remember also that *anālaya* "no-*ālaya*" is another synonym for Nirvāṇa.[11]

The *ālayavijñānaparāvṛtti* is sometimes called *bījaparāvṛtti* "revolution of the seeds" as well.[12] *Bīja* here signifies the "seeds" of defilements (*sāṃkleśikadharmabīja*) which cause the continuity of *saṃsāra*. By the "revolution of these seeds" one attains Nirvāṇa. Again the Pali term *khīṇabīja*,[13] which is used to denote an arahant whose "seeds of defilements are destroyed," expresses the same idea.

Thus, one may see that, although not developed as in the Mahāyāna, the original idea of *ālayavijñāna* was already there in the Pali Canon of the Theravāda.

[1] *Laṅkā*, pp. 221, 222.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 77, 222. Suzuki (*Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, p. 182) says: ". . . The *Laṅkāvatāra* differs from the Yogācāra in one important point, i.e., that while the latter maintains that the Ālaya is absolutely pure and has nothing to do with defilements and evil passions, the *Laṅkāvatāra* and Aśvaghosha maintain the view that the Tathāgata-garbha or the Ālaya is the storage of the impure as well as the pure . . ." But this is not so. The Yogācāra also considers that the Ālaya is the storage of defilements. Cf. *Sarvasāṃkleśikadharmabījasthānatvād ālayaḥ* "It is called Ālaya because it is the place for the seeds of all the defilements". *Triṃśikā*, p. 18. Cf. also *ālayavijñānāśritadauṣṭhulya*, *ibid.* pp. 22.

[3] A I p. 10.

[4] The Commentary says that here "*citta* means *bhavaṅgacitta*" *cittanti bhavaṅgacittaṃ*.

[5] *Mahāyānasaṅgraha*, p. 15.

[6] *Ibid.* p. 14; *Triṃśikā*, pp. 16, 22; *Dīgha Nikāya* I, p. 21.

[7] Here it should be remembered that *ālayavijñāna* is one of the eight *vijñānas*.

[8] *Majjhima Nikāya* I, p. 256 ff. *Mahātaṇhāsaṃkhaya-sutta*.

[9] *āśrayasya parāvṛttir iti*: *āśrayoʼtra sarvabījakaṃ ālayavijñānam*. (*Triṃśikā*, p. 44). *ālayavijñānāśritadauṣṭhulyavinivṛttiprabhṛti ālayavijñānaṃ vyāvṛttaṃ bhavati Sai va ca arhad avasthā.* (*Ibid.*) p. 22.
. . . *vijñānānāṃ parāvṛttiḥ anāsravo dhātur vimuktiḥ*. (*Sūtrā-laṅkāra*, XI, 44). *āśrayasya parāvṛttiṃ anutpādaṃ vadāmy aham*. (*Laṅkā*, p. 202).

[10] *E.g.* A II, p. 34; III, p. 35: . . . *madanimmadano pipāsavinayo ālayasamugghāto vaṭṭupacchedo taṇhakkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ*.

[11] S IV, p. 372; also: *yo tassāyeva taṇhāya asesavirāganirodho paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo*, S V, p. 421 and *passim*.

[12] *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, XI, 44: *bījaparāvṛtter ity ālayavijñānaparāvṛttitaḥ*.

[13] *Te khīṇabījā avirūḷhicchandā nibbanti dhīrā* . . . in the *Ratanasutta*, Sn: p. 41.
The *bīja* theory of the Yogācāra should be compared with the *abhisaṃkhāraviññāṇa* (=bija) of the Theravāda.

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Which Dhammapada?

Colin Dale

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Our Pali Dhammapada (Dhp) is only one of several existing versions. These are briefly but expertly surveyed by Professor Norman in his book on Pali literature.[1] It is not even clear that Dhp is the oldest of these texts, though it conceivably may be. Let us just list the others. There is 1. the *Udānavarga*[2] (Uv) in a near-Sanskrit version found in Turkestan, and comprising some 1050 stanzas (as against 423 in Dhp). A Tibetan rendering of this has twice been translated into English.[3] There is 2. the so-called *Gāndhāri Dharmapada* (GDhp)[4] which was found in Khotan in two parts (a third part is missing), and 3. there are four Chinese versions.[5] 4. The most recent discovery, known as the *Patna Dharmpada* (PDhp), has been edited no fewer than three times.[6] A vinaya text, the *Mahāvastu*,[7] also contains some relevant material.

Professor Norman says there are differences of opinion about the poetic quality of the verses of Dhp, and certainly Professor Brough is pretty scathing on the subject – and he is quoted with obvious approval by Bernhard, the editor of Uv., which certainly has a lot of padding. But Brough's words can be taken as referring at least principally to the "extra" verses in GDhp, and so not necessarily to Dhp. Though some lovers of our text may have sung its praises too uncritically, it certainly does not in general seem to deserve Brough's strictures: indeed the author of the witty word-play of Dhp.97 (to take a single example) was, I think, no mean poet. But poetic merit apart, the various versions differ considerably, and when the same or similar stanzas occur in different redactions, they are often in quite a different order. There is no conclusive evidence as to priority, but Dhp and PDhp seem to be closest to whatever was the original version. As to the sources of the material, Professor Norman points out that more than half of

1. K. R. Norman, *Pali Literature* (vol.VII, fasc. 2 of *A History of Indian Literature*, ed. J. Gonda), Wiesbaden 1983, pp. 58-60.
2. Ed. F. Bernhard, 2 vols., Göttingen 1965-8.
3. W. W. Rockhill, *Udānavarga. A Collection of Verses from the Buddhist Canon*. London 1892: (rep. Delhi 1982); *The Tibetan Dhammapada*. Translated and edited by Gareth Sparham, Delhi 1982.
4. *The Gāndhāri Dharmapada*, ed. J. Brough, London 1962. An enterprising local character seems to have split the MS into three parts. One part he sold to the Russian vice-consul, and one to the French explorer Dutreuil de Rhins. The fate of the third part is unknown. As early as 1897 it had been recognised that the portions preserved in St. Petersburg and Paris were parts of the same MS, but wars and revolutions delayed complete publication of the available material till 1962. See Brough's introduction. There is a remote chance that the missing part may turn up.
5. See Samuel Beal, *Dhammapada, translated from the Chinese*, 1878 (rep. Calcutta 1952). It is curious that both Beal and Sparham (n. 3) use the Pali name *Dhammapada* (instead of Skt. *Dharmapada*) in the titles of their versions.
6. By N. S. Shukla, Patna 1979; by G. Roth in H. Bechert (ed.), *The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition* (Göttingen 1980), pp. 97-135; by Margaret Cone in *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, vol. xiii, pp. 101ff. Neither this nor GDhp has been translated into English.
7. Norman (n. 1), p. 60.

the verses in Dhp occur elsewhere in the canon, while some seem to come from non-Buddhist (Brahmin or Jain) sources. The suggestion that each and every stanza was uttered by the Buddha on a particular occasion is thus a fantasy of the (unknown) commentator. But in any case, the idea that, e.g., each of the clearly parallel verses 1 and 2 was addressed by the Buddha to a different person on a different occasion would be hard to believe!

The stories attached to the different stanzas of Dhp - however they got there - are very interesting and instructive, and it is noteworthy that they were translated into English[8] many years before the actual exegetic material of the commentary in which they are incorporated.[9] This fact had an advantage in so far as the translators of this were able to draw on all the other known versions, including PDhp, for their very valuable notes.

A word must be said about translations of Dhp. There are at least 40 so-called translations into English of this work, but it must be said that more than half of these are rehashes of existing versions, often cobbled together by people with little or no knowledge of Pali! It is curious to see how many of them open with the words, sometimes as they stand, sometimes slightly adapted, with which Max Müller's rendering of 1881 begins: "All that we are is the result of what we have thought ", which is perhaps not a bad paraphrase, but scarcely a translation of the original: *Manopubbangamā dhammā* "the *dhammas* (states, conditions) are preceded by mind". A number of these versions also suffer from another defect: that of trying to assimilate Buddhist thought to that of Vedānta or the like. A particular offender here, alas, is the Penguin version by J. Mascaró, and another well-known version, by Radhakrishnan, is similarly at fault. The most reliable version is still that of Nārada Thera, of which there are various editions, or that of Buddharakkhita Thera.[10] These translations make no mention of the other recensions we have mentioned. For these we must turn to the work of Carter and Palihawadana (see n. 9), which includes a verse-translation of the text. This is generally sound, though it opens rather oddly: "Preceded by *perception* (my italics) are the mental states" - with absolutely no explanation of this unusual rendering of *mano-*. If they wanted at all costs - but why? - to avoid writing "mind" here, "volition" would perhaps have made better sense (not that I am proposing this).

I certainly agree wholeheartedly with Titus Gomes about the value of studying the *Dhammapada*. And perhaps we can consider it to some extent a miniature "Buddhist Bible" if we want such a thing, as it certainly includes, in some shape or form, most of the essentials of the Buddhist

8. E. W. Burlingame, *Buddhist Legends, translated from the original Pali Text of the Dhammapada Commentary* (Cambridge, Mass 1921), rep. London 1969.

9. *The Dhammapada. A New English Translation with the Pali Text and the First English Translation of the Commentary's Explanation of the Verses ...*, by John Ross Carter and Mahinda Palihawardana. New York, Oxford, 1987.

10. Trans. Buddharakkhita Thera, Bangalore 1965. Nārada's and Radhakrishnan's versions include the original Pali.

teaching, at least in the Theravāda form.[11] It is not quite true, at least outside of Sri Lanka, that all Bhikkhus have to learn it by heart before their ordination - but it might be a good idea if they did!

11. Brough (n. 4), p. 243, suggests that *manomayā* in Dhp 1, 2 might represent a Vijñānavāda point of view ("mind-made"). GDhp and other versions have forms corresponding to Pali *manojavā* "swift as thought", which is not quite parallel with the first two terms and gives a dubious sense. The true reading is uncertain.

OBITUARY

Venerable Songch'ol, An Inspiration for Millions

Ven Mujin Sunim

Venerable Songch'ol, the Patriarch of the Korean Buddhist Chogy Order, passed away on the 4th November at 7 · 30 am. To this spiritu head of Korea's largest Buddhist Order, some 12,000 monks and nuns at about 15 million lay people have looked for guidence for the past 13 years.

Born in Sanch'ong in Southern Kyongsang-do Province, Songch'o Sunim was an exceptionally intelligent child. He wrote his first poem at th

Patience

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Tenzin Gyatso
The Fourteenth Dalai Lama

Serialized from A FLASH OF LIGHTNING IN THE DARK OF NIGHT: A *Guide to the* Bodhisattva's Way of Life, *by Tenzin Gyatso, The Fourteenth Dalai Lama.* (*Printed by arrangement with Shambhala Publications, Inc.*)

This concludes the chapter of His Holiness' commentary on 'Patience' from the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* by Śāntideva. Patience, together with meditative concentration, constitute the key aspects of the training in *bodhicitta*. The instructions in this chapter are very powerful aids to practice.

62 If when others slander you, you claim
Your anger is because they harm themselves,
How is it that you do not resent
The slander of which others are the victim?

When people say unpleasant things about us, if it is the nasty things in themselves that make us angry, then we should get angry also when nasty things are said about others. For the case is the same as far as these unpleasant things are concerned. But when unpleasant things are said about other people, what usually happens is that we attribute the criticism to causes that do not concern us and remain indifferent. Why do we not apply the same argument when we ourselves are the object of criticism? When someone influenced by negative emotions says nasty things about us, why do we allow ourselves to get angry? It is, after all, negative emotions, not people, that are responsible for the attack. And again, if we are not angry when other people are criticized, it follows that we should also tolerate people insulting the Buddha, breaking statues, burning down monasteries, slandering great teachers and so on.

64 Even those who vilify and undermine
The sacred Doctrine, stupas, images of holy beings
Are not the proper objects of my anger:
The Buddhas are not harmed thereby.

74 For the sake of my desired aims,
A thousand times I have endured the fires
And other pains of hell,
Achieving nothing for myself and others.

75 The present pains are nothing to compare with those,
And yet great benefits accrue from them.
These afflictions, which dispel the troubles of all
wandering beings –
I should only take delight in them.

If, for example, a person condemned to death were to have his life spared in exchange for having his hands cut off, he would feel very relieved. Similarly, when we have the chance to purify a great suffering by enduring a slight injury, we should accept it. If, unable to bear insults, we get angry, we are only creating worse suffering for the future. Difficult though it may be, we should try instead to broaden our perspective and not retaliate.

We have been and are still going through endless suffering without deriving any benefit whatsoever from it. Now that we have promised to be good-hearted, we should try not to get angry when others insult us. Being patient might not be easy. It requires considerable concentration. But the result we achieve by enduring these difficulties will be sublime. That is something to be happy about!

79 When compliments are heaped upon my merits,
I want others to rejoice in them;
When, however, someone else is praised,
My happiness is slow and grudging.

When people we do not like are praised, we normally become jealous. This is a mistake. When good things are said of others, we should try to join in. Then we too may get a little happiness. So why not rejoice? If we can rejoice and feel a sense of satisfaction when those we dislike are praised, the happiness we have is truly positive and approved by the Buddhas. When we practise like this, even our enemies come to appreciate us. This is one of the best ways of gaining others' respect.

80 Since I want the happiness of beings,
I have wished to be enlightened for their sake.
Why then should others irk me
When they find some pleasure for themselves?

If we cannot appreciate and rejoice in the happiness someone else might have in praising other people, in the end we will be unable to tolerate even the slightest joy in anyone else. If that is the case, we might just as well give up anything that helps others and never even make gifts, refusing to accept anything that might please them. If we enjoy being praised, it is wrong for us to be irritated when someone else is praising others and deriving pleasure from doing so.

83 If even this I do not want for beings,
How could I want Buddhahood for them?
How can anyone have bodhicitta
Who is irritated by the good that others have?

As we have taken the vow to attain omniscience for the sake of all beings, when these same beings have a little happiness on their own account, it makes sense to rejoice rather than to be irritated. We have made ourselves responsible for dispelling all suffering and accomplishing all happiness, so when others are happy, our responsibility actually becomes lighter. But if we cannot bear others being happy, how can we pretend to be seeking Buddhahood?

When things are not going well for someone we dislike, what is the point in rejoicing? It does not make his present suffering any worse, and even if it did, how sad it would be that we should wish such a thing.

90 The rigmarole of praise and reputation
Serves not to increase merit or the span of life;
Bestowing neither health nor strength of body,
It contributes nothing to the body's ease.

Simply being praised is of no substantial help at all: it does not increase people's good fortune, nor does it make them live any longer. If temporary pleasure is all you want, you might as well take drugs. Yet many people invest much money and even deceive their friends so as to win status. This is quite stupid. Their status and fame do not really help much in this life and do nothing for future lives. There is no point in being happy if we are famous or unhappy because people speak ill of us.

93 Children can't help crying
When their sand castles come crumbling down.
Our minds are so like them
When praise and reputation start to fail.

94 Short-lived sound, devoid of intellect,
Can never in itself intend to praise us.
'But it's the joy that others take in me', you say.
Are these the poor causes of your pleasure?

95 What is it to me if others should delight
In someone else or even in myself?
Their joy is theirs alone;
What part of it could be for my enjoyment?

Nice words of praise are devoid of mind: they have no wish to say good things about us. The good intentions other people have of praising us are their good intentions, not ours! If we are happy because others have pleasant things to say about us, then we should also be happy when they say the same about our enemies. We should treat everyone equally.

98 Praise and compliments disturb me.
They soften my revulsion with samsara.
I begin to covet others' qualities, and
Every excellence is thereby spoiled.

Praise, if you think about it, is actually a distraction. For example, in the beginning one may be a simple, humble monk, content with little. Later on people may say flattering things like 'He's a lama' and one begins to feel a bit more proud and to become self-conscious about how one looks and behaves. Then the eight worldly preoccupations become stronger, do they not? Praise is a distraction and destroys renunciation.

Again, at first when we have little, we do not have much reason for a sense of competition with others. But later, when the 'humble monk starts to grow some hair', he becomes conceited, and as he becomes more influential, he vies with others for important positions. We feel jealous of anyone who has good qualities, and this in the end destroys whatever good qualities we ourselves have. Being praised is not really a good thing, and it can be the source of negative actions.

99 Those who stay close by me, then,
To ruin my good name and cut me down to size –
Are they not the guardians who protect me
From perdition in the realms of sorrow?

As our real goal is enlightenment, we should not be angry with our enemies, who in fact dispel all the obstacles to our attaining enlightenment.

101 They, like Buddha's very blessing,
Bar my way, determined as I am
To plunge myself in suffering.
How could I be angry with them?

102 We should not be angry, saying,
'They are obstacles to virtue.'
Patience is the peerless austerity,
And is this not my chosen path?

It is no use excusing ourselves, saying that our enemies are preventing us from practising and that that is why we get angry. If we truly wish to progress, there is no practice more important than patience. We cannot pretend to be practitioners if we have no patience.

If we cannot bear the harm our enemies do to us and instead get angry, we are ourselves the obstacle to achieving an immensely positive action. Nothing can exist without a cause, and there can be no practice of patience without there being people who wrong us. How, then, can we call such people obstacles to our practice of patience, which is fundamental to the Mahayana path? We can hardly call a beggar an obstacle to generosity.

There are many reasons for charity; the world is full of people in need. On the other hand, those who make us angry and test our patience are relatively few, especially if we avoid harming others. So when we encounter these rare enemies we should appreciate them.

107 Like a treasure found at home,
Enriching me without fatigue,
Enemies are helpers in the bodhisattva life.
They should be a pleasure and a joy to me.

When we have been patient towards enemies, we should dedicate the fruit of this practice to them, because they are the causes of it. They have been very kind to us. We might ask: 'Why should they deserve this dedication when they had no intention of making us practise patience?' But do objects need to have an intention before they are worthy of our respect? The Dharma itself, which points out the cessation of suffering and is the cause of happiness, has no intention of helping us, yet it is surely worthy of respect.

We might think, then, that our enemies are undeserving because they actively wish to harm us. But if everyone were as kind and well-intentioned as a doctor, how could we ever practise patience? And when a doctor, intending to cure us, hurts us by amputating a limb, cutting us open or pricking us with needles, we do not think of him as an enemy and get angry with him. Thus, we cannot practise patience towards him. But enemies are those who intend to harm us, and it is for this reason that we are able to practise patience towards them.

111 Thanks to attitudes of bitter hatred,
I engender patience in myself.
They are thus the very cause of patience,
Fit for veneration like the Doctrine.

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112 Beings and the Buddhas are thus equal
In fields of merit, said the Blessed Lord.
Many who have sought the happiness of others
Have transcended all perfection.

There are two fields through which we can accumulate merit: beings and Buddhas. It is with the aid of beings, wretched though they are, that we can accumulate positive actions, develop *bodhicitta*, practise the six perfections, and attain the qualities of nirvana. Without beings we cannot have compassion we cannot achieve supreme enlightenment but rather shall fall into the extreme of nirvana. So the attainment of supreme enlightenment and the understanding we gain on the path are dependent on beings just as much as on the Buddhas. It is a mistake to separate them, saying the Buddhas are superior and beings are inferior. As they are both equally necessary for our enlightenment, why do we not respect beings as much as the Buddhas?

114 Their aims are not, of course, alike,
But it is by their fruit that they must be compared.
This, then, is the excellence of living beings' qualities.
Beings and the Buddhas are indeed the same!

Of course, they are not equal in their qualities. But in the sense that beings have the potential to assist in our accumulating merit and gaining enlightenment, we can say that they are equal.

119 As the Buddhas are my constant friends,
Boundless in the benefits they bring me,
How else may I repay their goodness,
But by making living beings happy?

122 Buddhas are made happy by the joy of beings;
They sorrow and lament when beings suffer.
Making beings happy, I please the Buddhas also;
Offending them, the Buddhas also I offend.

If we really take refuge in the Buddhas, then we should respect their wishes. After all, in ordinary life it is normal to adapt in some way to one's friends and respect their wishes. The ability to do so is considered a good quality. It is truly sad if, on the one hand, we say that we take refuge with heartfelt devotion in the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha but, on the other hand, in our actions, we contemptuously ignore what displeases them. We are prepared to conform to the standards of ordinary people but not to those

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of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. How miserable! If, for example, a Christian truly loves God, then he should practise love for all his fellow human beings. Otherwise, he is failing to follow his religion: his words and deeds are in contradiction.

127 Reverence for beings will rejoice the Buddhas,
Excellently bringing welfare for myself;
It will likewise drive away the sorrows of the world,
And will therefore be my constant practice.

The ambassadors of a king or president, for example, have to be respected, however unimpressive they may look, because they represent a whole country. Similarly, all beings, wretched as they may be, are under the protection of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. So, by directly harming beings, we indirectly pain the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. This is something we should be very careful about.

If we can please beings, it goes without saying that this will contribute toward our attaining omniscience. Even in this life, we shall be happy and relaxed, well thought of, and have many friends. In future lives we shall be good-looking, strong and healthy, and shall be reborn in the higher realms, with the eight qualities that are the result of positive actions. Under such favourable conditions we shall eventually attain enlightenment. So, helping others is fundamental on the path to Buddhahood.

This very important chapter on patience is the foundation for the next chapter, which shows how we can benefit others through understanding the qualities of altruism and the disadvantages of egotism.

In general it is the very notion of enemies that is the main obstacle to *bodhicitta*. If we can transform an enemy into someone for whom we feel respect and gratitude, then our practice will naturally progress, like water following a channel cut in the earth.

To be patient means not to get angry with those who harm us and instead to have compassion for them. This is not to say that we should let them do what they like. We Tibetans, for example, have undergone great difficulties at the hands of others. But if we get angry with them, we can only be the losers. This is why we are practising patience. But we are not going to let injustice and oppression go unnoticed.

In the next issue of *The Middle Way* we continue this serialization with 'Endeavour'.

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Do you recall, above all else,
what was the origin of the primordial mass?
[*Saltair na Rann* (Psalter of quatrains)][46]

Council of Ontario Universities

[46] Mac Eóin (n. 18 above), 152.111.7865–68. Despite the fully Christian orientation, note the similarity to the phraseology employed in the Germanic "earth and heaven" formula: "Tell me that first, if your wit allows and you know it, Vafþrudnir: from where did the earth and heaven above first come, wise giant?" (quoted in Lars Lönnroth, "Iǫrð fannz aeva né upphiminn: A Formula Analysis," in *Specvlvm Norroenum: Norse Studies in Memory of Gabriel Turville-Petre*, ed. Ursula Dronke et al. [Odense: Odense University Press, 1981], pp. 310–27).

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Malcolm David Eckel

GRATITUDE TO AN EMPTY SAVIOR: A STUDY OF THE CONCEPT OF GRATITUDE IN MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

At the beginning of a study of gratitude or thanksgiving in the Buddhist tradition it is important to acknowledge the presence of cultural images that can distort our understanding of the way such concepts function in a Buddhist environment. This is particularly true of a concept like gratitude that bears such a theistic aura. Merely to mention the term in a Western religious context is to invite the mind to leap to a theistic conclusion: "gratitude to God." But Buddhists do not affirm the existence of an ultimate, personal God, and from that one fundamental difference radiate many other subtle differences that influence the meaning of what otherwise would be very familiar concepts. Gratitude and other such concepts can be found in the tradition and will often seem very familiar, but they can be located very differently in the structure of the religious discourse and religious action that make up the Buddhist tradition.

What I propose to do in this essay is simply to make a virtue of necessity. I will take the theistic images that most often lead to misunderstanding of the Buddhist tradition and use them to generate

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questions about the tradition that Buddhists themselves might at first find unusual. I will do this in the hope that the questions will let us see the Buddhist tradition in a new way and also in the hope that an attentive look at the differences in the Buddhist answers will give a new perspective on structures of religious thought that are closer to home. To keep the investigation within controllable limits, I will pose the questions only to a certain body of material: the speculation about Buddhahood and the relationship between the Buddha and his disciples in the philosophical literature of the Indian Mahāyāna tradition and particularly in the works of the Mādhyamika philosophers from Bhāvaviveka to Śāntideva.

To help pose the questions let us start with an image of gratitude that is frankly theistic. This is the prayer of general thanksgiving from the Episcopal *Book of Common Prayer*, a prayer that is engraved, if not consciously, at least subliminally, on the mind of anyone raised in the Anglican communion: "Almighty God, Father of all mercies, we thine unworthy servants do give thee most humble and hearty thanks for all thy goodness and loving-kindness to us and to all men. We bless thee for our creation, preservation, and all the blessings of this life; but above all for thine inestimable love in the redemption of the world by our Lord Jesus Christ, for the means of grace, and for the hope of glory."[1] The image is a familiar one, an image of response to a being who is conceived in personal form, for blessings that reflect at once both cosmic events ("creation," "preservation," "redemption") and relations of a more personal sort ("thine inestimable love"). But what gives this expression of gratitude a peculiarly religious character is the element of ultimacy. It is not an expression of gratitude that would take place just between two human beings but an expression of gratitude toward the ultimate source of one's existence. The images in the prayer, from the expressions of humility in the first line to the references to salvation in the last, all conspire to indicate gratitude toward a being who is truly ultimate.

It is the element of ultimacy that makes gratitude in the Buddhist tradition such a difficult problem. Concepts that fall within the range of the term "gratitude" are not difficult to find. There is the concept of *anumodanā*, for example, which indicates a joyous acquiescence in another person's good fortune and is used throughout the tradition to undermine a slavish preoccupation with one's own individual welfare. But the element of gratitude in Buddhist thought goes beyond particular concepts to suggest a certain meditative or recollected attitude

[1] *The Book of Common Prayer* (New York: Church Hymnal Corporation, 1977), p. 58.

toward the vicissitudes of life. The present Dalai Lama is fond of repeating to his Western audiences how "grateful" he is to the Communist regime in China for giving him the opportunity to practice love for his enemies. To some ears the sentiment may sound contrived. But it has roots deep in the Mahāyāna ascetical tradition, in the meditation on the "exchange of self and other" in the eighth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and more fundamentally in the "joyfulness" that characterizes entry into the first stages of *dhyāna* or "meditation" in traditional Buddhist discipline.[2] What is problematic for Buddhists is not that there should be gratitude in this familiar sense, as an experience of relations between equal human beings, but that this gratitude should be directed to a divine being who ultimately is the source of the benefits of this life. Indian Buddhist philosophers admitted no ultimate divine source. In fact they carried on a running battle with their Hindu colleagues for more than a millennium on precisely this point.[3] Even when the Buddhist tradition was nearing extinction in India, Buddhist philosophers showed no sign of abandoning their position.

One possible response to the absence of ultimate divine personhood in Buddhist thought would be to look at the relations between human beings as the primary locus of Buddhist gratitude. There is much to commend this approach. It avoids the pitfall of suggesting, as much Buddhist scholarship in the last century has done, that behind the negations that characterize many Buddhist expressions of ultimate reality lies a veiled affirmation.[4] But to focus simply on ordinary

[2] On the exchange of self and other, see *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 8.129-31: "All who suffer in this world seek their own pleasure; all who have pleasure in this world seek the pleasure of others" (8.129). "What more is there to say! Consider the difference between the fool who seeks his own welfare and the sage who acts for the welfare of others" (8.130). "No one will attain Buddhahood, let alone pleasure in transmigratory existence, who does not exchange the suffering of others for his own pleasure" (8.131). The Sanskrit text of these verses is found in *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati*, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts no. 12 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960), p. 163. A useful modern Tibetan commentary that reflects current Tibetan understanding of the concept is Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, *Meaningful to Behold* (Ulverston, England: Wisdom Publications, 1980). On the element of "joyfulness" in the introductory stages of *dhyāna* (Pāli *jhāna*) see *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosācariya, ed. Henry Clarke Warren, rev. Dharmananda Kosambi (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 112 ff.

[3] An amusing reference to the controversy between Buddhists and Hindus over the existence of God (*Īśvara*) is found in a *śloka* attributed to the Hindu philosopher Udayana: addressing God, the philosopher says: "Drunk with the wine of your own sovereignty, you ignore me; but when the Buddhists are here, your very existence depends on me": "*aiśvaryamadamatto 'si mām avajñāya vartase / upasthiteṣu bauddheṣu tvadadhīnā tava sthitiḥ.*" The verse is quoted in George Chemparathy, *An Indian Rational Theology: Introduction to Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali* (Vienna: Indological Institute, 1972), p. 28.

[4] "Buddhist scholarship" is meant to refer primarily to Western studies of the Buddhist tradition. But it should be remembered that scholars who themselves are

human relationships, as on a relationship between equals, misses the force of the comparative question. The prayer of general thanksgiving would have us ask not just whether there is gratitude in the Buddhist tradition but whether there are features in the relationship to ultimate reality (or its surrogates or embodiments) that naturally express themselves in a response of gratitude. The question is a dangerous one in Buddhist thought. It can easily slip into the theistic patterns of thought that so obscure the understanding of Buddhist sources. But it must be asked, if we are to do justice to the element of ultimacy in the Buddhist sources themselves.

The difficulty of the question can be seen in one of the images of Buddhahood that constantly recurs in the Mādhyamika literature. It is a picture of the Buddha seated on the throne of his enlightenment with his mind in a state of perfect concentration. His mind is perfectly emptied: there is not a flicker of thought to distract his concentration. Yet around him his disciples have gathered to hear his teaching. The Buddha says nothing; his concentration is never broken. But through an interaction of the disciples' preparation and expectations with the "vows" that the future Buddha took in the career that led him to enlightenment, the disciples hear what is necessary for their own progress to enlightenment. The classic expression of this image of Buddhahood in the sūtra literature is a passage in the *Tathāgataguhya Sūtra* quoted by Candrakīrti in the *Prasannapadā:*

> O Śāntamati, between the night in which he attained perfect Buddhahood and the night in which he was to attain *parinirvāṇa* with no remainder, the Tathāgata did not utter a sound. He did not speak, he does not speak, and he is not going to speak. But all sentient beings, with their various dispositions and interests and in accordance with their aspirations, perceive as issuing forth the Tathāgata's diverse teaching. And each of them thinks: "The Lord is teaching the Dharma to us and we are hearing the Tathāgata's Dharma-teaching." On that point the Tathāgata has no conception and makes no distinction. O Śāntamati, this is because the Tathāgata is free from all the conceptual diversity that consists of the traces of the network of concepts and distinctions.[5]

Buddhists have contributed to the notion that there is a "Supreme Being" in Buddhist metaphysics. D. T. Suzuki, e.g., has said: "The process of deification thus constantly went on until, some centuries after the death of the Master, he became a direct manifestation of the Supreme Being himself—in fact, he was the Highest One in the flesh, in him there was a divine humanity in perfect realization" (William Barrett, ed., *Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki* [New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956], p. 31).

[5] The Sanskrit is found in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti*, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica 4 (St. Petersburg, 1903–13), p. 539. A somewhat different version is quoted by Prajñākaramati in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā:* "Between the night in which the Tathāgata was enlightened and [the night] in which he attained *parinirvāṇa*, he did not utter a single syllable. Why? The Lord was in constant concentration. Those who needed to be taught by syllables, sounds, and cries heard a voice coming from the Tathāgata's mouth, from the point between his eyes, from the protuberance on his head." The Sanskrit is found in *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva*, p. 199. This radical interpretation of the Buddha's silence can be found in Mādhyamika sources from the time of Nāgārjuna up to the final stages of the development of the tradition in India. See, e.g., *Madhyamaka-kārikā* 25.24cd or verse 7 of the *Niruppamyastava:* "O Lord, you have not uttered even a single syllable, yet all those who are to be taught are sprinkled by the rain of Dharma." The Sanskrit is found in Giuseppe Tucci, "Two Hymns of the Catuḥ-stava of Nāgārjuna," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1932), p. 314. Śāntarakṣita refers to the *Tathāgataguhya Sūtra* in his explanation of the term *muni* ("sage") in the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā:* "The Lord is the greatest of these [sages] because he is uniquely silent in body, speech, and mind. This [silence] is explained by the account of 'the secret of the body' (*kāya-guhya*), and so forth, in the *Tathāgataguhya Sūtra*": bcom ldan 'das ni lus dang ngag dang yid thub pa thun mong ma yin pa dang ldan pa'i phyir de dag gi dbang po yin te / de ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i gsang ba'i mdo las / sku'i gsang ba la sogs pa smos pas 'bstan te (*Derge Tibetan Tripiṭaka*, Harvard Yenching Library, Tōhoku 3883, *Sa* 16a/1–2). Étienne Lamotte points out that this image of the Buddha's silence is a radical extension of the view that the Buddha taught by uttering only a single sound (*ekasvara*) (see *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti* [London: Pali Text Society, 1976], pp. 12–13).

[6] These two explanations of the term *paramārtha* occur often in Mādhyamika literature. See, e.g., the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* quoted by Chr. Lindtner in "Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and Its Sources," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9 (1981): 172. The locus classicus is Bhāvaviveka's *Tarkajvālā*, trans. Shotaro Iida, *Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980), pp. 82–83.

In this image of Buddhahood the disciples come face to face with the ultimate, and the confrontation is salvific. But in a crucial sense, the meeting is an encounter with nothing. The Buddha says nothing and the disciples, in reality, hear nothing. The "reality" of the salvific experience is based only on a combination of the disciples' preparation and the actions taken by the future Buddha before he became fully enlightened.

The dilemmas associated with this image give rise to a series of stock philosophical questions about the nature of the encounter with the ultimate that takes place in the Buddha's presence. First, what is "the ultimate"? Does the term have any discernible referent? In their exegetical literature the Mādhyamikas commonly used two ways of analyzing the term "ultimate" (*paramārtha*). It could be taken as a compound referring to the cognitive datum (*artha*) that is ultimate (*parama*) or to the cognitive datum (*artha*) that belongs to ultimate cognition (*parama-jñāna*). The second option was to take the term as referring to a cognition (*jñāna*) whose content (*artha*) is ultimate (*parama*).[6] The members of the Svātantrika branch of the Mādhyamika tradition uniformly preferred the second explanation over the first, for reasons that are easy to see. In a sense the second explanation brings the ultimate down to earth. It treats the ultimate

not as an abstract entity but as a form of awareness that someone might actually demonstrate or embody. It also treats it as an awareness that someone who does not already have it might be able to cultivate or confront firsthand in the presence of someone else.

The explanation of the term "ultimate" was also applied to the term "emptiness" (*śūnyatā*), particularly in verses that attribute direct salvific efficacy to emptiness. We read, for example, in *Madhyamaka-kārikā* 18.5d: "Conceptual diversity (*prapañca*) is stopped by [the understanding of] emptiness." The commentator Bhāvaviveka explains: "The term 'understanding' (*adhigama*) should be applied. [Conceptual diversity] is stopped by understanding that *dharmas* have no self. [The term] 'emptiness' in [the phrase] 'stopped by emptiness' also may refer to the cognition (*jñāna*) of emptiness. [In that case the verse] would mean that [conceptual diversity] is stopped when the cognition of emptiness arises."[7] If emptiness were merely the abstract condition of "having no own-being" (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), the salvific power of emptiness would be difficult to explain. But the commentator explains that the term "emptiness" refers to the cognition of emptiness. So emptiness, like the ultimate, is an awareness that can be made present in the experience of an individual and can have salvific impact not only on the individual who has it but also on others who confront it through that individual's presence.

To say that the awareness of emptiness can have salvific impact on someone other than the one who has the awareness raises other, more troubling questions. The awareness of emptiness is free from all conceptual discrimination (*vikalpa*). If a Buddha says nothing and conceives of nothing, in what sense can he "act"? And if he cannot act, how can he have any effect on the disciples who come to him expecting that he will have something to teach? A typical Mādhyamika reply to this question opens up the complex theory of the Buddha's "bodies" (*kāya*):

> [An opponent objects:] A Buddha who has no concepts (*nirvikalpa*) cannot have any Mahāyāna, because such a Buddha ultimately teaches no Dharma. . . .
>
> [Bhāvaviveka replies:] The Tathāgata Body is nonconceptual (*nirvikalpa*), but because of a promise to seek the welfare and happiness of others and because of a previous vow, a Manifested Body (*nirmāṇa-kāya*) arises from it

[7] Spros pa ni stong pa nyid kyis 'gag par 'gyur zhes bya ba gsungs te / rtog pas zhes bya ba'i tshig gi lhag ma'o / / chos bdag med pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid rtogs pas 'gag par 'gyur ro / / yang na stong pa nyid kyis 'gag 'gyur zhes bya ba la / stong pa nyid ni stong pa nyid ces pas ste / stong pa nyid shes pa skyes na 'gag par 'gyur ro / / zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go / / (*The Tibetan Tripitaka: Peking Edition* [Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1957], vol. 95, *Tsha* 231a).

that is capable of assisting everyone. On the basis of this [Manifested Body] a teaching is produced that conforms to syllables, words, and sentences. This [teaching] reveals to the followers of the Mahayana the selflessness of both *dharmas* and persons (*pudgala*)—[a doctrine that is] not shared by heretics (*tīrthika*), Disciples (*śrāvaka*) and Solitary Buddhas (*pratyeka-buddha*)—so that the perfections (*pāramitā*) may be accomplished. This [teaching] is called "Mahāyāna." The teaching arises in spoken form when the Ultimate Buddha is present. This is why we consider the Teacher to be the agent of the teaching.[8]

Bhāvaviveka's reply distinguishes two forms of the Buddha. First, there is the Tathāgata Body, which corresponds to the Ultimate Buddha and in other contexts to the Dharma Body. This body has no concepts, no motive, and, strictly speaking, no "action." From the Tathāgata Body appears a Manifested Body that makes it possible for the Buddha to act. The Manifested Body is active but not ultimate; the Tathāgata Body ultimate but not active.

The distinction between the Tathāgata Body and the Manifested Body allows Bhāvaviveka to claim that the Buddha "acts" without violating the nonconceptual character of emptiness. The actual bearer of the Buddha's action is the Manifested Body rather than the Tathāgata Body. The Tathāgata Body remains pure in its nonconceptuality. But the distinction raises even more questions. If the Buddha's "action" is limited to an aspect of Buddhahood that is less than ultimate, how can it have its intended salvific effect? The Buddha's ultimate awareness is the source of salvation and, even if the Manifested Body acts, would still be shrouded by silence. So the next question is whether the action of the Manifested Body can in some sense be attributed to the Tathāgata Body. Is the voice of the Manifested Body associated in some way with the silence of the Tathāgata Body? To answer this question Bhāvaviveka makes use of a brief but crucial formula drawn from much earlier levels of Buddhist speculation: "This teaching arises

[8] Sangs rgyas rnam rtog med pa yi / /
theg pa chen po mi rung ste / /
gang phyir don dam sangs rgyas kyis / /
chos ni bstan pa ma byas phyir / /

De bzhin gshegs pa'i sku rnam par mi rtog pa las kyang / sprul pa'i skus thams cad la phan 'dogs par bzod pa gzhan la phan pa dang / bde ba sgrub pa'i thugs dam gyi yongs su bsgos pa nyid dang / sngon gyi smon lam gyi shugs kyi dbang gis rnam pa thams cad du 'byung ste / de la brten nas yi ge dang ngag dang tshig rjes su mthun pa'i mtshan nyid kyi gsung chos dang / gang zag bdag med par mu stegs byed dang / nyan thos dang sangs rgyas thams cad dang thun mong ma yin pa gsal bar mdzad pa / pha rol tu phyin pa rnams yang dag par 'grub pa'i phyir theg pa mchog gis 'gro ba rnams la nye bar 'byung ste / de ni theg pa chen po zhes bya'o / / don dam pa'i sangs rgyas yod na bstan pa brjod pa'i gsung 'byung ba'i phyir ston pa yang bstan pa dag gi mdzad pa po nyid du 'dod pa kho na yin pas (ibid., *Tsha* 301b–302a).

in spoken form when the Ultimate Buddha is present." The phrase is a direct reflection of the early Buddhist formula of dependent arising:

> When this is present, that comes to be;
> from the arising of this, that arises.
> When this is absent, that does not come to be;
> on the cessation of this, that ceases.[9]

David Kalupahana has rightly drawn attention to the pragmatic quality of this archaic formula.[10] The formula indicates only that two phenomena are associated empirically. To say that one causes or has a rigid connection with the other would be to say too much. To deny any association at all would be to say too little. Instead of a formal causal relationship there is merely the pragmatic observation that the occurrence of one phenomenon is associated with the occurrence of another. For Bhāvaviveka the formula allows an empirical association of "action" with the presence of the Tathāgata Body, without attributing to it the formal role of cause.

It is worth noting that, while Bhāvaviveka does not mention the distinction between the two truths (*satya-dvaya*), his argument would be lost without it. He is trying to argue that the Tathāgata Body does not act but nevertheless is associated empirically with action. To make this position convincing he would have to bring to the surface his assumption about a duality of perspectives: one perspective from which the Buddha appears not to act and another from which he seems to be associated with action. The possibility of multiple perspectives troubled some Mahāyāna philosophers. But the Mādhyamikas saw no inconsistency in holding that two different perspectives on an object could yield two different results, as Jñānagarbha indicates in his discussion of the two truths: "What is ultimate for one is relative for another, just as one person's mother is considered another person's wife."[11] If he were forced to be explicit, Bhāvaviveka would say that ultimately (*paramārthena*) the Buddha does not act, but conventionally (*vyavahāreṇa*) he is associated with action. The systematic

[9] *Imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imass 'uppādā idaṃ uppajjati. . . . Imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.* The formula is found in *The Majjhima-nikāya*, ed. V. Trenckner and R. Chalmers (London: Pali Text Society, 1888–99), 1:262–64 and elsewhere in the Pāli *suttas*. The translation is quoted from David Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), pp. 28–29.

[10] Kalupahana, chap. 3.

[11] Gzhan gyi don dam byas gang yin / / de ni gzhan gyi kun rdzob ste / / gzhan gyi mar 'dod gang yin de / / gzhan gyi chung mar 'dod pa bzhin (*Derge Tibetan Tripiṭaka*, Tōhoku 3882, *Sa* 10a).

use of these two perspectives is what makes Mādhyamika thought so relentlessly paradoxical. But the contradictions are much less troubling if the differences between the two perspectives are kept clear.

So far the Mādhyamikas have given us two aspects of Buddhahood that can serve as a focus of gratitude. There is a Buddha who embodies ultimacy in the form of an awareness of emptiness and a Buddha who can act out of this awareness of emptiness to save living beings. Other aspects of Buddhahood can be brought to the surface as well, if we are prepared to ask the right questions. We have used a passage that describes the Manifested Body as "arising" from the Tathāgata Body. When it had arisen it was capable of manifesting the "action" of the Tathāgata Body in Bhāvaviveka's carefully circumscribed sense. But the "arising" of the Manifested Body raises an entirely new series of questions. For example, what causes it to arise? If its cause is the Tathāgata Body, we fall again into the same kind of questions that surrounded the Buddha's action. If the Tathāgata Body is nonconceptual, how can it cause something to arise at one time rather than another, or in one form rather than another? And if it causes one thing to arise rather than another, how can it still be nonconceptual? To answer these questions the Mādhyamikas shifted their attention away from the moment of the Buddha's enlightenment to the actions he performed while he was still a bodhisattva (a Buddha in the making) preparing the way for eventual Buddhahood.

In the passage on the Buddha's action Bhāvaviveka said: "The Tathāgata Body is non-conceptual, but because of a promise to seek the welfare and happiness of others and because of a previous vow, a Manifested Body arises from it that is capable of assisting everyone." The force of this sentence can easily be lost in what otherwise seems to be an array of conventional formulas. But the terms "promise" and "vow" are meant to have great theoretical significance. They refer to the lingering traces of past decisions and actions that continue to have effect even when the bodhisattva who was the agent of the actions has been completely extinguished. The image is of a bodhisattva who acts like a rock dropped into a karmic pond. The bodhisattva is gone, but the ripples continue to radiate outward from the point where he disappeared. Or it might be better to think of the extinguished bodhisattva as a black hole in the karmic universe, an invisible and impenetrable singularity that can be seen only by the clouds of white-hot matter spiraling around and into it. Śāntideva used more conventional images to make the same point in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra:*

> When neither being nor non-being are present to the mind, then, since there is no other option, [cognition] has no object and is laid to rest. [9.35]

The Buddha's body appears because of [the achievements of his] disciples and [his previous] vows, like a wishing-jewel or a wishing-tree that fulfills desires. [9.36]

It is as if a snake-charmer disappeared after consecrating a pillar that quells poison long after he has passed away. [9.37]

The pillar of the Buddha is consecrated by the [bodhisattva] practice that led to enlightenment, and it accomplishes everything that needs to be accomplished, even though the *bodhisattva* has been extinguished. [9.38][12]

The prototype for these comparisons is the Buddha relic enshrined in the reliquary mound (*stūpa*) that serves as the focus of Buddhist worship. The early Pāli tradition gives us the picture of a Buddha who at his death is completely extinguished. He does not continue in a personal sense to guide his disciples. Instead he leaves behind a powerful double legacy. His teaching (*dhamma*) guides those who are able to follow his example and seek an end to the cycle of transmigration, and his physical relics (*sarīra*) serve as a focus of meditation and veneration for those who need to depend on an external object of worship to gain spiritual benefit.[13]

These two legacies, the teaching and the relic, or the Dharma Body (*dhamma-kāya*) and the Form Body (*rūpa-kāya*), correspond to the Tathāgata Body and Manifested Body in Bhāvaviveka's account of the Buddha's activity, but with a shift in meaning.[14] The Tathāgata Body is not the body of the Buddha's teaching, but the pure, nonconceptual awareness that in the Mahāyāna is the essence of his teaching, and the Manifested Body is not the physical relic, but the form of the Buddha that lingers in active, conceptual form. The change in meaning is due in part to a more radical application of the concept of Buddha bodies. In the Pāli canon the distinction between the Dharma Body and Form Body represented an attempt to deal with the absence of the Buddha after his death. In Mādhyamika literature the distinction was applied to all events in the Buddha's life after his enlightenment. Events that in the Pāli tradition were considered actual acts of the Buddha, from the instruction of his first disciples in the Deer

[12] *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva*, pp. 199–200. See also Bhāvaviveka's account of the Buddha's silence in n. 5 above.

[13] On the establishment of the *stūpa* cult, see "The Book of the Great Decease" (*Maha-parinibbāna-suttanta*) in *Buddhist Suttās*, trans. T. W. Rhys Davids, The Sacred Books of the East, vol. 11 (1881; reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1969).

[14] Frank Reynolds gives a clear account of the *dhamma-kāya* and *rūpa-kāya* in the Theravāda and comments on the connection between the *rūpa-kāya* and the *stūpa* cult in "The Several Bodies of Buddha: Reflections on a Neglected Aspect of Theravada Tradition," *History of Religions* 6 (1977): 374–89.

Park at Benares to the Buddha's dying words, were considered by the Mādhyamikas to be nothing more than the lingering effect of actions performed before the enlightenment.

Bhāvaviveka's brief account of the two bodies does not specify in great detail what these previous actions were, but it does indicate the type of action Bhāvaviveka had in mind: he refers to a "promise to seek the welfare and happiness of others and a previous vow." The concept of the "vow" (*praṇidhāna*), in particular, played a dominant role in the form of the Mahāyāna tradition that emphasized a person's dependence on the Buddha's salvific activity. The example that comes most easily to mind is the tradition of salvation described in the *Sukhāvatī-vyūha*, the model for the Pure Land tradition in much of China and Japan.[15] This sūtra explains that, if a person chants the name of the Buddha Amitābha with a serene mind, it is possible to be reborn in Amitābha's Buddha field, the Pure Land. What makes the salvation possible is not Amitābha's present action but the vow that was taken when Amitābha was still a bodhisattva. The vow lingers and works its effect, even when the bodhisattva has been extinguished.

If we add the element of the bodhisattva's preparatory action to the other aspects of Buddhahood discussed earlier, we begin to get a sense of the complex religious structure within which an adherent of the Mahāyāna might express "gratitude to the Buddha." The Buddha is an embodiment of emptiness, so we can say with some justification that gratitude is *to* the ultimate. The Buddha also "acts" (in a very circumscribed sense), so we can say that gratitude is for the Buddha's saving activity. But the stress falls less on the Buddha's present activity than on actions he took when he was still a bodhisattva. Gratitude is above all for the conditions of salvation set in motion by the future Buddha as part of his preparation for enlightenment.

Only one part of the concept of Buddhahood still remains to be explored for us to complete the picture. The verses from the ninth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* quoted earlier contained a double formula to explain how the Buddha's body arises: "[It] appears because of [the achievements of his] disciples and [his previous] vows."[16] The role of the vow is now clear, but what of the disciples themselves? Mādhyamika literature describes their importance in different ways. The *Tathāgataguhya Sūtra*, quoted by Candrakīrti and cited differently by a number of other Mādhyamikas, says that "all sentient beings, with their various dispositions and interests [hear the

[15] *Buddhist Mahāyāna Texts*, trans. F. Max Müller et al., The Sacred Books of the East, vol. 49 (1894; reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1969).

[16] See n. 12 above.

Buddha's voice] in accordance with their aspirations [*adhimukti*]."[17] Bhāvaviveka's account of the two bodies of the Buddha attributes no role to the disciples, but he corrects the omission in his commentary on *Madhyamaka-kārikā* 25.24cd:

"The Buddha taught no Dharma anywhere to anyone" means that a voice called "the Dharma Teaching," which is based on [the Perfections] that begin with generosity (*dāna*), has sixty parts, and satisfies all sentient beings, arises as if from the Tathāgata's action, in accordance with the inclinations, faculties, and dispositions [of his listeners], through the influence of his previous vow (*praṇidhāna*) and through the causal agency of the roots of virtue (*kuśala-mūla*) that were produced, accumulated, and developed by sentient beings who were gathered by the four articles of attraction (*saṃgrahavastu*) when he practiced the bodhisattva practice.[18]

With an acute sense of the irony involved in ascribing any active role to the person who is being saved, he attributes even the disciples' own virtues to encounters with the bodhisattva in previous lives.

Whether we accept Bhāvaviveka's modest statement of the disciples' role or the more traditional statement in the *Tathāgataguhya Sūtra* the sources force us to acknowledge some role for the disciples in generating their own salvation. Without the disciples the Buddha would not have spoken, and their statements shape the very nature of the encounter. The *Tathāgataguhya Sūtra* and the quotations from Bhāvaviveka give us only fragmentary hints of what these attainments might be. "The roots of virtues" (*kuśala-mūla*) indicate the importance of merit. "Aspiration" (*adhimukti*) stresses a combination of commitment and a certain cognitive predisposition to enlightenment. A more complete study of the topic would have to look more carefully at the role of both of these concepts in the preliminary stages of the bodhisattva path, especially the path of acquisition (*saṃbhāra-mārga*) and the stage of the practice of aspiration (*adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi*).[19]

[17] See n. 5 above.

[18] Sangs rgyas kyis ni gang du yang / / su la'ang chos 'ga' ma bstan to / / zhes bya ba ni sngon gyi smon lam gyi shugs gyi dbang dang / byang chub sems dpa'i spyad pa spyod pa na bsdu ba'i dngos po bzhis bsdus pa'i sems can dge ba'i rtsab bskyed pa dang / nye bar bsags pa dang yongs su smin par gyur pa rnams kyi rgyu'i mthu nyid gyis mos pa dang / dbang po dang bsam pa'i dbang gis chos ston pa zhes bya ba'i gsung sbyin pa la sogs pa'i gzhir gyur pa / yan lag drug cu dang ldan pa / sems can thams cad yang dag par mgu bar mdzad pa / de bzhin gshegs pa'i phrin las lta bur byung gis (*The Tibetan Tripiṭaka* [n. 7 above], *Tsha* 301a).

[19] The two terms name stages in the outline of the bodhisattva path found in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*. See Eugene Obermiller, "The Doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā as Exposed in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra of Maitreya," *Acta Orientalia* 11 (1932): 1–133, 334–54.

But these quotations show, at the very least, that the disciples themselves play an essential role in the salvific encounter, both through their merit and through their preliminary understanding. In a certain sense the encounter with the empty Buddha is nothing more than a chance for them to see reflected back at themselves the reaction their own study and practice have prepared them to see.

The combination of dependence on the Buddhas and bodhisattvas with a sense of self-reliance gives a certain ironical tone to the more sophisticated forms of Mahāyāna devotional literature. The patterns of dependence are present in familiar form in the poets' expressions of thanks to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas for the benefit their actions have brought to living beings. But the poets also express their own ability to embody the aspiration and the insight that distinguish the great saviors of the Mahāyāna tradition. The verses interweave the themes of dependence and autonomy, or humility and self-exaltation, in a way that makes both good poetry and good philosophy. A few verses from the opening chapters of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* will illustrate what I mean.

To grasp the jewel of the mind (*citta*) I worship (*pūjāṃ karomi*) the Tathāgatas, the pure jewel of the Good Dharma, and the offspring of the Buddhas [i.e., the bodhisattvas] who possess an ocean of virtues. [2.1]

All the flowers, fruit, and medicinal herbs, all the jewels in the world, and all the clear and pleasant water; [2.2]

Jewel-bearing mountains, forests delightful for solitude, vines resplendent with ornaments of flowers, and trees whose branches are bent with good fruit . . . [2.3]

I bear with my mind (*buddhi*) and offer to the Great Sages and their offspring. May they who are most worthy of honor accept them from me and with great compassion take pity on me. [2.6][20]

The poet stresses his own humility by saying that he has nothing to offer as worship to the Buddhas but the imaginative creations of his own mind. But the term "mind" (*citta* and the related terms *buddhi* and *mati*) always recalls the "mind of enlightenment" (*bodhicitta*), which is precisely the quality that makes Buddhas and bodhisattvas such exalted beings. "I bow to the bodies (*śarīra*) of those in whom the precious mind (*citta*) has arisen, and take refuge in those who are the source of happiness and bring pleasure even to those who cause

[20] The Sanskrit of these and the subsequent verses is found in *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva*.

harm" (1.36). The poet acknowledges the great gap between himself and those Buddhas and bodhisattvas who have generated the mind of enlightenment. But merely by aspiring to such an awareness and doing honor to those who have achieved it, the poet himself begins to embody the mind he is praising. The full description of the poet's own "arising of the mind" (*cittopāda*) does not come for another chapter, but by praising the Buddha and expressing his abject dependence on those who have gone before, he begins by implication to experience the mind of Buddhahood himself.

The subtle movement from dependence on the mind of others to the embodiment of the mind within himself is expressed beautifully in the beginning of the third chapter.

I rejoice with faith in the merit all beings have acquired to relieve the suffering of unhappy states. May those who suffer dwell in happiness. [3.1]

I rejoice in the liberation of beings from the suffering of transmigratory existence, and I rejoice in the bodhisattvahood and Buddhahood of the saviors (*tāyin*). [3.2]

I rejoice in the oceans of the teachers' arising mind (*cittotpāda*) which brings pleasure and confers benefit on all beings. [3.3]

With folded hands I beseech the Buddhas in every direction. May they make the Dharma a lamp for those who out of ignorance have fallen into suffering. [3.4]

With folded hands I beseech the Buddhas who seek nirvana. May they stay for endless ages and may this world not be blind. [3.5]

And with the merit I have acquired by saying all this, may I act to calm the suffering of all beings. [3.6]

Just as the ancient Buddhas grasped the mind of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*) and persevered in the bodhisattva practice, [3.22]

I also generate the mind of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*) for the welfare of the world and eventually will practice these practices. [3.23]

When a wise person (*matiman*) has faithfully grasped the aspiration for enlightenment, he should rejoice (*praharṣayet*) for it to increase in the thought (*citta*) that: [3.24]

Today my birth has become fruitful. My human condition is appropriate. Today I have been born in the Buddha's family. I am now a child of the Buddha. [3.25]

In this passage the praise for the Buddhas and bodhisattvas gives way slowly to a joyous recognition that the poet himself embodies the qualities of a bodhisattva. The poet moves from the recognition of others' good fortune in the first three verses (a "joyful acquiescence" or *anumodanā* that indicates the quality of gratitude among ordinary beings) to joy in his own accomplishments in verse 24. The joy of each section is an aspect of gratitude, but each has a different focus. The first section reflects gratitude to Buddhas and bodhisattvas for their acts on behalf of others. Verses 24 and 25 reflect joy in the unfolding of the poet's own potentialities. What ties them together is the connection in verse 6. The poet cannot aspire to act as a bodhisattva acts unless he acknowledges his dependence on others and dedicates the results to others as well.

In summary, we can see that the theistic expectations surrounding the image of gratitude in Western religious thought pose a series of questions to the Buddhist sources. Can gratitude to the Buddha be understood as an expression of gratitude toward ultimate reality? And does gratitude focus largely on the present salvific actions of the Buddha or on the past? In the end we have a concept of Buddhahood that allows many important points of contact with theistic systems, but with crucial differences. The Mādhyamika tradition allows us to conceive of the Buddha as a point in which a human being can confront the ultimate. We also can conceive of the Buddha as the focal point of a history of salvific action. So it is possible to say without grievous distortion that a Buddhist can be grateful to emptiness in the form of the Buddha for a history of saving activities. But these statements have to be qualified to be fully acceptable. Emptiness is not a divine or supernatural reality. Indeed in Mādhyamika thought it ultimately is not a reality at all. And it is wrong to say that the Buddha ultimately acts. Finally we have to recognize that, in a significant confrontation with the emptiness embodied in a Buddha, Buddhists are grateful as much for the unfolding of their own autonomous potentialities as they are for the saving activities of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas.

Let me finish with an anecdote that helps put the elements of gratitude in the Mahāyāna tradition in proper perspective. The living quarters of a Tibetan monk often have elaborate altars that serve as the center of a private cult, with small Buddha images arranged next to images of the founders of the monastic lineages. Often a photograph of the monk's teacher is displayed prominently among these figures, as if he too were an object of devotion. Yet the elaborate, formal expressions of respect and even of dependence on a teacher seem puzzling, especially in a tradition that puts so much emphasis on autonomy and critical thought. On a recent visit to a Tibetan monastic college, I pressed one of the monks to explain what he meant by "the method of dependence on the teacher" (*bshes-gnyen-rten-tshul*) that characterized his tradition. I asked in particular whether dependence on a teacher could be compared to dependence

on one's own parents, a relationship that was outgrown when a person came to maturity. He laughed and said that the relationship was not the same at all. People could outgrow dependence on a mother or father, but the more people developed the depth of insight that led eventually to Buddhahood, the more they realized the extent of their dependence on their teachers. A sense of autonomy and a sense of dependence grew side by side. In the Mahāyāna tradition gratitude coexists with the autonomous development of a person's own potential for Buddhahood. To be truly independent is to realize the depth of one's dependence on others.

* * *

At the beginning of this essay I indicated that a close look at the concept of gratitude in Buddhist philosophical literature could give us a new perspective on structures of religious thought that are closer to home. To understand the reason for a new perspective one need only be reminded of the anomalous place Buddhist philosophy occupies in the theory of the study of religion. Buddhist philosophers seem to stretch the obvious interpretive categories to the breaking point. For Western historians of religion who are theologically based, the problem focuses on the existence of God. The Buddhist intellectual tradition in India made a clear point of denying the existence of God (*Īśvara*) as part of a polemic against the brahmanical tradition as a whole. For historians of religion who see religion through images of the "divine," "supernatural," or "transcendent," this leads to awkward problems of interpretation. Either Buddhist philosophers are viewed as nonreligious, or other categories have to be interpreted so that they function as surrogates for God. Wilfred Cantwell Smith's treatment of Buddhist faith in *Faith and Belief* is a classic example of the latter approach. Smith argues that the Buddhist orientation toward Dharma is fundamentally similar to the Western religious orientation toward God, and it is this similarity in orientation that makes the Buddhist tradition religious: "The movement is religious because through it men and women's lives were lived in what the Western world has traditionally called the presence of God."[21] Smith's argument is not "wrong" in an obvious sense. As a form of imaginative transposition, meant to stimulate a new understanding of both "God" and "Dharma," it has much to commend it. But as an interpretive formula, it runs

[21] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Faith and Belief* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 32.

into 1,500 years of Buddhist arguments to the contrary. On this point the Buddhist tradition is not easily moved.

Even the more neutral categories of the phenomenologists suffer comparable problems, in spite of the effort to start with categories that are as open-ended as possible. Van der Leeuw, for example opens his phenomenology with a definition that is scrupulously neutral in theological content: "Thus the first affirmation we can make about the Object of Religion is that it is a *highly exceptional* and *extremely impressive* '*Other*'. . . . As yet, it must further be observed, we are in no way concerned with the supernatural or the transcendent: we can speak of 'God' in a merely figurative sense; but there arises and persists an experience which connects or unites itself to the 'Other' that thus obtrudes."[22] Here the definition of religion is freed from specific ideas of God or the supernatural and tied instead to a structural principle: religion has to do with what is fundamentally different from the ordinary. A structural principle such as "otherness" makes it easier to approach the phenomena of Buddhist religiosity without prejudging the nature of the "object" that underlies them. The *stūpa*, for example, is set apart in certain formal ways as a focus of worship and can be treated as a religious structure, quite apart from what it is that is being worshiped. But even the principle of otherness seems to break down at the level of emptiness. Nāgārjuna's claim that "there is no difference between ordinary existence (*saṃsāra*) and nirvana" is but one, well-known example of the protest against dualism in Mādhyamika literature.[23] There are many more examples that could be quoted from both sophisticated and unsophisticated Mahāyāna literature to show this uneasiness with dualistic categories, especially when the process of philosophical analysis or religious questioning is pushed to its ultimate conclusion. The problem these passages pose to the theoretical study of religion is clear: if dualities are given only peripheral or penultimate status, the "otherness" that to Van der Leeuw was the distinguishing feature of religious phenomena does not have ultimate significance. Religious categories can only be considered peripheral to Buddhist thought.

Problems such as these are familiar to anyone who works with Indian Buddhist sources and would not deserve to be rehearsed again if they did not reflect so sharply on the image of the Buddha as the empty savior. In that single image of the Buddha, who is free from all conceptuality and does not truly act, yet whose power and presence

[22] G. Van der Leeuw, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 23.

[23] *Mūlamadhyamakākārikā* 25.19.

bring about the salvation of his disciples, we can see the Mādhyamika philosophers struggling with the religious aspect of their own thought. The works of the philosophers of the Indian Mahāyāna have been thoroughly explored from the philosophical point of view; the distinctive features of their ontology and their epistemology have been sketched out in great detail. But apart from Frederick Streng's now classic work, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*, there have been very few studies that treat these philosophers seriously as philosophers of religion.[24] Yet a glance at the contents of one of the encyclopedic works of Mahāyāna thought, such as Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, shows more than just a few isolated images of Buddhahood in a sea of epistemology and metaphysics. Candrakīrti, Bhāvaviveka, Śāntideva, and the other great philosophers of the Mādhyamika tradition framed their philosophy within a discussion of Buddhahood. The quest for Buddhahood was presented both as the reason for starting philosophical study and the goal the philosophy was meant to seek. And the texts in the tradition that have had the greatest enduring value, such as Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* and Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, were the ones that wove philosophical themes together with problems, such as merit making, faith, and devotion, that gave the tradition a distinctively religious flavor.

The image of the Buddha as the empty savior is helpful precisely because it pictures the religious situation for the philosophers without imposing the complicated superstructure of Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. It pictures the Buddha as someone who embodies the ultimate and makes it present. Crystallized in his presence, the ultimate has the power to transform those who encounter it and become the object of devotion and gratitude. All these characteristics can be associated with a religious phenomenology, since the ultimate is manifested as something that is out of the ordinary and becomes a locus of power. But the philosophers' interpretation of the image also shows how this simple image can be turned to a distinctively Buddhist end. The Buddha acquires his power by embodying a nonconceptual ideal. It is only the interaction of the Buddha's previous career and the potentiality of the worshiper that brings the transforming power of the Buddha's presence to bear in the life of the worshiper. Ultimately the gap between the worshiper and the Buddha who is worshiped is

[24] Frederick Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning* (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1967). An interesting exception to the general disregard of issues that might be interpreted as having a religious dimension is Masatoshi Nagatomi's "The Framework of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Book I," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 79 (1959): 263–66.

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broken down as the worshiper discovers the power of transformation that lies within. Here images of duality and nonduality coincide without a crude system of ranking that insists on placing one higher than the other. Of course, nonduality is ultimate, but it is inseparable from its dualistic context, just as the autonomy of a Tibetan monk is inseparable from dependence on a teacher.

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BODHIDHARMA AS TEXTUAL AND RELIGIOUS PARADIGM

In the last few decades, the study of Ch'an or Zen Buddhism has progressed greatly due essentially to the rediscovery of the Tun-huang manuscripts and to the role of Chinese and Japanese scholars such as Hu Shih, Ui Hakuju, Sekiguchi Shindai, and Yanagida Seizan. These scholars have attempted to detach themselves from the sectarian affiliations that once dominated the field of Ch'an studies and to approach the history of this tradition from an objective point of view. We owe to them an understanding of Ch'an/Zen that is sometimes quite different from the traditional account exported to the West by D. T. Suzuki, which unfortunately too often still prevails. Despite Suzuki's lasting influence, the situation of Ch'an studies in the West is gradually changing, and the early Ch'an tradition in particular is being placed by some scholars in its proper historical context.[1] This historical approach is certainly necessary and needs to be encouraged. But it also raises various problems, particularly in the case of the so-called founders of Ch'an schools. I would like to consider some of those problems here. Generally speaking, there are two alternatives to the historical approach: philosophical hermeneutics and structural criticism. I limit myself here to the structural approach and take

order ?

[1] See, e.g., Philip B. Yampolsky, *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

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as an example the legendary founder of Ch'an, the Indian monk Bodhidharma.

POSITION OF THE PROBLEM: THE "BIOGRAPHICAL" ILLUSION

Bodhidharma's biography is very obscure, yet his life is relatively well known. This is less paradoxical than it may sound. I shall argue that hagiography flourishes precisely owing to the scarcity of historical materials. The main task of historians, usually, is to try to uncover the facts behind the legend. The texts concerning Bodhidharma are considered by historians as documents that need to be interpreted using the historical method so as to bring to light their hidden truths. Often enough, after this mortuary washing, only a skeleton remains, and it is this skeleton that will enter the museum of history. In fact, some missing bones may have to be taken from another skeleton to complete the exhibit. Indeed, though some may consider biography the opposite of hagiography, the biographical process is in most cases only an unconscious duplication of the hagiographical process. Both are characterized by an attitude that I would call "substantialist," in that they consider a personage as some kind of individual entity whose essence is reflected in specific texts—biographical or doctrinal.

Thus, we have many biographical notices concerning Bodhidharma and several works attributed to him. Sekiguchi Shindai has shown that most of these *Treatises of Bodhidharma* were apocryphal.[2] Only one of them, the so-called *Treatise on the Two Entrances and Four Practices*, is presently considered to be Bodhidharma's teaching as recorded by his disciple T'an-lin.[3] In this work is also found the first biographical notice concerning Bodhidharma. According to this account, he was a South Indian monk who came to China to transmit the essence of Mahāyāna teachings. After his arrival in Canton, he went to Lo-yang, then the capital of the Northern Wei. These biographical elements reappear in Tao-hsüan's *Continued Biographies of Eminent Monks*, written in 645 (and revised down to 664) more than one century after Bodhidharma's mysterious death.[4] According to Tao-hsüan, Bodhidharma's type of practice, the so-called wall contemplation, was considerably different from and much more difficult to understand than the classical Indian *dhyāna* then prevalent in

[2] Sekiguchi Shindai, *Daruma daishi no kenkyū* [A study of the great master Bodhidharma] (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1957).

[3] See J. A. Jorgensen, "The Earliest Text of Ch'an Buddhism: The Long Scroll" (M.A. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1979).

[4] See *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* [Taishō edition of the Buddhist canon], ed. Takakusu Junjirō et al. (Tokyo: 1924–32), 50, 2060, 551c (hereafter abbreviated as *T.*; the references give the volume number, the catalog number, and the page and column).

Northern China.[5] He therefore attracted only a few followers. Among them was Hui-k'o, who later became the second patriarch of Ch'an. A passage in Hui-k'o's notice tells us that Bodhidharma transmitted to him a Buddhist scripture, the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, as the essence of his teaching;[6] hence the Ch'an school was first known as the "Laṅkāvatāra School." Another earlier mention of Bodhidharma is to be found in the *Record of the Buddhist Monasteries of Lo-yang*.[7] In this text, Bodhidharma is presented as a very old Central Asian monk who spent several days singing in praise of the great stupa in the Yung-ning monastery.

After endless discussions, historians have harmonized these conflicting images of Bodhidharma—as a devout and somewhat senile monk, as an austere practitioner of some esoteric type of meditation, and as a transmitter of Buddhist scriptures—to give a coherent account of his personality that differs greatly from that of the legendary figure of the Ch'an tradition. Yet all these discussions and the subsequent conclusions may have missed the point. As I mentioned earlier, the historiographical process that leads to the elaboration of this biography bears important resemblances to the hagiographical process on which it relies. Both share the same obsession with filling the chronological gaps by borrowing from various sources, and both are therefore ideological products. By considering the texts as documents that will yield valuable information, historiography completely ignores their worklike nature.[8] Such an easy division between "historical" and "hagiographical" components does violence to the texts and deprives the historian of valuable information about the evolution of Ch'an thought. Historiographical discourse often assumes that the earliest sources are the most authentic without questioning that assumption. In other words it is a rather arbitrary reconstruction that ignores or hides its ideological motivations and simply "submits a literary genre to the laws of another—historiography."[9] In the case of Ch'an historiography, a teleological conception of history appears to hold sway, one which takes classical Japanese Zen as the logical end of the Ch'an tradition, which in turn makes the "search for the real

[5] *T.* 50, 2060, 596c.

[6] *T.* 50, 2060, 552b.

[7] See A. C. Soper, *Literary Evidence for Early Buddhist Art in China*, *Artibus Asiae*, suppl. 19 (Ascona, Switzerland: Artibus Asiae Publishers, n.d.), p. 111; see also Paul Pelliot, "Notes sur quelques artistes des Six Dynasties et des T'ang," *T'oung Pao* 22 (1923): 253–61.

[8] On the distinction between the documentary and "worklike" aspects of a text, see Dominick LaCapra, *Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 30.

[9] Michel de Certeau, *L'Ecriture de l'histoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), p. 275.

Bodhidharma" meaningful only as a legitimation of the Zen tradition. If Bodhidharma was no more than an ordinary Central Asian monk, we may as well dismiss him as irrelevant to an understanding of the Ch'an and later Zen traditions. Bodhidharma does not, then, deserve attention as a historical person; and Buddhist historiographers should perhaps stop searching for "eminent monks" and writing their "biographies." The biographies that exist already have literary but not historical value; Bodhidharma should be interpreted as a textual and religious paradigm and not be reconstructed as a historical figure or a psychological essence.

But one may object that we possess works attributed to Bodhidharma and that his thought, at least, is relatively well known to us. Here again, we may be misled by thinking that is too "substantialist." As a working hypothesis Michel Foucault's definition of the author might yield much better results. According to Foucault, "The author is the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning. . . . [He] is not an indefinite source of significations which fill the work; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition and recomposition of fictions."[10]

Such a redefinition of the author may help us avoid the type of historicist reductionism that can still be found in very recent Ch'an studies. In one such study, for example, we find an attempt at reconstructing the thought of the *dhyāna* master Seng-ch'ou (480–560), the contemporary and successful rival of Bodhidharma (according to Tao-hsüan's *Continued Biographies*).[11] Seng-ch'ou is credited with a number of works that are clearly the products of a much later period and reflect the point of view of the so-called Northern School of Ch'an.[12] The same type of reductionism is found in the study of eminent Ch'an monks such as Wo-lun,[13] Shen-hsiu, or Hui-neng.[14] This traditional discussion of authorship is reminiscent of Borges's fiction about the world of Tlön, in which all books are considered

[10] See Michel Foucault, "What Is an Author?" in *Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-structuralist Criticism*, ed. Josue V. Harari (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 159.

[11] *T.* 50, 2060, 553b.

[12] See Jan Yün-hua, "Seng-ch'ou's Method of Dhyāna," in *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, ed. Lewis Lancaster and Whalen Lai (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 54–63.

[13] See Wu Chi-yü, "Wo-lun Ch'an-shih i-yü Tun-huang T'u-fan-wen (*Pelliot 116* hao) i-pen k'ao-shih," *Tung-huang hsüeh* 4 (1979): 33–46.

[14] This may be equally true in the case of Bodhidharma's *Treatise on the Two Entrances*, which is strongly reminiscent of Seng-ch'ou's *Hsin-hsing lun* [Treatise on mental practice].

the work of a single author: "The critics often invent authors: they select two dissimilar works—the *Tao-te ching* and the *1001 Nights*, say—attribute them to the same writer and then determine most scrupulously the psychology of this interesting *homme de lettres*."[15] As the literary critic Gérard Genette points out, "Fundamentally, Tlönian criticism is not the *contrary* of our positivist criticism, it is rather its hyperbole."[16]

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

I would therefore like to treat Bodhidharma's "life" as a literary piece belonging to the genre of hagiography. The first step toward understanding its meaning, then, is to ask what this genre is and by what rules it is governed. In other words, what is its syntagmatic structure (i.e., "the actual link between various functions in a given text")?[17] Michel de Certeau has proposed an answer worth considering, namely, that "hagiography is characterized by a predominance of precisions concerning places over precisions concerning time. . . . The life of a saint is a composition of places."[18]

The second step is to examine the paradigmatic structure of the hagiographical text (i.e., "the virtual relations between analogous or opposed functions, from one text to the other, in the whole corpus under consideration"). This leads me to ask whether the meaning of the hagiographical text itself has ever been fixed once for all. According to Ferdinand de Saussure: "To imagine that a legend begins with a meaning, has had since its first origin the *meaning* that it now has, is an operation beyond my understanding. It seems to suppose really that there have never been any material elements transmitted on this legend through centuries."[19]

De Saussure contends that in any particular legend each of the characters "is a symbol for which one can observe variations of: (a) name, (b) position vis-à-vis others, (c) character, and (d) function and actions. If a *name* is transposed, it could follow that part of the action is reciprocally transposed or that the whole drama is entirely changed by an accident of this kind."[20]

This, I believe, can provide a good starting point from which to examine Bodhidharma's life as a narrative. It is, in a sense, more

[15] Jorge Luis Borges, *Labyrinths* (New York: New Directions, 1964), p. 13.

[16] Gérard Genette, *Figures I* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), p. 129.

[17] Ibid., p. 154.

[18] Certeau, p. 286.

[19] See Jean Starobinski, *Words upon Words: The Anagrams of Ferdinand de Saussure* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 8.

[20] Ibid., pp. 5–6.

flexible than Vladimir Propp's theories concerning the folktale,[21] which do not take into consideration the semantic value of the hero's name and are somewhat too systematic for our purpose. The same may be said of Roland Barthes's and Claude Bremond's attempts at analyzing the logic of the narrative, not to mention Lévi-Strauss's study of mythology.[22] Hagiography is a hybrid type of narrative that offers more resistance to structural analysis than the folktale or the myth; yet recent developments in the field of textual analysis may still yield significant results.

A

Let us reconsider Bodhidharma's life in the light of de Saussure's definition by focusing on two of its elements, the function and the name. In the *Continued Biographies of Eminent Monks*, Bodhidharma is contrasted with the *dhyāna* master Seng-ch'ou, whose method of meditation, although deemed of a rather inferior type, was quite popular. To quote Tao-hsüan: "Thus, when we look at these two tenets [of Seng-ch'ou and Bodhidharma, it is clear that] they are like the two wheels of the same cart. [Seng-] ch'ou embraced the [practice called] the 'foundations of mindfulness', a model of purity to be venerated. Bodhidharma relied on the teaching of emptiness, whose purport is obscure and deep. Due to this fact, his principle was intrinsically difficult to comprehend, while Seng-ch'ou's model was easily accessible."[23]

This contrast is a typical literary device, and the opposition between the two men was probably not so clear cut. It is reminiscent of another famous antagonism, that of the respective founders of the so-called Northern and Southern schools of Ch'an, Shen-hsiu and Hui-neng,[24] who became paradigms of the two main types of Ch'an practitioners. Any later Ch'an monk was, in a way, a Hui-neng or a Shen-hsiu. Again, it is clear that the contrast between the two has been exaggerated for hagiographical purposes.

But, more than the contrast itself, what I would like to stress is that, in the early Ch'an tradition, both Bodhidharma and Seng-ch'ou, or Hui-neng and Shen-Hsiu, are symmetrical figures that imply each

[21] Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale* (Bloomington: Indiana University Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore and Linguistics, 1968).

[22] Roland Barthes, "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives," in *Image-Music-Text* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1977); Claude Bremond, *Logique du récit* (Paris: Seuil, 1973); Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, 2 vols. (New York: Basic Books, 1963–76).

[23] *T.* 50, 2060, 596c.

[24] Yampolsky (n. 1 above), pp. 130–32.

other. They constitute a narrative "actor," to use Terence Turner's terminology. According to Turner, "An 'actor' may become polarized into two contrasting figures, sharing one attribute but opposed upon one or more others."[25] The text is a whole, and the literary device used clearly affects the account of the life of each protagonist. It may therefore be artificial to dissect this kind of "biography" and to keep only what concerns Bodhidharma or Seng-ch'ou. Furthermore, the polarization between the two figures might be more than a simple literary device and might reflect instead a preexistent connection at the level of popular consciousness.[26]

Another possible model is provided by Barthes's hypothesis that many narratives "set two adversaries in conflict over some stake; the subject is then truly double, not reducible further by substitution; indeed, this is even perhaps a common archaic form, as though narrative, after the fashion of certain languages, had also known a *dual* of persons."[27] (Note that the French word *duel* has both meanings of "duel" or contest, and "dual" [the category in Greek grammar intermediate between singular and plural].) One of the protagonists of the duel (contrast or conflict) may change, but the duel itself remains. Thus, the contrast between Bodhidharma and Seng-ch'ou is structurally analogous to the rivalry between Hui-neng and Shen-hsiu, which is its sectarian hyperbole. It reflects the opposition and complementarity between the two levels of truth (absolute and conventional) or, in Zen terminology, between the theories of *kyōge betsuden* (special transmission outside of the Scriptures) and *kyōzen itchi* (harmony between Zen and the Scriptures), that is, between purity and eclecticism.

The syntagmatic contrast between Bodhidharma and Seng-ch'ou is obvious from Tao-hsüan's notice. The paradigmatic equivalence between them can be found in the fact that to both are attributed parallel theories concerning the "two entrances" and that both were considered candidates for the position of "first patriarch" by the early Ch'an school. Both, in de Saussure's terms, have the same function in Ch'an discourse and legend, where they are represented as Taoist immortals, Bodhidharma achieving immortality through the so-called

[25] Terence Turner, "Narrative Structure and Mythopoiesis," *Arethusa* 10, no. 1 (1977): 155.

[26] We may think here of what René Girard, in his book on *Violence and the Sacred* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), has said about "antagonistic *mimesis*" and the scapegoating process leading to the eviction of the double, later glorified as a "founder." Bodhidharma's death remains mysterious, and some Japanese scholars have suggested that he may even have been executed. The legend tells us that he was poisoned by jealous rivals.

[27] Barthes, p. 108.

deliverance from the corpse, Seng-ch'ou manifesting his supernatural powers by taming two tigers and causing the welling up of a "divine source."[28] Thus, Seng-ch'ou appears as the main double of Bodhidharma: on the syntagmatic axis of the hagiographical narrative, he is a rival, on its paradigmatic axis, he is a substitute.[29] Both Seng-ch'ou and Bodhidharma were apparently regarded by Ching-chüeh, the author of the *Leng-ch'ieh shih-tzu chi,* as the patriarchs of the two main trends of early Ch'an.[30] The amalgam between the two figures was achieved around the same time, as we can infer from a poem by Ts'en Chen (715–70) about a foreign monk who concentrated on the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and who had subdued two tigers and a dragon (an allusion to the "divine source" kept by a dragon).[31]

On the paradigmatic axis of Bodhidharma's hagiography, we find legends related to other thaumaturges such as Pao-chih and Fu "the Mahasattva" (alias Fu Hsi). Both characters served as models for a certain trend in Buddhism that considered *dhyāna* as a way to acquire supernatural powers. Fu Hsi (497–569), the "Chinese Vimalakīrti," is also considered as the precursor of the T'ien-t'ai school (as is Seng-ch'ou). The famous meeting between Bodhidharma and the Liang emperor Wu (another typical example of "duel")[32] is a variant of the encounter between Fu Hsi and this emperor.[33] In both cases, Pao-chih plays the role of a clairvoyant witness who reveals to the perplexed emperor the real identity of his interlocutor (Fu Hsi being a manifestation of the future Buddha Maitreya, Bodhidharma an avatar of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara [Chinese Kuan-yin]).

The similar function played by Fu Hsi and Bodhidharma is reflected in the comment by the T'ien-t'ai monk Chan-jan that the "Incarnation from Tuṣita Heaven" (Fu Hsi as Maitreya) surpasses the "coming of the Indian saint,"[34] which is to say, T'ien-t'ai teaching is superior to

[28] See Yanagida Seizan, *Shoki Zenshū shisho no kenkyū* [A study of the historiographical works of the early Ch'an school] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1967), p. 597. The names of Bodhidharma and Hui-neng are also related to similar "divine sources," and the latter is known in the legend as a "dragon-subduer." See Michel Soymié, "Sources et sourciers en Chine," *Bulletin de la Maison franco-japonaise,* n.s., 7, no. 1 (1952): 33–34.

[29] The same could be said in the case of Hui-neng and Seng-ch'ou, who are at the same time rivals in the narrative (syntagmatic axis) and functional equivalents (paradigmatic axis) as "sixth patriarch" of the early Ch'an tradition.

[30] *T.* 85, 2837, 1284c; and Yanagida, p. 518.

[31] See "T'ai-po hu-seng ko" [Song of the barbarian monk of T'ai-po], in *Ch'üan T'ang shih,* chüan 199, ed. Sheng Tsu (Taipei: Hung-ye shu chü, 1977), 1:2057 ff.

[32] See *Pi-yen lu* [The record of the blue cliff], "case" 1 (*T.* 48, 2003, 140a).

[33] Ibid., "case" 67 (*T.* 48, 2003, 197a).

[34] See *Chih-kuan i-li* (*T.* 46, 1913, 452c).

Ch'an.[35] The logic at work here is clearly a sectarian one. But the sectarian interpretation does not do justice to the dynamism and complexity of the legend.

B

If we consider now the role played by the name of Bodhidharma in the evolution of his legend, we come to an even more complex situation. The substitution of names is, according to de Saussure, one of the "two types of historic modification of legend which might well be considered the most difficult to accept."[36]

The most obvious confusion is the one between Bodhidharma and the Kashmirian monk Dharmatrāta (who flourished in the beginning of the fifth century), to whom was (unduly) attributed a *dhyāna-sūtra* (*Ta-mo-to-lo ch'an ching*). Not only has Dharmatrāta's lineage become Bodhidharma's lineage, and the basis of the later Ch'an patriarchal tradition, but Bodhidharma himself has become known in Tibet as Bodhidharmatrāta.[37] Note that, in the Tibetan tradition, he has become, with the Northern Ch'an master Mahāyāna, one of the two characters added to the list of the eighteen arhats.[38] Not too surprisingly, Mahāyāna himself is represented as accompanied by a tiger, a possible resurgence of the Seng-ch'ou figure.[39]

[35] This polemical attitude is the product of a later period, but the relationships between T'ien-t'ai and Ch'an schools have also given birth to the legend of the encounter between Bodhidharma and Nan-yüeh Hui-ssu (the first patriarch of T'ien-t'ai). Hui-ssu becomes a disciple of the Indian monk, who tells him that both will be later reincarnated in Japan (see Kōjō's *Isshinkaimon,* *T.* 74, 2379, 653b). This legend eventually merges with the story of the Japanese prince Shōtoku (himself considered as a reincarnation of Hui-ssu) meeting a starving beggar on the roadside and exchanging poems with this strange apparition in which he has recognized his former master Bodhidharma (*T.* 74, 2379, 653c). Another legendary encounter is the one between Bodhidharma and Chih-i, the actual founder of the T'ien-t'ai school. The story is found in a fourteenth-century Tendai encyclopedia, the *Keiran shūyōshū* (*T.* 76, 2410, 532b) and reveals the same opposition between *kyōge betsuden* and *kyōzen itchi.*

[36] The other is "a change of *motive* or *aim* for an action which remains unchanged" (see Starobinski [n. 19 above], p. 7).

[37] See Paul Demiéville, "Appendice sur 'Damoduolo' (Dharmatrā[ta])," in Jao Tsong-yi et al., *Peintures monochromes de Tun-huang (Dunhuang baihua),* Mémoires archéologiques, vol. 13, no. 1 (Paris: Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1978), pp. 43–49.

[38] On the question of the sixteen or eighteen disciples of Buddha, see Sylvain Lévi and Edouard Chavannes, "Les seize arhats protecteurs de la Loi," *Journal Asiatique* 8 (1916): 5–50, 189–304; M. W. de Visser, *The Arhats in China and Japan* (Berlin: Oesterheld, 1923).

[39] There is also some confusion in the iconography with the Chinese translator Hsüan-tsang and Seng-ch'ou. See Yamaguchi Zuihō, "Tora wo tomonau daijūhachi rakanzu no raireki" [On the origins of the eighteenth arhat], *Indō koten kenkyū* 6 (May 1984): 392–422.

Bodhidharma's name appears sometimes truncated as Bodhi, or more often as Dharma (Ta-mo). In the first case, it may be confused with another of his rivals, Bodhiruci. Incidentally, Bodhiruci (d. 527) was a translator of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, in a recension different from the one supposedly transmitted by Bodhidharma to his disciple Hui-k'o. According to the legend, Bodhiruci and another monk, Kuang-t'ung, jealous of Bodhidharma's fame, tried to poison him several times and eventually succeeded.[40] Kuang-t'ung (alias Hui-kuang, 468–537) was himself a disciple of Seng-ch'ou and had also studied on Mount Sung at the famous Shao-lin monastery. This monastery had been built by the emperor Hsiao-wen of the Northern Wei for another Central Asian monk named Fo-t'o or Pa-t'o (Chinese transcription for Buddha or Bhadra).[41] It is only much later, due to specific historical circumstances into which I cannot enter now, that Bodhidharma's name came to be associated with the Shao-lin monastery, leading him to become the posthumous founder of the martial art known as "Shao-lin boxing" (*Shōrinji kempō*). From the Sung-shan gazetteers,[42] we can assume that there was an apparent amalgamation of the lineages of Fo-t'o/Seng-ch'ou and of Bodhidharma/Hui-k'o. Bodhidharma comes to play the same role as Buddha (or Bhadra) as the patriarch of the Shao-lin ssu.

Pa-t'o is also the abbreviated transcription used for Guṇabhadra (394–468), the first translator of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. Guṇabhadra's translation is precisely the recension transmitted by Bodhidharma to Hui-k'o. In the *Leng-ch'ieh shih-tzu chi*,[43] Guṇabhadra is presented as the master of Bodhidharma, and this biographical interpolation may result from his role as transmitter of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra or from a confusion among the founder of the Shao-lin monastery, the *dhyāna* master Pa-t'o, and Bodhidharma's hypothetical nine years' practice near this monastery. In a later work of the Laṅkāvatāra tradition,[44] the relationship between Guṇabhadra and Bodhidharma is inverted, and Bodhidharma becomes the master of Guṇabhadra. In any case, the dual/duel structure remains.

Thus the different elements of the legend discerned by de Saussure reinforce each other and are in fact rather difficult to distinguish.

[40] The story first appears in an eighth-century work, the *Li-tai fa-pao chi* (*T.* 51, 2075, 180c).

[41] Concerning this monk, see Pelliot (n. 7 above), pp. 262–64.

[42] See, e.g., Tung Kao, *Ch'üan T'ang wen*, chüan 514 (Taipei: Hua-wen shu chü, 1965), 11:6619.

[43] *T.* 85, 2837, 1284c.

[44] See the *Leng-ch'ieh ching ch'an-men hsi-t'an chang* (*T.* 85, 2779, 536a); and Paul Demiéville and Jao Tsong-yi, *Airs de Touen-houang (Touen-houang k'iu): Airs à chanter des VIIIe-Xe siècles* (Paris: CNRS, 1971), pp. 84–87.

However inconclusive or impressionistic this argument may seem, all these clues point toward the same conclusion: Bodhidharma's life is a hybrid textual construction, and it is only a part of a larger structure that is also at work in the lives of masters apparently as different as Seng-ch'ou, Pao-chih, Fu Hsi, Fo-t'o (Pa-t'o), Guṇabhadra, Bodhiruci, et cetera. All these characters, before being historical figures, are textual paradigms. Their meaning is not primarily in their historicity but in the significant modifications achieved by their legends.

But biographies, however hagiographic they may be, are not simply legends or myths and are more resistant to a structural analysis than the latter genre. The approach we have taken here cannot be applied indiscriminately. It will prove most useful with certain categories of traditional figures, the so-called founders of a school or the representatives of certain trends. Significantly, most founders have a very dim historical existence. Most of the Buddhist schools start in relative obscurity and are organized by a second- or third-generation successor, who, I would argue, is in most cases the real founder. The first patriarch is retrospectively promoted to his honorific rank in order to give more legitimacy to the new school. He serves as a blank space on which one may project all the necessary "biographical" elements. In other words, there is no real origin to the patriarchal tradition, no real "founder." The character who plays that role is, to use Lévi-Strauss's expression concerning myth, a "virtual focus," a virtual object whose shadow alone is real.[45] His "biography" will proliferate around this obscure source, and historical details will soon turn into legend.

Besides that of Bodhidharma, other well-known embellished biographies are the lives of the so-called third and sixth patriarchs of the Ch'an tradition, Seng-ts'an and Hui-neng. In fact, they may have provided the missing links in the patriarchal lineage. The main purpose of this lineage itself was to link artificially several different schools. The first school, called the "School of Bodhidharma," originated probably with Hui-k'o or with a later Laṅkāvatāra master named Fa-ch'ung (587–665?). The second school, the so-called Tung-shan or Eastern Mountain School, was founded by the "fourth patriarch" Tao-hsin (580–651) and drew its legitimacy from the obscure figure of Seng-ts'an. The first detailed biographical account concerning the future "third patriarch" is to be found in the *Leng-ch'ieh shih-tzu chi*. The third school, the so-called Southern School, originated

[45] Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 5.

with Shen-hui (684–758) and not, as the tradition would have us believe, with Hui-neng, whose chief merit was to be relatively unknown. The lives of these three Ch'an masters (Bodhidharma, Seng-ts'an, and Hui-neng) are reconstructions dating from the eighth century, at a time when sectarianism was intense.[46] Their purpose is largely ideological. In the same way, the "classical" Ch'an of the ninth century traces its source back to two unknown disciples of Hui-neng, Nan-yüeh Huai-jang and Ch'ing-yüan Hsing-ssu. Being fundamentally paradigms for orthodox practice, these Ch'an masters should be treated as such and not given a false psychological identity through misguided erudition. This means that all variants of a hagiographical topos should first be considered in a synchronic perspective, without trying to sort out the historical kernel from the shell of legend. This metaphor of shell and kernel, implicit in the work of most historians, should itself be questioned. By thus widening the scope of our study and abandoning—at least for the founding figures—the obsolete concept of historical individuality, we might get closer to the global structure that regulates the transformations of actual biographies.

But this may not suffice to explain why we get, for example, the type called Bodhidharma as the first patriarch of Ch'an, instead of other possible types such as Seng-ch'ou or Fu Hsi. It seems that we have to reintroduce the historical or diachronic dimension in the last resort in order to make sense of these apparent contingencies. To interpret hybrid texts, our method must be itself hybrid. Although it will stress a kind of structural analysis, it must be aware of the failure of all systems that claim in their perfection to transcend history. Only by rejecting all methodological extremes, in a typical Buddhist fashion, may we reach a new, although limited, understanding of "the meaning of Bodhidharma's coming from the West."

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[46] On the formation of these legends, see Yampolsky (n. 1 above), pp. 3–88.

Chinese Buddhism

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Transcript of a talk given at the 1964 *Summer School*

I find it difficult to condense so vast a subject into so small a scope, but in spite of that I feel that before I come to the actual practice of Chinese Buddhism, which I feel is the most important part of it, I would just like to say a few words about the history of Buddhism in China, just to put it in its place, so to speak. The importance of Chinese Buddhism is as follows: as you know, the Buddhist scriptures fall into two main categories, the Pali, which is used in the Theravada countries, and the Sanskrit used in the Mahayana countries. Unfortunately, most of the Sanskrit originals have been lost. However, very detailed and careful translations of the Sanskrit scriptures exist in two languages, Tibetan and Chinese. It can therefore be said that in the world today, original Buddhist scriptures or close to original Buddhist scriptures exist in the form of Pali, Tibetan and Chinese. Japan, Korea and Vietnam, etc., depend on Chinese scriptures. Thus Chinese Buddhism is not only of concern to China, but to the whole of what might be called the very Far East. There is some evidence to suggest that Buddhism actually reached the coast of China about the year B.C. 200, for certain things have been found in the province of Shan-tung that suggest that, but not much is known about it. In the year 61 A.D., the Emperor Ming-Ti is supposed to have had a dream, in which a golden figure appeared to him and when his ministers were asked what to do about this dream they said, "well, send to India and find out". The fact that he dreamt of a golden figure and that this was interpreted by his ministers as being connected with something in India, suggests that there must have been some knowledge of Buddhism already when he had this dream. Anyway, from that time on Chinese pilgrims began making the very difficult journey to India which involved going through high mountains and frightful deserts, and it took many years, and great hardships were experienced, but they went to India principally to obtain teachers and sutras and these they gradually brought back over a period of several hundred years. Then came the business of translating the sutras into Chinese which was done very carefully indeed, never by an individual man, usually by a committee, who would have, say, one great Indian teacher who knew only Sanskrit and perhaps one great Chinese scholar, who knew only Chinese. In between the two there would be Indians who knew Chinese and Chinese who knew Sanskrit, and then the work would be passed backwards and forwards among these people until it received the approval of all concerned, the language experts, the religious experts, all had to agree, this is the correct translation of those sutras. Working in this marvellous way they produced translations which are so good that it might be possible for a man with a very good knowledge of Sanskrit and of Chinese to reconstruct the Sanskrit originals almost exactly from the Chinese translations.

When Buddhism first entered China it had already divided into a considerable number of sects in India itself. Therefore, the people who brought it to China, whether Chinese pilgrims or Indian scholars and teachers were naturally taught principally the teachings of their own

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particular sect, so quite a number of sects arose, but there was never the sharp difference between the sects which you find in the Western world, say in the Christian church. The sects all overlapped one another. There was never any feeling that "my sect is right and your sect is less right and positively wrong", but when a man said that he belonged to a particular sect he usually meant only that he personally emphasised the teachings in a particular book or series of books, so we have sects such as the *Hwa-ja-yen* sect. There used to be sects of that kind that are simply named after particular scriptures. All the Chinese sects with one possible exception are continuations of sects that arose originally in India. The possible exception is the Ch'an sect which is called Zen in Japanese. Some people say that this is a purely Chinese invention, and that it is the result of Buddhism being studied by people with a Taoist background, and in this way we could say that Buddhism is the father, and Taoism is the mother of Ch'an or Zen. However, the Chinese themselves would strongly deny that, and would say that Zen was introduced by Bodhidharma from India and he was in a direct line of succession of Patriarchs who go right back to Maha Kassapa.

From the point of view of the Western world I suppose that this Ch'an or Zen sect is of the greatest interest because of its flowering in Japan and because of the present great interest in Zen which we find in the Western world. It is called a doctrine without words, but in fact some compromises have to be made and there are a few Zen scriptures which are almost indispensable. One of them is the smaller Heart Sutra which tries to show the identity of subject and object, the identity, say, of the smeller, the organ of smell and the act of smelling, and the thing which is smelt. Then came a wonderful book written by a Chinese which many of you know as *The Sutra of Wei Lang* which is the only book written by a Chinese to receive the title of "sutra", because "sutra" is always used for the teaching of the Buddha himself, but this one book is considered to be so remarkable and so closely in spirit with the teaching of the Buddha, that it received the name of "sutra". Then after that, of course, there were various Chinese scholars who after experiencing, deeply experiencing, in their own minds the fruits of meditation, either themselves or their disciples produced books such as those by Huang Po and Hui Hai, of which I have attempted to make translations. As time went on the different sects in China began to merge until today it hardly makes any sense to talk about sects at all, because in a typical Chinese temple you can find certain practices, certain types of meditation, and so forth which derived from almost every sect. The main constituents of modern Chinese Buddhism, I should say, are what used to be the Vinaya sect, because the Vinaya is very important in China, and the number of rules followed by the monks there is slightly larger even than the 200 odd rules followed by the Theravadin monks, and to them is added the very strict rule of complete vegetarianism, even eggs and milk are not allowed. In China there is nothing comparable to that kind of person in Japan who dresses like a monk, but may be married. I don't know what the Japanese term for these people is. I don't know whether the characters used to refer to them are the characters used for the word "monk", for, of course, a married monk is a contradiction in terms. In Japan it seems to me that that kind of priest, shall we say, corresponds rather to a Church of England clergyman with his wife and children,

but this does not exist in China at all. Either you are 100 per cent layman or you are a monk, and if you are a monk you are 100 per cent vegetarian and 100 per cent chaste. As I say, as time went on the various ideas of the different sects all became joined into one, so that in addition to the Vinaya, which was common to all of them, you get meditation which in all branches of Chinese Buddhism is strongly influenced by the Chan or Zen sect. You also get a devotional form of Buddhism which we in England call Amidism. I think in the West many people suppose that if you are a Zen follower you cannot possibly be an Amidist and vice versa. As I will try to show you later, however, there is really no contradiction whatsoever between the two. Amidism is the repetition of the name of Amida Buddha, reliance upon a force external to yourself, coming quite close, I think, to the Christian's reliance upon God and this on the surface seems to be a direct contradiction to Zen Buddhism and other forms of Buddhism which tell you to rely on yourself, but I hope to show you later that they are exactly the same. Tibetan Buddhism has also had a considerable influence on Chinese Buddhism and you will find certain parts of the temple rites and so on are directly attributable to that. Now in the last few hundred years the divisions between these sects have practically died out, but before I come on to describe the main thing which is Chinese Buddhist practice today, I would just like to mention a few small points. First, there is no Buddhist hierarchy in China, unlike Tibet or Siam. In China almost every temple is an independent unit and there is no control from the top. This has some good results, you get something like the equivalent of academic freedom and each temple is free to perform in its own way. It also has bad results because if you have a particular community of monks who are not behaving as monks should behave, there is really no one to stop them from doing so. Second point, in recent years almost 80 per cent or 90 per cent of the most important Chinese teachers and scholars of Buddhism have been found among the lay Buddhist Associations rather than in the temples, but that, I think, is an accident of history because when the Manchu dynasty was overthrown and Imperial patronage withdrawn from the temples, they fell into very pitiful conditions and then the country became disorganised politically. There were all sorts of people running away from conscription or bandits going into hiding, and all sorts of people who quickly put on the yellow robe and entered the temples and, of course, this had rather a bad result and also for some reason in many temples for a long time only a few great teachers have arisen and so it happened that more and more the monks there were just repeating by heart things that they didn't really understand themselves, so all the formal side of Buddhism remained, but the inner, the vital side, the mystical side, reached a rather low ebb in the temples at the time of the Communist invasion. On the other hand in most cities of China there were associations of laymen who lived very strict Buddhist lives as *Upāsakas* and who had a great knowledge of Chinese literature in general and of Buddhist literature and practice in particular. It is really to these people that we owe the fact that Chinese Buddhism is still very much a living tradition. Buddhism has always been a minority religion in China.

In recent years owing to improved communications (1920-50) a good many highpowered Tibetan Lamas found their way to China.

Some of them stayed a long time and very often they drew round them whole groups of people, principally from these lay associations, and therefore, at the time when the Communists came in there was a very great revival of interest in the Tibetan form of Buddhism, and had the Communists not come, I think that this would have gone on and on, and there would have been an even greater, continually increasing, demand for learned lamas from Tibet. I think the reason for that demand is that Tibetans, particularly from geographical and political reasons have been so cut off from the rest of the world, that they were able to preserve intact so many aspects of Buddhism which could not be preserved so well in communities where life was more modern, and people were more busy, and where there were so many different influences outside and foreign influences at work.

Now I come to what I would like to think of as the main part of this talk which is the practice of Chinese Buddhism today. As I said the sects have more or less amalgamated into one, so it is possible now to talk of a Chinese Buddhism which more or less covers the whole. The chief pillars on which it is based, as I suppose in all forms of Buddhism, are Wisdom and Compassion. These two are always stressed as the means and the object of Buddhism. Compassion, the means, pure Wisdom the object. This Wisdom should be approached by three means simultaneously. One of them is Vinaya, leading moral lives, following certain rules; then the practice and study of sutras, listening to teachers and so on, for which, I think, one could use the word study to cover all of that; and then intuitive knowledge which comes only through meditation, from turning the mind inwards upon itself. Almost any Chinese Buddhist will say that not much progress can be made if you omit any one of those three, so correct behaviour or shall we say self-discipline, plus learning, plus intuitive knowledge, is the way to Enlightenment. Now many Westerners when they go to China are extremely surprised to find that in almost every Monastery, though there is a Zendo, in which the rules of Zen are strictly adhered to, in the main shrine room of the temple, the principal rites which are performed are in connection with what we call Amidism, the throwing ourselves upon the mercy of a Buddha who, to all appearances, is external to ourselves. So it seems astonishing at first and I was very surprised to find these two things going hand in hand. I had many discussions with Chinese Abbots and holy men about this. I said "how is it possible to practise two forms of Buddhism which seem so opposite" and it was always very difficult to make them see the point. At first they couldn't see that these were opposite to each other and indeed, of course, they are not. Now the main practice of the Amidists is to repeat the name of Amida Buddha a great number of times, but this repetition alone, of course, would be completely useless. It has to be accompanied by something in the mind, a mental practice. Even at the simplest level, even supposing you take a man who is uneducated in the ordinary sense, and also knows very little about Buddhism, if he practises this, with his mind concentrating at the same time, he very easily by this means attains a kind of one-pointedness of mind, which is the first step in meditation, and Dr. Suzuki, the great Zen expert from Japan, says in one of his books quite plainly that far more people have attained Enlightenment by "Namu Amida Butsu, Namu Amida Butsu", than through

the practice of Zen, because it is a very simple way for people to concentrate. People who have not been taught the rather difficult way of Zen find it very easy, but mere concentration in itself would not be enough because you might be concentrating on the wrong thing, and as far as we have got in this argument most people who go in for other forms of Buddhism will say, "well, you *are* concentrating on the wrong thing if you are concentrating on a force outside yourself". Some of you who have read translations of Japanese books and so on know that the Chinese or Japanese terms for these—*tariki* in Japanese, meaning "other strength", power from outside, and *jiriki*, which means strength or power from inside. Now it is these two which to the logical mind seem to be entirely opposed: you can have one or other, but how can you have both at the same time? Well, what the Chinese do in practice is in performing their equivalent of *pūja*, their rites and so on, they use this "other power" method, and in their meditation they use the "inner power" or "self power" method. Then it gradually appears that these two are, of course, the same because, I think, all Chinese Buddhists would accept the Zen doctrine of the One Mind. There is a Something which you may call the Absolute, or the One Mind; which is common to us all, and could be said to exist both inside us and outside us, though, of course, at a higher level the words "outside" and "inside" become meaningless, but at our everyday level we can imagine this Mind as something all around us, both inside and outside us, at the same time. When you practise the "tariki" form, that is something outside yourself, you are not addressing your mind to a force which is different from the force to which you address yourself when you practise the "jiriki" method of going into yourself. However, you might say then "why should it be necessary to practise them both?" Now I have found that all Chinese are insistent that meditation alone without any form of *pūja* or rites or something like that is decidedly harmful, and that this other aspect must be practised simultaneously. Why? Because the whole aim of meditation is to destroy your little self, your little ego must go. Now as long as you just meditate, when you make progress you think "ah, *I* have made progress". Who is I? You see, the more "*I* have made progress" the bigger your ego gets, the bigger your ego gets the less useful your meditation is. In fact it can be very harmful indeed, and fill you with spiritual pride. So the object of having a kind of external worship is to remind yourself, this is not *my* mind which gives me this power, it is, could we call it—The Mind. It is not my self with a small "s", it is the Self with a big "S" which gives us this power and to remind ourselves of this constantly is very good indeed. You should address that big Self or big Mind, very much as though a Christian addresses God as something outside yourself, but if on the other hand you practise this kind of devotional meditation alone, this also would be harmful, because then you get the idea of some power which is completely separate from yourself, you throw yourself on the mercy of that power, which is completely contrary to the teaching of Buddhism. So the thing is to evolve, as the Chinese have done, some kind of religious or spiritual life which at the lower everyday level has elements of both, other power and self power. Then, of course, as meditation goes forward, you perceive more and more in your own mind the perfect identity of these two, but even when the identity has been perceived you do not stop practising it—you

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do not regard the devotional side as a rather kindergarten measure and your Zen meditation as a University measure; it is not like that. These two have to go together. Indeed as you make progress in meditation, and your spiritual life, you may rise from level to level to level, but however high the level you rise to you do not then cease entirely practising those practices you were given when you were still at that lower level. This should go simultaneously. So in my own practice which has largely been moulded by the Chinese, when I enter my shrine room, and make some offerings, I suppose at that moment I am really conceiving of the object of worship as something outside myself, because I do not stop to think about it, but I certainly behave as if that object were outside myself. When I am doing meditation I attempt to turn my mind inwards, then there is no thought in my mind of the power outside myself. So in actual practice we could divide the spiritual life into those external parts that we perform as though it were to an external power and the internal parts we perform as though to an internal power, but always in the knowledge that these two are identical. I think that as spiritual progress is made then it becomes very clear that this power is one, but though one it does not cease to have these aspects, the external and internal.

As to the final point, this is a very interesting one, which goes far beyond logic. All of us who are Buddhists have sometimes given a thought to the One and the Many, and we are intellectually convinced that the one and the many are the same, by which I mean that existence in its pure form, (form is a bad word), is devoid of colour and form, and so on, and any kinds of divisions into A. B. C. and D. The world as it appears to us, however, contains many millions of different objects, and that is the many. Now, I suppose, most of us are convinced that the one and the many are the same, but this is not the point I am trying to make, but when we say to ourselves at the ordinary logical level, "the one and the many are the same", we mean that the many is an emanation of the One, or has proceeded from the One and may return to the One, but in a temporary sense the One has expressed itself in the Many. Whilst it is many, it seems not to be One, though we can well imagine that the many will become the One again. But what I understand from the Chinese Buddhism I have learnt, is that when you reach a very high point in meditation you will see that it is not that the many have come from the One and go back to the One, but that the One and the many are identical and simultaneous. Now this, of course, transcends any logical thought, because logically it is impossible for something to be one and many at the same time. For instance you are not trying to get from Samsara into Nirvana, you are not trying to proceed from ignorance to knowledge and so on with all these opposites. What you have to do is to reach a state in which you find that though it seems logically impossible, in fact it is beautifully clear and simple that these various opposites that we have been used to are absolutely identical at every moment, not just one coming from the other and going to the other, but they are identical. When this has become not just an intellectual theory but an experience then its result is tremendous. If I have an almost physical experience of this Oneness, of the One and the many, the subject and object, the giver, the gift, the act of receiving, all these are one. Then, how can I continue to hate anyone, to despise anyone, to want to be cruel to anyone,

to want to do harm to anyone? You no longer have to force yourself not to be unkind to others, you just would feel it impossible to be unkind to others.

From this kind of meditation, I think, alone can come genuine compassion as opposed to forced compassion. We are all told to love our neighbours and we try our best to do it, but we do not always succeed very well, but as I understand it, once this point is reached in meditation, then there is no effort at all to love your neighbour, in fact you couldn't not love him, for everyone loves himself. When you are convinced through and through that other people are yourself, how can you love them less?

I have met a few people in China, a few teachers, whom I believe to have attained this point and perhaps to have gone far beyond that, and the proof of the pudding, I always like to say, is in the eating—I always judge a doctrine by its results on the people, and I have really found people there about whom you could have no doubt whatever. The outward signs very often or nearly always include the following: that the man should have such peace in him, that, even if you can't speak his language, even if you know nothing about him whatever, if you find yourself sitting in the same room with him you begin to feel happy and you begin to feel peaceful. A second distinguishing mark, which I think is probably necessary in all cases is a tremendous good humour, a kind of humour which is almost childlike. If it were just a little different from what it is you would say "well, this man is childish". That is why Hui Hai, the great Chinese mystic, in his song about his Enlightenment says "everyone takes me for a mad fellow". I think this is a very important sign because in those religions which are based on "thou shalt do, and thou shalt not do", you get a tremendous seriousness and when you get to the people high up in the hierarchy or to their saintly people you find them terribly serious, solemn, intense. But why should a man who has discovered what life is all about, the thing that we all want to know so much, how can a man as confident as that be solemn? The only occasion for solemnity would be when you see other people suffering and in trouble and then, of course, feel very sorry for them and that makes you solemn. When you come across a man like that who is just full of peace and who somehow transmits happiness to you and at the same time has tremendous joy in him which makes him seem almost simpleminded, then he is a sage. This is most certainly what most Chinese Buddhists are aiming at last to attain.

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The Arahant and the Bodhisattva

by Michael Mettam

We latter-day Buddhists, in whatever part of the world we may live, are finding that we can no longer remain within the simplicities of one outlook, one school. The Theravādin of today finds that half his Buddhist friends are followers of the Mahāyāna, and that if they observe ancient tradition within their school they are supposed to regard his goal as 'selfish' and his system as a 'lesser vehicle'. Conversely, the Mahāyānist finds that his Theravādin friends, if they followed their own orthodoxy, would have to look on his scriptures as 'spurious' and his goal as inflated. What makes this dichotomy seem unlikely and wrong is that when it comes to practice — the search for wisdom, and the development of compassion, meditation and the training of the heart — these differences seem to disappear. A follower of the Theravāda, for instance, listening to a follower of Zen expounding the actual working principles of the faith by which he lives, thinks: 'Yes. Basically that is what I am trying to do too. That is Dhamma.' This is not to suggest that the practices of all Buddhist schools are the same, nor that they should be: far from it. But we can accept different practices as still pointing towards the same greater outcome. Such tranquil acceptance seems to be much more difficult, however, when it is a case not of differences in practice but of differences in doctrine. In spite of our brave assertions that, as Buddhists, we are not tied down to the blind acceptance of any view, and that we are prepared to try things out for ourselves, we do sometimes, nevertheless, unconsciously become caught up in a belief system. 'Belief', which tends to be closed and final, is very different from the pragmatic exercise of 'faith' which encourages us to follow up and try out a wise idea, while sympathising with a friend who tries out a different one which seems to work for him. But if we only imagine ourselves to be following an empirical faith but are, in fact, captured by a belief system, then whatever may appear to threaten that system is too painful for our minds to bear.[1] So we try to neutralise the offending notion, either by ignoring it completely, or by reducing it to insignificance by using terms like 'inferior' and 'selfish', or 'spurious' and 'inflated'.

There are two terms which crystallise a large part of the doctrinal

1. We find this problem explored in the first sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, the Brahmajāla Sutta, where it is said that each proclamation of view is —

> 'only the feeling (*vedanā*) of those who do not know and see (i.e. those who are still bound by primal ignorance); only the worry and vacillation of those who are immersed in craving.'
>
> D.I.40.

In other words, a belief system is not necessarily the outcome of faulty cognition (indeed, it may be a valid system, but while we are still governed by *avijjā* we cannot *know* this). What it is, however, is the outcome of desire and craving for security in an uncertain world. The Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi, in a masterly commentary on this sutta, which he translated under the title *The All-embracing Net of Views* published in Sri Lanka in 1978, underlies the irrational 'feeling' component in all examples of opinionatedness. He points out also that the sutta explains how our feelings of pleasure and security in a 'view' are greatly enhanced when we can convert others to the same standpoint.

differences between Mahāyāna and Theravāda Buddhism: they are the Bodhisattva and the Arahant. These two ideals appear to have piled up a surprising amount of abuse between them. Much of the criticism on the Mahāyāna side is ancient and inherited. The Arahant ideal of the early Buddhists has been stigmatised in the Mahāyāna scriptures as limited and self-centred, ever since the Mahāyāna texts began to appear in the early centuries of the Christian era. In Theravādin eyes this criticism is obviously incorrect, but the reasons for it can be understood more easily, as we shall see, when we look at the history of the times and see what the Mahāyānists had to contend with. On the Theravāda side, the Mahāyāna ideal of the Bodhisattva was at first not mentioned in the early texts and commentaries (because it was not known in that form — i.e. as a goal for Everyman). Later, it was largely ignored. It has, nevertheless, been the cause of much head-shaking among modern devotees of the Pāli canon ever since they heard of it. The standard, and again incorrect, reproach among Theravādins today is that people pursue the Bodhisattva path 'largely as an excuse for not trying very hard for enlightenment in this life', and that in any case 'it smacks of megalomania'. The question is, do we have to continue with this long-standing quarrel? Turning our backs on it and pretending that it is not there leads to an uneasy (because unresolved) example of cognitive dissonance.

In what follows I write of necessity as a partisan, because any follower of a particular lineage (in my case the Theravāda) is bound to be to some extent a partisan, though one may hope not to be an opinionated one. I suggest that the criticisms which have been made of the ideals of Arahantship and Bodhisattvahood on both sides have arisen from misconceptions. We find on investigation that the Arahant of the *Ti-Piṭaka* is *not* a cold and self-regarding introvert, and that the Bodhisattva of the Mahāyāna sutras does *not* shirk enlightenment, nor does he follow an unaccredited scripture. Nevertheless, there do seem to be temperamental differences between people who are drawn to one path or the other. We shall look at this possibility later, but first — how have the misunderstandings come about? We shall need to look briefly at the early history of Buddhism.[2]

The early canon: the *Ti-Piṭaka*

During the period between the death of the Buddha in the 5th century BC[3] and the reign of Asoka in the 3rd century BC, the Buddha's teachings were collected and preserved with great care in an oral transmission. The oldest portions of these collections were grouped together under the headings *sutta* (Pāli; Sanskrit *sutra*) — these were the Discourses of the Buddha and his chief disciples; and *vinaya* — the Disciplinary Code for the order of monks and nuns. From internal evidence it appears highly probable that part of this material was assembled during the Buddha's lifetime, and, as the scriptures

2. In a comparative study, such as this, one has to decide whether the few essential technical terms should be expressed in Pāli or Sanskrit, or both. I have decided on both — Pāli or Sanskrit, depending on which text or school is being quoted. For example, Arahant is the Pāli term (= Sanskrit: Arhat) and Bodhisattva is the Sanskrit term (= Pāli: Bodhisatta).

3. The date most generally agreed for the Buddha's death is 483 BC.

themselves declare, that some of it may even have been recited before him. Clearly, there were later additions and re-arrangements, but the Buddha-word was held in such deep veneration that it is likely that nothing was discarded, though we cannot of course tell how much was misunderstood or lost. The *sutta* and *vinaya* collections that were added to later by a set of analytical treatises grouped together under the heading *abhidhamma* became known by the comprehensive title *Ti-Piṭaka* (in Pāli; *Tri-Piṭaka* in Sanskrit), meaning the Three Collections (literally, 'baskets'). As to language, the *Ti-Piṭaka* was memorised and disseminated in the closely related vernaculars of north India, one of which would have been the language of the Buddha himself.[4]

Theravāda: The Pāli Canon

As time went on, and differences of interpretation of scripture arose in the Indian Buddhist community, those who agreed in outlook grouped themselves together in schools or sects, and gradually these increased in number. The growth of Asoka's empire over the whole of India greatly speeded up this process, and monastic groups became separated by considerable differences of language and locality. These differences did not much affect the textual core of sacred scripture — particularly the *sutta-piṭaka*[5] — but applied chiefly to commentary and exposition. During the reign of Asoka (himself a Buddhist), missions from one of these early Indian schools, the Theravāda, began to arrive in Sri Lanka. They brought with them the *Ti-Piṭaka* memorised in Pāli, and much commentarial material. The tradition is that the Pāli canon of the *Ti-Piṭaka* was virtually closed at the Council of Pāṭaliputra, Asoka's capital, during the reign of that emperor. Although differences of outlook and practice cropped up between the monasteries that grew up in Sri Lanka, these did not affect the preservation of the sacred scriptures. The canon of the *Ti-Piṭaka* and the commentaries from the mainland continued to be reverently memorised and recited, and in the last century BC the decision was taken in Sri Lanka that they should be written down in Pāli. It is from these early scriptures in Pāli that the Theravāda schools, both in the east, and now gradually also in the west, trace their lineage. They remained near in spirit to the profound simplicities of the ancient tradition and did not become involved in the controversies of the mainland. 'In the words of Professor Murti,[6] 'the Southern or Ceylonese school had little or no direct influence on the development of Buddhist schools in India.'

The Hīnayāna Schools

The *Tri-Piṭaka* — based on the teaching of the historical Buddha — also

4. The Buddha may have spoken some form of Māgadhī, from the region in which he chiefly taught. He encouraged his disciples to learn (and therefore to teach) Dhamma (Sanskrit, Dharma) in their own dialects. (Cullavagga V. 33).

5. The basis of the *sutta-piṭaka* is the four great Nikāyas (Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṃyutta and Aṅguttara). The fifth, or Khuddaka Nikāya contains much later material.

6. *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* by T.R.V. Murti.

contentiousness which, for him — since it appears to be directed against him as a Hīnayānist — mars an otherwise splendid outpouring. The Hīnayānist may be 'inferior' in Mahāyāna eyes: very well. He has no objection to the name.[12] But can he not be left to jog along in peace in his lesser vehicle, until, as he hopes, some form of greater understanding dawns for him? Why do the scriptural records which he venerates, and the scriptural characters who have inspired him, have to be the subject of so much obloquy in the scriptures of another school? It is clear that the Mahāyāna sutras were regarded — by Mahāyānists — as superseding and replacing the traditional teaching of the historical Buddha as represented in the *Tri-Piṭaka*. In the group of Mahāyāna scriptures known as 'The Perfection of Wisdom', for instance, we have the following account of 'failed' Bodhisattvas who turned to the 'inferior' doctrine:

> 'Just as if a dog were to spurn a morsel of food given to him by his master, and preferred to take a mouthful of water from a servant; just so, in the future, some persons belonging to the vehicle of the Bodhisattvas will spurn this perfection of wisdom, which is the root of the cognition of the all-knowing, and decide to look for the core, for growth, for Buddhahood, in the vehicle of the Disciples and Pratyekabuddhas.'
>
> XI 234, Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 lines
> Conze's translation

And again:

> 'To the extent that I want to win full enlightenment, and that my attention to it is perfectly pure, to that extent I have left behind the thoughts of Disciples and Pratyekabuddhas.'
>
> XX 384, Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 lines

The vehicle of the Bodhisattvas, in all Mahāyāna sutras, refers to Mahāyāna teaching, whereas the vehicle of the Disciples and Pratyekabuddhas refers to the early canon of the *Tri-Piṭaka*, which was very well known among Mahāyānists. The Lotus Sutra, chapter VII (page 172 of Kern's translation) gives an excellent summary of the Four Noble Truths and the Pratītya-samutpāda,[13] which can be regarded as the essence of early *Tri-Piṭaka* teaching, but insight into these is held to be insufficient for freedom. 'They are emancipated from chimeras, but not wholly freed': Lotus Sutra, chapter III page 91 (Kern). At the beginning of chapter III of the Lotus Sutra, Sāriputra — chief disciple and friend of the historical Buddha — is represented as saying:

> 'It was our own fault', not the Lord's, that we were 'dismissed into the lesser vehicle', because in the past we 'heard only in a hurry'.
>
> Kern, p. 61

According to this sutra, however, Sāriputra is now converted to the Mahāyāna doctrine, and is rewarded by the promise of a Buddha-field of his own:

12. Certain titles, such as, in England, 'Tory', which were originally handed out by opponents, became in the course of time merely neutral and convenient designations. 'Hīnayāna' is one such.

13. *paṭiccasamuppāda* in Pali.

> 'replete with celestial people; with lapis lazuli for earth, having eight intersecting roads with golden cords to bound their cities, and by each road a line of precious-seven trees always filled with flowers and fruits.'
>
> Lotus Sutra, Bunnō Katō translation page 81.

Shortly afterwards, the disciples Ānanda and Rāhula step forward and confess their previous fault in listening to an inferior doctrine, and are rewarded with Buddha-fields of equal glory. These sensuous paradises may strike us as being a far cry from the early *sutra-piṭaka*, but descriptions of spiritual states, which these are undoubtedly meant to represent, are notoriously difficult to achieve within the limitations of human language.

Another sutra, the Avataṁsaka, achieves impressive flights of description. Of the celestial Bodhisattvas it says:

> 'They approach and serve all the Tathāgatas, who are performing miracles every minute; they are able to expand their own bodies to the ends of the universe; . . . they reveal in each particle of dust all the worlds, singly and generally, with their different conditions and multitudes; and in these different worlds they choose the most opportune season to discipline all beings and bring them to maturity; emitting a deep, full sound from every pore of the skin, which reverberates through the universe, they discourse on the teachings of all the Buddhas.'
>
> translation by D.T. Suzuki:
> 'Indian Mayahana Buddhism' page 159.

But, in this sutra, the disciples of the lesser vehicle, such as Sāriputra, etc. (who are still present in these timeless spheres) have no share in these wonders, because, we are told, they have 'no stock of merit, no wisdom-eye, no samādhi, no emancipation, no power of transformation, no sovereignty, no energy, no mastery, no abode, and no realm which enables them to get into the assemblage of the Bodhisattvas and participate in the performance of the great spiritual drama.' (Suzuki, page 164).

We may feel that in this scenario there is an absence of the attitude of peaceful co-existence which is usually the Buddhist response to other schools and faiths. In order to understand why, we have to think back in history. We can well understand and sympathise with the impulse which drove the Mahāyāna poets and philosophers to break out against the aridities of the Hīnayāna scholiasts and to restore, as they undoubtedly did, men's perception of the sacred realm. But we also need to appreciate the difficulties and opposition which a newly emerging Buddhist movement would have had to face from the older orthodoxy. In the early centuries of the Christian era the Hīnayāna schools were arriving near the height of their influence and power. They were teachers of kings, masters of huge monastic complexes; and also, it appears from the evidence, self-complacent and intolerant. 'At this point, five hundred proud monks, nuns and lay devotees, rose from their seats and . . . left the assembly' (Lotus Sutra II) is the sort of incident that occurred when the new teachings were about to be introduced to the public. Mahāyānist comments on the older schools could be regarded as a means of fighting back against a powerful adversary, and stiffening the allegiance of their own supporters.

Among the problems they would have had to face was the question of

authenticity. In an interesting essay entitled 'Inspired Speech in Early Mahayana Buddhism', Graeme MacQueen[14] emphasises the fact that the really revolutionary development among the Mahāyānists was that they produced new scripture — not merely commentary, as did the older schools. The Mahāyāna texts are *sutras*. Attempts were sometimes made to justify the authenticity of the Mahāyāna canon by claiming that their sutras had been sealed by the Buddha into rocks, when he was alive, or given into the protection of the Nāga kings or the gods, so that they could be discovered and opened when the time was ripe. This was the language of those days: an appeal to the miraculous was a strong appeal. Such arguments do not carry much weight with us now, but, nevertheless, we have our own kinds of metaphysical understanding. In the essay referred to above, MacQueen demonstrates that frequently in the early *Tri-Piṭaka* the historical Buddha encouraged people to utter 'inspired spontaneous discourse', *prati-bhā* speech, which he then approved. From this MacQueen argues that this tradition of *prati-bhā* (= Pāli *paṭi-bhā*) constructions is the authority which basically upholds the Mahāyānist. He quotes the opening passage to the 'Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 lines', in which the Mahāyāna author says that once the Buddha's Mahāyāna followers have trained themselves in the Dharma, thereafter:

> 'nothing that they teach contradicts the true nature of Dharma. It is just an outpouring of the Tathāgatha's demonstration of Dharma.'
>
> Conze translation page 9.

An appeal to spontaneous creative inspiration is one which the modern Hīnayānist can certainly accept. But there are necessary safeguards to be applied: in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta of the *Ti-Piṭaka*, the condition for the acceptance of any teaching that claims to be the Buddha-word (or, by extension we might add, inspired by the Buddha) is that it should conform with *sutta* and *vinaya*.[15] The radiant, poetic scriptures of the Mahāyāna go far beyond what we find avowedly expressed in the *Ti-Piṭaka*, but the message of the Mahāyāna is pure-spirited, and does not, as far as I know, *contradict* the early canon, except, possibly, in the rough treatment of the original disciples of the Buddha — and possibly also in its attitude to what constitutes freedom.

Having quoted several passages from the Mahāyāna *sutras* which indicate the attitude of the 'greater' to the 'lesser' vehicle, we shall now, for the sake of balance, end with a passage from an early *sutta* of the *Ti-Piṭaka*, as preserved in the Pāli canon of the Theravāda Hīnayāna school. It is from the Saṃyutta Nikāya:

> 'Once upon a time, brethren, the Dasārahas had a kettle-drum called Summoner. As it began to split the Dasārahas fixed in ever another peg, until the time came that the Summoner's original drumhead had vanished and only the framework of pegs remained.

14. Graeme MacQueen: two papers entitled 'Inspired Speech in Early Mahāyāna Buddhism' published in the journal 'Religion' 1981, 1982.

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> Even so, brethren, will the brethren become in the future. Those Suttantas uttered by the Tathāgatha, deep, deep, in meaning, not of the world, dealing with the void, to these when uttered they will not listen, they will not lend a ready ear, they will not bring to them an understanding heart, they will not deem those to be doctrines which should be learnt by heart, which should be mastered.
>
> But those Suttantas which are made by poets, which are poetry, which are a manifold of beautiful sounds, a manifold of phrases, alien, the utterances of followers, to these when uttered they will listen, will lend a ready ear ... Thus it is, brethren, that the Suttantas uttered by the Tathāgatha, deep, deep in meaning, not of the world, dealing with the void, will disappear.
>
> Wherefore, brethren, thus should you train yourselves: — To those very Suttantas [of the Tathāgatha] will we listen, will we give a ready ear, to these will we bring an understanding heart. And we will deem these to be doctrines which should be learnt by heart, and mastered: — even thus.'
>
> S. II. 266

There we have the voice of the very early Hīnayāna, guardians of the *Ti-Piṭaka*, foreseeing developments to come.

Thus we, in a later day, have two Buddhist voices — Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna — speaking to us from the distant past. Those of us today who try to follow Dhamma, without becoming bogged down in opinionatedness or polemic or 'view' (P. *diṭṭhi*: Sk. *dṛṣṭi*), have no easy task, unless we follow the quaint path of the ostrich and stick our heads in the sand. We have a very rich inheritance of scripture, but it is a testing one. Fortunately for us, our admirable forbears have forged and preserved for us profound schools of 'practice' — the meditations, the intelligent exercise of compassion, the search for wisdom which each must learn and exercise for him-or herself. It is through these that we can safely approach the scriptures.

beings and this sense of the need to be a separate me, finding my position, making sure I'm liked, can be washed away and the habit of self identity weakened. Thus we realize the Refuge of Sangha, the great assembly of those who practise, not just an idea or social grace, but a means to help erode the mountain of self-view.

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The Bodhisattva in the Twentieth Century

A talk given at the Buddhist Society Summer School 1995 by

Sylvia Swain

There is, bhikkhus, a not-born, a not-brought-to being, a not-made, a not-formed. If, bhikkhus, there were not that not-born, not-brought-to-being, not-made, not-formed, no escape would be discerned from what is born, brought-to-being, made, formed. But since there is a not-born, a not-brought-to being, a not-made, a not-formed, therefore there is discerned an escape from what is born, brought-to-being, made, formed.

From the Itivuttaka, trans. John D. Ireland

I wonder what sort of escape from the worries, stresses and problems of daily life, whether private, social, international or environmental, are we hoping for when we come here? Perhaps part of us seeks the heavenly realm in which everything is done for us, everybody is friendly and our troubles are forgotten. But from years of experience I know that if I am wise there is to be found all that and much, much more, as they say in the advertisement.

If we seek only respite, the problems we have left behind us will be awaiting us on our return because it is taught that in heavenly realms nothing actually changes, nothing is solved. When our time is up, and we have to leave, feelings of melancholy or even depression may set in. If we look beyond that kind of escape, we discover that the presence here of the Dharma teachings, turn this Summer School into a realm of transformation to which we can safely bring our problems with real hope that we will learn new ways to deal with them, a new light to see them in, a new frame of reference for the understanding of suffering, and, perhaps, even a new concept of what is meant by escape. The second text is from the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra, when Subhuti asks the Lord:

> What is the manifestation of the great compassion? The Lord replies: 'That the bodhisattva, the great being, who courses on the bodhisattva pilgrimage, thinks that 'for the sake of the weal of every single being will I, dwelling in the hells for aeons, countless like the sands of the Ganges, experience therein the cuttings up, the breakings up, the poundings, the torments, the roastings, until that being has become established in the Buddha-cognition.' This excessive fortitude, this

indefatigability, for the sake of all beings, that is called the manifestation of the great compassion. (Conze, *The Perfection of Wisdom, Selected Sayings*, p. 41)

That is the text which came to my mind when I was asked to speak. War and its accompanying atrocities have dominated the news. We have also had the commemorations of the second world war to refresh our memories of both epic heroism and the Holocaust, those extreme polarities of the human spectrum. But it was the story of Palden Gyatso and the heart-rending accounts of Tibetan refugees from Chinese atrocities and the irony of the thought that the present Chinese authorities, whose ancestors developed the bodhisattva ideal to a peak in Quan Yin, should now systematically be trying to destroy all that the genius of their ancestors had bequeathed to their nation, that made the theme 'The Bodhisattva in the Twentieth Century' the only possible one for me.

War, cruelty and inhumanity have a history going back as far as the beginning of human consciousness, with its discrimination between self and other at its very roots. Human anguish is always topical; it was, after all, the theme which inspired Śakyāmumi Buddha to give up everything for the sake of bringing it to an end. So we too need to look at its most fundamental causes, as he did.

However, this century has not been without its own remedies. Karmically speaking, the movement of Buddhism to the Western world, doctrinally and materially through the setting up of Buddhist centres throughout Europe and America, will continue to be of world-wide significance and influence to future generations. It is also important to note that during the two thousand years since the Mahayana was established in the East, the West has been undergoing many stages of religious and intellectual development on its own account. For this century the most influential evolution has been the West's own breakthrough in consciousness, occasioned by the development of a psychology of the unconscious. Sigmund Freud produced what he called a 'psychopathology' of everyday life, but C. G. Jung opened up for us a broader, deeper and more generous context for a 'psychology of wholeness' with which to orientate our selves for the third millennium.

It was Jung who said:

> The psychological rule says that when an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate. That is to say, when the individual remains undivided and does not become conscious of his inner opposite, the world must perforce act out the conflict and be torn into opposing halves. (*Aion*, par. 126)

He was speaking there of events as mirrors which reflect those underlying psychological states of individuals and of nations which actually bring about the fateful outer events. So many such conflicts have come to pass in this century: our hot wars and our cold wars showing us just how unconsciously we have been living.

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The religions of the world abound with religious archetypes. Jung's terminology of archetypes in this context should not be seen as the psychologizing of religious experience but as a means of enablement, expanding the capacity to think, to contemplate, to discuss and to confront many misty religious ideas and aspirations inherited from earlier centuries.

From time to time religious doctrines need to be presented anew in accordance with the prevailing conditions. In the Buddha's day the prevailing condition was, in the eyes of the Awakened One, a state of virtual unconsciousness in which the gods had become routine or objects of superstition and the ascetic practices of the Jains had become obsessive and therefore just as unthinking, prompting him to introduce a comprehensive rational study of man together with a teaching discipline which still has not been surpassed.

Whereas, in our time, Jung, seeing that we had totally lost touch with 'our' gods, and with them, our experience of the numinous, investigated the unconscious itself. He discovered much long lost psychological treasure within it, including the long neglected gods whose wrath was now manifesting itself as obsessive and possessive neurotic illness. He restored them to us as archetypes of the collective unconscious, complete with renewed numinosity. Jung said:

> It is not a matter of indifference whether one calls it a mania or a god. To serve a mania is detestable and undignified, but to serve a god is full of meaning and promise because it is an act of submission to a higher, invisible and spiritual being. . . . When the god is not acknowledged, egomania develops, and out of this mania comes sickness. (*Alchemical Studies*, par. 55)

This puts religion in its correct context in Jung's psychology in so far as he maintained that, if a person can achieve a 'right' relationship with their religious faith, they would be well advised to stay with that, rather than to seek analytical or other help.

Not before we understand our smallness, can we comprehend our greater stature. Both the Buddha and Jung found an amazingly viable and meaningful conscious role for us small and humble creatures. In *The Undiscovered Self*, Jung says:

> Today we are faced with the problem of the moral backwardness which has failed to keep pace with our scientific, technical and social developments. So much is at stake and so much depends on the psychological constitution of modern man. Is he capable of resisting the temptation to use his power for the purpose of staging a world conflagration? Is he conscious . . . of what the conclusions are that must be drawn from the present world situation and his own psychic situation? Does he know that he is on the point of losing the life-preserving myth of the inner man which Christianity has treasured up for him? Does he realise what lies in store should this catastrophe ever befall him? Is he even capable of realizing that this would be a catastrophe? And finally, does the

And the Buddha showed humanity a way by which it can transcend both its creaturehood and the powers of those gods who hold it in such thrall. The powers of greed, hatred and the darkness of ignorance, he said, can all be overcome within the framework of the aware individual human life. He became the proclaimed 'teacher of gods and men' and he exhorted us to follow in his footsteps.

The ways he expounded may seem to be simple, but they are also very, very hard to achieve. There is the way of the *brahmafarer* of the Theravada tradition and there is the way of the *bodhisativa* of the Mahayana tradition, and his life validated them both. The mythology of the Mahayana has been brilliantly presented in their ideal of the bodhisattva vow and this makes it an easier story to relate. But when one has met practitioner-teachers of both traditions, as many of us here have been privileged to do over the years, we find their essence is the same; the qualities of openness and compassion are clearly recognizable, and the elements of character needed to walk the way of the Buddha are the same.

So now let us take a psychological perspective of the way of the vow.

All the religions have their archetypal figures, and mythologies worldwide describe the interaction between mortals and immortals, men and gods, because such things reflect the basic structures of the mind and therefore the problems common to people everywhere. The bodhisattva deity is the most articulate in that it lucidates and connects both worlds, the earthly and the heavenly, in one image and one being. As a symbol of a non-theistic religion, it is best able to meet the needs and bridge the remaining cultural divides between East and West.

However if our psychological perspective is to do justice to this great ideal, we must give equal acknowledgement to the god-like aspect and the human status. We can now recognize the religious archetypes as the 'interior' aspects of the celestial deities. This interior view of the gods, taken for granted in the East, was unrecognized or considered a heresy for centuries in the West, for whom all gods dwelt in the skies until, at a time of serious decline of Western religious faith, the exposition of the archetypes of the collective unconscious by Jung revealed to us, in a quite stunning way, our spiritual and psychological origins in a context which can provide a fitting viewpoint for contemporary study for the benefit of students of our multi-cultural society. Buddhism, a refuge 'in' itself, now seeks refuge 'for' itself in the countries of the Western world.

One of the supreme religious figures in the Buddhist hierarchy, an aspect of the Buddha himself, Avalokiteśvara, exhibits all the classic characteristics of a transcendent archetype, a symbol of the true self, being known under many names, manifesting itself sometimes in a masculine form and at others in a feminine one. An enormous quantity of literature has been written about this greatly revered figure in his/her celestial capacity. This mythology

begins at the threshold of nirvana, so to speak, the place at which the original 'great vow' was taken not to enter into the bliss of nirvana, but to remain in the world amid all the sufferings of humanity, until all beings have found release.

This threshold between the world and nirvana can be understood as the point of ethical decision-making, the 'place of the vow'. It is a true point having position but no measurability, it is also the place of 'meaning' where the significance of human life is revealed and expressed.

The name Avalokiteśvara, from which other very familiar names have derived, such as *Quan Yin*, *Kannon* and *Kwanzeon* means 'the one who harkens to the cries of the world'.

In the context of the human psychological problem it may be fair to say that our contact with the bodhisattva begins with the 'cry'. In fact, we can never really understand the bodhisattva if we do not understand the 'cry'.

Our very human conscious origin is marked by the cry. The cry pinpoints the moment of wounding, the moment of expulsion from Eden, the moment of emergence from primordial dumbness into the life of communication, protest, questioning and calling. Thus the cry is the most fundamental and universal human expression. It can range from a whimper to a scream and cover the entire spectrum of our feeling capacity from the inarticulate cry to the highly articulated one, from the cry of triumph to one of despair. It can register protest, demand, supplication. It can question 'why?'; or 'why not?' It can beg for succour, for justice, for healing. The cry of supplication is also a universal and familiar theme in all religions. 'They cried aloud unto the Lord' is the first step to communion with the Lord. But the one from the heart, expressing the pure anguish of life is the one which reaches the ear of the bodhisattva, even if it is uttered in silence.

Whether uttered aloud or silently in the heart, at any one time the world is filled with such cries. So common are the cries of the lonely and the unfulfilled, the hungry, the sick and the bereaved, the cries for justice and for meaning and the cry that asks: 'Why me?' that they go almost unremarked by the multitude.

Jung distinguished the voices of the unanswered, unreleased and unredeemed for special consideration as cries from the 'dead,' the deep unconscious, 'ancestral traces' which also have to be addressed in the healing processes and for the sake of which he originally undertook the writing of his *Septem Sermones ad Mortuos* (Seven Sermons to the Dead). Jung's psychology is the definitive depth psychology which addresses itself specifically to these three forms of anguish. It is a listening psychology and the equivalent in the religious field must surely be the ever-listening, ever-responding bodhisattva. In the mythology of the bodhisattva the pleas of the 'unanswered' are given audience and acknowledgement, the 'unreleased' are set free and the 'unredeemed' are liberated.

How is it that the bodhisattva can 'heed' and respond to cries which go unnoticed by others? To heed means to take into account, and this requires 'understanding', thus the bodhisattva must be well experienced in the nature of all forms of suffering which beset living beings.

Our audible cries are answered by our good neighbour bodhisattvas, the humanitarians in our midst, the caring people among us. But there is a special line of communication within the mind when the cry is silent and nothing is asked. It is a moment of acceptance, a moment free from self concern and, in reply, something of the rarefied bodhisattva world enters into our centre of gravity and we are reorientated to a new religious understanding. We cannot make this happen: it happens 'to' us when we reach a mature attitude towards the suffering in our lives, which we now understand to be a meaningful part of our life.

Unlike those archetypes representing the instinctive life, which constantly press forcefully upon the consciousness, this archetype can manifest itself fully only when the correct disciplined call is made. This is because the bodhisattva is not an entirely unconscious influence, as are the instinctive archetypes, but is a 'creation' at the meeting point of conscious and unconscious — neither a take-over of unconsciousness nor an assertion of willful ego-consciousness, but an expression of holistic consciousness.

Its special genius and character meet the description of the 'self' as given by Jung in a conversation with Miguel Serrano, when Jung said:

> So far, I have found no stable or definite centre in the unconscious and I don't believe such a centre exists. I believe that the thing which I call the 'Self' is an ideal centre, equidistant between the 'ego' and the 'unconscious', and it is probably equivalent to the maximum natural expression of individuality, in a state of fulfilment or totality. As nature aspires to express itself, so does man, and the 'Self' is that dream of totality. It is therefore an ideal centre, something created. (M. Serrano, *Record of Two Friendships*, p. 50)

The thrill and the fascination which mythology, both religious and secular, has exerted over human beings throughout history lies in the fact that it is built around the possibility of the realization of this ideal centre which is the 'be all and end all' of every heroic quest.

The tradition of the bodhisattva ideal is one of the most comprehensive in its symbolism, and the most clearly and maturely worked out among the saintly traditions of the world's religions. The bodhisattva story is so holistic that it need not even be told in a specific chronological sequence, one can begin the story anywhere. It can begin in the highest heaven or the deepest hell. It can begin with saint or sinner or with the novice monk or nun just beginning their own quest for enlightenment. It can begin in any form in which the bodhisattva chooses to manifest, a Brahman, a Bhikshu, youth or maiden form, a householder, a state officer and so on, as listed in D. T.

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Psychologically it 'begins with the first thought of enlightenment and ends with full enlightenment' (Conze, *The Perfection of Wisdom, Selected Sayings*, p. 46). Formally it begins with the Great Vow but humanly, for my part, it begins with all the cries of the world.

The very first cry at birth marks the pain of separation and, from there onwards, the consciousness of being separate and isolated gets ever more intense. Losing what is loved, not getting what is wanted are experiences of separation, and that empty ache of fear and dissatisfaction is a constant reminder of our incompleteness. We cry in order to be heard and healed because somewhere even in the midst of anguish there is, however deeply buried, a conviction that somewhere there is 'the one who hears'. That merest hope and suspicion of faith in such a being is the embryonic seed which eventually will develop into that first thought of enlightenment, *bodhicitta*, which then begets the entire process to enlightenment.

From this moment, the story can open out into one of two directions. Firstly there is the onward and upward direction, perhaps the more popular approach. One looks toward a celestial being, separate from oneself, but to whom one can direct supplications and be heard. The *Kwannon-sutra* provides copious examples of the miraculous powers of the bodhisattva to save, to release and protect those who call upon the sacred name. There is always a condition to be met and in this case it is specified that the name be uttered 'with singleness of mind'. This is of course a significant psychological factor which implies an intensity sufficient to disperse fragmentary mental contents and discursive thought and, above all, ideas of self versus others, in order that the cry of the supplicant be wholehearted and thus rendered audible to the archetype.

The second direction which can be taken is the more difficult but more direct inner one and this begins with the 'vow' which could be understood as a spiritual aspect of the 'cry' on behalf of all beings, in that it too comes one-pointedly from the heart. The vow is not to be thought of as something imposed on the mind, like a New Year's resolution, but as an imperative born of that actual experience of aeons of 'the breakings up, the cuttings up, the poundings, the torments and the roastings'. The 'vow' spontaneously proclaims 'itself' from the heart.

Cry and vow together are the essence of Kannon. The voice of Kannon it is said is 'a most exquisite voice, a voice that surveys the world, the voice of Brahma, the voice of the ocean.'

In much of the bodhisattva iconography, the waves of the sea form a plinth for the figure. It is the sea that binds the earth, not the earth the sea. Water is symbolic of our feeling function and the ocean is also a symbol of the unconscious. So we see Kannon having arisen, from the darkness of the unconscious into the light of consciousness with boundless feeling and compassion, from that ocean which was the wellspring of all life: the

bodhisattva is a uniting factor. In her the earthly reality and the transcendent ideal can now speak with one voice; the 'oceanic' voice. In her, the one who cries and the one who listens are 'not two.'

The bodhisattva is the fearless one, the great teacher who saves through teaching and teaches by the example of giving their all. This giving is singleness of mind in its highest and most ideal sense. The one-pointedness of the ego is the cry of one-pointed desperation and it is heard, but there is another aspect of the cry which turns it into calling, a vocation. This too is one-pointed and it marks the end of all concern for self. It is the call on behalf of universal suffering 'for all time' from the individual which, cohering with the bodhisattva's own wishes as declared in the vow, strengthens the archetypal influence in the world. The more an archetypal force is manifested in the world, the more it is 'called upon' and its power becomes stronger to influence events. When this call is heard and answered a link is forged and a state of communion is established between the archetype and the worldly being who is now happily in the service of the celestial one, 'the service of a god' (*Alchemical Studies*, par. 55 quoted above). This constitutes an incarnation of the bodhisattva:

> For bodhisattvas take pleasure in the wholesome practice of renouncing all their belongings. A bodhisattva must cast away even his body, and must renounce all that is necessary to life. He should react to the danger with the thought: 'If those beings take away from me all that is necessary to life, then let that be my gift to them. If someone should rob me of my life, I should feel no ill will, anger or fury on account of that. Even against them I should take no offensive action, either by body, voice or mind. This will be an occasion to bring the perfections of giving, morality and patience to greater perfection and I will get nearer to full enlightenment. When I have won full enlightenment, I will act and behave in such a way that in my Buddha field wildernesses infested with robbers will in no way whatsoever either be, or even be conceivable. (Conze, *The Perfection of Wisdom, Selected Sayings*, p. 39)

In the alchemical symbolism of initiation the themes of cutting up and dismemberment frequently appear, signifying total sacrifice of the body for the sake of the religious process and consequent rebirth. The bodhisattva is no vapid angel figure but a being who is fully opened up to knowledge of the shadow world for the purposes of integration and subsequent transformation.

Let us now turn our attention to those contemporaries who have indeed, in the most dire circumstances, trusted and drawn upon that oceanic strength. There are two cases for consideration, both connected with Tibet. Once a cloistered religious stronghold, now overrun by the forces of barbarism, it has become a focus of confrontation between an archetypal delusional hatred and archetypal compassion and integrity. But it is not the battleground it might have become in another country with a different

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leader. For despite the atrocities it is now a spiritual arena in which the victory will be determined, not by armaments and instruments of torture, but by the fidelity and example of its people and their spiritual leader.

For the first case we will concentrate on the life of one man, the by now famous Palden Gyatso, a Buddhist monk who has spent what should have been the best years of his life suffering a series of agonising imprisonments in Chinese jails and labour camps. In the 33 terrible years since he was first arrested, all he has had to sustain him has been his faith and his Buddhist training. We are all only human with our limitations, yet he 'endured the unendurable' of remorseless torture and deprivation as was described in the May issue of *The Middle Way*.

As the years wore on, the body aged and weakened but not the spirit. Here are one or two extracts taken from an interview with him that appeared in *Buddhism Now*. When asked how he felt during torture and how he dealt with it he replied:

> I think that the worst that could be administered was administered to me. . . . I was beaten at every interrogation. They would tie my hands with ropes behind my back, put ropes around both my arms and pull them back then they would tie a knot in the rope and attach it to the ceiling. I would then be hauled up into the air and hung there, they would hit me with anything that they could lay their hands on. Sometimes they would put petrol on the floor and light a fire on the floor underneath me. I would become overwhelmed with the heat and there would be tremendous pain; it was like being roasted. . . . But I always had the absolute conviction that I had done nothing wrong. My belief concerning the rights of the Tibetan people was fundamental. . . . I also believed that my suffering could somehow be of benefit to the Tibetan cause.

Asked how he felt towards his persecutors, he said:

> There was no revenge factor in me. I have no bad feelings towards them at all.

And when asked if he ever lost faith in the Buddha-Dharma, he answered:

> On the contrary, my faith in Buddhism strengthened. Buddha endured a lot of pain and made many sacrifices for the benefit of other beings. My offering, my pain, was no match for the pains of the Buddha.

Later he said:

> I bear no grudge against the Chinese. If I did I would be going against what I believe. The Chinese are beings, we are all beings. . . .

That is one outstanding example of how the bodhisattva vow works within us when the faith is true and the conscience is clear. If in the midst of trial and anguish we call upon the name, our cries are heard in the inner

dwelling place of the bodhisattva who has undertaken that commitment, literally, to 'endure [with us] the cuttings up, the breakings up, the poundings, the torments and the roastings. . .for the sake of all beings'.

The second example is found in that deeply touching story of the small band of Tibetan refugees shown on the Everyman programme, *Escape from Tibet*, whose sufferings, courage and endurance are being replicated to this day in the high, bitterly cold and dangerous passes of the Himalayas. Tortured and threatened, separated from their families and loved ones, they, too, did the impossible, 'endured the unendurable,' driven by dire conditions and inspired by the hope of seeing their beloved Dalai Lama. To the devout Tibetan, the Dalai Lama is the bodhisattva incarnate: the one whose blessing is sufficient reward for that otherwise unendurable suffering. Ill equipped for such a journey, sore-footed, exhausted, hungry and snow-blind as they all were, the sight of the little boy of only 11 became a symbol of steadfastness and courage enough to melt the heart. The journey was fraught with many dangers and risk of capture right to the end and when they finally arrived it was the little boy who was in danger of being suspected of being a Chinese spy, when all he wanted was to go with his brother to a monastery.

At the end of the film we see them being received by the Dalai Lama who, after giving all the refugees his blessing, suggested to them that when they had received their education they should go back to Tibet, otherwise, he explained, their culture would die out and their land be lost. A very hard directive, but it came from one who had taken on the sole responsibility for a nation under duress, as well as for the preservation of that nation's unique religious culture. Although few would go back under Chinese rule, he knew that anyone who did, for the reasons he gave, would prove to be an invaluable source of hope and inspiration to unite those who had been left behind and would also then themselves become truly set upon the bodhisattva path.

A tyrant conquers not by arms and torture alone, but through the bitterness and desire for revenge of his victims. This can lay the foundations for future wars. Only the one who has first conquered his own hatred can finally defeat the tyrant. Victimised though he was, Palden Gyatso, truly in service to the bodhisattva, never developed that almost irresistible victim psychology. He escaped badly injured, and may have to suffer nightmares for the rest of his life, but yet he returned to the world with 'gift giving hands.'

To return to *The Perfection of Wisdom*: 'If those beings take from me all that is necessary to life, then let that be my gift to them.' 'His' gift to the world was that in him hatred was 'not-born', the desire for revenge 'not-brought-to-being', causes for future wars 'not-made', paranoia 'not-formed'. The Dalai Lama, Palden Gyatso and many others like them have become living proof that even in the twentieth century the bodhisattva can emerge from the hells in full vindication of the vow.

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Validity and Vitality of Theravada Tradition

by Ven. Prof. Dr. Walpola Sri Rahula

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During the life-time of the Buddha there was nothing called Theravāda or Mahāyāna. There was only the *Buddha-vacana* 'the word of Buddha' or *Buddha-sāsana* 'the Message of the Buddha', 'the Teaching of the Buddha', consisting of the *Dhamma* 'Doctrine' and the *Vinaya* 'Discipline'. It was not divided into books or classified as three *Piṭakas* or five *Nikāyas*.

About three months after the *parinirvāṇa*[1] of the Buddha, Mahā-Kassapa Thera, the oldest and the most respected of the then living disciples, convened a Council of five hundred direct disciples who were recognized as *arahants*, in order to determine and settle the authentic teaching of their Master. This Council was held at Rājagaha, the capital of Magadha. The two chief protagonists at this extremely important historical event were Ānanda Thera, the Buddha's closest companion and attendant, considered to be the Custodian of the *Dhamma* (*dhamma-bhaṇḍāgārika*), and Upāli Thera who had been declared by the Master himself as the greatest expert in the *Vinaya*.

Mahā-Kassapa Thera who presided at the Council, first took up the *Vinaya* as it was regarded as the life of the *Sāsana* (*vinayo sāsanassa āyu*), and questioned Upāli Thera about every precept beginning with the first *pārājika* — where the precept was laid down, on account of what person, what was the offence, etc. When the *Vinaya Piṭaka* was settled in this manner and accepted by the Council as authentic, it was entrusted to Upāli Thera himself with the request that he should, with his pupils, preserve the text.[2]

After the *Vinaya*, the *Dhamma* was taken up. Mahā-Kassapa Thera questioned Ānanda Thera about the thirty-four *suttas* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* (Collection of long Discourses) beginning with the *Brahmajāla-sutta*, and the Custodian of the Dhamma answered all the questions and recited the *suttas*. The perpetuation of the *Dīgha-nikāya* was entrusted to Ānanda and his pupils.[3] In this manner the other four *Nikāyas* also were settled. Sāriputta Thera, the chief Disciple of the Buddha, had passed away before the Master. So the preservation of the *Majjhima-nikāya* (Middle length Discourses) was entrusted to his pupils.[4] The *Saṃyutta-nikāya* (Kindred Sayings) was assigned to the President of the Council, Mahā-Kassapa Thera himself, and his pupils.[5] The *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (Gradual Sayings) was put in the charge of Anuruddha

1. Some people write 'Nirvāṇa of the Buddha' which is meaningless. The death of the Buddha or an *arahant* is called *parinirvāṇa*.
2. *Dīgha-nikāya Aṭṭhakathā* I (PTS) p. 13
3. *Ibid* p. 15
4. *Ibid* p. 15
5. *Ibid* p. 15

Thera and his pupils.[6]

The *Cullavagga* says that at the First Council all five *Nikāyas* (*pañca nikāye*) were settled.[7] We have seen that the *Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṃyutta* and *Aṅguttara Nikāyas* were entrusted for perpetuation to four groups. But there is no mention of the *Khuddaka-nikāya*.

Now, the *Khuddaka-nikāya* is the biggest of the five *Nikāyas*. It is composed of the whole of the *Vinaya-piṭaka*, the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka*, and fifteen books such as the *Khuddaka-pāṭha, Dhammapada, Udāna, Itivuttaka, Suttanipāta*, etc.[8] We saw already that the *Vinya-piṭaka* was entrusted to Upāli Thera and his pupils. But we do not know to whom the rest of the *Khuddaka-nikāya*, namely the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka* and the other fifteen books were assigned.

From that day in the fifth century B.C. up to the first century B.C. when the *Tipiṭaka* was for the first time committed to writing at Aluvihara in Matale District in Sri Lanka, for four long centuries the *Buddhavacana* 'the Word of the Buddha' was handed down by oral tradition. Those *mahā theras* who were the Buddha's direct disciples and their unbroken pupilary succession preserved the text by *gaṇasajjhāyanā* 'group recitation' which is the oral tradition. It is not one person alone reciting a text, but a group of persons reciting it together. If one omits a word, others will supply it. If one uses a wrong word, another will correct it. If one forgets a line, others will recite it. Thus the text is controlled, protected and preserved intact. This method of oral tradition is supposed to be more reliable than a written record by one person from his memory after a period of some months or years.

At the end of the Council Ānanda announced that the Buddha had told him that the Sangha could abolish or amend minor rules if they so desired, after his death[9]. Ānanda was reproved by the Council for not ascertaining from the Buddha what rules the Master meant by the term 'minor'. Different opinions were expressed on the question of 'minor rules'. No unanimity was possible. Therefore, on a motion brought forward by the Council's President, Mahā-Kassapa Thera, the Sangha unanimously decided neither to lay down new rules nor to remove any of the existing rules, but to follow the rules as they were laid down by the Buddha.

Mahā-Kassapa's main argument for his resolution was that the public opinion would go against them if they removed any rules, however minor they might be. This was the argument on which the resolution was accepted.[10] It is of importance that, apart from public censure, Mahā-Kassapa did not give any valid reason for not changing the rules.

From that day to the present time, so far as we can gather, not a single *Vinaya* rule was ever changed by the Sangha of the Theravada tradition, nor were new rules introduced into the body of the *Vinaya*. But as time went on,

6. *Ibid* p. 15
7. *Vinaya* Vol II *Cullavagga* (PTS) p. 287
8. *Samantapāsādika* I (PTS) p. 27; DA I (PTS) p. 23. Generally, books on the history of Pali literature consider the *Khuddaka-nikāya* as belonging to the *Sutta-piṭaka*, which is an error. When the *Buddha vacana* 'The Word of the Buddha' is divided into five *Nikayas*, all *Buddha — vacana*, all *Tipiṭaka*, must be included in the five *Nikayas* not only the *Sutta-piṭaka*.
9. *Cullavagga*, p. 287
10. *Ibid*. p. 288

they had to face the realities of life under newly developed circumstances, and felt difficulty in following the *Vinaya* in its original form. But the decision of the Rājagaha Council stood against any change or amendment of the *Vinaya*. Therefore, without changing the letter of the law and without incurring public censure on which so much emphasis was laid by Mahā-Kassapa, bhikkhus discovered ways and means of overcoming the difficulty by interpreting the law without compromising themselves. After all, the *Vinaya* was not ultimate truth, but only a convention, a legal system, agreed upon for the smooth conduct of a particular community. As such, it had to be interpreted. These interpretations and decisions are known by the term *pālimuttaka-vinicchaya* which means 'decisions not found in the original texts.'[11] There is a whole book called the *Pālimuttaka-vinayavinicchaya* by Sāriputta Thera who lived at Polonnaruva in Sri Lanka in the 13th century. It contains discussions and decisions not found in the original *Vinaya* texts.

So the First Council was smoothly and successfully terminated in seven months.[12] As it was accomplished by Māha-Kassapa and other theras, it was called *theriya saṅgīti* 'Convocation of *Theras*' or *Theravāda*. This was the beginning of what we call Theravāda today. Only the Theravāda existed during the first one hundred years after the Buddha's death.[13]

Then, about one hundred years after the First Council, the Vajjiputtaka bhikkhus in Vesāli declared lawful some ten practices, generally called 'Ten Points'. They were minor matters. For example, let us take a few: to keep and carry salt in a horn vessel, in order to season unsalted foods, when received (*siṅgiloṇa-kappa*); to take the midday meal, even after the prescribed time, as long as the sun's shadow had not passed the meridian by more than two fingers' breadth (*dvaṅgula-kappa*); to drink unfermented palm-wine (*jalogi-kappa*); to accept gold and silver (*jātarūpa-rajata*). But these amounted to modifying or disregarding some minor rules, which was against the unanimous decision of the Rājagaha Council. Therefore a Council of seven hundred selected eminent bhikkhus,[14] headed by Yasa, Revata and Sabbakāmi was held at Vesāli where the ten practices (Ten Points, *dasa vatthu*) were rejected as unlawful, and the *Dhamma* (Doctrine) and the *Vinaya* (Discipline) were recited as at the First Council. This Second Council took eight months to complete its task.[15]

About ten thousand bhikkhus, condemned by the Vesāli Council for unlawful, wrong practices, formed a separate, unorthodox Sect or School (*ācariya-vāda*) named Mahāsaṅghika 'Great Community'. The *Mahāvaṃsa* calls it *ācariya-vāda* 'Sect' or 'School'.[16] But the *Ṭīkā* the Commentary on the Mahāvaṃsa, says that they 'split the original Community' — *mūlasaṅghaṃ bhinditvā-* and 'founded another opposing, rival Community' — *aññaṃ*

11. *Samantapāsādikā* (Simon Hewavitarne ed.) p. 551
12. DA I (PTS) p. 12
13. *Mahāvaṃsa* V 1-2
14. *Mahāvaṃsa* IV 62; *Samantapāsādikā* I (PTS) p. 34
15. *Ibid*
16. *Mahāvaṃsa* V 3-4

saṅghaṃ vilomaṃ akaṃsu.[17] Whether this *ācariya-vāda* named Mahāsaṅghika could be considered as *saṅgha-bheda*, 'schism', is an interesting question. We know Devadatta committed *saṅgha-bheda*. He tried to form his own Saṅgha rejecting the Buddha, his Dhamma and Saṅgha. But the Mahāsaṅghika-bhikkhus did not reject the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha. They only did not agree with the orthodox Theravāda Community on certain disciplinary questions, but they, like the Theravāda bhikkhus, accepted the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha. Today there are many 'Sects' or Nikayas within the Saṅgha in Buddhist countries due to various minor matters, but they have nothing to do with *saṅgha-bheda*.

During the years that followed the Second Council, there arose many Sects or 'Schools' both from Theravāda and Mahāsaṅghika, such as Gokulika, Ekavyohārika, Paṇṇattivāda, Bahulika, Mahiṃsāsaka, Vajjiputtaka, Bhadrayānika, Sammiti, Sabbatthavāda.[18] They promulgated various theories and doctrines. Of these Schools or Sects, no one, except Theravāda, exists today bearing any of those names.

About two hundred years after the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*, i.e. in the third century B.C., Asoka, the great Emperor of India, embraced Buddhism and became its ardent patron. Allured by the high status and comforts granted to the Sangha by the Emperor, undesirable and corrupting elements entered the Order thereby disturbing its unity and peace. Asoka was compelled therefore to hold at Pāṭaliputra (modern Patna) a *saṅgīti* which is generally known as the Third Council, to settle authoritatively the Canon of the Scriptures and to rid the Sangha of dissensions. This Council had as its members one thousand distinguished bhikkhus and its work was completed in nine months.[19]

After this Council, under the instructions of its far-sighted President, Moggaliputta-Tissa Thera, *dhamma-dūtas* or missionaries for the establishment of Buddhism were sent out to nine countries among which Sri Lanka was included. Asoka's own son, Mahinda Thera, was entrusted with the task of establishing Buddhism in Sri Lanka. The Emperor perhaps felt that his work would be most successful on that island, for Devānaṃpiya-Tissa, the King of Sri Lanka, had already expressed his friendship by sending ambassadors with valuable gifts to the Indian Emperor. Wherever they went, the Indian Buddhist missionaries were successful. Even Greeks like Yonaka Dhammarakkhita became Buddhist monks. But Sri Lanka was the most fertile of all fields for the Buddhist activities of Asoka.

What Mahinda took to Sri Lanka was pure Theravāda as it was settled at the Third Council. It had nothing to do with Hīnayāna (Small Vehicle) or Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle). These terms are not known to the Theravāda Pali literature. They are not found in the Pali Canon (*Tipiṭaka*) or in the Commentaries (*Aṭṭhakathā*) on the *Tipiṭaka*, not even in the Pali Chronicles of Sri Lanka, the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvaṃsa*.

It is universally accepted by scholars that the terms Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna are later inventions. Historically speaking, Theravāda already

17. *Mahāvaṃsa-Ṭīkā. Vaṃsatthappakāsinī* Vol I (PTS) p. 173
18. *Mhv.* V 3-13
19. *Smp.* I (PTS) p. 61; Mhv. V 279

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existed long before these terms came into being. At the time Buddhism went to Sri Lanka, i.e. in the 3rd century B.C., there was nothing called Mahāyāna, which began to appear much later, about the beginning of the Christian Era. Without Mahāyāna there could not be Hīnayāna. Buddhism that went to Sri Lanka with its *Tipiṭaka* and *Aṭṭhakatha* (Commentaries), in the 3rd century B.C., remained there intact as Theravāda, and did not enter the scene of the Mahāyāna-Hīnayāna dispute that developed later in India. It is therefore illegitimate to include Theravāda in either of these two categories. However, after the inauguration of the World Fellowship of Buddhists in Sri Lanka in 1950, well-informed people, both in the East and in the West, use the term Theravāda, and not the term Hīnayāna, with reference to the Buddhism prevalent in South-East Asian countries like Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. In fact, it is doubtful if any Hīnayāna sect or School, mentioned in the *Mahāvamsa* or in other ancient books is in existence today anywhere in the world.

The Pali texts of the *Tipiṭaka*, brought to Sri Lanka by Mahinda Thera, continued to be handed down by oral tradition.

The first century B.C. was one of the most important periods in the history of Theravāda Buddhism. Certain radical changes with far-reaching results pertaining to the life of bhikkhus as well as Buddhist doctrines took place during the latter part of that century. At that time the whole of Sri Lanka was violently disturbed by a foreign invasion on the one side, and on the other, it was ravaged by an unprecedented famine. The whole country was in chaos. Some learned *theras* had died. Some others had left the country for foreign lands. Even the continuation of the oral tradition was gravely threatened. During this period there was only one monk who knew by heart the Pali text named the *Mahā-Niddesa*. He was a man of immoral character. Yet the virtuous and learned *mahā theras* had even unwillingly to learn it from him so that text might not be lost with his death.[20] It was under these circumstances that the far-seeing *mahā theras* decided, as the last resort, to commit the *Tipiṭaka* to writing at Aluvihāra in Mātale so that the teaching of the Buddha might prevail.

On account of these calamities, the attitude of monks seems to have undergone a vital change. After the famine, at a meeting of several hundred monks held at a monastery called Maṇḍalārāma, a new question was raised — a question that was never raised before: What is the basis of *sāsana* (religion) — *pariyatti* (learning) for *paṭipatti* (practice)?[21] Some maintained that *paṭipatti* was the basis while others held that *pariyatti* was the basis. Ultimately it was decided that *pariyatti* (learning) was the basis of the *sāsana*, and not *paṭipatti* (practice).

Out of this new debate seem to have evolved, as a necessary corollary, two vocations termed *gantha-dhura*, and *vipassanā*. *Gantha-dhura* which means the 'vocation books' denotes the learning and teaching of the *dhamma* while *vipassssanā-dhura* means meditation. No such division of vocations is known

20. *Smp.* (Simon Hewavitarne ed.) p. 503
21. *pariyatti nu kho sāsanssa mūlam udāhu paṭipatti. Aṅguttara Aṭṭhakathā* (Simon Hewavitarne ed.) p. 52

to the original Canonical Pali texts. This division is found only in Pali Commentaries of the 5th century A.C. and other non-Canonical works. The acceptance of the new idea that learning is the basis of *sāsana* seems to have given rise to this innovation.

In the 5th century A.C., Buddhaghosa edited and translated the Sinhala Commentaries into Pali. There is a mistaken idea among some people that Buddhaghosa was the author of the Pali Commentaries. But Buddhaghosa himself says in his elegant introductory verses to the Pali Commentaries that the Commentaries brought to Sri Lanka by Mahinda Thera were translated into Sinhala language and that he was translating them into Māgadhi[22], which we now call Pali. We can be certain that not a single page of the Pali canon was lost after the 5th century A.C. because the text was fixed by the Commentaries, whereas about 90% of the original Sanskrit *Tripiṭaka* was lost. They are now available in Chinese and Tibetan versions.

Sub-commentaries or *Ṭikās* on the Pali Commentaries and works embodying the interpretations and decisions of the great *theras* in Sri Lanka were written after the 10th century A.C. This enormous corpus of literature — *Tipiṭaka, Aṭṭhakathā, Ṭikā* and *Pakaraṇa* — produced by the *theras* of Sri Lanka, was later transmitted to Burma, Cambodia and Thailand where it was accepted as the pure Theravāda tradition.

Talking about Theravāda we should not forget Mahāyāna. There are people who think these are two different religious systems. Some orthodox Theravāda Buddhists even consider Mahāyāna to be heretical. It is true there are popular beliefs and ritualistic external observances and practices peculiar to each of them. But they are superficial. The fundamental and essential teachings of the Buddha are common to both. For example, Four Noble Truths, Dependent Origination (*paticcasamuppāda*), Anatta doctrine, thirty seven Factors or Requisites of Enlightenment (*bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*) which include Four Foundations of Mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna*), Four Bases of Power (*iddhipāda*), seven Factors of Enlightenment (*bojjhaṅga*) and such other teachings are common to both Theravāda and Mahāyāna.

With regard to certain teachings Mahāyāna, and also Sarvāstivāda, come closer to the Pali *suttas* than the Theravāda *Abhidhamma*. In the Pali *Nikāyas* of the *Sutta-piṭaka* we come across four *rūpāvacara jhānas* (Absorptions of the Fine Material Sphere). But the Pali texts of the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka* speak of four *jhānas* (Absorptions, Trances) according to one method and of five according to another. Thus, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, an *Abhidhamma* text, first enumerates the four *jhānas* as found in the *suttas* and says this is the *catukka-naya* (Method of Four), and then gives the five *jhānas* according to another method and calls it *pañcaka-naya* (Method of Five).[23] The *Vibhaṅga* too, another *Abhidhamma* text, as usual, first gives the four *jhānas* and says it is the *Suttanta-bhājaniya* (Division according to the *Suttantas*), and then gives the five *jhānas* and says it is the *Abidhamma-bhājaniya* (Division according to the

22. See the introductory verses to the Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṃyutta, Aṅguttara and Vinaya Commentaries.
23. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (PTS) pp. 31-36
24. *Vibhaṅga* (PTS) pp. 256-271

Abhidhamma).[24] Later Pali works on *Abhidhamma* such as the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* and the *Abhidhammāvatara* speak only of five *jhānas*[25], ignoring altogether even the classifications according to 'the Method of Four and Five' or 'the Division according to the *Sutta* and the *Abhidhamma*'.

But in the *Abhidhamma-samuccaya* of Asanga,[26] a purely Mahāyāna *Abhidharma* text of the fourth century A.C. as well as in the *Abhidharma-kośa* of Vasubandhu[27], a Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma* text, also of the same century, we find only four *rūpāvacara-dhyānas*.

It is evident that the list of five *rūpāvacara-jhānas*, which is not found in the original Pali *suttas*, is a later development in the *Abhidhamma*, and the very terms *Suttanta — bhajaniya* and *Abhidhamma — bhājaniya* found in the *Vibhaṅga* seem to support this. There is no such division in the original *suttas*.

If you study the subject in detail, you will see the treatment of the *dhyānas* found in the Mahāyāna and Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma* is, on the whole, closer to the original Pali *suttas* than that found in the Theravāda *Abhidhamma*, particularly in the later *Abhidhamma* texts.

25. *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, ed. Siri Devamitta, (1929), p. 3 Abhidhammāvatāra (PTS) p. 4
26. *Abhidharma-samuccaya* of Asanga, ed. Pradhan (1950) p. 68, or *Compendium de la Super-Doctrine (Philosphie), (Abidharma-samuccaya)* d'Asanga, traduit et annoté par Walpola Rahula, Paris, 1971, p. 111
27. *Abhidharmakosa*, Ch. VIII, vv 7-9

Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism

Kenneth Holmes

PART TWO

The conclusions of Part One were these: that Buddhism was preserved in its most complete form in Tibet and that the traditional way to approach it was for the individual to study and practise whichever of its many teachings and techniques his or her own teacher(s) recommended. The latter's task, like that of a good physician, was to prescribe a formulation of remedial measures designed to bring the 'patient' swiftly to wholeness.

The main Tibetan traditions all claim to have taught basically the same thing but do not mind admitting that they had different styles in the way they went about it. Despite some epidermal differences, the x-rays revealing what lies behind the bulk of their practices (i.e. the psychology) match up surprisingly well. In sketching out these bare bones, I am using as titles four key quotes from the great 11th century Kagyu master, Gampopa, equivalents (verses to) which can be found in the other traditions. The first quote, 'the mind turns to dharma' refers to an initial awakening to Buddhism. The teachings concerned provide not only a general level of Buddhist under-

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Photo 'Silumina'

Hammalava Saddhātissa

28 May 1914 - 13 Feb 1990

From: Karunegoda Piyatissa (Maha Thero of the New York Buddhist Vihara)
The late Dr B.R. Ambedkar, Minister of Justice in the Nehru Government in India became a Buddhist together with more than 56,000 of his supporters largely as a result of the work of Dr Saddhatissa who was also the driving force behind the London Buddhist Vihara in Chiswick, W4. The Vihara was formerly in Ovington Gardens in Knightsbridge and in 1964, the present premises in Chiswick were purchased. Malalasekara who was then the Sri Lankan High Commissioner supported the Vihara and helped in many ways. The Vihara was re-organised by Sir Cyril de Zoysa who was the President of the Lanka Mahabodhi Society of Colombo and it was assisted by the late Anagarika Dhammapala later known as Ven. Dhammapala. Ven. Narada and Ven. Ñānasiri were instrumental in this.

Ven. Saddhatissa started as a teacher in 1939 at the Vickjamasila Pirivena and he went to India in 1944. He taught Pali and Sanskrit there and he was a member of the Pali Text Society, assisting Miss (Dr) I.B. Horner in the translating of many texts. He wrote many books including *The Buddha's Way*,

Buddhist Ethics, *The Life of the Buddha*, *Introduction to Buddhism*, and he taught at the University of Toronto as well.

An eminent scholar with a brilliant mind, he was an incomparable teacher with a charming sense of humour and he was much loved by all who came into contact with him. He was truly 'in the knowing' realising fully the three characteristics of all compounded things. Scholars of East and West published a volume in his honour *Buddhist Studies in honour of Hammalava Saddhatissa*, and he received three Doctor of Literature Degrees from Sri Lankan Universities. He was also given the title of Chief Nayaka of Britain and Europe. He did much research work in Sri Lanka and Thailand as well as at the British Library. He most recent works were the translation of the Sutta Nipata and the Abhidhamma, and the Upasikajanalankara.

After a minor operation he passed away at the age of 76 years, still working in the service of the Dhamma. 'Life is unknown, and cannot be measured. We cannot tell how long a man will live in this world. Life there is painful, short and bound up with suffering. Once a being is born it is going to die and there is no way out of this. When old age arrives or some other cause, then there is death. This is the way with living beings.' His Buddhist Manual, written by himself and Russell Webb, General Secretary at the Vihara for many years gives a translation of the Salla Sutta.

Transient are all compounded things. Work out your own salvation with diligence. May he attain Nibbana.

From Khemadhammo Bhikkhu:

I cannot pretend to have been enormously close to him nor to have known him particularly well, but he was always very kind to me and I valued so much the support he gave me, especially during, now, distant and lonely days when I struggled to establish a vihāra on the Isle of Wight. I shall never forget lifting the telephone one evening to hear his sonerous tones proclaiming that he would be coming tomorrow. And come he did, all that long way, just for the afternoon and just to encourage me and let it be known that I was not alone. I saw more of him in those three days than lately, but of course he was here for the grand opening of The Forest Hermitage in 1985 and before that he had graciously agreed to become the first Patron of Angulimala, the Buddhist Prison Chaplaincy Organisation. He liked to hear about the work in the prisons and sometimes when we were talking would retell the tale of how many years ago, shortly after he'd first come to England I think, he went to visit someone in Wandsworth Prison and as he stepped off the bus into the teeming rain an unknown fellow passenger saying something like, 'I know you do good work', reached out and put an umbrella in his hand before the bus drew away. In the years I knew him he never appeared to be in very good health, but he was always a most patient and dignified figure and as the recognised doyen of the Sangha he generously submitted himself to countless special occasions and ceremonies. I remember one particularly ponderous afternoon in London at a rather catholic gathering when he and I were the only two Bhikkhus present. Very soon after arriving it had dawned upon me

that this was not something to stay long at, but I obediently sat at Venerable Saddhātissa's side while the speeches and tea and seed cake floated about, wondering how and when I was going to escape it all. Eventually, the momentum of the afternoon seemed to slacken, I felt that enough was enough and turning to Ven. Saddhātissa I deferentially whispered that I thought I ought to be going. As if that were his cue, like a cork from a bottle, muttering and nodding his agreement, he was on his feet and preceding me to the door hardly before I could take in what was happening. I've wondered since whether behind that impassive exterior he hadn't also been racking his brains for a way out. Unquestionably he gave generously of himself and felt keenly his responsibility as the principal representative of the Sangha in Britain. Venerable Ajahn Chah liked him enormously and instructed us to respect him as though he were the Sangha-Rāja. In recent years there were moves to formalise that leading position: from Sri Lanka he was appointed Nayaka Mahā Thera for the UK and Europe, and during the abortive manoeuvres to create a Sangha Council here it was clear that he was the obvious choice to preside over it (it was pointed out at one meeting that he couldn't be accorded the title of Sangha-Rāja without a Buddhist monarch to appoint him, and that still seems a little way off in Britain!)

To remember him I still have the bowl gong he presented me with when we opened the Isle of Wight Vihāra and in due course I shall cause to have planted here a tree or group of trees in his memory and anyone who wishes may participate in that.

Thank you dear Venerable Dr Saddhātissa. Our respects and best wishes go with you.

From Anil D. Goonewardene:

The period of his stay in the United Kingdom, 1957 to 1960, will be remembered as an epoch in the development of Buddhism here. Partly due to many Asian Buddhists coming to live in the United Kingdom, and partly due to the increasing interest in Buddhism by native British people, this period saw Buddhism becoming firmly established in Britain. The first ordination in the United Kingdom was performed by Ven. Dr Saddhatissa in the 1960s.

Ven. Dr Saddhatissa worked untiringly for the cause of Buddhism in different ways. First, as the senior resident Buddhist monk here he gave a lead to the other ordained persons. His advice was sought often. He helped to establish several viharas, mainly of the Theravada tradition, in the United Kingdom and in Europe. He introduced many people to Buddhism and officiated at ceremonies where many accepted Buddhism as a religion.

Second, he gave innumerable talks on Buddhism at the vihara and outside, and in the United Kingdom and in other countries. He went on lecture tours to the United States of America, Japan and Europe, and, as recently as 1989, visited the Soviet Union.

Third, he had numerous scholarly publications to his name, both books and articles, in English, Pali and Sinhala, too many to detail.

Fourth, he was ever ready to explain any point regarding Buddhism not only to students and scholars but to anyone. He had a unique ability to

understand a question completely and then give an answer in a few words. While working in the South East Asian Room at the School of Oriental and African Studies there was a steady trickle of people coming to consult him.

Fifth, amidst all his other work Ven. Dr Saddhatissa did not neglect to perform his pastoral duties. I can remember an occasion when he walked the length of the hall at Chiswick Vihara to greet a disabled person who could not come to him. Children loved to go to meet him in his study and waited eagerly for the never failing invitation to dip into the box of chocolates and sweets he kept for them. When people phoned him he made it a point to inquire about the various members of the family. Many consulted him regarding personal and family problems, and his kindly advice based on the Dhamma was a salve to many a troubled mind.

Ven. Dr Saddhatissa made an important and lasting contribution to the study and teaching of Buddhism not only as a religion but as a scholarly academic discipline. In teaching the Dhamma he took pains to explain that Buddhism was not simply a philosophy but a living dynamic religion to be practised. He was also concerned to point out that Buddhism was not only a personal religion, and that the principles of The Dhamma applied to all manner of social, economic, political and other matters, both national and international. He explained that many of the problems in the world today, both of individuals and nations, were due to moral degeneration rather than to economic.

He passed away peacefully in hospital. According to Buddhist custom, his coffin lay in state at Kenton Vihara and hundreds of people came to pay their last respects to him. The remains were cremated in February 1990 in a dignified and, according to his wishes, a simple Buddhist ceremony, attended by many. The Buddhist world will miss him. May he attain nibbana.

Russell Webb writes:*

The Maṅgala Sutta cites 'association with the wise and honouring those worthy of honour' as a most beneficial activity, while the *Dhammapada* states 'Happy is association with the wise, even like meeting with kinsfolk.'

To meet Venerable Dr. Saddhātissa is to enter into a calming atmosphere, where a basic kindly spirit, devoid of material considerations, manifests itself. A serenity of warmth of feeling are ever displayed which must surely characterise the inner detachment of someone far advanced on the path to enlightenment. 'Just as a city gate fixed in the ground is not shaken by the winds from the four directions, even so do I declare to be a good man he who thoroughly perceives the noble truths,' so proclaims the *Ratana Sutta*.

The future Saṅghanāyaka of Great Britain and longest serving Dhammadūta in the West was born in Satkorale province, Ceylon, the son of the local ayurvedic doctor. After primary school education he expressed the wish to enter the Sangha (and even ran away from home to make his point!). He was permitted to undertake *pabbajjā* at the end of 1926 and attended the

* (from *Buddhist Studies in honour of of Hammalava Saddhatissa* (ed. Gatare Dhammapala *et. al.* Nagesoda 1984)

Śāstrodaya Pirivena at Sandalankawa. Thereafter, he pursued higher studies in the Vidyodaya Pirivena (now University) in the classical Buddhist subjects, won academic fame and occupied senior positions at several prestigious institutes of Oriental learning, both East and West, as the curriculum vitae below will best amplify. As an example of a keen and conscientious student of the Dhamma, one may recall his copying out by hand the voluminous Saddhamapuṇḍarīkasūtra when a copy could not be made available in India.

He made himself conversant in modern languages (Hindi, Urdu, Gujarati and Punjabi), in addition to Burmese and English, which were to stand him in good stead when teaching or preaching in the sub-continent. This work culminated in the mass conversion ceremony of half a million Untouchables at Nagpur in 1956. He had acted as a spiritual adviser to their leader, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, and continued this pastoral activity amongst the Indian Buddhists in England when he was appointed Head of the London Buddhist Vihāra in spring of the following year.

The Vihāra had only been reopened in 1954 and being the only traditional Buddhist centre in the country (and in the whole of Europe) at that time what was urgently needed was clear direction of purpose, depth of exposition and stability. During the next decade the Vihāra was the only permanent centre to remain unaffected by the factional in-fighting that briefly characterised the infant Buddhist movement in London. This centre soon acquired a reputation for sound instruction and practice of the Dhamma, encouraged by Ven. Saddhātissa (who has become identified with it and) whose stated aim has always been that, whilst serving the traditional religious needs of Asian Buddhists, eventually the Vihāra will be run for and by Western Buddhists.

Although primarily an outpost of the Theravāda, representative of other Buddhist traditions have always been made welcome at the London Buddhist Vihāra. An inviting, international climate of interest in the Dhamma was enhanced by the re-establishment of the British Mahābodhi Society, which had been founded by the great Sinhalese reformer and non-denominational Buddhist, Anagārika Dharmapāla, forty years earlier in 1926. This catholic outlook has resulted from Ven. Saddhātissa's breadth of vision based on a deep knowledge of both Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist texts, which attitude has permeated the centre and benignly influenced all visitors and enquirers. His attitude has been accentuated by worldwide travel and familiarity with other peoples and cultures. Indeed, his sincere interest and participation in interreligious dialogue stems from this recognition of the validity of others' views and feelings.

Because of his close connection with lay followers it was perhaps appropriate that his choice of subject for a doctoral dissertation was the *Upāsakajanālaṅkāra*, the only full-length Pali text devoted to the laity. Moreover, his main books in English have become prescribed textbooks at colleges and universities in the West. The most notable example is *The Buddha's Way* which has been described as 'the best, simplest, most readable and comprehensible short introduction to what the Buddha taught that has yet been written in English' — or, for that matter, in other languages in which

it has been translated. Added to this interest in the welfare of the laity was an ability to explain the fundamentals of Buddhism in unambiguous terms, as witness his prolific output of articles and journals in England, Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia and Singapore; it was natural for Kelaniya, Sri Jayewardenepura and Peradeniya Universities to confirm their award of D. Litt. 'in appreciation of his yeoman service to world literature and universal thinking'.

Hammalava Saddhātissa: Academic Records

Undergraduate

1933	Vidyodaya Pirivena (Oriental College), Colombo (winning First Prizes in the annual examinations)
1939	Final Examination of Vidyodaya Pirivena (Hons.) in Pali, Sanskrit, Prakrit, Sinhala and Buddhist History
1944	Final (Paṇḍita) Examination, Second Class, in Sinhala, Prakrit, Logic, History and Archaeology
1954	B.A. Second Class in Pali, Sanskrit, Ancient Indian History and Culture, Banaras Hindu University

Postgraduate

1957	M.A. in Pali with Buddhist Sanskrit (placed first in Higher Second Class), Banaras Hindu University
1958-61	Research Scholar of Buddhist Philosophy at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
1963	Ph.D. University of Edinburgh (diss. 'A Critical Edition and Study of the Upāsakajanālaṅkāra')
1979	D.Litt (h.c.) University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka
1981	D.Litts (h.c.) Universities of Sri Jayewardenepura and Peradeniya, Sri Lanka

Appointments etc.

Academic

1940-4	Senior Member of Staff and Principal, Vikramashila Pirivena, Pallewela, Sri Lanka
1950-3	Senior Lecturer in Pali, Mahābodhi College, Sarnath, Banaras
1956-7	Lecturer in Pali, Banaras Hindu University
1958-60	Lecturer in Sinhala, University of London
1966-9	Professor of Pali and Buddhism, Dept. of East Asian Studies, University of Toronto, Canada
1973	Visiting Lecturer in Buddhist Studies, University of Oxford
1978	Visiting Lecturer in Pali and Theravāda Buddhism at various universities in Japan

Other Academic

1955	Collaborator, Caṭṭha-saṅgāyanā of Pali Tipiṭaka in Burma
1963	Member of Executive Council, Pali Text Society, London

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Examinations

1954-7	Examiner, Postgraduate Pali Institute, Nalanda, Patna
1955-7	Examiner, Banaras Hindu University
1958	Examiner, University of London
1966-9	Examiner, University of Toronto
1980	Examiner, Oxford University

Non-Academic

1957	Head of the London Buddhist Vihāra
1966	President, British Mahābodhi Society, London
1966	President, Sangha Council of Great Britain
1980-1	Sanghanāyaka Thera of Great Britain

Selected bibliography of publications up to 1983, compiled by W.B. Dorakumbara

The birth stories of the ten Bodhisattvas and the Dasabōdhisattupattikathā, London: Pāli Text Society, 1975.

The Buddha's Way, London: Allen & Unwin, 1971. Also published in Braille and Sinhalese — Colombo: Gunasera, 1986.

Buddhist ethics: Essence of Buddhism, London: Allen & Unwin, 1971; Wisdom, 1987

A Buddhist's manual, (with Russell Webb) London: British Mahābōdhi Society, 1976. 2nd ed. 1982

Handbook for Buddhists, Benares: Mahā Bōddhi Society, 1956, 2nd ed. Calcutta: Mahabodhi Society, 1973

Introduction to Buddhism, London: Mahābōdhi Society, 1981

The life of the Buddha, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976, 1988. This book has been translated into Finnish, Hindi and Japanese in 1979, 1981 and 1983 respectively.

Nibbāna, Sir Baron Jayatilaka memorial lecture, Borella: Y.M.B.A., 1981

Upāsakajanālaṅkāra: a critical edition and study, London: Luzac for Pāli Text Society, 1965

Studies in Pali and Buddhism: a memorial volume in honour of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap, Delhi: B.R. Publishers (As editor along with A.K. Narain et al), 1979

Saral Pali Sikṣa: a Pali grammar in Hindi, Benares: Mahābodhi Society of India, 1948Gunaganga (The river of virtue), Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1972 (in Sinhalese)

Vidyāyugayata Budusamaya, Colombo: Ratnavali Prakasakayo, 1974 (in Sinhalese)

All that arises, O how unlasting,
Increase and swift decay, such is life.
All that has arisen, all that must pass away.
No more to rise or fall, that peace (Nibānna) is best.

— the Buddha

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Rupert Gethin

COSMOLOGY AND MEDITATION: FROM THE AGGAÑÑA-SUTTA TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY

Now there comes a time, Vāseṭṭha, when after a long period of time this world contracts. When the world contracts beings are for the most part born in the realm of Radiance There they exist made of mind, feeding on joy, self-luminous, moving through the air, constantly beautiful; thus they remain for a long, long time. Now there comes a time. Vāseṭṭha, when after a long period of time this world expands. When the world expands beings for the most part fall from the realm of Radiance and come here [to this realm]; and they exist made of mind, feeding on joy, self-luminous, moving through the air, constantly beautiful; thus they remain for a long, long time.[1]

An earlier version of this article was read at the Tenth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Paris in 1991. I am grateful to Steven Collins, Lance Cousins, Nobumi Iyanaga, Rita Langer, Orman Rotem, Paul Williams, and Nobuyoshi Yamabe for comments, criticism, or help with tracing references in the course of writing this article.

[1] D 3:84–85: "hoti kho so Vāseṭṭha samayo yaṃ kadāci karahaci dighassa addhuno accayena ayaṃ loko saṃvattati. saṃvattamāne loke yebhuyyena sattā ābhassara-saṃvattanikā honti. te tattha honti manomayā pīti-bhakkhā sayam-pabhā antalikkha-carā subhaṭṭhāyino ciraṃ dighaṃ addhānam tiṭṭhanti. hoti kho so Vāseṭṭha samayo yaṃ kadāci karahaci dighassa addhuno accayena ayaṃ loko vivattati. vivattamāne loke yebhuyyena sattā ābhassara-kāyā cavitvā itthattaṃ āgacchanti. te ca honti manomayā pīti-bhakkhā sayyam-pabhā antalikkha-carā subhaṭṭhāyino ciraṃ dighaṃ addhānaṃ tiṭṭhanti." All references to Pali and Sanskrit texts use the abbreviations listed in app. A of this article. For full citations, see app. A. References are to volume and page of the cited edition, except in the case of the Abhidharmakośa and Visuddhimagga; references to the former are to chapter and verse, and to the latter, to chapter and section of the Warren-Kosambi edition and Ñāṇamoli translation.

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This striking and evocative passage introduces the well-known account of the evolution of the world and human society found in the Aggañña-sutta of the Pāli Dīgha Nikāya.[2] It marks the beginning of a particular line of thought within Buddhist tradition concerning the world and its cycles of expansion and contraction. It is this line of thought that I wish to investigate in the present article.

It can sometimes seem that, as "literate, demythologized and Aristotelianized academics"—to borrow a characterization from G. S. Kirk[3]—we become peculiarly insensitive to the kind of poetic and imaginative world which, for perhaps most human beings for most of human history, has constituted "reality." It is perhaps not an accident then that, despite the fact that certain studies of contemporary Buddhism in Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand have drawn attention to the importance of the traditional cosmology to the worldview of present-day Theravāda Buddhists,[4] the subject of Buddhist cosmology has received relatively little attention from textual scholars.[5] Significantly, one of the few works devoted to Buddhist cosmology to be published in more recent years is not a study of ancient Pāli or Sanskrit sources but a translation of a fourteenth-century Thai classic, Phya Lithai's *Traibhūmikathā* or *Thrai Phum Phra Ruang* ("Three Worlds according to King Ruang").[6]

The overall paucity of scholarly materials dealing with Buddhist cosmology would seem to reflect a reluctance on the part of modern scholarship to treat this dimension of Buddhist thought as having any serious bearing on those fundamental Buddhist teachings with which we are so familiar: the four noble truths, the eightfold path, no-self, dependent arising, and so on. The effect of this is to divorce the bare doctrinal formulations of Buddhist thought from a traditional mythic context. This can result in serious distortions: the picture that has sometimes been painted of especially early Buddhism and Theravāda Buddhism is somewhat one-dimensional and flat. However, the principle that the study of the imagery employed in early Buddhist texts is a useful way of deepening our understanding of the more overtly conceptual teachings of the Nikāyas has already been used to good purpose by Steven Collins in his discussion of house imagery, vegetation imagery, and water imagery in

[2] This initial formula must be regarded as constituting a significant piece of floating tradition that forms part of the common heritage of ancient Buddhism. Apart from its occurrence in all four surviving recensions of the Aggañña-sutta—see K. Meisig, *Das Sūtra von den vier Stänten: Das Aggañña-sutta im Licht seiner chinesischen Parallelen* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1988)—we find the same formula (though with a slightly different account of the process of world expansion) used in two other suttas of the Dīgha Nikāya: the *Brahmajāla* and *Pāṭika* (D 1:17 and D 3:28–29; the expansion formula here reads: "vivattamāne loke suññaṃ brahma-vimānaṃ pātubhavati. ath' aññataro satto āyukkhayā vā puññakkhayā vā ābhassara-kāyā cavitvā suññaṃ brahma-vimānaṃ upapajjati. so tattha hoti manomayo pīti-bhakkho sayam-pabho antalikkha-caro subhaṭṭhāyī ciraṃ dīghaṃ addhānaṃ tiṭṭhati"). Two Aṅguttara passages (A 4:89; 5:60) also make use of parts of the formula, while Vibh 415 (cf. D 3:88), which states that human beings at the beginning of an aeon are born lacking the male or female faculty, also alludes to it. Outside the Nikāyas and Āgamas, looking beyond the Pāli tradition we find the formula used in the *Mahāvastu* (see *Le Mahāvastu*, ed. E. Sénart, 3 vols. [Paris, 1882–97], 1:52, 338–39) and referred to and commented on by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośa* (Abhidh-k 3:97c–d–98a–b; see Louis de La Vallée Poussin, trans., *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu: Traduction et Annotations*, 6 vols. [Brussels: Institut belge des hautes études chinoises, 1971], 2:203–4, and *Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*, ed. D. Shastri, 3 vols. [Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970–72], 2:554).

[3] G. S. Kirk, *Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures* (London, Berkeley, and Los Angeles: Cambridge University Press and University of California Press, 1970), p. 281.

[4] See R. F. Gombrich, *Precept and Practice: Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 153–91; S. J. Tambiah, *Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-East Thailand* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 32–52.

[5] The pioneering work is W. Kirfel, *Kosmographie der Inder* (Bonn: K. Schroeder, 1920), but this devotes rather little space to Buddhist sources in comparison to Brahmanical and Jain materials and is now rather dated. It is Louis de La Vallée Poussin's work on the Abhidharmakośa that has given us the most substantial material on Vaibhāṣika cosmology; see his *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, Vasubandhu et Yaśomitra: Troisième chapitre de l'Abhidharmakośa: Kārikā, Bhāṣya et Vyākhyā* (Brussels: Académie royale de Belgique, 1919), and "Cosmology and Cosmogony (Buddhist)," in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. J. Hastings, 13 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908–27), 2:129–38. The relevant portions of Ñāṇamoli's translation of Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga constitute the only readily available and accessible sources for the developed Theravādin system; see *The Path of Purification* (Colombo: Semage, 1964), 7:40–44, 13:29–65, p. 214, n. 14. The two more comprehensive studies of the details of the Nikāyas' cosmological outlook, Joseph Masson's *La religion populaire dans le canon bouddhique pāli* (Louvain: Bureaux du Muséon, 1942); and M. M. J. Marasinghe's *Gods in Early Buddhism: A Study in Their Social and Mythological Milieu as Depicted in the Nikāyas of the Pāli Canon* (Vidyalankara: University of Sri Lanka, 1974) tend to approach their subject from the standpoint that talk of gods and the like in the Nikāyas is something of a concession to "popular" Buddhism rather than an integral part of Buddhist thought—this is explicitly revealed in the title of Masson's book and is perhaps less true of Marasinghe's work; both these books, however, represent useful collections of material on cosmological ideas as presented in the Nikāyas. The figure of Māra has received some additional attention: T. O. Ling, *Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil: A Study in Theravāda Buddhism* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1962); J. W. Boyd, *Satan and Māra: Christian and Buddhist Symbols of Evil* (Leiden: Brill, 1975). R. Kloetzli's more recent *Buddhist Cosmology: From Single World System to Pure Land* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), while providing a useful summary and overview of Buddhist cosmological ideas from the Nikāyas through to the developed Mahāyāna, from my perspective passes rather quickly over the early materials and the Abhidharma. One of the most interesting treatments of cosmology in the Nikāyas to have been published in recent years is Peter Masefield's "Mind/Cosmos Maps in the Pāli Nikāyas," in *Buddhist and Western Psychology*, ed. N. Katz (Boulder, Colo.: Prajñā Press, 1983), pp. 69–93. See also R. F. Gombrich, "Ancient Indian Cosmology," in *Ancient Cosmologies*, ed. C. Blacker and M. Loewe (London, 1975), pp. 110–42.

[6] F. E. Reynolds and M. B. Reynolds, *Three Worlds according to King Ruang: A Thai Buddhist Cosmology* (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1982). One of the sources employed by Phya Lithai was the earlier Pāli *Lokapaññatti*; see E. Denis, trans. and ed., *La Lokapaññati et les idées cosmologiques du bouddhisme ancien*, 2 vols. (Lille, 1977).

the context of the Nikāyas' presentation of the teaching of "no-self."[7] Advocating an approach not dissimilar to Collins's, Stanley Tambiah has commented that the traditional Buddhist cosmological scheme "says figuratively and in terms of metaphorical images the same kind of thing which is stated in abstract terms in the doctrine. The basic doctrinal concepts of Buddhism . . . which are alleged to explain man's predicament and to direct his religious action, are also embedded in the cosmology (and its associated pantheon)."[8] It seems to me that in this he can only be right, and one of the things I will do in this article is to explore further the relationship in Buddhist thought between the realms of abstract theory, on the one hand, and cosmological myth, on the other. To ignore the mythic portions of ancient Buddhist texts is to fail in a significant way to enter into their thought-world. My particular focus will be certain cosmological ideas concerning the expansion and contraction of the universe and their implications for our understanding of the nature and significance of the fourth "meditation" (*jhāna/dhyāna*) in the account of the stages of the Buddhist path as presented in the Nikāyas and Abhidharma. What also emerges, I will argue, is a clearer perspective on the development of certain ideas usually considered characteristic of certain strands of Mahāyāna Buddhist thought: the *tathāgatagarbha* and an idealist ontology.

COSMOLOGY IN THE NIKĀYAS AND ABHIDHARMA

The Nikāyas and Āgamas contain very many cosmological details, but it is not until the period of the Abhidharma that we get attempts to organize these details into a systematic whole. Yet what Masson's and Marasinghe's studies of "gods" in the Nikāyas reveal is that, notwithstanding the fact that the Nikāyas nowhere give a systematic exposition of their cosmology,[9] all the basic principles and not a few of the details of the developed cosmology of the Abhidharma are to be found scattered throughout the Nikāyas.[10] I reckon the basic principles to be three. First, there are a number of different realms of existence that constitute a hierarchy; there are lower realms—the realms of animals (*tiracchānayoni*) and of hungry ghosts (*pettivisaya*) and various hells (*niraya*); there is the realm of men (*manussa*) and, above, the various heaven realms of the

[7] S. Collins, *Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravāda Buddhism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 165–76, 218–24, 247–61.

[8] Tambiah, *Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-East Thailand*, pp. 34–35.

[9] Although we do find the beginnings of systematization in the Aṅguttara-Nikāya, see Marasinghe, pp. 244–81.

[10] For a summary of the cosmological details as found in the Nikāyas, see ibid., pp. 43–62.

devas and *brahmās*.[11] Second, beings are continually reborn in these various realms in accordance with their actions—the ten unskillful (*akusala*) courses of action (*kammapatha*) lead to rebirth in one of the lower realms, and the ten skillful (*kusala*) courses of action lead to rebirth as a human being or in the lower heavens, while meditation attainments (*jhāna*) lead to rebirth in the higher heavens as a *brahmā*.[12] The third principle is that which is inherent in the formula from the Aggañña-sutta that I quoted above. The various levels of existence arrange themselves in "world-systems" (*loka-dhātu*); there are innumerable world-systems which all expand and contract across vast expanses of time.[13] This basic cosmological scheme is not confined to one isolated Nikāya context; it is something alluded to and assumed by very many of the Nikāya formulas. It is perhaps most conveniently summed up in the well-known formula which states that the Buddha, "having himself fully understood and directly experienced this world with its *devas*, its Māra and Brahmā, this generation with its *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas*, with its princes and peoples, makes it known."[14]

What I want to argue below does not hinge on establishing that the Buddha himself or the earliest phase of Buddhist thought subscribed to this specific cosmological view; I am concerned with how the tradition read the texts as a coherent whole rather than with their relative chronology and evolution. But I would add that I can see no particular reason for thinking that this basic conception of the universe does not belong to the earlier strata of the Nikāyas. There are no a priori historical grounds for regarding the principles of this cosmology as improbable in the mouth of the Buddha; as Marasinghe has commented, "From a study of the Jain, Ājīvika, and the Buddhist ideas of cosmological thinking, it may be surmised that, by the time of the Buddha, there was a rich floating mass of cosmological ideas in the Gangetic regions from which most religious teachers drew quite freely."[15]

[11] See esp. Masson, pp. 18–38, and the chart facing p. 144 for details of the various hierarchical lists found in the Nikāyas.

[12] See in particular A 2:126, 230; 4:39, 241; cf. Marasinghe, pp. 244–68, and chart facing p. 62.

[13] See Marasinghe, p. 44; D 2:139, 253; M 3:101–2; A 1:227, 5:59.

[14] For example, D 1:62: "so imaṃ lokaṃ sadevakaṃ samārakaṃ sabrahmakaṃ sassamaṇa-brāhmaṇiṃ pajaṃ sadeva-manussaṃ sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti." I follow the commentary (Sv 1:174) in taking *sadeva* in the sense of *sammuti-deva*. It is possible to take *samāraka* and *sabrahmaka* as indicating a plurality of *māras* and *brahmās*, respectively (on the grounds that the Nikāyas clearly do recognize a plurality of *brahmās* and *māras*); on the other hand, it seems to me probable that in the present context we should take *imaṃ lokaṃ* as implying simply "this [one] world-system" that we occupy; see Boyd, pp. 100–111; cf. the discussion of the terms *loka*, *loka-dhātu*, and *cakkavāḷa* below, n. 34.

[15] Marasinghe (n. 5 above), p. 260; cf. pp. 59, 259–61.

On the evidence of the Ṛg-Veda, Upaniṣads, and Jain sources such cosmological ideas might easily have been borrowed and adapted from the cultural milieu in which we understand the Buddha to have formulated his teachings. But this is perhaps to put it too negatively. In many respects the kind of cosmology that I have indicated above seems actually fundamental to Buddhist thought. On the evidence of the Nikāyas (and apparently the Chinese Āgamas) we know of no Buddhism or Buddha that did not teach a belief in rebirth, or conceive of rebirth as fluid among different realms, whether animal, hellish, human, or heavenly.[16] While certain of the details of the Aggañña-sutta's account of the evolution of human society may be, as Gombrich has persuasively argued, satirical in intent, there is nothing in the Nikāyas to suggest that these basic cosmological principles that I have identified should be so understood; there is nothing to suggest that the Aggañña-sutta's introductory formula describing the expansion and contraction of the world is merely a joke.[17] We should surely expect early Buddhism and indeed the Buddha to have some specific ideas about the nature of the round of rebirth, and essentially this is what the cosmological details presented in the Aggañña-sutta and elsewhere in Nikāyas constitute. They represent a concretized and mythic counterpart to the more abstract formulation of, say, dependent arising (*paṭiccasamuppāda*).

What functions do the various levels of existence and the gods play in the Nikāyas? There is no one simple answer to this question, but I shall answer initially by stating more fully what I identified above as the second principle of Buddhist cosmology, namely, that particular kinds of action of body, speech, and mind lead to certain kinds of rebirth. The passages I referred to in this connection effectively draw up a hierarchy of *kamma* that corresponds very closely to the hierarchy of levels of existence. At the bottom of this hierarchy we have unskillful *kammas* leading to rebirth in the realms of hell, hungry ghosts, and animals; next we have the skillful *kammas* of generosity (*dāna*) and the precepts (*sīla*) practiced to various degrees and leading to rebirth as a human being or as a *deva* in one of six realms of heaven; finally the practice of meditation (*bhāvanā*) and the development of the various *jhānas* leads to rebirth among "the gods of Brahmā's retinue" (*brahmakāyikā devā*) and beyond. At this point we should remind ourselves that *kamma* is for the Nikāyas—as for Buddhist thought generally—at root a mental act or intention; acts of body and speech are performed in response to and conditioned by the quality of the underlying intention or will (*cetanā*); they are unskillful or skillful because they are motivated by unskillful or

[16] See, e.g., the Mahāsīhanāda-sutta (M 1:68–83).

[17] See app. B, "How Old Is Buddhist Cosmology? A Note on the Aggañña-Sutta."

skillful intentions.[18] Acts of body and speech are, as it were, the epiphenomena of particular kinds of mentality; they are driven by specific psychological states. In a very real sense acts of body and speech are acts of will. Thus the hierarchy is essentially one of certain kinds of mentality (understood as *kamma*) being related to certain levels of existence; this is most explicit in the case of the various *jhānas* and Brahma realms. This way of thinking demonstrates the general principle of an equivalence or parallel in Buddhist thought between psychology on the one hand and cosmology on the other.

Many of the stories about *devas* from different heavens in the Nikāyas lend themselves very readily to a kind of "psychological" interpretation, that is, to interpretation in terms of certain mental states; in certain contexts this interpretation is explicit in the texts themselves. In the *vana-saṃyutta* of the Saṃyutta Nikāya there is a whole series of accounts of *devas* visiting *bhikkhus* dwelling in the forest in order to admonish the *bhikkhus* for their laziness.[19] Here the *devas* serve to arouse skillful states of mind in the *bhikkhu* that spur him on in his practice. Similarly in the *Māra-* and *Bhikkhunī-saṃyuttas* Māra is represented as appearing on the scene and tempting *bhikkhus*, *bhikkhunīs*, and the Buddha, with the world of the five senses.[20] Here then Māra appears to act as the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*) which are precisely the mental states that one must overcome in order to attain *jhāna*, and it is precisely *jhāna* that—at least according to a later understanding—takes one temporarily beyond the world of the five senses and out of Māra's reach.[21] To read these texts in loosely psychological terms is not, I think, to engage in acts of gratuitous "demythologizing"; the Buddhist tradition itself at an early date was quite capable of demythologizing—so much so that one hesitates to use such a term in this context. It is rather, I think, that this kind of psychological interpretation was for the Nikāyas inherent in the material itself. When questioned as to the nature of Māra, the Buddha responds in abstract terms that have to do with general psychological experience: "One says, 'Māra! Māra!' lord. Now to what extent, lord, might Māra or the manifestation of Māra exist?' 'Where the eye exists,

[18] A 3:415: "cetanâhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi. cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā" (cf. Abhidh-k 4:1).

[19] S 1:197–205; Marasinghe, pp. 207–13.

[20] S 1:111–13, 116–18, 130–31; 132–33; Marasinghe, pp. 185–98.

[21] According to the stock Nikāya formula (e.g., D 1:73), by abandoning the five hindrances one attains the first *jhāna* thereby passing from the *kāmâvacara* to the *rūpâvacara;* the developed cosmological tradition states that Māra dwells as a rebellious prince among the *paranimittavasavattin* gods (S 1:133, 1:33–34); see Boyd (n. 5 above), pp. 81–84, 114–19; G. P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names,* 2 vols. (London: Pāli Text Society, 1974), 2:613.

Samiddhi, where visible forms, eye consciousness and *dhammas* cognizable by the eye exist, there Māra or the manifestation of Māra exist.'"[22]

Again the *Suttanipāta* defines the armies of Māra that assault the Bodhisatta in what are essentially psychological terms:

435. Dwelling thus having attained the highest experience, my mind has no regard for sensual desires. See the purity of a being.
436. Sensual desire is called your [Māra's] first army, discontent your second; your third is called hunger and thirst, your fourth craving.
437. Your fifth is called tiredness and sleepiness, your sixth fear. Your seventh is doubt, deceit and obstinacy your eighth . . .
439. Namuci, this is your army—the attacking (force) of the Dark One [Māra]. Not being a hero one does not conquer it, but having conquered it one gains happiness.[23]

In the Saṃyutta Nikāya, the daughters of Māra too are presented as having a similar psychological reality: "Then Craving, Discontent, and Lust, the daughters of Māra, approached the Blessed One [the Buddha]. Having approached they spoke thus to the Blessed One: 'Ascetic, we would serve at your feet.' Now the Blessed One paid no attention, since he was freed in the unsurpassable, complete destruction of attachments."[24] It is surely to read nothing into these texts to say that the descriptions of the Bodhisatta's/Buddha's encounter with Māra's armies and daughters represent vivid descriptions of the psychology of the Buddha before and after his awakening. The Bodhisatta/Buddha has wrestled with certain mental states—Māra, his armies, his daughters—and defeated them. That is to say, particular psychological states are described in terms of an encounter with beings with cosmological significance—or vice versa.[25]

[22] S 4:38–39: "māro māro ti vuccati. kittāvatā nu kho bhante māro vā assa māra-paññatti vā ti. yattha kho Samiddhi atthi cakkhum atthi rūpā atthi cakkhu-viññāṇaṃ atthi cakkhu-viññāṇa-viññātabbā dhammā, atthi māro vā māra-paññatti vā."

[23] Sn 435–39: "tassa m' evaṃ viharato pattass' uttama-vedanaṃ / kāmesu nāpekhate cittaṃ passa suddhattaṃ / / kāmā te paṭhamā senā dutiyā arati vuccati / tatiyā khuppipāsā te catutthī taṇhā pavuccati / / pañcamī thīna-middhaṃ te chaṭṭhābhīrū pavuccati / sattamī vicikicchā te makkho thambho te aṭṭhamo / / . . . / / esa namuci senā kaṇhassābhippahāraṇī / na naṃ asūro jināti jetvā ca labhate sukhaṃ" (trans. adapted from K. R. Norman, trans., *The Group of Discourses: Revised Translation with Introduction and Notes* [Oxford: Pāli Text Society, 1992]).

[24] S 1:124.26–30: "atha kho taṇhā ca aratī ca ragā ca māra-dhītaro yena bhagavā ten' upasaṃkamiṃsu. upasaṃkamitvā bhagavantam etad avocuṃ: pāde te samaṇa paricāremā ti. atha kho bhagavā na manasākāsi yathā taṃ anuttare upadhi-saṃkhaye vimutto." See also Sn 835; Nd 1:181.

[25] The fact that the armies of Māra here in part overlap with the five hindrances of sensual desire (*kāma-cchanda*), aversion (*vyāpāda*), tiredness and sleepiness (*thīna-middha*), excitement and depression (*uddhacca-kukkucca*), and doubt (*vicikicchā*) underlines the point made already about the particular psychological interpretation of Māra in terms of the five hindrances.

I do not wish, however, to suggest that a psychological interpretation of such figures as Māra is the whole story. I am not claiming that all ancient readers or hearers of these "texts" would have conceived of Māra's daughters and armies simply as mystic symbols of particular mental states. No doubt for many, Māra, his daughters, and his armies would have had a reality as autonomous beings apart from their own mental states. I do want to claim, however, that a psychological interpretation would have made sense to the authors and readers of these texts. Yet in making such a claim I do not wish to imply that a psychological reading somehow reveals the "true" and "real" significance of the various cosmological beings—the significance intended by the Buddha but which the Buddhist tradition had to compromise in the face of popular belief, and which we in the late twentieth century are at last privileged to access. The Buddhism of the Nikāyas embraces the notion of rebirth, and the account of different realms of existence occupied by a variety of beings is integral to that. The categories of "mythic symbol" and "literally true" are modern and are bound up with a complex ontology that has been shaped by a particular intellectual and cultural tradition. Thus to approach what, for the want of a better term, *we* call the mythic portions of the Nikāyas with the attitude that such categories as "mythic symbol" and "literally true" are absolutely opposed is to adopt an attitude that is out of time and place. It seems to me that in some measure we must allow both a literal and a psychological interpretation. Both are there in the texts.

The equivocation between cosmology and psychology is particularly clear in a passage of the Kevaddha-sutta.[26] The Buddha tells of a certain *bhikkhu* who wished to discover where the four great elements (*mahābhūta*) ceased without remainder (*aparisesā nirujjhanti*). It seems that we must understand this as wishing to know the full extent of the conditioned world—both physical and mental. The *bhikkhu* appears to have been a master of meditation, for we are told that he attained a state of concentration in which the path leading to the gods appeared to his concentrated mind ("tathārūpaṃ samādhiṃ samāpajji yathā samāhite citte deva-yāniyo maggo pāturahosi"). He then proceeds to approach the gods of ever higher levels to pose his question until eventually he finds himself in the presence of Mahābrahmā himself, who confesses that he cannot answer the question and suggests that he return to the Buddha to put this question to him. The Buddha answers that the four elements cease, not "out there" in some remote outpost of the universe, but in "consciousness" (*viññāṇa*).[27] This account states very clearly how specific psychological states—in this instance, the mind concentrated in the

[26] D 1:215–23.

[27] "viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato pahaṃ" (D 1:23), interpreted by Buddhaghosa (Sv 2:393) as referring to *nibbāna*.

various levels of meditation—give access to particular cosmological realms.[28] Thus the *bhikkhu* is explicitly described as at once making a journey through various levels of the cosmos and making an inner, spiritual journey—a journey of the mind.

In the light of an extremely suggestive article by Peter Masefield, it seems that instead of being misled into searching for meaning in terms of the categories of literal truth and mythic symbol, we should understand the Nikāyas' reference both to a cosmic hierarchy of beings (humans, *devas* and *brahmās*) and to a psychological hierarchy of mental states (levels of *jhāna*) as paralleling the Upaniṣadic categories of "with reference to the gods" (*adhidaivatam*) and "with reference to the self" (*adhyātmam*): that is, "reality" may be viewed either from the perspective of an exterior world (*brahman*) or from the perspective of an interior world (*ātman*) that are in *some* sense—though, in the case of Buddhist thought, *not* an absolutist metaphysical one—the same.[28] Thus Masefield suggests that to talk or conceive of Māra as a cosmic entity on the one hand and as psychological forces on the other is essentially to shift from the *adhidaivatam* to the *adhyātmam* perspective.[29] I am persuaded that Masefield has indeed identified here a way of thinking that runs very deep in the Indian philosophical tradition, and while the importance of this way of thinking may be acknowledged in the context of the Vedas and Hindu and Buddhist tantra, it is insufficiently understood in the context of early Buddhism.

Turning from the Nikāyas to the Abhidharma, two full systematic accounts of Buddhist cosmology survive: that of the Theravādin Abhidhamma and that of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma. These two accounts are remarkably similar in broad outline and in fact also agree on many points of detail. This again suggests that the basic cosmology should be regarded as having been formulated relatively early since it forms part of the common heritage of ancient Buddhism. In what follows, I shall be drawing on both the Pāli Theravādin traditions and also, at points, Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa for the traditions of the Sarvāstivādins.

One of the general concerns of the Abhidharma is to provide a detailed and complex hierarchy of consciousness. The classic Theravāda scheme of eighty-nine or 121 "consciousnesses" (*citta*) begins with unskillful consciousnesses at the bottom, followed by consciousnesses that concern the mechanics of bare awareness of the objects of the five senses, and then by skillful sense-sphere consciousnesses; next come the various form-sphere and formless-sphere consciousnesses that constitute the *jhānas*,

[28] Masefield (n. 5 above). The Upaniṣadic locus classicus for the terms is Bṛhadāraṇyaka 2.3.

[29] Masefield, p. 93, n. 32.

or meditation attainments; finally, we have the world-transcending (*lokuttara*) consciousnesses that constitute the mind at the moment of awakening itself.[30] The basic structure of this hierarchy of consciousness parallels quite explicitly the basic structure of the cosmos: consciousness belongs to the sense sphere (*kāmâvacara*), the form sphere (*rūpâvacara*), or the formless sphere (*arūpâvacara*); beings exist in the sense world (*kāma-dhàtu, kāma-loka*), the form world (*rūpa-dhātu, rūpa-loka*), or the formless world (*arūpa-dhātu, arūpa-loka*). As well as laying down a more precise hierarchy of consciousness, the Abhidhamma also finalized the structure of the cosmos: both Theravādin and northern sources detail thirty-one basic realms.[31] The basic structure of this cosmos, along with its psychological parallel, is set out in figure 1.

In detailing the types of consciousness that beings reborn in particular realms are able to experience, the Abhidhamma provides a further indication of the parallel between the psychological order and the cosmological order.[32] Beings in the lowest realms (hell beings, animals, hungry ghosts, Asuras) can only experience sense-sphere consciousness; beings in the human realm and the heavens of the sense sphere characteristically experience sense-sphere consciousness but can in special circumstances (i.e., when attaining *jhāna*) experience form-sphere and formless-sphere consciousness. Beings in the form and formless worlds characteristically experience form and sense-sphere consciousness respectively; both may experience certain forms of both skillful and unskillful sense-sphere consciousness, but not those associated with hatred and unpleasant feeling.[33] The logic governing this arrangement is as follows: A being in one of the lower realms must experience at least a modicum of skillful consciousness or else, never being able to generate the skillful *kamma* necessary to condition rebirth in a higher realm, he or she is stuck there forever. Similarly, beings in the Brahma worlds must experience some unskillful consciousness, otherwise their *kamma* would be exclusively skillful, and they would be able to remain forever in these blissful realms where no

[30] Abhidh-s 1–5 (*citta-saṃgaha-vibhāga*); cf. Vism 14:83–110.

[31] Vibh 422–26; Vism 7:40–44, 13:29–65; Abhidh-s 22–24; Abhidh-k 3:1–3. Theravādin sources enumerate eleven realms in the *kāmadhātu* (four descents, the human realm and six heavens), sixteen in the *rūpadhātu* (three each for the first three *jhāna* realms and seven—including unconscious beings and five Pure Abodes—for the fourth), and four in the *arūpadhātu;* Abhidh-k enumerates ten in the *kāmaloka* (missing is the realm of *asuras* from the descents), seventeen in the *rūpaloka* (exchanging unconscious beings for two further basic fourth *dhyāna* realms), and four in the *arūpaloka; bhāṣya* to Abhidh-k 3:2b–d records that the Kaśmīris accepted only sixteen realms in the fourth *dhyāna* while La Vallée Poussin, trans. (n. 2 above), 2:3, n. 1, records a number of other slight variations in the northern sources.

[32] Abhidh-av 182–289 ("bhūmi-puggala-vasena cittuppatti-niddeso").

[33] The kind of consciousness that is characteristic of a being is essentially a function of a being's *bhavaṅga-citta*; see R. Gethin, "*Bhavaṅga* and Rebirth in the Abhidhamma," in *The Buddhist Forum*, vol. 3 (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1995), pp. 11–35.

COSMOLOGY				PSYCHOLOGY	
WORLD (*dhātu*)	REALM (*bhūmi*)		LIFE SPAN	MENTAL STATE (*citta*) (karma leading to rebirth in corresponding realm)	
FORMLESS WORLD (*arūpadhātu*)	Neither Consciousness nor Unconsciousness (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*)		84,000 aeons	Formless attainments (*arūpa-samāpatti*)	FORMLESS-SPHERE MIND (*arūpāvacara*)
	Nothingness (*ākiñcaññāyatana*)		60,000 aeons		
	Infinite Consciousness (*viññāṇañcāyatana*)		40,000 aeons		
	Infinite Space (*ākāsānañcāyatana*)		20,000 aeons		
WORLD OF PURE FORM (*rūpadhātu*)	The Supreme (*akaniṭṭha*)	PURE ABODES (*suddhāvāsa*)	16,000 aeons	Path of non-return (*anāgāmi-maggaṅ*) or transcendent 4th *jhāna*	Fourth *jhāna*	FORM-SPHERE MIND (*rūpāvacara*)
	The Clear-sighted (*sudassin*)		8,000 aeons			
	The Lovely (*sudassa*)		4,000 aeons			
	The Serene (*atappa*)		2,000 aeons			
	The Durable (*aviha*)		1,000 aeons			
	Unconscious Beings (*asaññā-satta*)		500 aeons	*asaññā-samāpatti*		
	Great Reward (*vehapphala*)		500 aeons	Ordinary 4th *jhāna*		
	↑ destruction by wind	Complete Beauty (*subha-kiṇha*)	64 aeons	Third *jhāna*		
		Boundless Beauty (*appamāṇa-subha*)	32 aeons			
		Limited Beauty (*parittā-subha*)	16 aeons			
	↑ destruction by water	Streaming Radiance (*ābhassara*)	8 aeons	Second *jhāna*		
		Boundless Radiance (*appamāṇābha*)	4 aeons			
		Limited Radiance (*parittābha*)	2 aeons			
	↑ destruction by fire	Great Brahmā (*mahābrahmā*)	1 aeon	First *jhāna*		
		Brahmā's Ministers (*brahma-purohita*)	½ aeon			
		Brahmā's Retinue (*brahma-pārisajja*)	⅓ aeon			
WORLD OF THE FIVE SENSES (*kāmadhātu*)	The masters of the creations of others (*paranimmita-vasavattin*)	HAPPY DESTINIES (*sugati*)	128,000 divine years	8 skillful states of mind motivated by non-attachment, friendliness and wisdom (*kusala-citta*)	SENSE-SPHERE MIND (*kāmāvacara*)
	Those who delight in creation (*nimmāṇa-rati*)		64,000 divine years		
	The Delighted (*tusita*)		16,000 divine years		
	The Yama Gods (*yāma*)		8,000 divine years		
	The Thirty-Three Gods (*tāvatiṃsa*)		2,000 divine years		
	The Gods of the Four Kings (*cātummahārājika*)		500 divine years		
	Human Beings (*manussa*)		variable		
	Jealous Gods (*asura*)	DESCENTS (*ajāya*)	unspecified	12 unskillful states of mind motivated by attachment, aversion and delusion (*akusala-citta*)	
	Hungry Ghosts (*peti-visaya*)		unspecified		
	Animals (*tiracchānayoni*)		unspecified		
	Hell Beings (*niraya*)		unspecified		

FIG. 1.—The thirty-one realms of existence, according to the following Pāli sources: Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha 22–24; Vibhaṅga 422–26; Visuddhimagga 7:40–44, 8:29–65; Dighanikāyaṭṭhakathāṭīkā 1:217.

unpleasant bodily or mental feeling ever occurs, escaping *dukkha* permanently rather than only temporarily (albeit for an aeon or two). Finally, beings such as humans who are in the middle of the hierarchy are evenly poised; they may experience the most unskillful kinds of consciousness or they may experience the most skillful—they may go right to the bottom or right to the top.

A point of particular significance that emerges from this is that, from the perspective of Abhidharma, to shift from talk about levels of existence to talk about levels of the mind is to continue to talk about the same thing but on a different scale. What is involved in moving from the psychological order (the hierarchy of consciousness) to the cosmological order (the hierarchy of beings) is essentially a shift in time scales. The mind (of certain beings) might range through the possible levels of consciousness in a relatively short period—possibly in moments. A being, in contrast, exists at a particular level in the cosmos for rather longer—84,000 aeons in the case of a being in the realm of "neither consciousness nor unconsciousness"—and to range through all the possible levels of being is going to take a very long time indeed.[34] The fact that what we are talking about here is a change of scale is exactly brought out by the Abhidharma treatment of "dependent arising" (*pratītyasamutpāda*). This law that governs the process of things, whether the workings of the mind or the process of rebirth, is always the same. Thus the Abhidharma illustrates the operation of the twelve links of dependent arising either by reference to the way in which beings progress from life to life or by reference to the progress of consciousness from moment to moment: from one perspective we are born, live, and die over a period of, say, eighty years; from another we are born, live, and die in every moment.[35] In chapter 3 of the Abhidharmakośa, Vasubandhu in fact discusses these different scales for the interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* precisely in the context of his exposition of cosmology (vv. 20–38). In general, traditional Buddhist cosmology as expounded in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma must be understood as at once a map of all realms of existence and an account of all possible experiences.

THE EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION OF WORLD-SYSTEMS

According to Buddhist cosmological systems the universe is constituted by innumerable "world-systems" or "world-spheres" (*loka-dhātu, cakkavāḷa*) comprising just thirty-one levels of existence.[36] Much as the mind

[34] Vibh 426; Abhidh-s 24.

[35] See Vism 135–92; Vibh-a 199–200; *bhāṣya* to Abhidh-k 3:24 (La Vallée Poussin, trans., 2:65–66); cf. R. Gethin, *The Buddhist Path of Awakening: A Study of the Bodhi-Pakkhiyā Dhammā* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), p. 351.

[36] Quite what constitutes a "world-system" is not clear. The term *cakkavāḷa* does not appear to occur in the four primary Nikāyas. Strictly a *cakkavāḷa* (cf. Skt *cakravāla* and Buddhist Sanskrit *cakravāḍa*) refers to the range of mountains surrounding the world; the

is not static or stable, neither, on a grander scale, are world-systems; they themselves go through vast cycles of expansion and contraction. According to the exegetical traditions of both the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins, the formula I quoted from the Aggañña-sutta, referring as it does to the rebirth of beings in the realm of Radiance (*ābhassara/ābhāsvara*)[37] at the time of world contraction, describes this contraction as the result of destruction by fire. Both Buddhaghosa and Vasubandhu provide some further details about how the destruction proceeds.[38] According to Buddhaghosa, world-systems contract in great clusters—he speaks of a billion (*koṭi-sata-sahassa*) world-systems contracting at a time.[39] Both writers describe how, when they contract, world-systems contract from the bottom upward. Thus in the case of destruction by fire, the fire starts in the lower realms of the sense sphere and having burned up these, it invades the form realms; but having burned up the realms corresponding to the first *jhāna/dhyāna*, it stops. The realms corresponding to the second, third, and fourth *jhāna*s, and the four formless realms, are thus spared the destruction. But destruction by fire is not the only kind of destruction, merely the most frequent—water and wind also wreak their havoc. When the destruction is by water, the three realms corresponding to the second *jhāna* are also included in the general destruction, while the destruction by wind invades and destroys even the realms corresponding to the third *jhāna*. Overall, only the seven realms corresponding to the fourth

term is then used to refer to a single "world-system" as constituted by the various realms that make up the world of sense-desire; Buddhaghosa says that there are an infinite number of such world-systems (Vism 7:40–44). The term used as a gloss for *cakkavāḷa* by Buddhaghosa here is *loka-dhātu*, which seems to be the preferred term in the Nikāyas. Thus the Aṅguttara Nikāya (5:59–60) talks of a Mahābrahmā ruling over a thousand such world-systems, while the Majjhima Nikāya (3:101–2) talks of Brahmās ruling over as many as a hundred thousand world-systems. It thus seems that world-systems that are distinct and self-contained at the lower realms of existence are not necessarily so at higher levels of existence. However, Buddhist tradition does not conclude that one should therefore talk of there being only one all-embracing Brahma-world. In fact, A 5:59 already talks in terms of thousands of Brahma-worlds, and the ancient conception of the thousandfold world-system, the twice-thousandfold world-system (embracing 1 million world-systems), and the thrice-thousandfold world-system (embracing 1 trillion world-systems according to Pāli sources and 1 billion according to northern) (see A 1:227–28, Mp 2:340–41, Abhidh-k 3:73–74) seems to imply a kind of pyramidal structure of world-systems: units of thousands of world systems (i.e., sense-sphere world-systems) are governed by a Mahābrahmā, and units of a thousand such Brahma realms are in turn governed by Brahmās of yet higher realms, and so on. Whatever, as the *Atthasālinī* says (pp. 160–61), there is no end to the hundreds and thousands of world-systems: if four Mahābrahmās in Akaniṭṭha were to set off at a speed which allowed them to traverse a hundred thousand world-systems in the time it takes a swift arrow to pass over the shadow of a palm tree, they would reach *nibbāna* without ever seeing the limit of world-systems.

[37] Sv 1:110; Vism 13:30; *bhāṣya* to Abhidh-k-bh 3:90c–d.

[38] Vism 13:32–55; Abhidh-k-bh 3:89–90, 100–102; cf. Reynolds and Reynolds (n. 6 above), pp. 305–27.

[39] Vism 13:31, 40–41, 55.

jhāna and the four formless realms are never subject to this universal destruction.[40]

So what becomes of the beings that occupy the lower realms when fire, water, and wind wreak their destruction? They cannot just disappear from *saṃsāra;* they must go somewhere. Here we touch upon a question which posed something of a problem in the Buddhist tradition and to which its answers are not entirely consistent. The simple answer that Buddhaghosa gives in the Visuddhimagga is that at the time of the destruction of a world-system by fire, all the beings that occupy the lower realms—including hell beings (*nerayika*)—are reborn in the Ābhassara Brahma realm (corresponding to the second *jhāna*) or above it. But since rebirth in a Brahma realm can only occur as a result of the practice of the *jhāna*s, Buddhaghosa has a problem. The chaos and hardships that are a prelude to the destruction of the world are hardly conducive to the practice of *jhāna*. Moreover, certain beings simply do not have the capacity to attain *jhāna* even if they try.

> There is no rebirth in the Brahma world without *jhāna*, and some beings are oppressed by the scarcity of food, and some are incapable of attaining *jhāna*. How are they reborn there? By virtue of *jhāna* acquired in the Deva world. For at that time, knowing that in a hundred thousand years the aeon will come to an end, the sense-sphere gods, called "Marshals of the World," loosen their headdresses and, with disheveled hair and pitiful faces, wiping their tears with their hands, clothed in red and wearing their garments in great disarray, come and frequent the haunts of men saying, "Good sirs, a hundred thousand years from now the aeon will come to an end: this world will be destroyed, the great ocean will dry up, and Sineru, king of mountains, will be burnt up and destroyed. The destruction of the world will reach the Brahma world. Develop loving kindness, good sirs. Develop compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. Take care of your mothers and fathers; honor the elders of the family." Hearing their words, both men and the deities of the earth are for the most part moved; they become kind to one another, and making merit by loving kindness and so on, they are reborn in the Deva world. There they enjoy the food of the gods and having completed the initial work on the air *kasiṇa*, they attain *jhāna*.
>
> However there are others who are reborn in the Deva world by virtue of their *kamma* "that is to be experienced at an unspecified time," for there is certainly no being wandering in *saṃsāra* devoid of *kamma* that is to be experienced at an unspecified time. They also similarly acquire *jhāna* there [in the Deva world].

[40] Vism 13:55–62 describes destruction by fire, water, and wind; Vism 13:65 and Abhidh-k-bh 3:102 detail the sequence and frequency of destruction by these three elements and are in complete agreement: seven cycles of seven destructions by fire followed by one by water (fifty-six destructions); followed by one cycle of seven destructions by fire followed by one by wind (sixty-four destructions); thus the Brahmās who live in the Subhakiṇha/Śubhakṛtsnā realms—the highest of the third *jhāna/dhyāna* realms—have a life span of sixty-four aeons.

So all beings are reborn in the Brahma world by virtue of the attainment of *jhāna*.[41]

For Buddhaghosa, at the time of the contraction of a world-system, all the beings occupying the lower realms should be understood as being reborn in those higher Brahma worlds that escape the destruction—this is true even of the beings in the lower realms of hell. When all else fails, this comes about by virtue of the fact that there is no being in *saṃsāra* that has not at some time or other performed the *kamma* necessary for rebirth in the happy realms of the sense sphere. Thus even beings born in hell realms as the result of unwholesome *kamma* will always have a latent good *kamma* that can come to fruition at the time of the pending contraction of the world-system; this is their "*kamma* to be experienced at an unspecified time" (*aparâpariya-vedanīya-kamma*).[42] Such beings are first reborn in a sense-sphere heaven, where they subsequently cultivate *jhāna* leading to rebirth in the Brahma worlds. What follows from this view of the matter is that all beings in *saṃsāra* are regarded as having dwelt at some time in the Brahma realms corresponding to the second, third, and fourth *jhānas*; moreover, periodically—though the periods may be of inconceivable duration—all beings are regarded as returning to these realms.

It seems, however, that some in the Buddhist tradition were not entirely happy with the understanding of the matter presented by Buddhaghosa. Commenting on the phrase, "when the world contracts beings are for the most part born in the realm of Radiance," as it occurs in the Brahmajāla Sutta, Buddhaghosa states that "'for the most part' [*yebhuyyena*] is said because there are other beings who are born either in higher Brahma realms or in the formless realms."[43] Dhammapāla, however, in his subcommentary on the text by Buddhaghosa, adds:

[41] Vism 13:33–35: "jhānaṃ vinā natthi brahma-loke nibbatti; etesañ ca keci dubbhikkha-pīḷitā keci abhabbā jhānâdhigamāya. te kathaṃ tattha nibbattantī ti. devaloke paṭiladdha-jjhāṇa-vasena. tadā hi vassa-sata-sahassass' accayena kappuṭṭhānaṃ bhavissati ti. loka-byūhā nāma kāmâvacara-devā mutta-sirā vikiṇṇa-kesā ruda-mukhā assūni hatthehi puñchamānā ratta-vatthā-nivatthā ativiya virūpa-vesa-dhārino hutvā manussa-pathe vicarantā evaṃ ārocenti: mārisā mārisā ito vassa-sata-sahassassa accayena kappa-vuṭṭhānaṃ bhavissati; ayaṃ loko vinassissati, mahā-samuddo pi ussussissati, ayañ ca mahā-pathavī sineru ca pabbata-rājā uḍḍayhissanti vinassissanti, yāva brahma-lokā loka-vināso bhavissati. mettaṃ mārisā bhāvetha, karuṇaṃ muditaṃ upekkhaṃ mārisā bhāvetha, mātaraṃ upaṭṭhahatha pitaruṃ upaṭṭhahatha, kule jeṭṭhāpacāyino hothā ti. tesaṃ vacanaṃ sutvā yebhuyyena manussā ca bhumma-devatā ca saṃvega-jātā aññamaññaṃ mudu-cittā hutvā mettādīni puññāni karitvā deva-loke nibbattanti. tattha dibba-sudhā-bhojanaṃ bhuñjitvā vāyo-kasiṇe parikammaṃ katvā jhānaṃ paṭilabhanti. tad-aññe pana aparâpariya-vedanīyena kammena deva-loke nibbattanti. aparâpariya-vedanīya-kamma-rahito hi saṃsāre saṃsaraṇako satto nāma natthi. te pi tattha tath' eva jhānaṃ paṭilabhanti. evaṃ deva-loke paṭiladdha-jjhāna-vasena sabbe pi brahma-loke nibbattanti ti."

[42] On *aparâpariya-vedanīya-kamma*, see Vism 19:14, Abhidh-s 5:52, Abhidh-s-ṭ 131–32.

[43] Sv 1:110: "yebhuyyenā ti ye upari brahma-lokesu vā āruppesu vā nibbanti, tad-avasese sandhāya vuttaṃ."

"or in world-systems other than those in the process of contracting" is the alternative to be understood by the word *or*. For it is not possible to consider that all beings in the descents at that time are born in form or formless existence, since it is impossible for those beings in the descents with the longest life spans to be reborn in the human realm.[44]

Dhammapāla's problem with Buddhaghosa's account seems to be that it fails to take account of the case of beings who, for example, commit one of the five great *ānantariya-kammas* (killing one's mother, father, an arhat, wounding a Buddha, splitting the Saṃgha) toward the end of an aeon. Such beings must as a result surely be born in the hell realms, and yet the aeon might end before they had lived out the result of that *kamma*. Dhammapāla therefore concludes that such beings must be reborn in the hells of other world systems.[45]

Looking further afield in Buddhist sources we find other instances of both Buddhaghosa's position and Dhammapāla's position on what happens to beings in the lower realms when a world-system contracts. For example, in chapter 3 of the *Kośa*, Vasubandhu writes:

> When not a single being remains in the hells, the world has contracted to this extent: namely by the contraction of the hells. At that time any being who still has karma that must be experienced in a hell is thrown into the hells of another world-system [that is not contracting].[46]

In chapter 8, however, Vasubandhu comments that at the time of the contraction of a world-system, "all beings of the lower realms produce *dhyāna* of the form-realm because of the special occurrence of skillful dharmas."[47] Yaśomitra comments that in these circumstances *dhyāna*

[44] DAṬ 1:201: "āruppesu vā ti vā-saddena saṃvattamāna-lokadhātūhi aññā-lokadhātesu vā ti vikappanaṃ veditabbaṃ. na hi sabbe apāya-sattā tadā rūpārūpa-bhavesu uppajjanti ti sakkā viññātuṃ, apāyesu dighatamāyukānaṃ manussalokuppattiyā asambhavato." The fact that the DAṬ comments here in this way when Vism-ṭ fails to make any comment on Buddhaghosa's account of the contraction of the world is perhaps further evidence that the authors of the Nikāya *ṭīkās* and Vism-ṭ are not the same; see L. S. Cousins, "Dhammapāla and the ṬīkāLiterature," *Religion* 2 (1972): 159–65; P. Jackson, "A Note on Dhammapāla(s)," *Journal of the Pāli Text Society* 15 (1990): 209–11.

[45] Compare Kv 476.

[46] Abhidh-k-bh 3:89: "yadā narakeṣv eka-sattvo nâvaśiṣṭo bhavati iyatāyaṃ lokaḥ saṃvṛtto bhavati / yaduta naraka-saṃvarttanyā / yasya tadānīṃ niyataṃ naraka-vedanīyaṃ karma dhriyate sa lokadhātv-antara-narakeṣu kṣipyate."

[47] This is stated by way of explanation of the last of three ways in which *dhyāna* belonging to the *rūpadhātu* may be produced: by the force of conditions (*hetu*), defined as repeated practice (*abhikṣṇâbhyāsa*), by the force of karma leading to rebirth in a higher realm coming to fruition, and also by the nature of things (*dharmatā*) (Abhidh-k-bh 8: 38c–d: "rūpadhātau dhyānotpādanam etābhyāṃ ca hetu-karma-balābhyāṃ dharmatayāpi ca saṃvartanī-kāle. tadānīṃ hi sarva-sattva evādhara-bhūmikās tad dhyānam utpādyanti kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ udbhūta-vṛttitvāt.")

arises without any instruction because of the existence of the trace (*vāsanā*) of previous *dhyāna* attainment.[48]

Another cosmological treatise current in Southeast Asia is the eleventh- or twelfth-century *Lokapaññatti*. Like the *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa, the *Lokapaññatti* states that at the time of the contraction of a world-system, beings in the lower realms are reborn first in the *kāmadhatu* and then in the Ābhassara realm after practicing the second *jhāna;* there is no mention of being reborn in the hells of other world systems.[49] The much later Theravādin source, "Three Worlds according to King Ruang," on the other hand, takes the line of Dhammapāla and chapter 3 of the *Kośa,* stating that hell beings may be reborn in the hells of world-systems that are not contracting.[50]

What are relative merits of these two perspectives regarding what happens to beings in lower realms at the time of world contraction? The position represented by Dhammapāla, *Kośa* chapter 3 and the *Triphum* of Phya Lithai—namely, that they are reborn in the lower realms of world-systems that are not in the process of contracting—appears to be more in keeping with the laws of karma and, for this reason, the more carefully considered: beings who murder their mothers, fathers, arhats, wound a Buddha, or split the Saṃgha must surely experience the results of their actions whether or not a world-system contracts.[51] Yet this makes the

[48] Vyākhyā to Abhidh-k-bh 8:38c–d: "upadeśam antareṇâyataḥ pūrva-dhyāna-vāsanāyām satyām dhyānotpattir iti."

[49] Although composed in Pāli, the *Lokapaññatti* appears to be based directly on Sanskrit traditions rather than the traditions of the Sri Lankan Theravāda; it corresponds closely to the *Lokaprajñapti* translated into Chinese by Paramārtha in 558 C.E. (Denis, trans. and ed. [n. 6 above], 2:ii). The position recorded here on what happens to hell beings at the time of the contraction of a world-system appears to reflect exactly the position of Paramārtha's translation of the *Lokaprajñapti* (Denis, trans. and ed., 1:194, 2:225–26).

[50] Reynolds and Reynolds (n. 6 above), p. 308.

[51] The Nikāyas and Āgamas for their part prefer to speak of the length of time beings will suffer in hell realms by way of simile rather than specific numbers of years or aeons (see Kokāliya-sutta, S 1:149–53; A 5:170–74; Sn 123–31; cf. bhāṣya to Abhidh-k 3:84). Vibh 422:26, which deals with age limits in the various realms of existence, says nothing about the hell realms, and begins with the human realm; the commentary (Vibh-a 521) states that *kamma* is what determines the life span of beings in the descents—as long as *kamma* is not exhausted beings do not pass from those realms; the *Anuṭīkā* apparently adds (see Ñāṇamoli, trans., *The Dispeller of Delusion,* 2 vols. (London: Pāli Text Society, 1987–90), 2:299, n. 7) that the life span in Avīci is an *antarakappa* (a sixty-fourth of a *mahākappa*). Abhidh-s 23 (chap. 5, verse 21) states that there is no definite age limit for beings in the four descents and for humans; the length of time spent in these realms is dependent on the specific *kamma* that brought about the rebirth. As far as human beings are concerned this comment seems to be made with reference to the tradition—found in the Cakkavattisīhanāda-sutta (D 3:58–79) and Mahāpadāna-sutta (D 2:1–54)—that the life span of humans varies from ten years to 80,000 years at different periods within an aeon, and thus does not mean that humans can outlive the aeon. Vasubandhu too states (Abhidh-k 3:83) that the life span of beings in Avīci is one *antarakalpa* (an eightieth of a *mahākalpa* according to northern tradition). Malalasekera (n. 21 above) comments (s.v. Avīci, Devadatta) that Devadatta is destined to suffer in Avīci for 100,000 aeons, but the source he cites (Dhp-a 1:148) strictly says only that at the end of 100,000 aeons Devadatta will become a *paccekabuddha,* and not that he will spend that period continuously in Avīci.

alternative tradition—that all beings are reborn in the Brahma realms—all the more interesting and, I think, significant. It is, as it were, the *lectio difficilior.* Why should Buddhaghosa, Vasubandhu, and the *Lokapaññatti* preserve and hand down a tradition that is so obviously problematic? In order to answer this question I would like to turn first to consider the theoretical account of the stages of the Buddhist path, since it seems to me that, viewed in the light of each other, the accounts of the stages of the path and the process of the expansion and contraction of the universe reveal clues about the unspoken assumptions that lie at the heart of Indian Buddhist thought.

COSMOLOGY AND THE BUDDHIST PATH

What should perhaps be regarded as the classic Nikāya account of the stages of the Buddhist path is found repeated in various *suttas* of the *sīlakkhandha-vagga* of the Dīgha Nikāya, and also, with slight variations, in several *suttas* of the Majjhima Nikāya.[52] This account can be summarized in simple terms as follows: on the basis of the practice of good conduct (*sīla*), the *bhikkhu* practices meditation; by this means, he abandons the five hindrances and attains the first *jhāna.* Attaining, successively, the second and third *jhānas,* the *bhikkhu* is described as further refining his concentrated mind until he eventually attains and abides in the fourth *jhāna.* This is described as a state of "purity of equanimity and mindfulness" (*upekkhā-sati-pārisuddhi*); "he suffuses his body with his mind that has been thoroughly purified and cleansed."[53] We then have a description of a series of eight (in the Dīgha) or three (in the Majjhima)[54] different attainments, each one of which is introduced by precisely the same formula: "When his mind has become concentrated thus, when it is thoroughly purified and cleansed, stainless, the defilements absent, when it has become sensitive, workable, steady, having attained imperturbability, he inclines and applies his mind to . . ."[55] In other words, having stilled the mind to the level of the fourth *jhāna,* the *bhikkhu* has brought his mind to an extremely refined state that is suitable and fit for various tasks: the development of knowledge of the interdependence of

[52] D 1, passim; M 1:178–84, 344–48, 3:33–36, 134–37; cf. M 1:267–71. See Gethin, *The Buddhist Path to Awakening* (n. 35 above), pp. 207–8.

[53] D 1:75–76: "so imam eva kāyaṃ parisuddhena cetasā pariyodātena pharitvā nisinno hoti."

[54] At M 3:36 there is just one attainment. The attainments are the eight vijjās (Vism 7:20), the last six of which are often referred to as *abhiññā* (e.g., D 3:281) and the last three as *vijjā* (e.g., M 1:482).

[55] D 1:76–83 (passim): "evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodate anaṅgaṇe vigatupakkilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte."

consciousness and the body; the creation of a mind-made body; the acquiring of certain extraordinary powers (the *iddhis* and other abilities, elsewhere termed higher knowledges or *abhiññās*). Lastly he may apply this mind to the gaining of the knowledge of the destruction of the *āsavas*, the knowledge of suffering, the arising of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the way leading to the cessation of suffering; he then knows that for him birth is destroyed and that there is no future rebirth after the present one.[56]

The story of the *bhikkhu* in the Kevaddha-sutta to which I referred earlier is in fact a rather precise parable of this understanding of the progress of the Buddhist path. The *bhikkhu* of the Kevaddha-sutta resorts to increasingly subtler states of consciousness and/or levels of the cosmos in order to seek an answer to the question of the ultimate nature of the universe; and yet, having come to the furthest reaches of the universe, he does not find his question satisfactorily answered but must return to the Buddha and be instructed to reorient his quest. Similarly, the *bhikkhu* who attains *jhāna* does not come to the end of the path but must turn his attention elsewhere in order finally to understand the nature of suffering, its cause, it cessation, and the path leading to its cessation.

It is in the light of this close correspondence that exists in Buddhist literature between journeys through the realms of the cosmos and inner journeys of the mind that the significance of the accounts of the expansion and contraction of the universe begins to be revealed. Stanley Tambiah has already drawn attention to this in some comments made in his study of the Thai forest monastic tradition—comments which are, however, brief and do not articulate the nature of the parallels entirely accurately.[57] Buddhist cosmology—in general, but especially in the account of the contraction and expansion of world-systems—provides us with a poetic, imaginative, and mythic counterpart to accounts of the stages of *jhāna* attainment. Reading accounts of the Buddhist path alongside tales of the universe's end and beginning is the way to enter more fully into the thought-world of ancient Indian Buddhism. In particular, what is revealed in the cosmological accounts is the understanding of the nature of the fourth *jhāna:* both the theoretical accounts of the stages of the path and the mythic descriptions of the contraction of the world-system converge on the fourth *jhāna.*

That the mythic account of the contraction of a world-system can be read as paralleling a meditator's progress through the successive *dhyānas*

[56] D 1:84: "khīṇā jāti vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparaṃ itthattāyā ti."

[57] S. J. Tambiah, *The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 49–52. Tambiah confusingly describes the Ābhassara realm as *arūpa* at one point and creates, to my mind, a rather misleading "dyadic opposition between material states and formless states."

is brought out explicitly in the following passage from the Abhidharmakośa which comments on how, at the time of contraction, fire, water, and wind destroy the successively higher levels of the world-system:

> In the first *dhyāna* thinking and reflection are imperfections; these are similar to fire since they burn through the mind. In the second *dhyāna* joy is the imperfection; this is like water since, by association with tranquility, it makes the senses soft. . . . In the third *dhyāna* out-breaths and in-breaths [are imperfections]; these are actually winds. In this way the subjective [*adhyātmika*] imperfection in a *dhyāna* attainment is of the same nature as the objective [*bāhya*] imperfection in the corresponding *dhyāna* rebirth.[58]

A mediator's entering the fourth *jhāna* thus marks the temporary attainment of a state of consciousness that is secure in its freedom from disturbances and defilements. For just as the realms of existence corresponding to the fourth *jhāna* can never be reached by the ravages of fire, water, or wind, so the mind in the fourth *jhāna* is undisturbed either by the gross objects of the five senses or the subtler movements of the mind still remaining in the first, second, and third *jhānas*. What is more, viewed from the cosmological perspective of the expansion and contraction of the world-system and the periodic return of beings to the Brahma realms, in stilling the mind to the level of the fourth *jhāna*, the *bhikkhu* is returning to a state experienced long ago. The cultivation of the *jhānas* becomes almost a kind of Platonic recollection of something long forgotten, of something one does not remember one knows. The recovery of the fourth *jhāna* is a return to a basic or fundamental state—a stable and imperturbable state of the universe and also of the mind.[59]

In saying, however, that the realms of existence corresponding to the fourth *jhāna* are always there, it is, of course, necessary to keep firmly in mind Buddhist principles of impermanence. The realms of the fourth *jhāna* do not have some kind of mysterious existence of their own; these realms always exist in the sense that there are always beings "in" these realms, although the particular beings occupying these realms continually

[58] *Bhāṣya* to Abhidh-k 3:100c–d: "prathame hi dhyāne vitarka-vicārā apakṣālāḥ / te ca manasaḥ paridāhakatvād agni-kalpāḥ / dvitīye prītir apakṣālā / sā praśrabdhi-yogenāśraya-mṛdu-karaṇād ap-kalpā / . . . / tṛtīye dhyāne āśvāsa-praśvāsāḥ / te ca vāyava eva / iti yasyāṃ dhyāna-samāpattau yathābhūta ādhyātmiko 'pakṣālaḥ tasyāṃ dhyānopapattāu tathābhūto bāhya iti" (cf. Abhidh-dī 115–16).

[59] Incidentally, this way of looking at the progress of the practice of meditation as a return to a kind of primordial state is not without parallels elsewhere in Indian tradition. The practice of yoga as presented in the *Yoga-sūtras* of Patañjali is also essentially a species of return: a reversal of the stages of the evolution of the *tattvas* from *prakṛti.* Thus the full manifestation of *prakṛti* with the appearance of the five senses and their respective objects is what characterizes ordinary human consciousness; by the practice of *samādhi* the *yogin* gradually, stage by stage, regains the primordial equilibrium of the three *guṇas* in unmanifest *prakṛti.* The knowledge that discriminates between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* can then be achieved.

change and no individual being can permanently exist in such a realm. The fourth *jhāna* realms thus do not constitute some kind of permanent substrate of the universe; it is simply that there are always beings "there," or rather beings that exist in the manner of the fourth *jhāna*. For the Ābhassara or Vehapphala, realms are not so much places as modes or ways of being.[60] So, to say that periodically the world contracts back as far as the Vehapphala realm is exactly to say that periodically beings return to this manner of being. It is in this sense that the levels associated with the fourth *jhāna* are basic, fundamental, almost, one might say, primordial. This, it seems, is precisely why they can serve as the stepping-off point for gaining the four formless attainments,[61] for developing various extraordinary meditational powers,[62] for realizing the liberating knowledge of the path. This, it seems, is precisely why, at the time of his *parinibbāna*, the fourth *jhāna* is the final active state of mind to be experienced by a living Buddha.[63]

I am now in a position to return to the question I posed above concerning Buddhaghosa's (and others') account of the process of the contraction of world-systems: Why does he preserve an apparently problematic account? The view handed down by Buddhaghosa, which he has no doubt received from the Sinhala *aṭṭhakathā* sources he had before him, seems concerned to emphasize that no being in *saṃsāra* is without the necessary *kamma* to enable a skillful rebirth in the *kāmadhātu* as a basis for subsequent rebirth in the realms corresponding to the fourth *jhāna;* and that there is no being in *saṃsāra* without experience of the realms of the fourth *jhāna*—of the states which give close access to the liberating insight of *bodhi*. In other words, all beings have the capacity to become awakened and indeed all have somewhere in them an experience of a state of mind that is in certain important respects "close" to the awakening state of mind.

THE MAHĀYĀNA

To anyone familiar with the Mahāyāna, the suggestion that beings always have within them a capacity to become awakened sounds strangely familiar, and at this point I would like to consider certain parallels that can,

[60] Vasubandhu does, however, designate the realms of the *rūpadhātu* as "places" or "locations" (*sthāna*); the *ārūpyadhātu*, on the other hand, is without location (*asthāna*). This would seem to be because to the extent that beings of the *rūpadhātu* possess *rūpa-skandha* (they possess the senses of sight and hearing) they must have location. Compare Abhidh-k 2:2–3, 7:3; Y. Karunadasa, *The Buddhist Analysis of Matter* (Colombo: Department of Cultural Affairs, 1967), pp. 161–62.

[61] For example, Vism 10; one should note here that in certain contexts (e.g., Abhidh-s 5; Nārada, trans., *A Manual of Abhidhamma* [Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1980], p. 64) the four formless attainments are treated simply as modifications of the fourth (or, according to the Abhidhamma reckoning, fifth) *jhāna*.

[62] Vism 12:2, 12–13, 58; Gethin, *The Buddhist Path to Awakening* (n. 35 above), p. 102.

[63] D 2:156.

I think, be found between the cosmological ideas I have been discussing and certain ideas that find expression in Mahāyāna *sūtra*s. Buddhaghosa's account of what happens to beings when a world-system contracts bears a certain resemblance to aspects of an idea we are accustomed to associate with the Mahāyāna, namely, the tradition of *tathāgatagarbha*—"that within each being which enables enlightenment to take place."[64] Although formulated rather differently, something of the *tathāgatagarbha* way of thinking is, I suggest, present in the cosmological traditions of the Abhidharma. In the context of the Nikāya and Abhidharma understanding of the development of the stages of the Buddhist path, the function of a "trace" left by previous *dhyāna* practice experienced long ago, or of a skillful kàrma "to be experienced at an unspecified time" which makes for the attainment of the fourth *dhyāna* state, is in significant respects similar to that of the *tathāgatagarbha* in Mahāyāna thought: both may facilitate and effect enlightenment for deluded beings. This is not to suggest that Buddhaghosa here espouses a doctrine of *tathāgatagarbha* or that *tathāgatagarbha* views have influenced him or that he has influenced the development of *tathāgatagarbha* theory. Rather there appears to be a common Buddhist theme here that finds expression in one way in Buddhaghosa's account of the contraction of a world-system and in another way in the theory of *tathāgatagarbha*.[65] While we cannot say that Buddhaghosa's account of the expansion and contraction of a world-system is in all respects equivalent to the theory of *tathāgatagarbha*, we can say that in *certain* respects it is; there is a certain overlap here.

A second area of interest centers on the understanding of the "pure abodes" (*suddhâvāsa/śuddhâvāsa*) in the Nikāyas, Abhidharma, and Mahāyāna. The Buddhist yogin who has mastered the fourth *jhāna* has withdrawn the mind from the world of the senses, from the world of ordinary ideas and thoughts, and returned it, as it were, to a refined and fundamental state. From this state of mind he now has the possibility of seeing the world more clearly, seeing it as it truly is, and even, to a limited extent, by the practice of the various meditational powers (such as creating mind-made bodies, etc.), of constructing a different world. This way of thinking is continued and taken further in Mahāyāna Buddhist thought. For it is in the realm of the fourth *dhyāna* that Bodhisattvas become Buddhas and create their "Buddha fields" and "pure lands."

In non-Mahāyāna texts the five "pure abodes" are regarded as the abodes of "never-returners" (*anāgāmin*), beings who are all but awakened, beings who are in their last life and who will certainly attain arhatship

[64] P. M. Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 98.

[65] Both these expressions are connected with another expression of this theme, namely, the Sautrāntika theory of "seeds"; cf. P. S. Jaini, "The Sautrāntika Theory of *Bīja*," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* 22 (1959): 237–49.

before they pass away.[66] Rather interestingly, then, according to certain traditions of the developed Mahāyāna, the Akaniṣṭha realm—the highest of the "pure abodes" and of the realms of the fourth *dhyāna*—is occupied not by never-returners about to become arhats but by tenth-stage Bodhisattvas about to become *samyaksambuddhas*. Having attained Buddhahood in the Akaniṣṭha realm, they send out their "creation bodies" (*nirmāṇa-kāya*) to the lower realms for the benefit of sentient beings. Śāntarakṣita in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* explains as follows:

3549. Since their existence is outside *saṃsāra*, which consists of the five destinies, the death of Buddhas is not admitted by us; therefore it is their creations that are perceived.
3550. In the lovely city of Akaniṣṭha, free from all impure abodes—there Buddhas awaken; but here [in this world] creations awaken.[67]

Kamalaśīla goes on to comment:

Saṃsāra consists of the five destinies comprising hells, hungry-ghosts, animals, gods and men; and since Buddhas exist outside this their mortality is not accepted. How then does one learn of their birth in the family of Śuddhodana and others? Accordingly he says that it is their creations that are perceived. Supporting this from scripture he utters the words beginning, "In the Akaniṣṭha. . . ." There are gods called the Akaniṣṭhas; in a certain place among them the gods are called "those belonging to the pure abodes," for here only the pure noble ones dwell. Among them the highest place is called the Palace of the Great Lord, and there only Bodhisattvas in their last existence who are established in the tenth *bhūmi* are born, while here [in this world] by reason of their sovereignty in that place their creations gain knowledge. Such is the tradition.[68]

[66] Visṃ 22:56–57; Malalasekera (n. 21 above), s.v. "suddhāvāsā"; Marasinghe (n. 5 above), p. 262; Abhidh-k-bh 6:42–44 (La Vallée Poussin, trans. [n. 2 above], 4:221–28).

[67] Tattvasaṅgraha 2:1107 (vv. 3549–50): "pañcagaty-ātma-saṃsāra-bahir-bhāvān na martyatā / buddhānām iṣyate 'smābhir nirmāṇaṃ tu tathā matam / / akaniṣṭhe pure ramye 'śuddhāvāsa-vivarjite / budhyante tatra sambuddhā nirmitas tv iha budhyate." I read *ramye 'śuddhāvāsavivarjite* for Shastri's *ramye śuddhāvāsavivarjite*, although a Tibetan translation of apparently the same verse does not recognize the sandhi: "Rejecting the pure abodes, he rightly and completely awakened in the ecstatic abode of Akaniṣṭha." (See *mKhas grub rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras*, trans. F. D. Lessing and A. Wayman [The Hague: Mouton, 1968], pp. 22–23.) The implication that the Akaniṣṭha realm is somehow apart from the pure abodes is surely problematic, while the phrase "akaniṣṭha-bhavane divye sarva-pāpa-vivarjite" (Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 269.4) would seem to confirm my emendation.

[68] Tattvasaṅgraha 2:1107: "naraka-preta-tiryag-deva-manuṣya-bhedena pañcagaty-ātmakaḥ saṃsāraḥ tad-bahir-bhūtāś ca buddhā bhagavata ity asiddhaṃ martyatvam eṣām / katham tarhi śuddhodanādi-kuloṣpattir eṣām śrūyate / ity āha nirmāṇaṃ tu tathā matam iti / etad evāgamena saṃspandyann āha akaniṣṭha ity ādi / akaniṣṭhā nāma devāḥ teṣām ekadeśe śuddhāvāsa-kāyikā nāma devāḥ / atra hy āryā eva śuddhā āvasanti / teṣām upari maheśvara-bhavanaṃ nāma sthānam / tatra carama-bhavikā eva daśabhūmi-pratiṣṭhitā bodhisattvā utpadyante / iha tu tad-ādhipatyena tathā nirmāṇam upalabhyata ity āgamaḥ" (cf. G. Jha, trans., *The Tattvasaṅgraha of Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalashila*, 2 vols. [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986], 2:1547; Williams, pp. 180–81).

Significantly, a level associated with the fourth *dhyāna* is once more conceived of as in some sense fundamental and primordial—the level upon which the creative activity of Buddhas is based.

The extent and precise interpretation of the tradition that Buddhas become enlightened in Akaniṣṭha is not, however, entirely clear; the ancient accounts of the career of the Bodhisattva are varied and not always consistent. The exact source of Śāntarakṣita's quotation from "scripture" (*āgama*) is not traced, although the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Sagāthaka vv. 38–40, 772–74) similarly states that beings become Buddhas in the Pure Abodes "among the Akaniṣṭhas of the form-realm" while their creations awaken in this world:

772. I am of Kātyāyana's family; issuing from the Pure Abode I teach beings dharma that leads to the city of nirvāṇa.
773. This is the ancient path; the Tathāgatas and I have taught nirvāṇa in three thousand sūtras.
774. Thus not in the realm of the senses nor in the formless does a Buddha awaken, but among the Akaniṣṭhas of the form realm who are free of passion he awakens.[69]

Taking this tradition at face value, what seems to be being said is that full Buddhahood is attained by a tenth-stage Bodhisattva in the Akaniṣṭha realm; after this the "created" or "emanated" body (*nirmāṇa-kāya*) performs the acts of a Buddha beginning with the descent to this world from Tuṣita, the Heaven of Delight. In other words, Siddhārtha Gautama from the time of his conception and birth is a *nirmāṇa-kāya* of an already fully awakened Buddha. However, such an understanding is not entirely consistent with what is said in the Prajñāpāramitā literature or in the *Daśabhūmika* about the final stages of the career of the Bodhisattva.

The *Pañcaviṃśatasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā* appears to make no mention of the Pure Abodes or Akaniṣṭha in this connection, and it is the ninth-stage Bodhisattva that descends into the womb, takes birth, and sits beneath the tree of awakening, reaching the tenth stage when he becomes a Tathāgata.[70]

[69] Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 269.4–9, 361.1–6: "akaniṣṭa-bhavane divye sarva-pāpa-vivarjit / nirvikalpāḥ sadā yuktaś citta-caitta-vivarjitāḥ / / balābhijñā-vaśi-prāptāḥ tat-samādhi-gatiṃgatāḥ / tatra budhyanti sambuddhā nirmitas tv iha budhyate / / nirmāṇa-koṭyo hy amitā buddhānāṃ niścaranti ca / sarvatra bālāḥ śṛṇvanti dharmaṃ tebhyaḥ pratiśrutvā / / . . . kātyāyanasya gotro 'haṃ śuddhāvāsād viniśṛtaḥ/ deśemi dharmaṃ sattvānāṃ nirvāṇa-puragāminam / / paurāṇikam idaṃ vartma ahaṃ te ca tathāgathāḥ / tribhiḥ sahasraiḥ sūtrāṇāṃ nirvāṇam atyadeśayan / / kāma-dhātau tathārūpye na vai buddho vibudhyate / rūpa-dhātvakaniṣṭheṣu vīta-rāgeṣu budhyate."

[70] É. Lamotte, trans. *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra)*, 5 vols. (Louvain: Bibliothèque du Muséon and Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste, 1944–80), 5:2431–32, 2438, 2442–43; E. Conze, trans., *The Large Sūtra*

Although the *Daśabhūmika* once again does not mention the Pure Abodes or Akaniṣṭha in connection with the *bhūmis*, it does talk of Bodhisattvas established in the tenth stage as being "mostly the Great Lord [*maheśvara*], king of the gods [*deva-rāja*]."[71] Various passages (which must be the source of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* tradition quoted above) consistently identify these terms as epithets of the chief of the gods of the Pure Abodes.[72] But for the *Daśabhūmika* it is the Bodhisattva of the tenth stage (and not the ninth stage as in the Prajñāpāramitā) who manifests in a single world-system all the acts of Tathāgatas from abiding in the Tuṣita realm to Parinirvāṇa (the final attainment of nirvāṇa at death), but he appears to do this as Bodhisattva, remaining such and not becoming a full Buddha in the process.[73] Moreover,

> At will he displays the array of the realms of all the Buddhas at the end of a single hair; at will he displays untold arrays of the realms of the Buddhas of all

on Perfect Wisdom with the Divisions of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), p. 165. Eighth-stage Bodhisattvas are here described as enjoying the play of the higher knowledges (*abhijñākrīḍanatā*), seeing Buddha fields (*buddha-kṣetra-darśanatā*), and producing their own Buddha fields in accordance with what they have seen ("teṣāṃ buddha-kṣetrāṇāṃ yathā-dṛṣṭānāṃ sva-kṣetra-pariniṣpādanata"). The commentarial **Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (see Lamotte, trans., 5:2433–35, 2439, 2444) fills this out and explains that at the eighth stage the Bodhisattva sees the bodies of the Buddhas as "creations" (*nirmāṇa*), and that he accomplishes the concentration that fills the universe with his own magical creations, like a magician producing apparitional armies, palaces, and cities; from now on he knows the precise circumstances of any new birth he will assume. During the ninth stage he is a Bodhisattva in his last existence (*caramabhavika*); finally, seated beneath the tree of enlightenment, he at last enters into the tenth stage, the stage of the Cloud of Dharma (*dharma-meghā bhūmi*). The *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* here appears to impose the standard nomenclature of the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* on the ten *bhūmis* of the Prajñāpāramitā, despite the fact that the details of the *Daśabhūmika* scheme are manifestly different.

[71] Daśabhūmikasūtra 94.20–95.6: "yasyāṃ pratiṣṭhito bodhisattvo bhūyastvena maheśvaro bhavati deva-rājaḥ." Compare Daśabhūmīśvaro 199.2–5; T. Cleary, trans., *The Flower Ornament Scripture: A Translation of the Avatamsaka Sutra*, 3 vols. (Boston: Shambala, 1984–87), 2:111.

[72] Lalitavistara 79.6–7: "jāta-mātrasya bodhisattvasya maheśvaro deva-putraḥ śuddhāvāsa-kāyikān deva-putrān āmantryaivam āha." G. Bays, trans., *The Lalitavistara Sūtra: The Voice of the Buddha: The Beauty of Compassion*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: Dharma, 1983), 1:164. See also F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953), s.v. "maheśvara." The *Lalitavistara's* account of the Pure Abodes is interesting in itself. The *Lalitavistara* begins with the Buddha attaining a *samādhi* called "the manifestation of the ornaments of a Buddha" (*buddhālaṃkāravyūha*) (Bays, trans., p. 2); the lights that subsequently issue from his body attract the attention of various gods of the Pure Abodes who come to him and request the Buddha to teach the *Lalitavistara*, a teaching that "cultivates the skillful roots of the Bodhisattva" (*bodhisattva-kuśala-mūla-samudbhāvana*) (p. 3). The gods of the Pure Abodes lead the way in coming to honor the newly born Bodhisattva (p. 79) while later they create the four omens that prompt the Bodhisattva to go forth (p. 136). Nobuyoshi Yamabe has drawn my attention to Lamotte, trans., 1:519, which associates tenth-stage Bodhisattvas called Maheśvaradevarājas with the Pure Abodes.

[73] Daśabhūmikasūtra 90.11–15: "dharma-meghāyāṃ bodhisattva ekasyām api lokadhātau tuṣita-vara-bhavana-vāsam upādāya cyavanācaṅkramaṇa-garbhasthiti-janmābhiniṣkramaṇābhisambodhy-adhyeṣaṇa-mahādharmacakra-pravartana-mahāparinirvāṇa-bhūmir

> kinds; at will in the twinkling of an eye he creates as many individuals as there are particles in untold world-systems. . . . In the arising of a thought he embraces the ten directions; in a moment of thought he controls the manifestation of innumerable processes of complete awakening and final nirvāṇa. . . . In his own body he controls countless manifestations of the qualities of the Buddha fields of innumerable Blessed Buddhas.[74]

If this is what tenth-stage Bodhisattvas do, then what do Buddhas do? Ignoring the poetic imagination of the *Daśabhūmika*, the short answer seems to be much, much more of the same—so much so that one cannot properly begin to conceive of what Buddhas truly do. Nevertheless, it appears that we are to understand that at some point in the process—the repeated process of manifesting the acts of Buddhas and carrying out their work—these tenth-stage Bodhisattvas do actually become Buddhas.

At this point it is useful, I think, to consider the witness of the later Indo-Tibetan tradition. mKhas grub rje's "Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras" (*rGuyd sde spyi'i rnam par gzhag pa rgyas par brjod*) is an early fifteenth-century dGe lugs work which devotes its first chapter to the question of how the Śrāvakas and then the Mahāyāna (considered by way of the "Pāramitā" and "Mantra" schools) understand the final stages of the process of the Blessed teacher's becoming a fully awakened one (*abhisaṃbuddha*).[75] Let me go straight to mKhas grub rje's account of the understanding of this process according to the Mantra school. mKhas grub rje takes it as axiomatic for the Mahāyāna that full awakening is gained in Akaniṣṭha. But how precisely does it come about there? mKhas grub rje details the position of the Yoga and Anuttarayoga Tantras according to a number of Indian commentators (eighth to tenth century). For present concerns some indication of his account of Śākyamitra's and Buddhaguhya's understanding of the Yoga Tantras will suffice. According to them, Siddhārtha Gautama, a tenth-stage Bodhisattva from the time of his birth, having practiced austerities for six years, then established himself in the imperturbable concentration (*āniñjyo-nāma-samādhi*) of the fourth *dhyāna*.

> At that time, the Buddhas of all the ten directions assembled, aroused him from that *samādhi* by snapping their fingers, and said to him, "You cannot become a

iti sarva-tathāgata-kāryam adhiṣṭhati" (cf. Daśabhūmīśvaro 191.6–8; Cleary, trans., 2:107).

[74] Daśabhūmikasūtra 91.4–7, 14–18: "ākāṅkṣann ekavālapatha ekasarvabuddhaviṣayavyūham ādarśayati / ākāṅkṣan yāvad anabhilāpyān sarvākārabuddhaviṣayavyūhān ādarśayati / ākāṅkṣan yāvanty abhilāpyāsu lokadhātuṣu paramāṇurjāmsi tāvata ātmabhāvān ekakṣaṇalavamuhūrtena nirmīte / . . . / cittotpāde ca daśadikspharaṇaṃ gacchati / cittakṣaṇe cāpramāṇā abhisambodhīr yāvan mahāparinirvāṇavyūhān adhitiṣṭhati / . . . / svakāye cāpramāṇānāṃ buddhānāṃ bhagavatāṃ aprameyān buddhakṣetraguṇavyūhān adhitiṣṭhati" (cf. Daśabhūmīśvaro 192.11–13, 193.3–6; Cleary, trans., 2:108).

[75] Lessing and Wayman, trans. (n. 67 above), pp. 16–39.

Manifest Complete Buddha by this *samādhi* alone." "Then how shall I proceed?" he implored them. They guided him to the Akaniṣṭha heaven. Moreover, while his maturation body (*vipāka-kāya*) stayed on the bank of the same Nairañjanā River, the mental body (*manomaya-kāya*) of the Bodhisattva Sarvārthasiddha proceeded to the Akaniṣṭha heaven.

After the Buddhas of the ten directions had given garment initiation (*vastra-abhiṣeka*) and diadem initiation (*mukuṭa-abhiṣeka*), they bade him enter the intense contemplation in sequence of the five Abhisaṃbodhi. After completing the five Abhisaṃbodhi, he became a Manifest Complete Buddha as Mahāvairocana, the Saṃbhoga-kāya.[76]

Insofar as this account sees Gautama as a Bodhisattva who has taken a human birth in his last existence and the enlightenment as straightforwardly founded on the actual attainment of the fourth *dhyāna*, it is closer (than, say, the *Pañcaviṃśatikā* or *Daśabhūmika* accounts) to the Nikāya description; the Bhayabherava-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya describes the Bodhisatta as gaining the fourth *jhāna* and then, on the basis of that attainment, the three knowledges which culminate in the knowledge of the destruction of the *āsavas*.[77]

If we now consider the above range of material on the process of the Bodhisattva's final attainment of Buddhahood, it seems that it embraces two basic views. According to one view the Bodhisattva in his "final existence" (i.e., before finally transcending existence) is *reborn* in the Akaniṣṭha heaven where he finally becomes a Buddha; he subsequently manifests various creations which *appear* to be born, go forth, practice, meditation, and become Buddhas. According to the other the Bodhisattva in his last existence is actually born as a human being; seated beneath the tree of awakening he ascends *in meditation* with a mind-made body to the Akaniṣṭha heaven where he finally becomes a Buddha, while his "real" human body remains seated beneath the tree. Yet to state the positions thus baldly actually infringes a deeply rooted ambiguity and equivocation that runs through the cosmological material I have been considering in the course of this article. For where is the true Buddha? In Akaniṣṭha? Or seated beneath the tree of awakening? How does one come to Akaniṣṭha? By traveling through space? Or by journeying in the mind? Let me emphasize here that I am asking these questions of the ancient texts and not raising the problem of how the modern Buddhist tradition should set about finding an understanding of its ancient cosmology that is compatible with the "findings" or modern science, whatever precisely those are. And my point is that to ask such questions in such terms betrays a particular metaphysics and ontology which is precisely not the metaphysics and ontology of the Indian Buddhist tradition.

[76] Ibid., p. 27. See also T. Skorupski, "Śākyamuni's Enlightenment according to the Yoga Tantra," *Sambhāṣā (Nagoya University, Indian Buddhist Studies)* 6 (1985): 87–94.

[77] See M 1:21–24.

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In the course of this article I have been trying to explore the way in which psychology and cosmology parallel each other in Buddhist thought—something that Peter Masefield has already tried to elucidate in the Nikāyas by reference to the Upaniṣadic terms *adhyātmam* and *adhidaivatam*. I have suggested that in the Abhidharma the shift from psychology (levels of *citta*) to cosmology (levels of the *lokadhātu*) can be viewed as a shift of time scale. The effect of my discussion is not to reveal something new but to bring into sharper focus something that lies at the heart of Indian Buddhist thought, namely, a basic ambiguity about matters of cosmology and psychology, about the objective outer world and the subjective inner world. This is true to the extent that the key to understanding both is to recognize that there is a fundamental and profound equivalence between cosmology and psychology.

In conclusion I should like to risk a few general comments about the metaphysics and ontology of Indian Buddhism. I do not want to imply here that all Indian Buddhism shares an explicit and definite metaphysics and ontology, but I am suggesting that there is a general, underlying orientation, which tends to locate reality in the mind and its processes rather than in something "out there" which is other than the mind. We may want to persist in asking questions in the latter terms, yet it is significant that the tradition itself never quite does. On the contrary, it seems to take for granted and as natural an ambiguity between cosmology and psychology, for what is the difference between really *being* in Akaniṣṭha and *experiencing* one is really in Akaniṣṭha?

To put it another way, there is a loosely "idealist" tendency to all Indian Buddhist thought. It is no accident that one of the most important and influential philosophical schools of Indian Buddhism, the Yogācāra, expounded an idealist ontology. For the Yogācāra the only reality anything ultimately has is psychological. Yogācāra thought is essentially a product of and a continuation of an Abhidharmic way of thinking; it gives explicit expression in systematic and philosophical form to a tendency that runs through the whole of Buddhist thought. The Theravādin Abhidhamma tends to sidestep the issue of the ultimate ontological status of the external world and the world of matter; the question is never explicitly raised. Yet for the Theravādin Abhidhamma—and as I understand it this would also be true of the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma—the physical world each being lives in and experiences is one that is the result of his or her past *kamma* performed by deed, word, and thought; regardless of the ultimate ontological status of the external world and the world of matter, the particular physical sensations that beings experience are constructed mentally insofar as each one is the result of past *kamma*. In technical Abhidhamma terms our basic experience of the physical world is encompassed by just ten classes of sense-sphere consciousness that are the results (*vipāka*) of twelve unskillful and eight skillful classes of

sense-sphere consciousnesses: what we thought in the past has created the world we live in and experience in the present; what we think in the present will create the world we shall live in in the future.[78] Or, as Dhammapada (vv. 1–2) famously put it, "dhammas have mind as their forerunner, mind as preeminent, mind as their maker" ("manopubbaṃgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomaya"). That is, Indian Buddhist thought is in unanimous agreement that ultimately the particular world each of us experiences is something that we individually and collectively have created by our thoughts. The parallel that exists in Buddhist thought between cosmology and psychology is simply a reflection of this basic fact of the Abhidharma understanding of the nature of existence.

Indologists are familiar with the Upaniṣadic interiorization of the Vedic sacrificial ritual; students of Hindu and Buddhist Tantra take for granted the correspondences that are made between the body of the yogin and the universe as microcosm and macrocosm respectively.[79] Yet the similarities between this and certain ways and patterns of thinking found in early and Abhidharmic Buddhist thought are rarely recognized in the existing scholarly literature. These similarities consist in the general tendency to assimilate some kind of internal world to an external world, and in the principle that places mind and psychology—the way the world is experienced—first. The assimilation of cosmology and psychology found in early Buddhist thought and developed in the Abhidharma must be seen in this context to be fully understood and appreciated. I can do no better than to finish with the words of the Buddha:

> That the end of the world . . . is to be known, seen or reached by travelling—that I do not say. . . . And yet I do not say that one makes an end of suffering without reaching the end of the world. Rather, in this fathom-long body, with its consciousness and mind, I declare the world, the arising of the world, the ceasing of the world and the way leading to the ceasing of the world.[80]

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[78] See, e.g., Abhidh-s 2 on "motivationless consciousness" (*ahetuka-citta*) and Abhidh-s chap. 4, on the "consciousness process" (*citta-vīthi*); cf. L. S. Cousins, "The Paṭṭhāna and the Development of the Theravādin Abhidhamma," *Journal of the Pāli Text Society* (1981), pp. 22–46.

[79] See, e.g., J. Varenne, *Yoga and the Hindu Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 127–63; J. Brereton, "The Upaniṣads," in *Approaches to the Asian Classics*, ed. W. T. de Bary and I. Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 115–35.

[80] S 1:62 = A 2:48: "nāhaṃ taṃ gamanena lokassa antaṃ ñāteyyaṃ daṭṭheyyaṃ patteyyan ti vadāmi ti. na khó panāhaṃ āvuso appatvā lokassa antaṃ dukkhass' antakiriyaṃ vadāmi. api khvāhaṃ āvuso imasmiṃ yeva vyāmamatte kaḷevare saññimhi samanake lokaṃ ca paññāpemi loka-samudayaṃ ca loka-nirodhaṃ ca loka-nirodha-gāminiṃ ca paṭipadaṃ."

APPENDIX A
BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABBREVIATIONS

A	Aṅguttara-Nikāya
Abhidh-av	Abhidhammāvatāra
Abhidh-dī	Adhidharmadīpa
Abhidh-k-(bh)	Abhidharmakośa-(bhāṣya)
Abhid-s-(ṭ)	Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha-(ṭīkā)
As	Atthasālinī
D	Dīgha-Nikāya
DAṬ	Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathāṭīkā
Dhp-a	Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā
Kv	Kathāvatthu
M	Majjhima-Nikāya
Mp	Manorathapūraṇī
Pp	Papañcasūdanī
S	Saṃyutta-Nikāya
Sn	Suttanipāta
Sv	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī
Vibh	Vibhaṅga
Vibh-a	Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā (= Sammohavinodanī)
Vism	Visuddhimagga
Vism-ṭ	Visuddhimagga-ṭīkā (= Paramatthamañjūsūṭīkā)

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APPENDIX B
HOW OLD IS BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY? A NOTE ON THE AGGAÑÑA-SUTTA

The writings of a number of scholars seem to imply that the Nikāya cosmology should not be attributed to the Buddha himself. Konrad Meisig, continuing the work of Ulrich Schneider, argues that the account of the evolution of the world and human society introduced by the formula I quoted at the start of this article should not be regarded as forming part of the "original" Aggañña-sutta.[81] Schneider's and Meisig's arguments are complex and involved but appear to me to be neither individually nor collectively conclusive. The fact remains that the cosmogonic myth forms a significant part of all four versions of the text that Meisig examines; in other words, we have no hard evidence of an Aggañña-sutta—or whatever its "original" title—without the cosmogonic myth. On the other hand, we do have some hard evidence for the cosmogonic myth apart from the Aggañña-sutta.[82] Even when it is not accepted as forming part of an "original" Aggañña-sutta, it must be acknowledged that the tradition it represents is well attested.

The whole notion of an original version of a sutta raises interesting questions. The kind of model with which Meisig would seem to be working regards the original Aggañña-sutta as a discourse delivered by the Buddha himself on one particular occasion (at Sāvatthī since all versions are agreed in locating it there?), which was remembered by his followers and for a while handed down

faithfully by them, until someone or some group still in the pre-Aśokan period appended to it a cosmogonic myth.[83] But this kind of model is perhaps inappropriate to the composition and transmission of oral literature and may also be historically naive. A more appropriate general model for an original sutta might be of a "text" representing the substance of a discourse or teaching that the Buddha himself may have given on a number of different occasions and which in part at least draws on a stock of images and formulas which the Buddha himself employed in a variety of contexts as he considered appropriate. Whether or not the Buddha himself composed his teachings in this way, it is clear that someone started doing so at some point, since many of the discourses of the Pāli Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas are manifestly put together in this way. This, however, is a matter that needs more systematic research. It may well be that Schneider's and Meisig's analysis goes some way to revealing the blocks of tradition which have been put together to form the Aggañña-sutta; but to expose these blocks of tradition does not of itself tell us anything about who put them together and when. In the end, Schneider's and Meisig's understanding of the original Aggañña-sutta amounts to a judgment about how well the blocks of tradition have been put together; their view is that they have been put together badly and that the two basic parts of the discourse are ill-fitting. Yet even if we agree with this judgment, the bare fact that a sutta is badly put together does not of itself preclude the possibility that it is the original work of the Buddha; a claim that the Buddha cannot possibly have made such a mess of it is an appeal to the transcendent notion of Buddhahood rather than a conclusive historical argument.

To say that the Aggañña-sutta is composed of two parts must surely be largely uncontroversial. Clearly paragraphs 1–9 and 27–32 do form something of a unity and could intelligibly stand on their own; again, the cosmogonic myth of paragraphs 10–26 is an intelligible unit such that the Buddhist tradition itself abstracted portions of it to be used outside this context. But it seems to me purely arbitrary to pick on the first as original and relegate the second to the status of later interpolation. One might just as well argue the Buddha originally gave a discourse consisting of a cosmogonic myth that was later wrapped up in an ethical disquisition on the four classes (*vaṇṇa*) by certain of his followers who did not appreciate myth. This reveals what one suspects might be the true basis for the conclusion that it is the section of the Aggañña-sutta concerned with the four classes that constitute the original sutta: the "ethical" portion of the discourse is to be preferred to the "mythic" precisely because it is ethical, and, as we all know, the earliest Buddhist teachings were simple, ethical teachings, unadulterated by myth and superstition; we know that early Buddhist teaching was like this because of the evidence of the rest of the canon. Here the argument becomes one of classic circularity: we arrive at a particular view about the nature of early Buddhism by ignoring portions of the canon and then use that view to argue for the lateness of the portions of the canon we have ignored.

Richard Gombrich has countered the Schneider/Meisig view of the Aggañña-sutta by arguing that the two parts of the discourse have been skillfully put together and that the cosmogonic myth works as an integral part of the discourse

[83] See Meisig, p. 68.

taken as a whole.[84] According to Gombrich the first half of the discourse introduces the problem of the relative status of *brāhmaṇa*s and *suddas*; this question is then dealt with in a tongue-in-cheek satirical manner by the Aggañña myth. Gombrich regards the overall form of the Aggañña-sutta as we have it as attributable to the Buddha himself and thus original. But for Gombrich the text is "primarily satirical and parodistic in intent," although in time the jokes were lost on its readers and the myth came to be misunderstood by Buddhist tradition "as being a more or less straight-faced account of how the universe, and in particular society, originated."[85] Following Gombrich, Steven Collins has discussed the Aggañña Sutta in some detail as a "humorous parable," finding in certain of its phrases echoes of Vinaya formulas.[86] Gombrich's arguments for the essential unity of the Aggañña text as we have it are extremely persuasive, yet I would disagree with the implication that we should regard the mythic portions of the Aggañña-sutta as solely satirical.

Certainly it seems to me that Gombrich must be right in arguing that there is a good deal of intended humor in the Aggañña-sutta, and certainly I would not want to argue that the cosmogonic myth was never intended to be understood as literal history in the modern sense. How could it have been? Yet it still seems to me unlikely that, for the original compiler(s) of and listeners to the discourse, the mythic portion of the sutta could have been intended to be understood or actually understood in its entirety as a joke at the expense of the poor old *brāhaṇas*. As Gombrich so rightly says, if we want to discover the original meaning of the Buddha's discourses we need to understand the intellectual and cultural presuppositions shared by the Buddha and his audience. While in absolute terms this is an impossible task, since we can never entirely escape our own intellectual and cultural presuppositions and be reborn in the world of the Buddha—at least in the short term—we can still surely make some progress in trying to rediscover that world.

The question I would therefore ask is, Do we have any particular historical reasons for supposing that it is unlikely that the Buddha should have recounted a more or less straight-faced cosmogonic myth? My answer is that we do not. Indeed, I want to argue the opposite: what we can know of the cultural milieu in which the Buddha operated and in which the first Buddhist texts were composed suggests that someone such as the Buddha might very well have presented the kind of myth contained in the Aggañña-sutta as something more than merely a piece of satire. Far from being out of key with what we can understand of early Buddhist thought from the rest of the Nikāyas, the cosmogonic views offered by the Aggañña-sutta in fact harmonize extremely well with it. I would go further and say that something along the lines of what is contained in the Aggañña myth is actually required by the logic of what is generally accepted as Nikāya Buddhism.

[84] Richard Gombrich, "The Buddha's Book of Genesis?" *Indo-Iranian Journal* 35 (1992): 159–78; see also his *Theravāda Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988), p. 85.

[85] Gombrich, "The Budda's Book of Genesis?" pp. 163, 161.

[86] Steven Collins, "The Discourse on What Is Primary (Aggañña-Sutta): An Annotated Translation," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 21 (1993): 301–93.

It might be countered that the Buddha's refusal to answer categorically certain questions—including questions about whether or not the world was eternal and infinite—indicates that the Buddha was not interested in metaphysical questions and instructed his monks not to waste their energy on them. The account of the world on a cosmic scale found in the Aggañña-sutta is then to be seen as not in keeping with the spirit of the Buddha's instructions and therefore as the creation of curious *bhikkhu*s who, unable to restrain their imaginations, ignored the express instructions of their teacher. Such an outlook both misunderstands the nature of the, usually, ten "undetermined questions" and misrepresents the Aggañña-sutta. This sutta does not expressly answer the question of whether or not the world is eternal and infinite, and as Steven Collins has argued, the real reason for the refusal to give a categorical answer to the questions is that they are, from the standpoint of Buddhist thought, linguistically ill-formed.[87] Thus it is not because the Buddha does not know the answer to these questions that he refuses to answer them but because the terms employed in the questions have in the Buddhist view of things no ultimate referent: it simply does not make sense to ask whether the world is eternal or not because there is no one "thing" to which the word world refers. The notion "world" is just like the notion "self": it is not of itself an ultimately real thing but merely a concept, a mental construct. The ten undetermined questions thus, it seems to me, have no direct bearing on the cosmological ideas expounded in the Aggañña-sutta.

[87] Collins, *Selfless Persons* (n. 7 above), pp. 131–38.

Buddhism and Meister Eckhart

by Maurice Walshe

(Based on a talk given to the Sharpham North Community, 14.3.1989)

The thought of the great German Dominican mystic Meister Eckhart has been more than once compared with the teachings of Buddhism, especially Zen. Eckhart was born about 1260 and entered the Dominican friary at Erfurt about 1275. He rose rapidly in his Order and was sent several times to Paris, where he took his Master's degree and later taught and debated. The Dominicans were considered the special upholders of orthodoxy, and he was a highly qualified theologian with the scholastic philosophy at his finger-tips. It was only after about 1323, when he had been appointed head of the great Dominican *Studium Generale* in Cologne that any suggestion was made that his views were in any way unorthodox. The aged Archbishop of Cologne, a Franciscan (!), was busily engaged in hunting down heresy. It seems that some unfortunates arraigned before him, in desperation appealed to the authority of the famous Dominican master. The Archbishop instituted proceedings against Eckhart for misleading the common people. Eventually the case came before the Papal court, then at Avignon, and thither Eckhart went to defend himself, all the while protesting his orthodoxy. The case dragged on, and Eckhart died about the end of 1327. In March 1329 Pope John XXII issued a bull denouncing 28 of Eckhart's propositions, culled from his writings. Modern representatives of his Order believe that Eckhart was wrongly condemned, and there is hope that the present Pope may rescind his predecessor's verdict. It should also be mentioned that until recently there has been — and partly still is — doubt about the authenticity of certain works ascribed to Eckhart. Much earlier work, especially in English, was based on dubious sources. My own translation of the sermons and treatises is based on the monumental edition of the original texts by the late Prof. Josef Quint of Cologne.

It may be useful to introduce Eckhart backwards, as it were, with what may well be his parting words before setting out for Avignon. They are found in a text which I feel is authentic.

> Meister Eckhart was besought by his good friends: 'Give us something to remember, since you are going to leave us.' He said, 'I will give you a rule, which is the keystone of all I have ever said, which comprises all truth that can be spoken of or lived. It often happens that what seems trivial to us is greater in God's sight than what looms large in our eyes. Therefore we should accept all things equally from God, not ever looking and wondering which is greater, or higher, or better. We should just follow where God points out for us, that is, what we are inclined to and to which we are most often directed, and where our bent is. If a man were to follow that path, God would give him the most in the least, and would not fail him. It often happens that people spurn the least, and thus they prevent themselves from getting the most in the least, which is wrong. God is in all modes, and equal in all modes, for him who can take Him equally. People often wonder whether their inclinations come from God or not, and this is how to find out: if a man finds it within himself to be willing above all things to obey God's will in all things, provided he knew or recognised it, then he may know that whatever he is inclined to, or is most frequently directed to, is indeed from God.

> Some people want to find God as He shines before them, or as He tastes to them. They find the light and the taste, but they do not find God. A scripture declares that God shines in the darkness, when we sometimes least recognise Him. Where God shines least for us is often where He shines the most. Therefore we should accept God equally in all ways and in all things. Now someone might say, 'I would take God equally in all ways and in all things, but my mind will not abide in this way or that, so much as in another.' To that I say he is wrong. God is in all ways and equal in all ways, for anyone who can take Him so. If you get more of God in one way than another, that is fine, but it is not the best. God is in all ways and equal in all ways, for anyone who can take Him so. If you take one way, such and such, that is not God. If you take *this* and *that*, you are not taking God, for God is in all ways and equal in all ways, for anyone who can take Him so. Now someone might say: 'But if I take God equally in all ways and in all things, do I not still need some special way?' Now see. In whatever way you find God most, and you are most often aware of Him, that is the way you should follow. But if another way presents itself, quite contrary to the first, and if, having abandoned the first way, you find God as much in the new way as in the one you have left, then that is right. But the noblest and best thing would be this, if a man were to come to such equality, with such calm and certainty that he could find God and enjoy him in *any* way and in *all* things, without having to wait for anything or chase after anything: *that* would delight me! For this, and to this end, all works are done, and every work helps towards this. If anything does not help towards this, you should let it go.'

In many a sermon Eckhart has described the birth of the Word in the soul and other mysteries. Here, in his final exortation, he is insisting on what his disciples ought to *do*. It is above all the essence of his *practical* teaching — which to my mind argues strongly in favour of its authenticity. As regards Buddhism, I long ago ventured to coin the phrase: Buddhism is not something to *believe* but something to *do*, and it is here in the practice, or in the practical attitude, that Eckhart's teachings and Buddhism seem to come especially close. It would of course be easy to dismiss the whole of Eckhart's teaching as irrelevant to Buddhism simply because he speaks of God. Some people may argue that this is not just a superficial objection, but one of substance, pointing to an unbridgeable gap between Buddhism and Christianity. We should face this challenge. Just because we disagree, we should not try to gloss over what may be perceived as a real difficulty by some. It is Christian doctrine, amply subscribed to by Eckhart, that God is ineffable and beyond the normal reach of human thought. Much the same is said by Buddhists about Nibbāna, or the Unborn. Therefore, whatever may be the case with great sages and saints, we ordinary Buddhists and Christians, when we speak of God or Nibbāna, literally don't know what we are talking about. 'There is, o monks', said the Buddha in the *Udāna*, 'an Unborn, Unbecome, Unmade, Unconditioned. If there were not this Unborn . . ., there would be no deliverance here visible from that which is born, become, made, conditioned.' While this statement does not in the Buddhist view imply a personal God, it could be interpreted as so doing (I personally believe — however you may interpret it — that we have here the true heart of *all* religion worthy of the name). In fact in Indonesia, where a religion to be recognised must be theistic, some Buddhists have used this very passage in order to legitimise their faith in the eyes of the authorities.

Eckhart did not enjoy the freedom of thought prevailing in ancient India. Like the Indonesian Buddhists of today, only far more so, he had to watch his step. Till he moved to Cologne, this may have been no great problem, but faced with the persecuting Archbishop, he was in trouble. He was far too important a man to be sent to the stake, but the Archbishop aimed to discredit and silence him — and largely succeeded. It is not to Eckhart's dishonour to say that he was compelled to work within the system. To have deviated too obviously from orthodoxy would simply have meant martyrdom not only for himself, which he might have been willing to face, but for his followers. I am not, for instance, suggesting that Eckhart believed in any form of, say, reincarnation. I am merely saying that if he had had any such belief he would necessarily — and sensibly — have kept quiet about it.

The comparison of Eckhart's thought with Buddhism has hitherto been really only made with Zen — possibly because the two writers to make the comparison, D.T. Suzuki writing in English and Shizuteru Ueda writing in German, were themselves Zen Buddhists. The question is of less importance than might seem, especially since the miasma of misinformation — and worse — about Zen has begun to lift, and it has become increasingly apparent that despite certain idiosyncrasies Zen is after all not so different from other schools, even Theravāda.

The consistent burden of Eckhart's sermons is above all the birth of the Word in the soul — a theme he repeats over and over again with variations. For him, the Word is the Son — the word spoken by the Father into the silent depths of the soul. There is, Eckhart says (and the proposition was indeed condemned, but only through a misunderstanding), something in the soul that is not created. Sometimes he calls it a castle, sometimes a spark. This spark (*scintilla animae*) is, in so far as it is pure divine intellect, uncreated and one with God, but as a 'power of the soul' it is created, being an analogue of the divine intellect. According to Eckhart, too, being is a property of God alone, hence his statetment, also condemned: 'All creatures are pure nothing'. This resembles Vedānta rather than Buddhism.

If Eckhart could not introduce some new and unorthodox doctrine without disaster, equally he could not totally pass over anything he disapproved of in the official teaching. All he could do was to play it down, and refer to it as little as possible. Now it has been noted that there are remarkably few references to Hell in Eckhart's writings, and those there are are pretty perfunctory — in marked contrast to most popular preachers from his day to our own. The awful doctrine of eternal punishment was rigidly believed in by his Church then and later. Indeed, it was this frightful teaching that was responsible for all the tortures and persecutions of the Inquisition, for the witch-hunts of Protestants, and for untold misery and despair among believing Christians. Though it is ascribed to Jesus, I personally, without being a Christian, cannot believe he taught any such thing. If he did, he was worse than the Pharisees, who took a milder view. Of course we read of some pretty frightful Buddhist hells, but they are not eternal and not the creation of a loving Father(!). In any case we don't have to believe literally in them — even though it can be assumed that those guilty of really nasty behaviour (and how

include, in this 'enlightened' century!) will have cause for bitter regret in some future existence.

Perhaps we can draw a useful parallel between Eckhart and Nāgārjuna. Eckhart said: 'To get at the kernel, you must break the shell', but if he too recklessly broke his orthodox shell, he was soon in trouble, whereas Nāgārjuna could say what he liked without fear of suppression. There were many legends about both men, in Nāgārjuna's case partly invented by modern scholars. One otherwise excellent book was by a Vedāntist who tried to make out that his views were those of the Vedānta. Others have held that he introduced a total revolution in Buddhist thought, breaking away from the earlier tradition. In fact, as some of us long suspected and as has recently been shown, he restored the true teaching which had got garbled by the Sarvāstivādins, whose so-called Hīnayāna beliefs were wrongly ascribed to the Theravādins. Here, I am merely trying to suggest that perhaps Eckhart was trying, as far as he was able and as far as he was allowed, to restore something of the true doctrine of Christianity which had got more than somewhat overlaid by his time. Eckhart and Nāgārjuna were both deeply learned in their respective systems. Both had, I believe, penetrated through the jargon to the kernel of their faith and were concerned to bring it to light.

Eckhart knew very well that some of his sayings would shock, even while he firmly maintained their orthodoxy. Here is a passage from a sermon which contains two things his listeners had to reckon with. Neither was quoted against him, it seems, but both may have occasioned some head-shaking, or head-scratching. He says there are two kinds of birth: birth *in* the world and birth *out of* the world, which is spiritual birth in God. He goes on: 'Christ says: "Whoever would follow me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me," that is to say "Cast out all grief so that perpetual joy remains in your heart."' Probably few people would have interpreted this text (Matt. 16.24) in just this way, though in context it is not illogical. But while his hearers are puzzling out this riddle, he delivers the shock: 'Thus the child is born in me. And then, if the child is born in me, the sight of my father and all my friends slain before my eyes would leave my heart untouched. For if my heart were moved thereby, the child would not have been born in me, though its birth might be near.' Father and friends stand here for objects of attachment, to whose loss we should be indifferent. We have a parallel in *Dhammapada* 294:

> mātaraṃ pitaraṃ hantvā rājāno dve ca khattiye
> raṭṭhaṃ sānucaraṃ hantvā anigho yāti brāhmaṇo
>
> 'Having slain mother, father, two warrior kings and having destroyed a country with its chancellor, ungrieving goes the Bramin'.

In the next sentence Eckhart explains his meaning:

> 'I declare that God and the angels take such keen delight in every act of a good man that there is no joy like it. And so I say, if this child is born in you, then you have such great joy at every good deed that is done in the world, that your joy becomes steadfast and immutable . . . For we can see that in God there is neither anger or sadness, but only love and joy.'

We can perhaps compare, in Buddhism, the 'opening of the Dhamma eye' whereby the reality of Nibbāna is seen for the first time. Those in whom, in Eckhart's terminology, the Word is born, or those in whom the Dhamma-eye has opened, perceive reality and are transformed by it. We need not argue about whether or not it is 'the same' reality.

The nearest Eckhart ever came to criticising the Church was when he said: 'If God could turn away from the truth, I would cling to truth and abandon God' — so of course, if the People or the Church could abandon truth . . . What strikes us strongly is the assurance with which he speaks as one possessed of divine wisdom. This in itself, alas, proves nothing — all too many people down to the present day have spoken with the authority of those who know, with horrifying results. But with Eckhart it is different. True, even the famous William of Ockham thought him mad, but to others his message rings clear and true. He is like a great beacon to lead those who wish to follow on the path to truth, albeit on a particular course not entirely of his making. It might be fair to suggest that he plotted a path out of the labyrinth of medieval scholasticism, and out of the uncertainties by which the Christian message has been dogged to this day.

What is enlightenment? Silly question — not being enlightened, I can't tell you and don't propose to try. Perhaps, however, it is possible to hazard a theory about the mechanics of 'disendarkenment'. Let us start with an analogical case in which not, indeed, enlightenment, but certainly some remarkable powers of the mind have been revealed. A recent book discusses the cases of some people who, despite grave physical and/or mental handicaps, yet display powers far beyond the capacity of most of us. A blind man with cerebral palsy can play any tune faultlessly on hearing it only once. An animal sculptor with an IQ of about 50 needs only a fleeting glance at a picture to be able to reproduce it in perfect *three-dimensional* detail. A 12-year-old autistic boy drew an accurate architectural sketch of St Pancras Station after a brief visit, and so on. Other people solved almost instantly incredibly difficult mathematical problems. The author refers to left- and right-hand brain-halves, etc, all of which may be perfectly true but don't really explain very much. Of course we know one function of the brain is to act as a kind of sieve through which the vast mass of sense-impressions passes to enable us to cope without being overwhelmed by them. The brain, in fact, is not so much a memory as a forgettery. It seems to me that these people have, as it were, a hole in some odd corner of the sieve through which some knowledge streams unhindered. The knowledge is unconscious, and certainly cannot in any way be equated with 'enlightenment', but it is genuine knowledge or skill of a high order, often with an aesthetic quality and with an element of ESP. In passing, I would like to suggest that it is questions such as these to which science should pay more attention than it does. The time has surely come by now to stop brushing scientifically inconvenient facts under the carpet. Anyway, the phenomena mentioned, though clearly not themselves forms of 'enlightenment', may well be considered as possibly analogous to it.

The arising of the Dhamma-eye is described in the Suttas (e.g. DN 3) as follows: 'And just as a clean cloth from which all stains have been removed

receives the dye perfectly, so in the Brahmin Pokkharasāti (or whoever), as he sat there, there arose the pure and spotless Dhamma-eye, and he knew: "Whatever things have an origin must come to cessation (*yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ tam nirodhadhammaṃ*)"' — at first sight an almost trivial-sounding statement like 'What goes up must come down'. Perhaps its profounder significance dawns when we contemplate another famous verse:

> Aniccā vata sankārā uppāda-vaya-dhammino
> uppajitvā nirujjhanti tesaṃ vupasamo sukho
>
> 'Impermanent are compounded things, prone to rise and fall,
> Having risen, they're destroyed, their passing truest bliss'

said to have been uttered at the Buddha's passing-away by Sakka, king of the gods, and often quoted. This is not full enlightenment but the moment of stream-entry or First Path, after which full enlightenment is certain. I have already suggested that the opening of the Dhamma-eye is comparable to the birth of the Word in the soul in Eckhart's terminology. About a century before Eckhart, Wolfram von Eschenbach, the greatest medieval German poet, wrote what I consider the finest version of the Holy Graal story, *Parzival*, available in a fine Penguin translation by my friend Arthur Hatto. For Wolfram, uniquely, the Graal was not the chalice of the Last Supper or the like, but a stone come down from Heaven. The French scholar René Nelli thought that Wolfram drew on astrological conceptions of his time for his idea of a precious stone fallen from heaven which, by grace, had kept its pristine purity, thus participating in the incorruptible nature of the firmament, thus symbolic of that spark of which Eckhart speaks, that is incorruptible and uncreated. I think what Eckhart, and the Buddha, and Wolfram are pointing at is the same knowing, differing only in degree — most completely in the Buddha, less profoundly but very poetically in Wolfram. Eckhart's function — half-frustrated by his enemies — was to bring this same truth to light within the Christian tradition of his time. I don't think it differs fundamentally from what my own revered teacher, Ajahn Cha, calls establishing the Buddha in our mind as 'the one who knows'. 'The Buddha', he says in *A Taste of Freedom*, 'is just this "One who knows" within this very mind! It knows the Dhamma, it investigates the Dhamma. It's not that the Buddha who lived so long ago comes to talk to us, but this Buddha-nature, the "One who knows", arises. The mind becomes illumined.' Are not he and Eckhart, using different but not totally dissimilar words, groping towards an expression of the same thing?

I think by now I have interposed myself sufficiently between Eckhart and you. Here is what he has to say in his 87th sermon:

> Now pay earnest attention to this! I have often said, and eminent authorities say it too, that a man should be so free of all things and all works, both inward and outward, that he may be a proper abode for God where God can work. Now we shall say something else. If it is the case that a man is free of all creatures, of God and of self, and if it is still the case that God finds a place *in him* to work, then we declare that as long as this is *in* man, he is not poor with the strictest poverty . . . So we say that a man should be so poor that he neither is nor has any place for God to work in. To preserve a place is to preserve distinction. Therefore I pray to God to make me free of God, for my essential being is above God, taking God as the origin of creatures. For in that essence of God in which God is above being and distinction, there I was myself and knew myself so as to make this man. Therefore I am my own cause according to my essence, which is eternal, and not according to my becoming, which is temporal. Therefore I am unborn, and according to my unborn mode I can never die. According to my unborn mode I have eternally been, am now and shall eternally remain. That which I am by virtue of birth must die and perish, for it is mortal, and so must perish with time. In my birth all things were born, and I was the cause of myself and all things: and if I had so willed it, I would not have been, and all things would not have been. If I were not, God would not be either. I am the cause of God's being God: if I were not, then God would not be God. But you do not need to know this. A great master says that his breaking-through is nobler than his emanation, and this is true. When I flowed forth from God, all creatures declared: 'There is a God'; but *this* cannot make me blessed, for with this I acknowledge myself as a creature. But in my breaking-through, where I stand free of my own will, of God's will, of all His works, and of God himself, *then* I am above all creatures and am neither God nor creature, but I am that which I was and shall remain for evermore. There I shall receive an imprint that will raise me above all the angels. By this imprint I shall gain such wealth that I shall not be content with God inasmuch as He is God, or with all His divine works: for this breaking-through guarantees to me that I and God are one. *Then* I am what I was, then I neither wax nor wane, for then I am an unmoved cause that moves all things. Here, God finds no place *in* man, for man by his poverty wins for himself what he has eternally been and shall eternally remain. Here, God is one with the spirit, and that is the strictest poverty one can find.
>
> If anyone cannot understand this sermon, he need not worry. For so long as a man is not equal to this truth, he *cannot* understand my words, for this is a naked truth which has come direct from the heart of God.

'Then, O Blessed One, there is now the time for it! Now, O Sublime Master, is the time for the Blessed One to teach Dhamma in brief, to teach it at length and to teach it both briefly' and at length! There will be those who will understand the Dhamma!

Well then, Sāriputta, thus should training be done: "Concerning this body with its consciousness, there shall be no conceited imaginings of 'I' and 'Mine' and no such bias. Nor should there be such conceited imagining and bias of 'Mine' with regard to any external objects. We shall thus abide in the attainment of the heart's liberation and the liberation of wisdom, that, while we so abide, there will not be for us any conceited imagining nor bias of 'I' and 'Mine'." That is how the training should be done.

In so far, O Sāriputta, as the monk has no such conceited imaginings nor bias of 'I' and 'Mine' concerning this body with consciousness and with regard to any external objects; and in so far as he thus abides in the attainment of the heart's liberation and of the liberation by wisdom — he is then called 'One who has cut off craving and has removed the fetters; one who by the full comprehension (and abandonment) of conceited imaginings, has made an end of suffering.'

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MANICHAEAN VIEWS OF BUDDHISM

My religion is of that kind that it will be manifest in every country and in all languages and it will be taught in far away countries.[1]

With these fine words Mani proclaimed his message to be one destined to be carried to all corners of the known world, and historically this proved to be true. From its Mesopotamian hearth at Babylon, Manichaeism spread westward into the Roman Empire as far as Spain, while also spreading eastward over the Iranian plateau into Central Asia and from there still further eastward to the very shores of the South China Sea. The story of Manichaeism in the West is fairly well known, with a prominent feature being the Manichaean usage of Christian concepts to spread its own message and the consequent strenuous efforts of Christianity to eradicate this new rival. That story, though, does not concern us here. Instead, our eyes turn to the East where, throughout Central Asia and China, Manichaeism faced the older well-established Buddhist tradition to which it had to respond

[1] Middle Persian M5794, trans. in J. Asmussen, *Manichaean Literature* (New York, 1975), p. 12. This work by Asmussen is an important repository for Middle Persian and Parthian material. Recent general studies of Manichaeism by M. Tardieu, *Le Manicheisme* (Paris, 1983); and, scheduled for 1985, an English work by S. Lieu for Manchester University Press.

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over several centuries. What we will try to do is to ascertain whether there was any particular pattern behind the ensuing Manichaean responses to Buddhism.

The earliest Manichaean responses came from Mani himself (216–77). Following his early upbringing and eventual breakaway from the Gnostic-Baptist community that he had belonged to in Mesopotamia,[2] he had very quickly traveled by sea to the Indus Valley (then under Sasanian control). According to Manichaean missionary sources, like the Coptic *Kephalaia*, he spent some two years there (240–42), enjoying some local success and setting up a local Manichaean community.[3] Buddhism as such was not mentioned in the context of the Indus Valley sojourn, although in fact that period was one where Buddhism was at the height of its strength in India, with established Sarvastavadin and vibrant new Mahayana strands prominent in northwest India. It is quite possible that Mani's acceptance of rebirth, nonkilling of animals, and monasticism owed something to this early contact with Buddhism. Following the accession of Shapur to the Sasanian throne (242–72), Mani chose to return overland to Iran through the kingdom of Turan (present-day Baluchistan), which was also under Sasanian sway. According to Manichaean missionary sources, Mani managed to convert the local ruler away from his previous Buddhist beliefs.[4] Thus it was that Mani returned to Sasanian Iran with firsthand personal knowledge of Buddhism to set alongside his earlier knowledge of Christianity and Zoroastrianism. The fortunes of Mani in the Sasanian Empire do not concern us directly in this study. It suffices to note that the generally benevolent attitude of Shapur enabled Mani to travel around the empire setting up various Manichaean groups, but that after his death the developing Zorastrian hostility and ascendancy at the Sasanian court of Bahram I (274–77) brought about Mani's imprisonment and death in 276–77.

This study is concerned with the attitude Mani took toward Buddhism—no mere academic question. I have already mentioned Mani's own personal encounter with Buddhism. Although Mani himself did not return to those fledgling communities set up in the Buddhist-dominated areas of the Indus Valley and Turan, his attention

[2] Indications by the Muslim historian al-Nadim, writing in his *Kitab al-Fihrist* (tenth century A.D.), were graphically confirmed in the Manichaean biography of Mani's life, *The Cologne Mani Codex*, trans. R. Cameron and A. Dewey (Missoula, Mont., 1979).

[3] W. Sundermann, "Mani in India," in *Proceedings of the International Conference on the History and Culture of Central Asia in the Kushan Period, Dushanbe, September 27–October 6, 1968* (Moscow, 1975), 2:153–57, and "Mani, India, and the Manichean Religion" (paper delivered at The Society for South Asian Studies, London, October 19, 1984).

[4] Parthian M8286, M481, M1306 II, M5911, M1307 pieces, in Asmussen, pp. 18–19.

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continued to turn eastward. The Manichaean M4575 fragment states how, on his return from India, Mani immediately sent out his father, Patteg, and brother, John, to take over the care of those Manichaean groups established there by him.[5] (Unfortunately we have no further material describing subsequent Manichaean fortunes in that area, except for al-Nadim's mention in his *Kitab-al-Fihrist* of an *Epistle to the Indians* that had been composed by Mani, but which is not extant.) As significant perhaps was Mani's sending of his close disciple, Mar Ammo, to the east Iranian border zones of the empire to spread the Manichaean message further in an increasingly Buddhist-dominated environment. Of particular interest are Manichaean sources like the M2 and M216 fragments, which have him entering the Kushan lands around the Oxus, long a Buddhist stronghold, which politically had been recently subjugated by the Sasanians and enjoying some success.[6] What were the earliest Manichaean attitudes toward Buddhism, as formulated by Mani himself?

An immediate mention of Buddhism comes in his *Shahburkhan* text, which he presented as his first written piece of scripture to Shapur in 225. According to Mani: "Wisdom and deeds have always from time to time been brought to mankind by Messengers of God. So in one age they have been brought by the messenger called Buddha to India. . . . Thereupon this revelation has come down, this prophecy in this last age, through me, Mani."[7] Here we have Mani accepting the Buddha (as he did also Zoroaster and Christ) as a previous "Messenger of Light" who had preached the same doctrine as was later brought by Mani. The problem then arose that the continuing Buddhist tradition (as also the Zoroastrian and Christian ones) was in Mani's own time teaching various views that were often the very antithesis of Manichaean doctrine. How was Mani to explain this apparent contradiction? Mani's resolution of these doctrinal differences can be seen interspersed throughout many of his teachings. For example, in the Middle Persian M5794 piece, he described how the earlier traditions had been limited in scope geographically for "the primeval religions were in one country and one language," in contrast to his own universal message.[8] The Coptic *Kephalaia* reported similar comments by Mani: "He [Jesus] who has his church in the West, he and his church have not reached the East; the choice of him who has chosen his church in the East has not

[5] Ibid., p. 20.

[6] Ibid., pp. 21–23.

[7] As recorded by Abu'l-Rayhān Muḥammad al-Biruni, *The Chronicle of Ancient Nations*, trans. E. Sachau (London, 1879), p. 190. The original Manichaean text is no longer extant.

[8] Asmussen, p. 12.

come to the West. . . . But my hope, mine will go towards the West, and she will also go to the East. And they shall hear the voice of her message in all languages, and shall proclaim her in all cities. My church is superior in this first part to all previous churches, for these previous churches were chosen in particular countries and in particular cities. My church, mine shall spread in all cities and my Gospel shall touch every country."[9] Again the contrast was made with Mani's work, which had spread his message during his own lifetime into both East and West, in contrast (in Mani's eyes) to the Buddha whose work had remained in his lifetime to the East (India). Such comments by Mani about the geographical limitations of earlier revelations curiously evoke similar comments made in Baha'i literature during the past hundred years.[10]

However, the question still remained to be resolved why, even with such geographical limitations, the Buddha, despite being a previous Messenger of Light (like Mani), had given rise to a Buddhist tradition that did not preach the same message as that of Mani. Mani's answer was to claim that such divergences were a result of later misunderstandings and corruptions creeping into primeval religions like Buddhism (and also Zoroastrianism and Christianity). By such an approach Mani could split the figure of the Buddha away from the later Buddhist tradition that rivaled Manichaeism. The Middle Persian M5794 piece made this point at a general level: "The former religions existed as long as they had the pure leaders, but when the leaders had been led upwards [died] then their religions fell into disorder and became negligent in commandments and works."[11] By way of contrast that same Manichaean piece proclaimed that Mani's message would never become corrupted on account of the care which he had personally taken in his lifetime to write out his doctrines (the "living books," nine in all, which, coupled with his reformation of the Middle Persian language, transformed Iranian literary development). However, the Buddha (as was also the case with other primeval messengers) had not taken this precaution. As the *Kephalaia* 7.23 noted: "He selected and complemented his community [*ekklesia*] and revealed his hopes to them. But he did not write down his wisdom in books. His disciples who came after him recalled the *bit* of wisdom they had gleaned from the Buddha and

[9] *Kephalaia* 154, trans. in S. Lieu, *The Religion of Light: An Introduction to the History of Manichaeism in China* (Hong Kong, 1979), p. 11.

[10] A separate study will be made about these similar Manichaean and Baha'i treatment of earlier revelations. Suffice to note the similar Baha'i comments about the writing of the Buddhist scriptures after the Buddha and the identification of Baha'ullah with Maitreya.

[11] Asmussen, p. 12.

committed it to writing."[12] As a result of such views Mani was indeed able to reconcile the earlier appearance of Shakyamuni Buddha as a Messenger of Light with his own arrival as the last such messenger. For Mani there was no difference between the message originally brought by the Buddha and his own. Rather, the difference lay between the Buddha's original message and the later Buddhist tradition, which had retained only an incomplete record of the Buddha's teaching and which had fallen prey to corrupting influences. It was not Mani who was out of step with the Buddha, it was instead the Buddhist tradition that was so out of step through its misunderstanding.

On the one hand, then, Mani did accept the figure of the Buddha as a previous Messenger of Light, like himself. Yet, on the other hand, it was a somewhat qualified acceptance, given his criticism of the existing Buddhist tradition. Given the geographical limitation of the Buddha's ministry and the incomplete understanding of his message by the later Buddhist community, Mani felt quite able to interpret the Buddha's original wisdom as he saw fit. Mani's own revelation gave him a secure foundation. As he himself claimed in the Middle Persian M5794: "This revelation of mine of the two principles and my living books, my wisdom and knowledge are above and better than those of the previous religions."[13] Mani, and his later followers down the centuries, could use whatever *bit* of Buddhist wisdom they thought appropriate, secure in the knowledge that the full vessel of wisdom had been given and recorded by Mani.

Within Mani's own lifetime his commitment to send his disciples out in all directions meant a continuing Manichaean encounter with Buddhism. From the east Iranian areas like Merv and Bactria that were the focus of Manichaean missionary efforts (led by the Parthian disciple, Mar Ammo), Manichaeism started gradually to penetrate further eastward into Central Asia. For these first centuries Parthian was the official language used in Manichaean circles of east Iran/Central Asia. What is immediately clear from such Manichaean literature (as compared with their Coptic and Middle Persian texts) is the strong Buddhist environment within which the Manichaean writers were having to express their own beliefs. The Parthian M8286 piece shows this in its description of Mani's successful conversion of the previously Buddhist ruler of Turan, in which that ruler paid hommage to Mani: "You are the Buddha, and we are sinful men."[14] Since

[12] *Kephalaia* 7.23, trans. in H. Klimkeit, *Manichaean Art and Calligraphy* (Leiden, 1982), p. 1 (my emphasis).

[13] Asmussen, p. 12.

[14] Ibid., p. 19.

the literal meaning of the Buddha was "Enlightened One," the Manichaean writers were applying an audacious (but from their own perspective quite appropriate) functional adoption from Buddhism. A further twist in these Parthian circles was to identify Mani with Maitreya, the future Buddha foretold to appear after Shakyamuni. In the M42 we read the words of the imprisoned Light (i.e., the soul): "The complaints went off from me for help at the time when Shakyamuni Buddha . . . me. He opened the door of salvation to the fortunate souls that he redeemed among the Indians." To which the reply given to the imprisoned Light was: "Because of the arts and wisdom that you received from Buddha, Dibat, the great virgin, envied you. When he [Buddha] went into Nirvana, he told you 'Await Maitreya here.'"[15] Not surprisingly the Manichaeans then claimed that Maitreya, in the person of Mani, had come. According to the Parthian M801: "From paradise the gate was opened, and it was happiness to us: The commander Maitreya has come, Mar Mani, to a *new* throne . . . Buddha Maitreya has come, Mar Mani the Apostle, he brought victory."[16] As Maitreya, sitting on that new throne, Mani was in an even stronger position to announce the correct laws applicable for those later times. Armed with this extra piece of Buddhist legitimacy, the Manichaean missionaries could proceed yet further with selective use of Buddhist themes.

The whole trend within Parthian Manichaean literature was to respond more and more to Buddhist terminology and forms. Mar Ammo, the great apostle to the East, had already started this in Mani's own lifetime, for in the *Huwīdagmān* and *Angad Rōshnān* hymns attributed to him he uses Indian loanwords like *krm* ("action," Sanskrit *karma*), *mrn* ("death," Sanskrit *maraṇa*), and *nrḫ* (Sanskrit *naraka*).[17] One particular term from Buddhism adopted by Parthian circles was *prnybr'n.* used to denote the Sanskrit *parinirvāṇa* (literally, "complete nirvana," that is to say, death and passing away), which gave rise to a whole cycle of hymns mourning the *parinirvāṇa* of Mani. An early example of this comes from the Parthian M5, which can be dated to 386: "It was a day of pain and a time of sorrow

[15] Ibid., p. 110.
[16] Ibid., p. 63.
[17] These two hymns by Mar Ammo are trans. by M. Boyce, *The Manichaean Hymn Cycles in Parthian* (London, 1954); see glossary for examples mentioned in this study of words borrowed from Buddhism. Most of the Sanskrit words appearing in Parthian Manichaean texts seem to have come via the intermediary of the Gandhari Prakrit used by Buddhism in northwest India and parts of Central Asia. General survey of Manichaean Parthian literature by A. Ghilain, *Essai sur la Langue Parthe, son système verbal d'après les textes manichéens du turkestan oriental* (Louvain, 1939). Sogdian came to replace Parthian in Manichaean usage by the seventh century.

when the Apostle of Light went into Parinirvana [prnybr'n]."[18] Later on in the Parthian M1202, composed during the sixth century in or around Balkh, further Buddhist usages can be seen within Manichaeism. The text enumerates the hours of the day and their particular *yakṣa* ("guardian"). That term is Indian, following the already established Buddhist *yakṣa* catalogs such as the *Mahamayuri* that were popular in Buddhist circles from the fourth century onward; and the figures are borrowed from the Buddhist lists (e.g., Bis-parn of Peshawar is none other than the Buddhist figure of Visvapani).[19] Within the later Parthian literature that continued to be used in the Tarim basin until the sixth/seventh centuries, a further range of Buddhist terms was taken over by Manichaean writers. Consequently in Manichaean circles we have terms like *byxš* ("to beg," Sanskrit *bhikṣate*), *šmn* ("wanderer," Sanskrit *śramaṇa*), *lwg* ("level of reality," Sanskrit *loka*), *mwxš* ("deliverance," Sanskrit *mokṣa*), *sms'r* ("shifting material world," Sanskrit *saṃsāra*), *pwn* ("accumulated merit by deeds," Sanskrit *puṇya*), or, in a more mythological vein, *Zmbwdyg* (Sanskrit *Jambudvipa*) and *Smyr* (Sanskrit *Sumeru*).[20]

The effect of all this can be seen in a Manichaean piece reminiscent of Buddhist literature. The M5815 states: "Now the devout one should consider himself as high as the Sumeru mountains. . . . The pure devout must sit down in pious meditation and he should turn away from sin and increase what is pious. In this samsara there is nothing except only the merit and pious deeds that men having knowledge do." Not surprisingly this Buddhist-like piece is given its Manichaean anchorage as it continues: "Those who follow me Mar Mani . . . and want the pure and just Elect as leaders, they are the ones that are saved and find salvation from this samsara and reach eternal redemption."[21] Superficially Buddhist modes of spiritual practice were all right, as long as they were conducted within the official safeguards and correct interpretation of Mani and his later hierarchical successors.

[18] Asmussen, p. 57. R. Ort, *Mani: A Religio-Historical Description of His Personality* (Leiden, 1967), pp. 238–43, for this type of *parinirvāṇa* literature in Manichaeism.
[19] W. Henning, trans., "Two Manichaean Magical Texts," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 12 (1947): 47–57, p. 50, sees this piece as composed in or near Balkh.
[20] Most recent studies by N. Sims-Williams, "Indian Elements in Parthian and Sogdian," in *Sprachen des Buddhismus in Zentralasien*, ed. K. Rohrborn and W. Veenker (Wiesbaden, 1983), pp. 132–41; H. Klimkeit, "Gottes- und Selbsterfahrung in der gnostisch-buddhistischen Religionsbegegnung Zentralasiens," *Zeitschrift für Religions-und Geistesgeschichte* 35, no. 3 (1983): 236–47. The latter talks about the "Buddhisierung" of Manichaean language.
[21] Asmussen, p. 58.

This process of adoption and adaptation of suitable Buddhist themes was even more clearly shown in China, where Manichaeism was formally introduced at the imperial court in 694, only to be forcibly repressed afterward in the Confucian reaction of 845.[22] From this open period for Manichaeism in China comes the *Compendium of the Doctrines and Styles of the Teaching of Mani, the Buddha of Light,* which, with its praising of Mani as the "Buddha of Light," strikes a forthright note and which was composed in 731 on the order of the emperor. In it we find Mani presented in Buddhistic attire: "He because of his great compassion opposing the demonic forces and personally receiving the pure instructions from the venerable Lord of Light became incarnate and is therefore called the Apostle of Light. Being most sincere, profoundly intelligent, devoted and firm and strong in argument, He is called the King of Law of Perfect Wisdom. Through emptiness responding to spirituality and holiness, through 'bodhi' beholding the Ultimate. He is called Mani, the Buddha of Light."[23] All the great Mahayana themes are being bandied about, like compassion (*karuṇā*), law (*dharma*), perfect wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*), emptiness (*śūnyatā*), and insight (*bodhi*). Indeed the Manichaeans managed to turn the Mahayana key concept of *upāya* ("skillful means") to their advantage by describing in this tract how Mani had been "for sixty years teaching skillful means."[24] Naturally a lot of Manichaean adoptions were easy to use for their purposes, since in themselves the terms were neutral in meaning. Thus *prajñā* ("wisdom") and *bodhi* ("insight") could be bandied about by both Buddhists and Manichaeans, while meaning different things for each tradition. Ecclesiastical titles used by the Buddhist hierarchy could be used quite easily by the incoming Manichaeans.[25] At a more doctrinal level the various Buddha fields (*Buddha-kṣetras*) could be used in connection with the Manichaean views on the various Emanations of Light, in almost a kind of flexible number game. Using the *Compendium* text we have such a description about Mani: "Being clad in a white robe symbolizes the four pure dharmakayas. His occupying the white throne depicts the five vajra-lands."[26] Thus the

[22] Lieu, *The Religion of Light.*

[23] "The Compendium of the Doctrines and Styles of the Teachings of Mani, the Buddha of Light," trans. W. Haloun and W. Henning, *Asia Major* 3 (1952): 184–212, p. 190.

[24] Ibid., pp. 190–91. See M. Pye, *Skillful Means: A Concept in Mahayana* (London, 1978) for its Buddhist context.

[25] R. Gauthiot, "Quelques termes techniques Bouddhiques et Manichéens," *Journal Asiatique* (1911), pp. 49–67.

[26] *The Compendium* . . . , p. 194. For respective Buddhist and Manichaean models, see B. Sangharakshita, *A Survey of Buddhism,* 4th ed. (Bangalore, 1976), pp. 265–81;

four *kāyas* ("bodies") of the Buddha were assimilated to the Manichaean fourfold Godhead.

One of the most salient features of Manichaeism was its use of light symbolism, for indeed it was the "Religion of Light," to use its common Chinese title; and so Mani's depiction as the "Buddha of Light" is highly appropriate according to Manichaean values. It is not surprising therefore to find the Manichaeans keen to find analogous light symbolism in Buddhism. That was not difficult to do. The Pali *Sutta Nipāta* 442 painted a very poetic picture of the Buddha being a bringer of light to dispel the darkness of ignorance. In the Mahayana texts this luminous terminology is even more prominent. The Lotus Sutra (chap. 25) so described Avalokiteśvara/Kuan-Yin, while the *Suvarna-bhasottama Sūtra* translates in fact as "The Sutra of Golden Light." Particularly appropriate for Manichaean adaptation was the popular Pure Land tradition within Buddhism. This tradition centered around the figure of Amitabha Buddha, total devotion to whom dissolved the selfish ego. Amitabha's name was in fact formed from the epithets *amita* ("infinite") and *bha* ("light"); thus it is quite natural that light symbolism was used frequently for the description of Amitabha's realm of Sukhavati (literally "Pure Land") in Pure Land core texts like the longer and shorter versions of the *Sukhāvatī-vyūha Sūtra* and the *Amitayur-dhyāna Sūtra.* A comparison of the descriptions of the Buddhist realm of Amitabha and the Manichaean realm of light (as, e.g., in the *Huwīdagmān* attributed to Mar Ammo) shows close similarities in style. This is not to suppose that these two lands of light fulfilled the same roles. The Buddhist realm, while easy and restful, was designed so that one could press forward without any strain to the further goal of Enlightenment; whereas the Manichaean realm was where all the liberated souls (particles of light) were reunited with the Father of Light. The Buddhist realm was at heart but an interim, though very enjoyable, stage; while the Manichaean realm was the final and proper destination.

Nevertheless these independent, yet so similar, descriptions were noticed by the Manichaeans. Given that they considered the revelation of Mani to be the fullest and best-preserved one, they could as always appropriate as much as they wanted of the Buddhist Pure Land tradition without the slightest qualms. This is indeed what happened in the *Mo ni chiao hsia pu tsan* hymns, where a superior Manichaean understanding is implied about the Pure Land: "I also petition the clean, pure and wonderful Radiance, the *new* Pure Land . . . all

A. Jackson, "The Fourfold Aspect of the Supreme Being in Manichaeism," *Bulletin of the Linguistic Society of India* 5 (1935): 287–96.

the Buddhas and Lohans (Arahants) in the *past* have all established wonderful Laws for the five lights. *Now* the brave and resolute Mani, the venerable Lord, has shown and revealed *all* about them."[27] As can be seen, the emphasis was on the superiority of the Manichaean message, which was both a renewal of older concepts and also one more suitable for the present time.

One might be led to think that it was still a rather wholesale and indiscriminate attitude of adoption that the Manichaeans followed toward Buddhist material. This would be false, though, for in fact the Manichaeans were actually very selective in what they chose to use from the Buddhist tradition, although once they decided to use something they had no hesitation in exploiting it to the full. But as can be shown it was a very selective utilization. On the one hand, the Manichaeans were quite happy to incorporate and emphasize Mahayana themes like *śūnyatā* and *prajñāpāramitā* that were the central plank of Nagarjuna's Madhyamika school of thought, which through that very theme of *śūnyatā* claimed to demonstrate the falsity of any fundamental differences between *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*. Although the Manichaeans were happy to take those Madhyamika tools, they did not want to take the nondiscriminatory conclusions that struck against the very heart of the Manichaean dualism. In this case the Manichaeans ignored these uncomfortable Buddhist conclusions and, purloining Buddhist clothes, left behind the Buddhist body.

Faced with uncomfortable Mahayana Buddhist conclusions, the Manichaeans were quite ready to use the Hinayana parts for their own purposes. This is not too surprising since the Hinayana traditions (more accurately the Theravada and Sarvastavadin strands) tended to take a more negative stance vis-à-vis matter, the body, and the world than did the Mahayana. In consequence a dualistic ring came to be heard in those Hinayana circles, with *saṃsāra* virtually coming to be contrasted and opposed to nirvana at a deep quasi-absolute level of reality.[28] Thematically the disgust expressed in Mar Ammo's *Huvīdagmān* (4b, 6a) and the *Mo ni chiao hsia pu tsan* (19.27) about the body bring to mind similar-sounding comments in such Buddhist works as the *Vinaya Piṭaka* (1.6), *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (3.66), *Dīgha-Nikāya* (2:314–15), and *Dhammapada* (147–48). There remained within those Theravada texts the proviso that such negative

[27] *Mo Ni Chiao Hsia Pu Tsan: The Lower (Second) Section of the Manichaean Hymns*, trans. Tsui Chi, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 11 (1943): 174–219, pp. 179, 198 for quote. See J. Pas, "The Meaning of Nien-fo in the Three Pure Land Sutras," *Studies in Religion* 7 (1978): 403–13, for a Buddhist perspective.

[28] Sangharakshita, pp. 231–43.

descriptions were not so much absolute truth but, rather, that they pertained to method; that is, the easiest way to break down attachments to the selfish physical ego was through viewing the body as foul in such meditative exercises, although in truth the body was not something to be either clung to or rejected in the light of the Buddhist Middle Way. Such Buddhist provisos were not to restrict the Manichaeans. Explicit confirmation of this selective approach to Buddhist material comes in the Manichaean adaptation of Sarvastavadin elements. Buddhist theory had been that the body was impermanent (*anicca*), being made up of five shifting aggregates called *skandhas* (literally, "heaps"). Within the Hinayana an extended *Abhidharma* system had evolved that had broken these five *skandhas* into yet smaller and smaller little shifting elements. The practical aim was to reduce attachments to the body and the selfish ego by showing the body to be a series of shifting, interdependent forces. A tendency toward overscholastic analysis had crept in, it seems, with the smallest elements (*dharmas*) being considered more or less as static pictures of ultimate reality, which fostered at times a somewhat discriminative approach, the dangers of which were felt by the Mahayana schools. Among those Hinayana groups, the Sarvastavadin school had made the most detailed *Abhidharma* schemata.

The Manichaean *Compendium* did claim support from Buddhist texts: "The teaching [*dharma*] expounds the principle of Light thus removing the delusion [*avidyā*] of Darkness; the doctrine explains the two natures taking discrimination [between them] for its particular method. Thus the Buddhist sutras say 'If a man foresakes discrimination he destroys every law' . . . and again 'The birds turn to the air, game turns to forest and marsh, truth turns to discrimination, the Enlightened turns to Nirvana'. Unless one ascertains the principles and roots whereto can one turn?"[29] These Buddhist sutra verses quoted in support of the Manichaean dualistic (two natures) analysis can be traced to the *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna*, a Sarvastavadin work that was brought back by the famous pilgrim Hsuan-tsang to China in 645. What this shows is Manichaeism ignoring the diverse Mahayana sutras that warned against discriminative quasi-dualistic approaches and turning where need be to the more scholarly Sarvastavadin texts, which employed a more discriminatory approach in their analysis of the bodily constituents. Even so the Manichaeans continued to stretch the acquired Buddhist concepts further away from their original nuances. Discrimination, in its qualified Buddhist sense of "choosing" between erroneous and correct views and training, was replaced by

[29] *The Compendium* . . . , p. 193, insertions by translator.

the Manichaean use of discrimination to imply dualistic analysis between totally opposed aspects, that is, the two principles or natures of light/darkness manifested, as well as spirit/matter or soul/body. As with previous examples the Manichaeans used the existing Buddhist material extensively and imaginatively, yet without losing sight of the Manichaean message that was to be conveyed.

In all of these regions, from India through the east Iranian zones of Central Asia to China itself, Manichaeans were always an incoming minority responding to a larger well-established Buddhist tradition that over the centuries had often enjoyed favored treatment from local rulers. However, the relative positions of power, Buddhist and Manichaean, were dramatically changed in the eighth century. Sogdian merchants and missionaries had spread the Manichaean message during the late seventh century, not only into China but also farther afield in the Altaic areas of Central Asia that were coming to be dominated by Turkish groups. Among these groups the Uighurs were prominent, establishing a powerful empire from their capital Ordu Baliq (in present-day northern Mongolia). A signal event took place in 762 when the Uighur emperor, suppressing on behalf of the T'ang emperor a revolt at Lo-yang in northern China, met some Manichaean missionaries and was converted to that faith by them. On his return to Ordu Baliq he took four Manichaean officials back with him and proclaimed Manichaeism to be the official religion of his empire, which dominated Central Asia. For the first (and only) time, under the Uighurs, the Manichaeans were to be the favored official religion. Although the Uighur empire based in Mongolia was to be shattered in 840 by the Kirghiz nomads, some of the Uighur managed to reconstitute a kingdom around Turfan (north Tarim basin) that lasted until the thirteenth century and that provided a continuing sympathetic milieu for the Manichaeans. In these Turkish areas Buddhism was a well-established tradition, and so it is interesting to consider how (from its position of "power") Manichaeism responded to Buddhism in that Uighur setting. Some of this process of response is illuminated by Manichaean artistic material from the ninth to the twelfth centuries found in the Turfan oasis. This supplements and amplifies the indications found in Manichaean texts.

An early source for discerning Manichaean responses to Buddhism, in this slightly different Turkish setting, comes from the well-known inscription from Kara-balghasun that was composed around 815 (in Turkish, Chinese, and Sogdian) and that told the story of the introduction of Manichaeism into the Uighur Empire. The words of Bogu Khan, the Uighur emperor who was converted in 762, are particularly striking in the inscription: "Formerly I was unknowing and I called

the demons 'Buddha', now I have understood the true [law] and can no longer serve [these false gods]. . . . All images of demons, sculptures and paintings should be destroyed by fire; all those who venerate genii and fall down before them should [repent] and the Religion of Light be accepted."[30] If we read this at face value, Manichaeism when given its chance was displaying the same intolerance as it had suffered in the Roman and Sasanian Empires. It remains an open question how far this initial order by Bogu Khan was actually put into effect and whether it was taken on his own initiative (for political reasons?) or at the urgings of the now-established Manichaean hierarchy at court. Concerning Buddhism, the Manichaeans could claim that although Shakyamuni Buddha had indeed been a previous Messenger of Light, later Buddhists had corrupted and/or misunderstood his message and so were in need of correction (forcibly if the chance arose?) by the later Manichaeans. The paradoxical situation could arise, and is perhaps being described above, in which Buddhist "Buddhas" could be rejected as demonic, tainted idols and only assimilated Manichaean "Buddhas" accepted.

Unfortunately, there is not very much information on internal religious relations within the Uighur Empire. A greater range of material has come from the Turfan area, where the somewhat chastened Uighur remnants maintained their kingdom following the collapse of the empire in 840. Buddhism was even more well established in the Tarim basin than it had been in the former Uighur heartland in Mongolia. Consequently, the need for Manichaeans to come to some sort of terms was even greater. Many of the responses to Buddhism followed patterns similar to those already seen in Parthian, Sogdian, and Chinese circles, with adoptions and adaptations being made of suitable Buddhist material. It is no surprise to read Uighur texts talking about "my father Mani, the Buddha (*burxan*)" or about "the father of our souls, divine Mani Buddha."[31] For this reason it is difficult to know whether figures in the art found at Turfan portray Shakyamuni or another Buddha from the Buddhist tradition, or Mani, the most recent "Buddha of Light" from the Manichaean tradition.[32] The preexisting Buddhist terminology was maintained but changed into Manichaean usage (e.g., the Manichaean "law" in the *Khvastvanift* 4.B). This sort

[30] Translated in H. Klimkeit, "Manichaean Kingship: Gnosis at Home in the World," *Numen* 29 (1982): 17–32. p. 21. See also U Marazzi, "Alcuni problemi relativi alla diffusione del Manicheismo presso i Turchi nei secoli VIII–IX," *Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli* 39 (1979): 239–52.

[31] Translated, respectively, in Klimkeit, *Manichaean Art and Calligraphy* (n. 12 above), p. 40; Asmussen (n. 1 above), p. 51.

[32] Klimkeit, *Manichaean Art and Calligraphy*, p. 40, fig. 30.

of linguistic adoption, which has already been dealt with in connection with the Parthian and Chinese material, need not delay us further. However, artistically the Manichaean material found at Turfan complements this established linguistic pattern. Particular motifs make their way from the Buddhist world into that of the Manichaeans. Manichaean high *electi* appear seated on lotus thrones or, as in other pictures, with hands in the specific *vitarka mudra* teaching position employed by established Buddhist artists.[33] However, the teaching being given by the *electi* was that of Mani! Despite these clear artistic and literary adoptions from Buddhism, Manichaeism did not lose its own particular thrust. It seems probable that the popular confessional texts used by Manichaeans in Central Asia were indeed taken from the earlier existing Buddhist genre.[34] But, as the *Khvastvanift* shows, they were used to teach "the two principles . . . the light principle . . . the dark principle" (8.A) that was at the core of Manichaeism.[35]

A Manichaean text from Kocò, dated from the ninth century, even mentions a false and a true Maitreya: "Maitreya on the earth [*Mitrii yir uza*]. The sign and vehicle of this son of demons will be a bull. He will be capable of every kind of trickery, ruse and magic. But Maitreya Buddha [*Mitrii burxan*], the son of God, will come and say, 'I am the true son of God.' On that occasion, there will be a *diritar*, an *élu* [i.e., high electus]. This *élu* will believe in the holy buddha and his salvation; the false Maitreya, the son of demons, will then speak to that *élu*."[36] As always it was Mani and his successors, the high *electi*

[33] Ibid., pp. 34, 35, illustrations 21, 22.

[34] As demonstrated by J. Asmussen, *X"astvanift: Studies in Manichaeism* (Copenhagen, 1965), pp. 253–58. Ironically, later Manichaean influences have been traced in Buddhist confessional literature and other texts like the *Sakiz Yukmak* and *Maitrisimit* from Uighir Buddhist circles in eight and ninth centuries; see H. Klimkeit, "Manichaische und buddhistische Beichtformeln aus Turfan," *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 29, no. 3 (1977): 193–228, and *Manichaean Art and Calligraphy*, p. 33, for *Sakiz Yukmak* sutra. Manichaean artistic themes also seem to have entered Buddhism. See H. Klimkeit, "Vairocana und das Lichtkreux: Manichaische Elemente in der Kunst von Alchi [West Tibet]," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 13 (1979): 357–99, and *Manichaean Art and Calligraphy*, pp. 32–33, illustrations 16 (from Kizil) and 17–20 (from Alchi). Interesting résumé of research on Buddhist-Manichaean interactions by J. Ries, "Bouddhisme et Manichéisme: Les Etapes d'une recherche," in *Indianisme et Bouddhisme: Mélanges offerts a Mgr. Etienne Lamotte* (Louvain, 1980), pp. 281–95.

[35] Translated by J. Asmussen, *Manichaean Literature* (n. 1 above), p. 73.

[36] Translated by W. Baruch, "Maitreya d'après les sources de Serinde," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 132 (1948): 67–92, 77–78. It must be said that this is a somewhat curious text, for *Mitrii*'s sign and the vehicle of the bull evoke the Iranian god Mithra who was integrated into Manichaeism, rather than the Buddhist Maitreya who was also used as we have already seen by Manichaeans. Nevertheless, this figure is called *Mitrii burxan*, i.e., *Mitrii* the Buddha, which is why Baruch takes him to be Maitreya. The important point is the fact that the Manichaeans felt able to discriminate between a true (Manichaean interpreted) and false (non-Manichaean interpreted?) figure of

of the Manichaean church, who were the ones capable of distinguishing between the true and the false. Did this attitude just express itself through Manichaean literature, through its selective adoptions and adaptations; or was it also translated into direct physical action against other traditions that maintained their independence outside the Manichaean tradition, as seems to be indicated by the inscription from Kara-balghasun that was discussed earlier? The indications available to us seem to suggest the former. In 982 an envoy, Yang yen-te, sent by the Chinese court to the Uighur ruler Arslan, noticed at the Uighur center of Turfan some fifty Buddhist convents dating from the time of the T'ang dynasty together with a library of Chinese Buddhist texts. He also described a shrine to Mani (*Ma-ni-ssu*) "attended by Persian priests who carefully observe their particular regulations and declare the Buddhist books as heretical."[37] Yang yen-te's observations show that, after a century and a half of Manichaean dominance in Uighur political circles, Buddhism was still numerically strong. This suggests that there had indeed been no direct Manichaean persecution of its Buddhist rival. Furthermore Yang yen-te's brief words are important for showing current Manichaean attitudes toward Buddhism, which were that Buddhism had indeed some truth but that through misunderstanding and corruptions it had then diverged from the path taught by Shakyamuni Buddha, the Messenger of Light, and so had lapsed into heresy, unable to accept thereafter the renewal offered by Mani. As usual it was the Manichaean *electi* who were able to sort the wheat from the chaff in the various traditions encountered. From a Manichaean perspective the Buddhists were indeed tinged with heresy, for they had diverged and lapsed from the previously pure message brought by Sahkyamuni Buddha, which was the same as that later one brought by the equally enlightened Mani.

Manichaeans continued to live alongside Buddhists in Central Asia until the coming of Islam, and their own internal decline resulted in a Manichaean disappearance by the thirteenth or fourteenth century. In China, Manichaeans and Buddhists had both been proscribed in 845. Whereas this situation lasted only a few years for Buddhism, for the

Mitrii, a discrimination that could be applied to any encountered figure and that recalls the true and false Buddhas mentioned on the Uighur Manichaean inscription of Kara-balghasun.

[37] Translated by M. A. Stein, *Innermost Asia* (Oxford, 1926), p. 582, though some scholars like Pelliot have given this piece the sense that it was the Buddhists who considered the Manichaeans to be heretical. Be that as it may, both religions in their outward appearances would have appeared very similar due to the extensive Manichaean usages from Buddhism.

next centuries this was to be the continuing fate for the now-hard-pressed Manichaean community, which, although uprooted from northern China, did manage to maintain itself semiclandestinely in southern China.[38] The Manichaean propensity selectively to adopt suitable Buddhist themes was also maintained. The coming of the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1260–1368) may have eased the pressures on the surviving Manichaean cells in southern China, and it is from the Yuan period that a Manichaean temple survived at Ch'uan-couch (medieval Zaiton) on the Fukien coast. Its outside was like an ordinary Buddhist temple, but the Buddha statue was un-Buddhist in its iconography. Its identity is clear, though, by the revealing dedicatory inscription in stone that was later placed at the entrance to the temple:

> Mani, the Buddha of Light,
> the most pure light,
> the great and powerful wisdom,
> the highest and unsurpassable truth,
> Inscribed in the ninth month of the Chih-ch'ou
> year of the Cheng-tung period [1445].[39]

Such language is the type used by early Manichaeans in China, as we have most clearly seen in the *Compendium* of 731. After 700 years alongside their more numerous Buddhist neighbors in China, the Manichaeans were still following this selective, adoptive approach. By this time the political climate had turned against the Manichaeans again, and under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) they were proscribed once more. Nevertheless, there are indications that the Manichaean temple continued to function until the early seventeenth century.[40] By this late stage, with the ecclesiastical hierarchy more and more attenuated, the Manichaean message did start to be affected at its core by Buddhist and especially Taoist concepts. So it was that Manichaeism finally disappeared from China, merging with some of the messianic secret societies that flourished in the seventeenth century, such as the Red Turban sect that preached the return of the Prince of Light (the *ming wang*).[41] Ironically the Manichaean temple at Ch'uan-couch passed into its present Buddhist usage.

[38] S. Lieu, "Polemics against Manichaeism as a Subversive Cult in Sung China (A.D. c. 960–c. 1200)," *Bulletin of the John Rowlands University Library of Manchester* 62, no. 1 (1979): 132–67.

[39] S. Lieu, "Nestorians and Manichaeans on the South China Coast," *Vigilae Christianae* 34, no. 1 (1980): 71–88, 81, for inscription.

[40] See ibid., pp. 87–88, for a translation of the account by Ho Chiao-Yuan in the early seventeenth century.

[41] J. Langlois and S. K'o-K'uan, "Three Teachings Syncreticism and the Thought of Ming T'ai-tsu," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 43, no. 1 (1983): 97–139.

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What has been shown in this long chronological span is that over the centuries, in east Iranian, Chinese, and Turkish circles, Manichaeism had been able to maintain its distinctive message, while at the same time making maximum use of the external Buddhist trappings that were available. Unity within the far-flung Manichaean community was maintained, with Mani's own composition of the seven canonical "living books" being the cohesive and authoritative doctrinal bond for these Manichaean groups spread from the shores of the Atlantic to the shores of the South China Sea. The simple yet forceful dualistic analysis was preserved, although it was presented in rich detail according to the preexisting cultural and religious background of local areas. Consequently the Manichaeans were able to present their own spiritual message through a Buddhist medium, secure in their own minds that they had the fullest revelation as given by Mani. To use the already quoted *Kaphalaia*, "bits" of recorded Buddhist wisdom could be used without scruple within the superior "totality" of Manichaean wisdom. Shakyamuni Buddha could be, and was, accepted without having to accept actual Buddhist doctrine that did not agree with Mani's analysis. Such a policy was outrageous for Buddhism, as can be seen in its literature, but according to Manichaean premises it was quite proper.

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CONTRASTING MODES OF ACTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BUDDHIST AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Over the years historians of religion have shown surprisingly little interest in comparative religious ethics. Recently, however, the topic has begun to receive mention in writings produced by scholars in the field. For example, Ninian Smart, in a recent paper devoted to identifying research priorities for the future of the discipline, has singled out the area of comparative ethics for special mention.[1] Moreover, several historians of religion have begun to address themselves to some of the methodological and substantive issues that are involved in doing comparative ethical research.

Within the past year a debate has developed between two groups of scholars interested in comparing different expressions of religious ethics. As James Childress has pointed out in the lead editorial in the spring 1979 issue of the *Journal of Religious Ethics*, this debate has developed essentially along disciplinary lines. One side has been manned by philosophically oriented scholars who have had their primary academic training in western studies. The other side has been constituted by historians of religion who have done their primary research in relation to nonwestern traditions.

Up to this point, as Childress's editorial makes clear, the debate has proceeded in a rather uneven way. The lead has been taken by those with a philosophical orientation—most notably by David Little and Sumner Twiss in their recent book, *Comparative Religious Ethics*.[2] In this carefully conceived and highly responsible work, Little and Twiss have set forth their own philosophical method; they have illustrated that method through case studies in Navajo thought, in the Gospel of Matthew, and in the Theravada Buddhist scriptures. In the face of this pioneering effort, several historians of religion have mounted a series of critical responses. They have challenged both the adequacy of the approach and the substantive validity and usefulness of the comparisons that have been made.

However, if the incipient discussion concerning comparative religious ethics is to be carried forward in a truly creative way, those who represent the history of religions side of the debate cannot rest content with the kind of methodological critiques that have been formulated thus far. Such critiques are needed, but they are certainly not enough. Nor can they rest content with the kind of specialized scholarship that discredits, on particularistic grounds, some of the more problematic comparative theses that have been proposed. Again, this kind of critically oriented scholarship is necessary, but it is by no means sufficient. Rather, historians of religion must take the further and much more challenging step of generating, within the parameters of their own discipline, their own truly comparative insights.

A HISTORY OF RELIGIONS APPROACH

In this paper I will begin, at least, to take up this challenge. In order to do so I will present the preliminary results of a project

This paper was originally presented as an inaugural lecture at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, and much of the oral style has been retained. However, the paper has been revised in the light of comments and suggestions from a number of colleagues, including Charles Keyes, Lee Yearley, Donald Swearer, and Jay Kim. I am especially indebted to Bernard McGinn for valuable contributions that have been incorporated into the discussion of Christianity.

[1] Ninian Smart, "History of Religions," *Bulletin of the Council on the Study of Religion* 10, no. 3 (June 1979): 73.

[2] David Little and Sumner Twiss, *Comparative Religious Ethics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978). Another recent book which approaches the subject philosophically, though in a very different way, is Ronald Green's *Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious Belief* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

designed to generate a variety of religiohistorical comparisons between certain aspects of Christian and Buddhist ethics. In the Christian context I will focus attention on the classical tradition that developed in the premodern West. In the Buddhist context I will concentrate on the Theravada tradition that developed in India and premodern Sri Lanka.

Since there are few religiohistorical precedents for work in comparative religious ethics, it will be useful to begin by considering a few basic methodological points. But rather than treating these points abstractly, I will simply mention five main stages or aspects of the procedure I have followed. I do not claim that these stages or aspects must necessarily characterize every religiohistorical approach to the study of comparative religious ethics. But I do contend that, taken as a whole, they provide a framework for one kind of religiohistorical investigation that can yield valid and interesting results.

The first phase or aspect of this approach involves acquiring a holistic understanding of the two religions that are the bearers of the ethical perspectives to be compared. At first glance the attempt to acquire such a holistic understanding would seem to be such an obvious prerequisite for further research that to mention it would be superflous. However, it is necessary to make the point explicit, since the recognition of its importance does seem to differentiate historians of religion from many of our more philosophically oriented colleagues.

The second phase or aspect of the approach involves a focusing of attention on the specifically ethical dimensions of the two religions being studied. More specifically, this means carrying out a preliminary survey of the whole range of normative modes of action that are considered by each tradition to be relevant to proper morality or to the proper maintenance or improvement of the social order.

The third phase or aspect of the procedure involves the identification of a central religioethical pattern that plays a prominent role in the life of both traditions. Clearly, a full-scale comparative interpretation would require the identification of a number of such patterns, and the pursuit of a number of correlated studies. Nevertheless, if a truly central pattern can be discovered, a single comparative study can yield highly significant results.

The fourth phase or aspect of the procedure involves investigating the substantive similarities and differences between the ways that the common pattern has been articulated in the two

different religious contexts. This is a delicate enterprise that requires careful attention to the texts and practices of both traditions. Moreover, it requires a series of interpretative judgments concerning the fundamental character of the orientations which these texts and practices express.

The fifth and final phase or aspect involves a comparison of the ways in which the different expressions of the pattern have actually functioned in the life of the two religious communities. This last phase is not, let me emphasize, simply an addendum that is tacked on to the comparative program in order to assuage a historian of religion's overactive sociological conscience. Rather, as I hope to demonstrate as the paper proceeds, it opens the way for the most interesting and far-reaching kinds of comparative insights.

In the discussion that follows I have chosen to bypass any discussion of the first two, essentially preliminary stages in the process I have outlined, and to focus directly on the three phases that are explicitly comparative in character. First, I will argue that there is a specifically religioethical pattern of contrasting modes of action that plays a central role both in classical Christianity and in traditional Theravada Buddhism. Second, I will argue that there are important similarities and equally important differences in the characteristic ways this pattern has been articulated by Christians and by Theravadins. Third, I will contend that there are major similarities and differences in what I call the "social location" of this pattern within the two traditions, and that the differences that are involved have had profound ecclesiastical and societal implications.

CONTRASTING MODES OF ACTION: THE COMMON PATTERN

A striking fact that emerges from even the most preliminary study of classical Christianity and traditional Theravada Buddhism is that in both cases a very fundamental and pervasive distinction has been made between two contrasting modes of human action. Within the Christian context, this pattern of contrasting modes of action has been expressed in a variety of different formulations, each conveying its own particular set of emphases and connotations. Christians have contrasted actions characteristic of the kingdoms of this world with actions associated with the kingdom of God. They have contrasted actions that take place within the this-worldly realm of sin, bondage, and death with actions that take place within the supraworldly realm of freedom and fulfillment

established through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. They have contrasted the activity that characterizes the natural life lived by those who stand apart from the reconciling activity of God with the life under grace lived by those who have been reconciled through faith. Christians have never ceased to debate about the precise meaning and significance of these contrasts, but even those who have sought to minimize them have felt the need to take them seriously into account.

Turning from the Christian to the Theravada Buddhist context, we find that this pattern of contrasting modes of action appears in an equally central position. Theravadins have persistently distinguished actions associated with the samsaric realm of rebirth and suffering from actions associated with the Nibbanic experience of release and freedom. They have clearly differentiated the life of karmic activity that generates wordly punishments and rewards from the life of path action that was discovered, exemplified, and taught by the Buddha. And they have drawn a clear boundary line between the actions of this-worldly beings who remain caught up in the continuing round of karmic existence and the supraworldly activity of the noble beings who constitute the elite community of Theravada saints. Again, both Theravadins and Buddhologists have argued about the character and implications of these contrasts, but there presence at the very heart of Theravada teaching and spirituality has seldom been seriously disputed.

The commonality of this pattern of contrasting modes of action extends far beyond the simple presence of these basic structural components and involves a variety of more substantive dimensions as well. Consider, for example, the common characteristics that both traditions have associated with this-worldly action and the mode of this-worldly existence that it generates. In both cases this-worldly action has been understood to be action that is grounded in assertions of the human will that arise from and reinforce a false sense of selfhood and self-interest. Moreover, both traditions recognize that this-worldly action includes some types of action that are, from a religious and ethical perspective, relatively positive; and they both recognize that there are other forms of this-worldly action that must be totally condemned. In this regard Christians have developed conceptions of a so-called natural religion and natural law that are accessible even to those who do not transcend the limits of this-worldly existence; and in so doing they have established a basis for distinguishing this-worldly activities that are relatively good from those that are truly evil in

character.[3] In a similar way the Theravadins have maintained that there is a law of karmic retribution that regulates this-worldly activity in accordance with religious and moral values. Thus, the Theravadins have insisted that this-worldly actions that are religiously and morally good (that is to say, those that involve a minimum of delusion, grasping, and hatred) inexorably generate results that are pleasant both for the individual and his society. And they have also insisted that this-worldly actions that are religiously and morally evil (that is to say, those that involve greater components of delusion, grasping, and hatred) generate, with equal certainty, results that are unpleasant and painful for the individual and for society. Within both the Christian community and the Theravada community there have been major disagreements concerning the importance that should be attached to the distinction between the relatively positive and the totally negative forms of this-worldly activity. However, there are two points that must be emphasized. The first is that the mainstream interpreters within both traditions have clearly and forcefully differentiated between more and less acceptable forms of this-worldly activity. The second is that the major interpreters in both traditions have been virtually unanimous in the judgment that all this-worldly actions are intrinsically faulted and that they are, therefore, incapable of satisfying human beings' longings for a salvation that is truly ultimate and final.

The commonality of the pattern of contrasting modes of action that appeared within Christianity and Theravada Buddhism is further illustrated by the similarities that characterize the way Christians and Theravadins have understood the transition from this-worldly to supraworldly activity. In both cases it has been strongly affirmed that the transition is one that cannot be effected through any simple or ordinary exercise of the human will. Though both Christians and Theravadins have agreed that human beings are able to exercise their wills in such a way that they can accomplish certain religious and moral goals within the realm of this-worldly existence, they have both

[3] In the course of Christian history the notions of natural religion, natural law, and natural virtues have played a major role not only in the interpretation and evaluation of ethical activity outside the church, but also in the formulation of specifically Christian ethics. This history forms one of the leitmotifs of Ernest Troeltsch's great work, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches* ([London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1931], vol. 1) and is treated from a quite different perspective in Lee Yearley's doctoral dissertation on "Natural and Super-natural Activity in the Tradition Represented by St. Thomas and Cardinal Newman" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1969).

affirmed that this kind of willful action—because it is bound up with a false sense of selfhood and self-interest—cannot possibly accomplish the transition that leads to the highest levels of religious and ethical attainment. To put the same point more positively, Christians and Theravadins have shared a common recognition that the transition from this-worldly acitivity to life in the kingdom or to life on the path necessarily involves a truly radical restructuring of human motivation and action. They have agreed that false notions of selfhood and the kind of willful action that accompanies them must be transcended and that radically new sources and styles of action must be called into play. And—what is especially interesting to historians of religion—the adherents of the two religions have conveyed the experience and meaning of this radical restructuring through the use of very similar patterns of imagery and symbolism. In Christianity the dominant images images used to describe this transformation have been those of restoring the image of God distorted or destroyed by the fall, of dying and rising with Christ, and of being reborn in Christ. In Theravada Buddhism, the dominant images that have been used to describe the transformation have been those of renunciation and enlightenment following the example of the Buddha, of attaining the "spotless eye of truth," and of "changing one's lineage" so that one enters into the heritage of the Buddha and others who have practiced the path.

The substantive commonality of the pattern of contrasting modes of action in Christianity and Theravada Buddhism is still further illustrated by the similarities which characterize the highest levels of Christian and Theravada attainment. Both traditions have described the highest, supraworldly level of religious and ethical activity as one in which the basic wellsprings of human selfishness and willfulness have been definitively overcome. This is not, in either case, taken to imply that complete perfection or a complete experience of religious realization has necessarily been attained. Christians have always recognized that those who have been reborn in Christ must still contend with their natural self, which remains subject to the temptations of pride, avarice, and the like. Similarly, Theravadins have always recognized that most of those who have undergone a change of lineage and become noble beings must still deal with the remnants of grasping and hatred that persist from their karmic past. Nevertheless, both traditions have insisted that those who have become involved in supraworldly activity have made a decisive entry into a process of

sanctification through which remaining imperfections will certainly be removed, in which the highest virtues can be effectually cultivated, and through which ultimate and final salvation is assured.

THE COMMON PATTERN: A SECOND LOOK

Having identified and at least briefly described the pattern of contrasting modes of action as it has appeared in classical Christianity and traditional Theravada Buddhism, it is now possible to move on to the second major phase or aspect of our task—namely, the investigation of the various ways in which the Christian and Theravadin expressions of that pattern diverge. In order to pursue this very important aspect of our comparative enterprise it will be necessary to take a second look at the Christian and Theravada understanding of the nature of this-worldly activity, their characterizations of the transformation through which this-worldly activity can be transcended, and their conception of the dynamics of supraworldly attainment.

Within the Christian tradition the understanding of the sources, the forms, and the binding force of this-worldly activity has been closely intertwined with Christian conceptions of God and his relationship to human beings. Among Christians the self-centeredness and willfulness that characterize this-worldly action have been seen to be both the cause and the effect of human beings' rebelliousness against their creator and their resistance to his will. Thus, the most negative and destructive forms of this-worldly activity have been identified as those that derive from or contribute to situations in which human sinfulness has severed even the last remnants of a proper relationship between human beings and the God who is the source of their being. The relatively positive forms of this-worldly activity have been identified as those that derive from or contribute to the preservation or cultivation of certain remnants of a proper understanding and acceptance of the divine will—as it is expressed, for example, in the natural law, in the intimations of conscience, or the like. Moreover, the inability of human beings to make any unaided breakthrough beyond the limitations of this-worldly activity has been associated with their inability to offer, on their own behalf, the kind of compensation that would be necessary in order to restore a proper relationship between themselves and their creator.

Quite naturally Christians have closely correlated their conception of the nature of this-worldly activity with their understanding

of the religious and ethical transformation that leads beyond it. Through the forgiving and reconciling activity accomplished in the life and work of Jesus Christ a proper relationship between God and humanity has, according to the Christian Gospel, been reestablished. And through a responding act of faith and love human beings are able to experience that forgiveness and reconciliation, and to be reborn into a new life of fellowship with him. I hardly need to emphasize that the exact formulation of the interplay between the forgiving action of God in Christ and the human response of faith and love has been a continuing source of controversy among Christian theologians, ethicists, and churchmen through the centuries. However, the basic Christian conviction that both divine initiative and human response are necessary in order to effect the transition from this-worldly activity to supraworldly activity has provided the common ground from which these debates have all proceeded.

These same basic themes appear once again in the Christian notion of supraworldly activity and the process of sanctification. Within the Christian context the life of supraworldly action is a new life in Christ in which a proper relationship with God has been restored; it is, in other words, a life in which human beings enjoy an active fellowship with their creator in his various personae as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It is a life in which God's grace and forgiveness are continually experienced and reexperienced. It is a life in which there is a divinely supported and ever-deepening struggle to root out the remnants of sinful rebelliousness and self-centeredness. It is a life in which the God-willed and Christ-exemplified virtues, such as faith, hope, and love, are cultivated and expressed both through spiritual discipline and moral action. It is a life which has, as its constant accompaniment and final goal, a vision of the Triune Diety in all of its mystery and splendor.

When we turn our attention from the Christian to the Theravada variant of the pattern of contrasting modes of action, the differences are significant, and they appear at every level. Thus, within the Theravada context the sources, the forms, and the limiting force of this-worldly action are definitely not associated with any kind of broken relationship with a creator God, or with any kind of human rebelliousness. On the contrary, Theravadins have located the sources of ordinary human willfulness in the delusion that there is some kind of self at the core of the human person, with the grasping after conditioned objects and goals that this delusion initiates and encourages, and with the hatred toward other sentient

beings that this grasping inevitably generates. The most negative and destructive expressions of this-worldly existence (that is to say, the ones that generate the most negative karmic results for the individual and for society) are, therefore, taken to be those in which the delusion of selfhood, the grasping after conditioned objects and goals, and hatred toward other sentient beings are the most prominent and are given the freest reign. Likewise, the most positive forms of this-worldly activity (for example, adherence to the moral precepts, venerating the Buddha, and the practice of meditation) are those in and through which delusion, grasping, and hatred are most effectively minimized and kept under control. Following this same line, Theravadins have affirmed that it is the inability of ordinary human beings to overcome the triple bonds of delusion, grasping, and hatred that keeps them continually imprisoned within the unsatisfying cycle of karmic rebirth and retribution.

Given the Theravadins' conception of the basic sources and character of this-worldly existence, it is quite obvious that their understanding of the transition to a supraworldly mode of activity can have nothing to do with divine forgiveness or any kind of God-centered conception of faith. Rather, Theravada Buddhists, in their version of the way that the bondage of self-centered and willful action can be transcended, have emphasized the pivotal role, not of faith, but of a visionary insight into the nature of phenomenal reality; more specifically, they have emphasized the role of visionary insight into the absence of any kind of self and into the impermanent character of all conditioned objects or goals. It was the attainment of this kind of visionary insight concerning the selflessness and impermanence of reality that marked—according to the authoritative Theravada accounts—the Buddha's own transition from this-worldly, karmic activity to the practice of the path. And it has been this same visionary insight that has provided—according to the Theravada scriptures and commentaries—the basis for the change of lineage through which others have experienced the same transformation from samsaric bondage to Nibbanic freedom.

From all of this it naturally follows that the Theravada conception of supraworldly action is far removed from any notions of divine grace or communion with a deity.[4] On the contrary, Thera-

[4] This may be an appropriate point to highlight the difference between the kind of comparative approach I have adopted and that recently employed by Mahinda Palihawadana in his excellent article on the question, "Is There a Theravada Idea of Grace?" in *Christian Faith in a Religiously Plural World*, ed. Donald G. Dawe

vadins have identified supraworldly action with the practice of the path that leads to Nibbana. According to the Theravada view, the practice of this path is an effort, on the part of noble beings who have already attained a visionary insight into the truths of selflessness and impermanence, to realize the full fruits of this insight through the further discipline of the body and mind. It involves a resultant, but nevertheless utterly spontaneous, arising of a series of moments of Nibbanic consciousness: moments that are experientially sublime and that serve, in addition, progressively to destroy the residual elements of delusion, grasping, and hatred that have persisted from the practitioner's karmic past.[5] In tandem with this process of sanctification—a process that moves forward in a well-charted series of eight stages that run from the stage of the stream-winner to the stage of the arhat or fully perfected saint[6]—the practitioner also cultivates other meditative powers and social virtues that are in accord with his own particular capacities and temperament.[7] Once this noble path has been fully traversed—and it is worth noting that Theravadins have

and John B. Carmen (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1978), pp. 181–95. Palihawadana, who teaches Sanskrit at the University of Sri Lanka, argues that the Christian notion of grace and the Theravada notion of the path address the same fundamental problem—namely, the natural bondage of the human will—but offer different soteriological solutions. Though I find that Palihawadana's work confirms several of my own conclusions, I differ with him on one very basic point. Whereas he maintains that in Christianity and Theravada Buddhism the problem is the same while the solution differs, I believe that there are similarities and differences both at the level of the problem and solution. In this connection I would argue that the form which the problem takes and the form of the solution that is given to it arise (to borrow for my own purposes a classic Buddhist concept) "co-dependently."

[5] The relation between the self-effort that is exerted by those who practice the path and the utter spontaneity of the arising of the moment of Nibbanic consciousness constitute a difficult problem which we cannot examine here. However, it should be noted that the stereotyped emphasis that neglects the element of spontaneity is not in accord with the testimony of the texts. For a discussion, see Palihawadana.

[6] These eight stages include two identified with the "stream winner," two identified with the "once-returner," two identified with the non-returner," and two identified with the arhat, or fully perfected saint.

[7] An estimate of the importance that Theravadins have traditionally given to the cultivation of extraordinary powers and positive virtues by those who have entered into the path involves a number of very complex and delicate questions. Certainly many Theravadins have emphasized that those who practice the path should and do cultivate such powers and virtues. However, it is also true that most of the authoritative Theravada manuals do not focus attention on this point and that many Theravada interpreters have maintained that, under certain conditions at least, such cultivation may serve as a threat rather than an appropriate supplement to the process of purification. Moreover, Mahayana Buddhists have often criticized those who practice the Theravada path for their presumed neglect of the positive virtues, most notably the virtue of compassion. This whole set of issues is too complex to be dealt with here; but I plan to return to it in a future study.

recognized that this may, for some individuals, take several lifetimes to accomplish—the practitioner arrives at the absolute pinnacle of Theravada experience. According to Theravada testimony, noble beings eventually reach a point at which even the last remnants of delusion, grasping, and hatred have been utterly rooted out and destroyed. At this point they realize, in a way that is claimed to be totally unobstructed and unfettered, the uncreated, ineffable, and infinitely satisfying goal of Nibbana.

"SOCIAL LOCATION" AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

In our discussion thus far we have, I trust, made a certain amount of progress in generating valid and significant comparisons between classical Christian ethics and traditional Theravada ethics. However, the identification of a common religioethical pattern and the investigation of the similarities and differences between the Christian and Theravada expressions of that pattern have not yielded the full comparative story. What is more, these procedures would not be sufficient for the task even if similarities and differences of this kind were to be spelled out in the greatest possible detail. Therefore, in order to round out our comparative effort it is necessary to turn our attention to the third crucial aspect of the situation to which I alluded in my introduction—namely, to the distinctive ways that Christians and Theravada Buddhists have established what I call the "social locations" of their two contrasting modes of activity.

In both the Christian and the Theravada traditions the locations attributed to the contrasting modes of action have played a fundamental role in structuring communal life and in establishing communal boundaries. Within the Christian context the division between the two contrasting modes of action has been correlated—ideally at least—with the division between the Christian community and non-Christians. In Theravada Buddhism, the two modes of action have been correlated—again at the level of the ideal—with the division between the Theravada monastic community (the *sangha*) and all others, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, who stand outside it. This has meant that the Christian tradition has established a basically dual perspective in which Christians practicing a supraworldly mode of action have been distinguished from non-Christians involved in this-worldly activity. On the other hand, it has meant that Theravadins have established a basically tripartite perspective in which the members of the monastic order have been associated with the practice of supraworldly action, the Buddhist

laity with specifically Buddhist forms of this-worldly activity, and non-Buddhists with ordinary forms of this-worldly activity.

In the face of the practical realities that the two traditions have faced in the course of their history, both of these perspectives have been modified by the inclusion of an additional category. Both Christians and Theravadins have been forced to recognize that the community that has been associated with supraworldly action has, in fact, come to include many members whose actual life does not embody the ideal which they affirmed when they entered it (in the Christian case through baptism coupled in some cases with confirmation, in the Theravada case through ordination). Thus, very early in their history the Christians developed a more complete perspective which recognized and located three types of action: (1) the supraworldly action of the members of the *ecclesia in ecclesiola* who truly manifested the Christian life of faith and love; (2) the ambiguous action of "worldly Christians" who, though they had accepted the Christian faith and lived within the Christian community, continued for the time being to behave "carnally"; and (3) the worldly action of those who remained outside the Christian fold (see fig. 1*a*).[8] Similarly, the Theravadins developed a more complete perspective which recognized and located four types of action: (1) the supraworldly action of the noble beings actually engaged in the practice of the eight-staged path; (2) the ambiguous action of "worldly" monks who, though they had been ordained and lived within the communal discipline of the order, continued for the time being to act within the confines of the karmic bondage; (3) the Buddhist form of this-worldly action practiced by committed Buddhist laymen; and (4) the worldly action of those not associated with Buddhism[9] (see fig. 1*b*).

The Christian and Buddhist ways of locating the two contrasting modes of action have had profound ecclesiastical and social implications. In Christianity the fact that the basic initiatory ritual separated Christians from non-Christians and that this ritual, symbolically at least, marked the transition from this-worldly life to the life of supraworldly action led to an essentially unitary view of the Christian church. As we have seen, distinctions were made between those who, despite their symbolic transformation and entrance into the faith, continued to be involved in carnal activities rather than in a life of love. Distinctions were also made between Christians who were "babes" in the faith and those who had achieved higher levels of Christian maturity. Moreover, distinctions were often drawn between various kinds of Christian vocations and life-styles. Thus, many Christian communities evaluated the life-styles associated with laymen, ordained clergy, and monastics of various types in a clearly hierarchical manner. However, the classical Christian presumption has always been that all members of the Christian community have been set free from the bondage of sin and been reborn in Christ; therefore, it has been maintained that, despite the wide variety of Christian attainments and life-styles, the Church remains, in its essence, a unitary community constituted by those who share common access to grace and sanctification.[10]

This same Christian tendency to see some element of supraworldliness in all authentically Christian activity, lay as well as monastic, has had a profound effect on Christian engagement with the social order. Because of this tendency, Christians who have been concerned with the establishment and maintenance of a Christian society have been forced to move in one of two directions. Either they have found it necessary to make uneasy theological as well as practical compromises in order to deal with the this-worldly aspects of social life, or they have been driven in the direction of utopian experiments in which the social community has been called upon to realize an essentially other-worldly ideal. Christians have undertaken both kinds of efforts in many different historical and cultural contexts, and in some cases (for example, Augustine's effort to relate the two kingdoms) have hit upon solutions that have had great intellectual power and remarkable historical influence. Nevertheless, the religious and ethical adequacy of these efforts and their results have remained very live issues for discussion and controversy. In this situation there has developed a kind

[8] It is possible to identify still another type of specifically Christian action—namely, supraworldly action practiced by those who are outside the church (note, for example, Calvin's notion of the elect who are not associated with the institutional church). However, this type of action was in most instances not highlighted, and its inclusion in the present discussion would complicate the discussion without affecting the basic argument.

[9] It is possible to identify still another type of specifically Buddhist action—namely, supraworldly action carried on by those, including laymen, who have become bodhisattvas (see, for example, Frank Reynolds, "Four Modes of Theravada Action," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 7, no. 1 [Spring 1979]: 12–27). However, bodhisattva action is not emphasized in the Theravada texts, and its inclusion in the present discussion would complicate the discussion without affecting the basic argument.

[10] I am well aware of certain medieval Catholic exceptions, but I am nevertheless convinced that this unitary conception of the church has been dominant in Christian ecclesiology from New Testament times to the present. For a review of relevant materials and a defense of this thesis, see Kenneth Kirk, *Vision of God: The Christian Doctrine of the Summum Bonum*, Bampton Lectures for 1928 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1932).

CLASSICAL CHRISTIANITY



FIG. 1*a*.—Classical Christianity

of interaction between Christian communal ideals and Christian societies that has, on certain occasions at least, been both disruptive and creative.

A third major effect of the tendency to see some element of supraworldliness in all authentically Christian activity has been the creation of a certain distance and even tension between the church and those who stand outside it. There have quite obviously been countervailing influences that have been generated by other Christian teachings, for example, those concerning God's love for all human beings, the universal implications of Christ's saving activity, and the continuing presence of sinfulness within the Church. Nevertheless, the fact that those within the church have been distinguished from those outside it both because they are Christians and because, sacramentally at least, they have undergone a definitive soteriological transformation, has had its impact. This focus on a single, all-important boundary line has sharpened the Christian sense of separateness, on the one hand, and intensified the Christian concern for evangelism, on the other.

Turning from the Christian to the Theravada case, the situation is quite different, primarily because within their fourfold structure of religious and ethical possibilities, the Theravadins have recognized a specifically Buddhist mode of action that is unambiguously

TRADITIONAL THERAVADA BUDDHISM



FIG. 1*b*.—Traditional Theravada Buddhism

this-worldly.[11] Thus, for example, the Theravada community has never conceived of itself as a unitary community bound together by the common soteriological experience of those who participate in it. Quite to the contrary, the Theravada community has traditionally been divided into two quite distinct groups. The first group has been the order of monks (and in some cases nuns as well) which symbolically and ritually represents the spiritual elite that has actually entered into the practice of the path. The second group has been the laity, whose gift-giving and other merit-making activities are identified as specifically Buddhist forms of this-worldly activity. To be sure, Theravadins have been quite explicit about the fact that most members of the monastic order have not in actual fact undergone an experiential change of lineage, and that path attainment is, at least theoretically, open to laymen as well as to monks. Nevertheless, Theravadins have, for well over two millennia, maintained a highly distinctive form of communal life which presumes that the well-being and unity of the community depends on the coexistence of two soteriologically contrasting

[11] In certain contexts, the statement that the Theravadins have recognized a Buddhist mode of action that is unambiguously this-worldly would have to be qualified. For example, several Buddhologically oriented historians of religion (notably John Strong, Lowell Bloss, and John Holt) are presently carrying forward research which indicates that this-worldly merit-making activities are often associated experiences which provide, at the very least, intimations of Nibbana. However, the necessary qualifications are of such a character that they would not affect the thrust of the present argument.

modes of action embodied in the monastic community, on the one hand, and the laity, on the other. Moreover, theirs is a form of communal life that is continually being constituted and reconstituted through the maintenance of proper relationships and exchanges between monastic practitioners and their lay supporters.[12]

A second implication of the fact that Theravadins have recognized a Buddhist mode of thoroughly this-worldly action appears in the area of Theravada engagement with society. In contrast with socially and politically oriented Christians, Theravadins with similar interests have not been forced to make uneasy compromises or to espouse some form of social utopianism. Rather, Theravadins with social and political interests have been able to operate within a sphere of religious and ethical activity that is recognized as being both thoroughly this-worldly and authentically Buddhist. Thus, they have been able to develop and implement social conceptions and forms that have been widely accepted within the Theravada community at the same time that they have been effectively adapted to the limitations imposed by the this-worldly aspects of social and political life. Without question, the establishment of doctrinally acceptable Theravada social ideals that have been unambiguously this-worldly in character has contributed to a generally supportive but, for the most part, rather stable relationship between Theravada Buddhism and traditional Theravada societies.[13]

A third implication of the fact that Theravadins have recognized a specifically Buddhist mode of this-worldly action appears in the character and tonality of the relationships that have developed between Theravadins and those who stand outside the Theravada tradition. In contrast with the Christian situation in which the confessional distinction has been sharpened by its correlation with the most basic ritual and soteriological division, Theravadins have recognized that most of the members of their community share a thoroughly this-worldly mode of existence with those who do not participate. This recognition of a shared mode of existence between

[12] For a fuller discussion of the Theravada form of dual community and its social implications, see Frank E. Reynolds and Regina T. Clifford, "Sangha, State and the Struggle for National Integration," in *Transitions and Transformations in the History of Religions: Essays in Honor of Joseph M. Kitagawa*, ed. Frank Reynolds and Theodore Ludwig (suppl. to *Numen* 39) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980).

[13] This statement should not be taken as affirming a static view of Theravada Buddhist history as a whole. (Such a view, as I have tried to show in a variety of other contexts, would be mistaken.) The point is, rather, that when set alongside Christianity, Theravada Buddhism has exhibited a less critical and less "prophetic" attitude toward the structures of Theravada society and has, as a result, generated fewer moves toward structural social reform.

the laity and those outside the tradition has contributed to a high degree of fluidity and flexibility concerning communal boundaries. It is true that Theravadins have always presumed that the ordinary members of their community do have, by virtue of their participation, a clear soteriological advantage over those who are not Buddhists. Moreover, in certain situations—especially when their tradition has been under attack—Theravadins have strongly accented the particularities of the Theravada style of life, even among the laity. But when the whole range of Theravada history is surveyed, it becomes apparent that the explicit recognition that the majority of Theravadins are themselves entangled in an unambiguously this-worldly mode of existence has served to blur the boundaries that separate participants from nonparticipants and to establish broad areas of common religious and ethical involvement.

CONCLUSION

With this discussion, then, our task is basically completed. We have identified a common religioethical pattern of contrasting modes of action which has played a central role in both classical Christianity and traditional Theravada Buddhism. And in so doing we have highlighted one major source of the religious and ethical affinity between the two traditions that has long been sensed by many Christians, by many Theravadins, and by at least a few historians of religion. We have gone on to delineate the very weighty, substantive differences that have characterized the Christian and Theravada ways of understanding and expressing the two modes of action, as well as the transition that leads from the one to the other. We have contrasted the Christian conception of sin-tainted this-worldly action with the Theravada conception of karmic activity. We have gone on to contrast the Christian understanding of faith in God and his redeeming activity with the Theravada understanding of enlightened insight into the selflessness and impermanence of reality. Finally, we have contrasted the Christian notion of the sanctified life of grace and the vision of God with the Theravada notion of the practice of the path and the attainment of Nibbana. Thus, we have balanced the first phase of our comparative account by calling attention to certain very basic and intractable differences that distinguish the two traditions.

We have then proceeded to identify and compare the social locations associated with the contrasting modes of action in the Christian and Theravada contexts. We have shown that the social

locations given to this-worldly and supraworldly activity in Christianity have supported a unitary conception of the Church, while the differing social locations of the two modes of action in Theravada Buddhism have supported a dual conception of the religious community in which wholeness is achieved through an ongoing process of material and spiritual exchange and reciprocity (the relevant connections and disjunctions are highlighted in row 1 in figs. 1*a* and 1*b*). We have shown that the social locations that have been given to the contrasting modes of action in Christianity have contributed to a more tensive and occasionally even dynamic relationship between Christianity and Christian societies, whereas the social locations of the two modes of action in Theravada Buddhism have contributed to a more consistently stable and supportive relationship between Theravada religion and traditional Theravada societies (the relevant connections and disjunctions are highlighted in row 2 in figs. 1*a* and 1*b*). And we have shown that the social locations that have been given to the two modes of action in Christianity have sharpened the dividing line between Christians and non-Christians, whereas the social locations of the two modes of action in Theravada Buddhism have tended to blur the distinction between those who stand within the tradition and those who stand outside it (see the connections and disjunctions highlighted in row 3 in figs. 1*a* and 1*b*).

Having thus completed the agenda that was established at the outset, it now may be appropriate to reflect on what we have tried to accomplish. We have tried to generate an intellectual context within which more extended, detailed, and content-centered comparisons between classical Christian and traditional Theravada ethics might be pursued. We have also tried to establish a historical basis from which a more sophisticated comparison of contemporary Christian and Theravada ethics might proceed. And, finally, we have made some points that might possibly stimulate new ways of thinking among contemporary Christians and Theravadins who are actually engaged in the formation of normative ethical positions. However, I am very much aware—and I am quite sure that those who are involved in Buddhist and Christian studies will concur—that I have raised more questions and problems than I have resolved. I can only hope that, given the present condition of the field of comparative religious ethics, this will be taken as a virtue rather than a sin.

University of Chicago

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BUDDHIST TANTRIC HEALING

for the meeting at Hunsur, Karnataka

January, 1998

(by Alex Wayman)

First we must distinguish what is here termed "Buddhist Tantric Healing" from ordinary healing. The ordinary healing is represented textually in Tibetan Buddhism by two famous texts--one canonical: Vāgbhaṭa's *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya*, the other called briefly *Rgyud bzhi*. The Vāgbhaṭa work was translated into German from the original Sanskrit by the Sanskritist Kirfel collaborating with a German lady physician Hilgenberg.[1] The other text, *Rgyud bzhi*, is being made available in English with Sanskrit and Tibetan terms by Vaidya Bhagwan Dash, promised in 15 volumes, with Vol. I appearing in 1994,[2] with further volumes being published by this prolific scholar.

The opening sentence of *Rgyud bzhi* presents a Sanskrit title *Amṛta-hṛdaya-aṣṭāṅga-guhyopadeśa-tantra*, with Tibetan translation--as though supporting Dash's contention that this large, valuable work was translated from Sanskrit. However, Bu-ston, when editing the Kanjur and Tanjur, rejected certain texts from canonical inclusion, concluding that these particular texts were really composed in Tibetan, with Sanskrit and Tibetan titles easily applied, since various Tibetans had studied in India, and Indian Buddhist pandits came to Tibet. Thus, the Sanskrit title does not itself prove a translation from Sanskrit--it is rather a decision based on the content. For example, there are the medicinal plants, which usually differ on the floor of India from those of Tibet which is mostly high up, although some plants are shared. Dash mentions (Vol. I, p. xviii), "It describes the use of medicinal plants which grow in India and not exclusively in Tibet or its neighbouring countries." This information, plus the āyurvedic terminology, supports Dash's theory of an Indian origin, but does not prove an Indian origin for the entire

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[1] *Vāgbhaṭa's Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā*, tr. [into German] by Luise Hilgenberg and Willibald Kirfel (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1941).

[2] Vaidya Bhagwan Dash, *Encyclopaedia of Tibetan Medicine*, Vol. I. (*Rtsa Rgyud* or *Mūla Tantra* (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1994).

text. Thus, the *Rgyud bzhi* may have started with translation of a text in Sanskrit, which was then expanded with Tibetan and Mongolian medical data.

As to the terms *guhya* and *tantra* in that title ascribed to the *Rgyud bzhi*, first take the term *tantra*, Tib. *rgyud*. I do not object to Dash's rendition as a 'treatise', hence four of them. In a literal sense, the term *tantra* has many meanings in Indian literature, while the Tibetan translation *rgyud* narrows the meaning inclusion to such as 'cord', 'connection', 'continuity'. In such senses, the first volume contains the 'cords' and the 'connections', which will be lengthened and connected to in the subsequent volumes of the series, namely four basic kinds of them. But the use of the term *tantra* here is not that of the Buddhist Tantra that occupies much space in the canonical collections called Kanjur and Tanjur. One can see this difference by this text's use of the name Bhaiṣajya-guru, a medicinal role adopted by the Buddha for teaching the medicinal subject matter of the text. In contrast, as shall be shown below, in Buddhist Tantra a yogi can (i.e. if able to) identify himself with Bhaiṣajya-guru, and then perform healing functions for others. As to the term *guhya*, it seems to apply here to the ability of a few specialists (in comparison with the populace which depends on them for medical advice) to know the secret properties of plants, etc. for healing purposes. The term *guhya* here does not mean the same as the *guhya* in the title of a well-known Buddhist Tantra work, the *Guhyasamāja-tantra*, on which I put out a work years ago.[3] The term *guhya* in this latter Tantra, as will be also shown below, implies the deliberately secret, so that the basic text needs a commentary (or more) to be understood.

Finally, for this necessary difference of non-tantric healing from the tantric kind which I shall attempt to explain below, we should mention that there is a growing Western literature on Tibetan medicine. Only one of these works needs now to be mentioned. It is the informative book on Tibetan medicine by

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[3] Alex Wayman, *Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra; The Arcane Lore of Forty Verses* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971, reprinted 1980, 1991).

Rechung Rinpoche.[4] In short, in non-tantric medicine, a physician is consulted to suggest medicines, which might work as hoped. Also, non-tantric medicine has a premise that the physical body is real, and it is this body which is treated.

Tantric healing has a premise that there is a subtle body with centers called *cakra*, which if four in number are at the base of the spine, at the navel, the heart, and in the neck. If increased in number, there is one in the center of the forehead, and one at the crown of the head; and these centers are taken for granted in tantric healing. I should also cite a paragraph from an earlier essay:[5] "Tantrism regards man as a microcosm with correspondences to different orders of nature. It sets the old three personal poisons of Buddhism--lust, hatred, and delusion--into correspondence with the three external poisons--the two described in classical Indian medical texts which are the 'stable' (or stationary) poison (e.g. from roots of vegetables) and the 'mobile' (or moving) poison (e.g. from snakes among animals), plus a third category 'concocted' (produced from such things as quicksilver, precious metals, and ambrosia [*amṛta*])--to wit, 'delusion' with the 'stable' one, 'hatred' with the 'mobile' one, and 'lust' with the 'concocted', perhaps with 'lust' regarded as creative. Besides, Tibetan medicine theory relates those three personal poisons to the disease-causing imbalances of the three physiological doṣa's [whose English renditions are inaccurate][6]--lust promoting too much 'wind' (*vāta*), hatred the 'bile' (*pitta*), and delusion the 'phlegm' (*kapha*, or *śleṣma*)."[7]

What all forms of healing have in common--whether claimed just for the physical body, or claimed to involve the subtle body--is a premise that the

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[4] *Tibetan Medicine*, presented and translated by the Ven. Rechung Rinpoche Jampal Kunzang (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

[5] Alex Wayman, "Buddhist Tantric Medicine Theory on Behalf of Oneself and Others," *Kailash*, Vol. I, No. 2 (1973), p. 153.

[6] Cf. Alex Wayman, "'Words for Fire' in Dpal-'dsin Sde's *Abhidhānaśāstra*, *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung*, Vol. XLIV (1-2) (1990), p. 244, note, re my Introduction to the English translation of *Carakasaṃhitā*, Vol. I, by Ram Karan Sharma and Vaidya Bhagavan Dash, Varanasi, 1971, defending their leaving untranslated the triad of vāta, pitta, and kapha.

[7] Wayman (note 5, above), p. 153, note 1, for addition of a third category 'concocted', and for associating the three psychological poisons with the three physiological 'faults'.

healing method keeps an illness from getting worse, thus encouraging the bodily resources to work toward curing what remains of the illness. For example, if a baseball athlete is hit somewhere by a baseball, a cold pack is generally applied to the place, which does not completely heal the blow-effect, but keeps it from getting worse, and then the body is supposed to do the rest of the healing process.

After that introduction to both kinds of medicine, we can turn to Buddhist Tantric healing, which ordinarily requires the ability to go into a *samādhi*, or deep concentration, especially by identification with a divinity, such as the healing Buddha, so that one may become a healer thereby, or possibly heal oneself. Various Buddhist Tantras contain sections, or perhaps a single verse, that describes the healing process according to the particular Tantra. Now, it is well known that the Buddhist Tantras are divided canonically into four groups, called Kriyā-tantra, Caryā-tantra, Yoga-tantra, and Anuttarayoga-tantra. The difference between these four classes is described briefly in an abstract to an article in Hindi, namely, that the Kriyā Tantras stress external action; the Caryā types, meditation on *paramārtha-satya* with appropriate acts; the Yoga types avoiding external acts and meditating on the Tattva; finally, the Anuttarayoga-Tantra for those attracted to non-dual knowledge.[8] Mkhas-grub-rje has more accurate information in his *Rgyud-sde-spyi-rnam*, which Lessing and I many years ago translated.[9] I myself am aware of tantric-type healing from texts of the Kriyā-, Caryā-, and Anuttarayoga-tantra. And it will be of interest to take account of the extent to which these passages agree with the differences attributed to these Tantra classes. Briefly speaking, Mkhas-grub-rje shows that there is much in common between the Kriyā and the Caryā Tantras. He takes from a Kriyā Tantra

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[8] *Dhīh*, Journal of Rare Buddhist Texts Research Project, issue 20 (Sarnath, 1995), essay by Ṭhākurasena Nego, abstract at p. 160-1.

[9] First published as *Mkhas Grub Rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras*, tr. from Tibetan by Ferdinand D. Lessing and Alex Wayman (with original text and annotation) (The Hague: Mouton, 1968): and reprinted as F. Lessing & A. Wayman, *Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric Systems* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978).

(5)

work *Dhyānottara* (cf. the tr., pp. 137-8) a list of ten kinds of subject matter, and mentions that the three, namely, 2. The Self Reality, 3. The Reality of the *vidyā-dhāraṇī*, 4. The Reality of the God, show the four members of recitation that are of great importance in both the Kriyā and Caryā Tantras. Since these practices in both Tantra classes involve generation of a deity in front, this shows in both cases the use of external things. At tr., p. 217, Mkhas-grub-rje, mentions that in the Yoga-tantra there is a merger of action (*karma*) and agent (*kāraka*). At tr., p. 251, we learn that the Yoga-tantra and the Anuttarayoga-tantra have in common what is called *yoga-tantra* as contrasted with *yoginī-tantra*, also what is called--especially in the Anuttarayoga case--'Father' Tantras as contrasted with 'Mother' Tantras. And at tr., p. 259, we learn that the Anuttarayoga Tantras of all kinds aim at the inseparability of Beatitude and Void (*sukha-śūnya*). The foregoing should suffice for the necessary background for the Buddhist tantric theory of healing. Now for individual passages related to the Tantra classes.

The Kriyā-tantra class has a large work entitled *Mañjuśrī-mūla-tantra* which contains in its 15th chapter,[10] following the initial prose, a series of verses that pertain to healing and involving the three physiological 'faults' (*doṣa*) alluded to above, where I shall employ the inaccurate English renditions with individual quote marks, 'wind', etc. The text employs the night division of four watches (*yāma*), and since dreams in these watches provide illness prognostics, it is of interest that the Greek philosopher Aristotle claimed that diseases show up in dreams before any other method of determining their likelihood. The very first verse of our text claims that any dream in the first watch of the night arises from 'phlegm'; in the second one, from 'bile'; in the third one, from 'wind'; in the fourth one, from truth (*satya*). The next few verses then give typical dreams of the first three watches; then relates the three psychological defilements (lust, hatred, and delusion) to the three 'faults'--as I gave above; then goes into morbidities by dint of the three defilements. The verses then go into seeing the 'true dream' in the fourth watch of the night, hence just before awakening.

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[10] I employ the edition *ĀryaMañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, ed. by T. Ganapati Sāstrī (Trivandrum, Government Press, 1920), Part I.

Thus, it must be this fourth watch which gives the prognostic of illness, and so of which illness is due to a morbid surge of one or other of the three 'faults' (*doṣa*). This text, still the 15th chapter, then goes into the method of dispelling bad dreams, by reciting mantras, and so on. There is no space to go into these complications here. It follows that the theory shows that at one time there were probably specialists who could relate various dream symbols of the last watch of the night to certain morbid afflictions, and who could prescribe various tantric machinations designed to counteract such bad portents. This chapter preserves much of the basic theory, but would require much more information from other sources to convey what is going on, and to be convincingly practical. For example, the chapter goes into the theory of the planets and the lunar mansions, each of which in traditional accounts was associated with a food, which by present information implicates a dream auspice. It follows that it would require an extensive research to explicate the wide-spread implications. In any case, that an interpreter is necessary to figure out someone else's dream prognostics seems to go well with the Kriyā-tantra.

Passing to the Caryā-tantra type of text, here the present author has put out a work on what is considered the principal Carya-tantra, namely what is called the *Vairocanābhisambodhitantra* in the Tibetan canon, and called the *Mahāvairocanasūtra* in the Sino-Japanese canonical traditions.[11] This work by myself and Tajima has several instances of healing. Thus, p. 166, five syllables are associated with the five elements: A--earth; VA--water; RA--fire; HA--wind; KHA--space. Then I take from Buddhaguhya's commentary the remarkable theory that one can combine these elements, with one in charge, as indicated by its respective syllable. Then, using that wonderful commentary, I reported: "Thus, for curing the illness of another, the performer imagines that his 'A' using wind (i.e. breath) passes from his body into the body of the other person. In particular, he imagines that his breath and the breath of the other person mingle and become unified. Or he imagines that the 'A' coming from the feet [because associated

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[11] Alex Wayman and R. Tajima, *The Enlightenment of Vairocana* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992).

with earth] pervades the series of eye and other sense organs." I then added my interpretation that for various curative methods assumed for the system, one uses this 'A' along with the 'water', 'fire', or 'wind'. In fact, as mentioned same page, the performer may only succeed in this during the sixth month after having performed the preliminary service during the previous five months. Also, the manner in which this type of healing is expressed indicates that the type of healing mentioned in my article where the preceptor identifies himself/herself with Bhaiṣajya-guru[12] in order to heal someone else is a practice belonging to the Caryā-tantra. Using data from the notes of F. D. Lessing, who observed the cult in China,[13] I added: "Only when the performer is identified with this Lord of Healing can he be expected to be successful in the healing attempt. In case of sickness, the officiant blows upon the holy water, sprinkles the patient with it, and throws the mustard seeds one by one. They change into dharmapālas (protectors of the faith) and expel the demons of illness. This act is done three times. A fire is kindled in which *gu-gul* is strewn to send the demons into flight."[14]

The same Vairocana scripture is cited from its Chap. XXIII (no. in Tibetan canon), while Buddhaguhya's commentary is numbered Chap. XX. The scripture states (our p. 183): "Master of the Secret ones, it is like this: When a person happens to be feverish, there is no doubt that by contemplating a *maṇḍala* in his mind he would be rid of the fever." Buddhaguhya explains: "When the head is feverish, a water-*maṇḍala* is prescribed for the top of it. One must think of a flask with mouth turned downwards, from which comes an ambrosial fluid, imagined to enter the head and continue further downward. In the case of an illness to the face, there is no doubt that it is alleviated by imagining

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[12] Wayman, note 5, above, pp. 157-8.

[13] He made these observations during his sojourn in China probably in the 1920's. I was his assistant (and collaborator) at the University of California, Berkeley, during the 1950's.

[14] Dr. Lessing noted that guggulu is bdellium or the exudation of amyris agallochum, a fragrant gum resin, used as a perfume and medicament.

an earth-*maṇḍala* there. When one is afflicted by a chill and shivering, one should imagine the fire-*maṇḍala*. As in the other cases, one should imagine that the element-circle pervades the entire body. The *maṇḍala* is the same as an element characteristic, e.g. of fire. The mind and the element-*maṇḍala* must be inseparable." I should mention that by *maṇḍala* of elements is meant forms depicted in our text, p. 164, the square, circle, triangle, half-moon, bowl with surmounting triangle vertices, starting with the feet and ending just over the head, and explained there.

Finally for this Vairocana scripture, there is the practice using the 100 syllables, set forth on our p. 163, where we learn that 20 of the syllables are recited during each of five months, presumably making the practitioner able to apply the healing in the sixth month. On our pp. 186-7, the note 26, I cite information by Padmavajrāṅkuśa, his treatise *Śatākṣara-vidhi* [on the ritual of the 100 syllables] in the Tibetan Tanjur: "When one is struck by severe illness, plague, enemies, and fights; by mischief, harm, and shadows (generally), one should recite the hundred syllables. When there are the deeds of Māra, one draws the hundred letters; having applied them to a banner, one whirls (it) in all directions." I added: "The difference appears to go with troubles due to human agency (*puruṣakāra*) to be countered by recitation, and troubles due to spirits or divinities (*daiva*) to be countered by inscribed letters." This concludes our data from the Caryā-tantra.

Now for the Anuttarayoga-tantra. Years ago, when preparing a synthetic biography in English from several biographies of Tsong-kha-pa (1357-1419 A.D.) --the celebrated founder of the Gelugpa sect of Tibet--it included the following passage:[15]

At Skyor-mo-luṅ college in Central Tibet after listening to the

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[15] The passage was first included in my essay of note 5, above, p. 154. Subsequently, it was part of the synthetic biography of Tsong-kha-pa which I presented within my Introduction to the first edition of my translation from this author's *Lam rim chen mo* the part under the title *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 18-9.

(9)

instruction, he memorized in 17 days the great commentary on Guṇaprabha's *Vinayasūtra*. But this effort apparently brought on a fierce ailment in the upper part of his body, from which he was not relieved for a long time, despite prescriptions from specialists. It hung on for over a year, including eleven months of study with Red-mda'-pa at Sa-skya, where he also listened to the Sa-skya interpretation (sa-lugs) of the *Hevajra-tantra*. Then he took a prescription from a friend at Sa-skya who was versed in incantations (*mantra*). He recited several times a neuter HA and the former ailment left without a trace.

Later on,[16] I happened to notice in Tsong-kha-pa's commentary called *Sbas-don* on the Mother Tantra *Śrī-Cakrasaṃvara-tantra*, a section on treating illness by tantric means that might explain this 'neuter HA'. Whether it does or not, it is worthwhile to translate this section from Tibetan under its given heading:[17]

Pacification of illnesses by recourse to mantras and mystic circles (*cakra*).

After that explanation of casting the prognostic, I shall explain the method of effecting the rite by mantras of the seven syllables[18] constituting the upahṛdaya (near-heart length incantation), of the Hero Heruka and by the various

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[16] The following translation from Tsong-kha-pa's *Sbas don* commentary is given in my essay, note 5, above, pp. 154-157, which was accompanied by two diagrams (Counterclockwise and Clockwise, adapted from pictures found in the Tantric part of the Tibetan Tanjur).

[17] Translated from the *Sbas don* commentary in the Peking Tibetan Tripitaka (PTT), i.e. the Japanese photo edition, Vol. 157, p. 78-5 to p. 79-1.

[18] The Laghutantra (fundamental tantra) of the *Śrī-Cakrasaṃvara-tantra* (PTT, Vol. 2, p. 29-5) gives the seven syllables in the order Ṭaph Pha Hūṃ Hūṃ Ha Ha Hrīḥ Oṃ because this Tantra uses the left [or counterclockwise] orientation. Tsong-kha-pa's commentary of Chap. 12 is on the saptākṣara (seven syllables) and explains (PTT, Vol. 157, p. 39-3) that the syllables are pronounced in the order Oṃ Hrīḥ Ha Ha Hūṃ Phaṭ, arranged leftwise on a lotus, while the other Hūṃ belongs to the lord Heruka. Notice that the Lord's Hūṃ, in the center, or heart, is constantly pronounced.

dispositions of them in cakras (circles).

(1) He disposes the upahṛdaya of HA, etc. in the middle of a solar disk, either concretely by drawing or mentally by contemplation. Then he should imagine that the illness is in the middle of this, and should recite the upahṛdaya up to a thousand times by lengthened utterance (Tib. spel tshig).[19] He contemplates on his left hand the syllables of mantra in the appearance of crystal; and when it is revealed to the sick person suffering from an illness, no sooner is the hand seen, than the illness is entirely destroyed. Of this there is no doubt.

(2) Many of the commentaries on this point assert that if one contemplates in the heart of the one to be cured (*sādhya*) his perceiving faculty (*vijñāna*) the measure of a thumb and with the appearance of pure crystal, that one is freed from the illness. So one should pay heed to that explanation.[20]

(3) One contemplates a moon disk like the moon of autumn. In the middle of this moon one makes five sections (*koṣṭhaka*) by four directions and the middle; and by adding four in the intermediate directions, one arranges a total of nine sections. In its center one disposes an OṂ, in the east the HRĪḤ, south HA, west HA, north HŪṂ. Also in the center, HŪṂ; a PHAṬ in the four intermediate directions or four PHA-s, leaving out the Ṭ. When the letters appear white like the color of crystal, the bright circle dispels all illnesses. And the one to be cured contemplates on his left hand the circle located in the

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[19] *Spel tshig*, as defined in the native Tibetan dictionary by Geshe Chos Grags, seems to mean expansion into phrases and longer, i.e. that the upahṛdaya is repeated making, so to say, phrases, sentences, paragraphs.

[20] It is striking to identify the Buddhist *vijñāna* with the 'thumb-soul' which the old Upaniṣads locate in the heart.

middle.

(4) One contemplates as placed in his head the holder of the stable and mobile poisons; that from it (i.e. his head) a stream of ambrosia flows, ridding the entire body of poison. Thus it is freed from poison.

(5) Likewise, whatever the illnesses of plagues, demonic possession, and so on; from stable and mobile poisons; of fainting spells, aches, sores, and so on; of leprosy, from poison fangs, and so on; and whatever the illnesses other than those mentioned, all of them without doubt are purged when one arranges the seven syllables on the form of the moon, and as imagined on the left hand are manifested to the one suffering with illness. When one contemplates that the rays of those mantra syllables arise with the nature of ambrosia, and purge and put to flight in the ten directions of east, etc., then one dispels the poison.

In my synthetic biography of Tsong-kha-pa as published I also included this passage from the latter part of his life:[21] "Then in his fifty-seventh year (A.D. 1413) a serious illness threatened his life. He performed extensive Yantras (occult machinations) of Śrī-Vajrabhairava [a Father Tantra] as a means of increasing the length of his life and warding off dangers. In the morning he would perform the 'prosperity' recitation-contemplation; and in the evening, the 'warding off' recitation-contemplation. After this practice had been repeated many times his body displayed a radiance; the illness cleared up, at least temporarily, and the danger was averted. After that, he put the ācārya Dar-ma-rin-chen in charge of the clergy of the sect [known as the Gelugpa]." The biography goes on, including that he was still able to compose some of his greatest works. Thus, in 1418, his commentary on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*; and in 1419 (the last year of his life) his great commentary *Sbas don* on the *Śrī-Cakrasaṃvara-tantra*,

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[21] See note 15, above, for the work translated from the *Lam rim chen mo*, now. p. 24.

that was cited above. Almost to the last day of his life he was able to preach both tantric and non-tantric doctrines to laymen and townspeople as well as to monks. This shows that the Buddhist tantric healing practices were able to preserve the clarity and memory going with mental functions, as well as his speaking ability.

As to Tsong-kha-pa's morning practice of the 'prosperity' ritual, and his evening practice of the 'warding off' one, I should explain that these are two of a standard list of four 'magical acts' of appeasing, increasing prosperity, domineering, and destroying, which are acts employed in all four Tantra classes. Varieties of each are found in a work, the *Vajra-vidāraṇa-dhāraṇī*; and I gave these varieties in a footnote to the Mkhas-grub-rje work which Lessing and I translated.[22] The varieties make it certain that Tsong-kha-pa employed the 'appeasing' and 'increasing prosperity' acts. First, for the prosperity magic, the varieties are: 1. Fulfills the previously unfulfilled. 2. Averts cessation of the previously fulfilled, 3. Yields everything desired. Next, for the appeasing magic, the varieties are: 1. Protects all the sentient beings; [in short,] it appeases (illness, etc.), 2. Makes prosper (life, etc.), or paralyzes and confuses all (evil) sentient beings. Those interested in the *Vajra-vidāraṇa-dhāraṇī* may consult my presentation of this entire work within an essay in the recently-issued honorary volume for H. H. the Dalai Lama.[23]

Now I pass to the healing material in the *Guhyasamāja-tantra*, namely, in its 15th chapter. It is striking that both the *Mañjuśrī-mūla-tantra* (utilized above) and the *Guhyasamāja-tantra* use their 15th chapter for such a purpose. And I favor the 3rd century, A.D. for both of them, but the *Mañjuśrī* one (its first part) being composed in the So. West of India, the *Guhyasamāja* one in the North-East of then India. The *Guhyasamāja* is perhaps the most important Father Tantra of the Anuttarayoga-tantra class.

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[22] See note 9, above, and now p. 136, note 32.

[23] Alex Wayman, "The Implications of the *Vajravidāraṇa-nāma-dhāraṇī* for Oneself and Others," in *H. H. the Dalai Lama Felicitation Volume* (Sarnath, 1997), pp. 304-325.

My previous presentation of such a passage from the *Guhyasamāja* was first to present an example among interlineary commentaries in Tibetan and later to show the tantric character of being difficult on purpose. I shall differentiate them as (1) and (2).

(1) Here it is presented as a sample from the *Pradīpoddyotana* glosses.[24] The *Pradīpoddyotana*, by the tantric author Candrakīrti, was the chief commentary on the *Guhyasamāja* studied in Tibet, and Tsong-kha-pa wrote in Tibetan an interlineary commentary on it.[25] For this extract from the *Guhyasamāja*, Chap. 15, I also employed the commentary by Celupā from the Tibetan Tanjur. Initially I translate four verses from Sanskrit, nos. 110-113 (India edition) or 112-105 (in Matsunaga's edition)[26] (agreeing with corrections to the first of the four, and with some parenthetical expansion from the Celupā commentary):[27]

> 110. Whatever the wished-for syllable-phrase (i.e. whether Jinajik, Ārolik, or Vajradhṛk) it achieves the virtuality (*guṇa*) (i.e. the expected result) by devotion. One should contemplate a comparable image (*bimba*) (of Vairocana, etc. going with the chosen syllable-phrase) by calling forth the diamond of illness (*vyādhivajra*).
>
> 111. One should imagine issuing from the places of one's own body, speech, and mind, a compact (*samaya*) image of a monkey, or else of a dog.
>
> 112. Remaining in the rank of diamond (i.e. identification with the deity of the chosen syllable-phrase), one imagines a discus (*cakra*) or a thunderbolt (*vajra*) (in hand), and

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[24] Cf. Alex Wayman, "The Interlineary-type Commentary in Tibetan," in Louis Ligeti, ed. *Tibetan and Buddhist Studies* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984), at pp. 372-6.

[25] I much utilized this commentary in my work mentioned in note 3, above.

[26] The *Guhyasamājatantra* is edited in Sanskrit, Benotosh Bhattacharya, Oriental Institute, Baroda, reprinted 1967; S. Bagchi, Darbhanga, 1965; Yūkei Matsunaga, *Journal of Koyasan University*, No. 10, further corrected edition, Osaka 1978.

[27] Celupā's commentary, *Ratnavṛkṣa-nāma-rahasya-samāja-vṛtti*. PTT, Vol. 63. p. 215-5.

contemplates that it smashes to bits the symbol (*samaya*) of body, speech, or mind.

113. Starting from then, the Complete Buddhas, the Bodhisattvas of great fame, their eyes ecstatic, confer the joyful rank of empowering (*adhiṣṭhānapada*).

The idea is that under meditative circmstance--not spelled out in the *Guhyasamāja* itself--the performer is supposed to imagine that a deep-seated, intractable illness, accordingly called "diamond of illness" is objectified in front in the form of a monkey or a dog. Celupā says the dog is three-legged, and he adds a "naked hungry-ghost" (*preta*) (Tib. yi dvags gcer bu). So does Vitapāda[28] who, like Celupā, writes *Guhyasamājatantra* commentary in the lineage of Buddhajñānapāda--called 'Jñānapāda', the other lineage called 'Ārya' by tantric authors using Mādhyamika names. Then the performer, identified with one or other of the three Buddhas (Vairocana, Amitābha, or Akṣobhya) going with those *mantras*, Jinajik, etc. imagines that with a circular weapon called *cakra*[29] or with a thunderbolt (*vajra*) he smashes the image to bits; and supposedly that ends the deep-seated illness. The onlooking Buddhas take notice of the remarkable success and adopt this performer for empowerment.

Apparently the commentators are supposed to distinguish between 'inner' and 'outer' illness, since both the *Pradīpoddyotana* and Celupā so distinguish and do so at variance with one another. According to the former, the outer kind seems to be accidental or adventitious, due to external agencies; the inner seems to be due to the three *doṣa* of Indian medicine, food that does not agree with one, etc.[30] According to Celupā, the outer illness arises from the (four) elements, the inner from *karma* (one's past and present acts).[31]

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[28] *Śrī-guhyasamāja-sādhana-siddhi-sambhava-nidhi-nāma*, PTT, Vol. 65, p. 243-4-8 to -5-1.

[29] For the *cakra* as a weapon, see W. E. Begley, *Viṣṇu's Flaming Wheel: the Iconography of the Sudarśana-Cakra*, New York, 1973, chap. I, *The Cakra as a Fabled Weapon*, pp. 7-22.

[30] *Pradīpoddyotana* (Mchan 'grel edn.), PTT (extra volumes), Vol. 158, on Chap. XV, p. 130-2-4,5.

[31] PTT, Vol. 65, p. 215-5-2.

In my article about the interlineary-type commentary, I presented the interlineary commentary in the present case by putting the *Pradīpoddyotana* comment in full capitals, with the annotation commentary in small letters. Here I shall only present my translation in which I combined the *Pradīpoddyotana* comment with Tsong-kha-pa's gloss:[32] "One should creatively contemplate and then meditate upon a divine body whose form is consistent with that (*mantra*). Having proceeded with the two *samādhis* going with the one of the three *vajras* [i.e. Buddhas] that is the case, at the time of exercising the *karma* [i.e. the third *samādhi*], how is it (to be done)? One imagines the Samādhisattva in one's own heart, and then that the *mantra* at the navel, accomplished among the possible three, is accompanied by light rays. As to the term *'dam tshig'* it renders the Sanskrit *samaya*, and 'illness' (*vyādhi*) is explained by etymology as 'out of health'. The text says, 'like a compact monkey', 'the illness like a monkey, or else of a dog', i.e. like a dog, that is the illness in such-like form, [that illness] based on, dwelling in body, speech, or mind. One imagines it condensed in the image of a black syllable KAṂ in the heart. Then the light rays of the *mantra* of the navel impelling it upwards, the *mantra* reaches the heart. As the wisdom fire-nature of the complete two collections [i.e. of merit and knowledge], it became completely white. At that time, the syllable KAṂ is at the tip of the nose; and that KAṂ of polluted nature changes into the form of a black, ugly monkey or dog; or black, ugly hungry ghost. As to the text, 'One imagines the appearances', one should consider intently and contemplate the evocation which has exited from the body. Thereupon, given that the very fearful and durable form stays in front, and there is the particular one of the three *mantras* as appropriate, one pronounces it with the additional words, 'smash all the pollution, HŪṂ'. One imagines being in the rank of *vajra*, whether with a discus or with a thunderbolt of gaping mouth (*karālavajra*) held in the right hand. One imagines that hurling it one smashes to bits and destroys the harmful illness in body, and so on, i.e. the symbols (*samaya*) of body, speech, and mind."

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[32] Cf. note 24, above, pp. 374-5.

That long citation combining the annotation requires further explanation. The remark about two *samādhis* refers to the preliminary rite (*prathama-prayoga*) and the 'triumphant *maṇḍala*' (*vijaya-maṇḍala*), to which a third one called 'ritual victory' (*karmavijaya*) is added to make the three *samādhis* of the 'stage of generation' (*utpatti-krama*).[33] And I continued in that article, "Then Tsong-kha-pa shows this third *samādhi* phase and that two kinds of *mantras* have to be employed. The first kind is one of three, Jinajik, Ārolik, Vajradhṛk, going with the three Buddhas. The yogin is affiliated for these purposes with one of the three and uses the corresponding one of the three *mantras*. The preceding *samādhis* result in establishing a so-called '*samādhisattva*' in the heart, while the present *samādhi* puts one of those three *mantras* at the navel. Besides, one imagines that the illness is condensed into a black KAṂ-syllable in the heart, a second thing in the heart. One imagines that the white *mantra* at the navel has light rays, and while moving toward the heart pushes out the black KAṂ-syllable up to the tip of the nose. From there the KAṂ-syllable, still constituting the illness, moves in front of the performer in the form of a monkey or dog, so the *Guhyasamājatantra* repeated by the *Pradīpoddyotana*, but Tsong-kha-pa adds the similarly fiercesome or repulsive hungry ghost (*preta*) according to the alternate lineage of the *Guhyasamāja*." The third outer representation of the illness may have been added because the *Guhyasamājatantra*, XV, 111, 112, refers to body, speech, and mind. While not saying it explicitly, there is the suggestion that the monkey goes with mind and the naked hungry ghost with body, leaving the three-legged dog to go with speech. And I concluded, "Still identified with one of the three Buddhas, one pronounces the particular *mantra* while imagining a destructive weapon held in the right hand and that this weapon smashes the image to bits and so also the illness. The syllable KAṂ possibly represents the Sanskrit word *kaṣāya* ('degradation', 'pollution'), since the Tibetan word *sdig pa* (usually 'sin') sometimes renders *kaṣaya*,[34] so I rendered it here by 'pollution'."

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[33] For the three *samādhis*, see Lessing and Wayman, trs., note 9, above.

[34] So in the Buddhist Sanskrit-Tibetan dictionary *Mahāvyutpatti*, no. 2423 in the Sakaki edn.

That suffices for the annotation-type commentary, and let us go to the next consideration.

(2) The difficulty on purpose. The passages, especially stressing the use of the term *samāya*, made it clear that one could not understand Buddhist Tantra works just by reading them, no matter how learned one may be in the Sanskrit language in which the originals were composed. My essay was prepared for a meeting in Bulgaria about the meaning of words.[35] In the immediately preceding section dealing with verses from the *Guhyasamājatantra*, Chap. XV, the term *samaya* occurred twice, first rendered 'a compact', namely image; and then 'the symbol', namely, of body, speech, or mind. In the passage below I render the former meaning as 'condensation'. The meaning 'symbol'--also 'pledge'--is frequent in the Buddhist Tantras--and the meaning 'time' or 'occasion' is at the outset of non-tantric Buddhist scriptures--but the 'compact/condensed' meaning is rare, and is not given in the reference work, Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, even though it is the literal meaning of *samaya* ('coming together'). An honest reader of such a Buddhist Tantra passage in this Chap. XV should admit being puzzled about the passage's meaning. So also, about another passage of Buddhist tantric healing in my essay on being difficult on purpose. Among the several illustrations was this one, *Guhyasamājatantra*, Chap. XV, verses 107-109 (= 109-111 in Matsunaga's edition), as follows in the edited Sanskrit:

ĀḤ / gaṇḍapitakalutāś ca cānye vyādhayaḥ smṛtāḥ /
naśyanti dhyānamātreṇa vajrapāṇivāco yathā //
/ aṣṭapatraṃ mahāpadmaṃ śaśāṅkam iva nirmalam /
tatra madhyagataṃ cintet pañcaraśmiprapūritam //
/ saṃharet kṛṣṇasamayaṃ codane sitasannibham /
idaṃ dhyānapadaṃ guhyaṃ rahasyaṃ jñānanirmalaṃ //

Before translating this passage, it can be pointed out that this concerns overcoming various sicknesses by a tantric machination. This is clear enough.

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[35] Alex Wayman, "Buddhist Tantra and Lexical Meaning," in Maxim Stamenov, ed., *Current Advances in Semantic Theory* (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1992, pp. 465-478)

The three illnesses specifically mentioned are the *gaṇḍa* (a kind of lump excrescence on the face or neck), the *piṭaka* (a boil), and *lūtā* (a swelling due to a bite of a poisonous spider). But the manner in which the tantric machination takes place is not clear. Besides this Sanskrit version I employ the Tibetan translation, as well as Tsong-kha-pa's annotation on the *Pradīpoddyana* commentary, and Celupā's commentary, which were also employed above. The *Pradīpoddyotana* commentary is probably the chief one for the Tibetan savants, because it frequently comments on multiple levels, the four ways of understanding the *Guhyasamājatantra*, 1. invariant sense, i.e. literal meaning (*akṣarārtha*), 2. shared sense (shared with nontantric Buddhism or with lower Tantras (*samastāṅgārtha*), 3. pregnant sense (*garbhyartha*), 4. ultimate sense (*kolikārtha*). In an earlier work I gave illustrations of the four, employing also the Sanskrit manuscript of the *Pradīpoddyotana*.[36] We may observe that a reader's understanding of such a word as *samaya* as employed here, namely, in the 'condensation' sense--which fits the 'invariant sense', i.e. literal meaning, namely, 'coming together' (which the Monier-Williams dictionary did give)--is no better simply by fitting the literal meaning. Probably in other languages as well it is easier for readers to recognize derived and later meanings than the so-called 'original' literal meaning of a word. We are now prepared to make an initial translation of the three verses:

> ĀḤ. *Gaṇḍa, Piṭaka, Lūtā* (three kinds of skin swellings), and other sicknesses (of such type), as reported, disappear by a single contemplation according to what Vajrapāṇi said. One should contemplate a great lotus with eight petals, pure like the moon; and thereon in the center full of five rays he should compress (the poison) into a black condensation (*samaya*) (which) upon 'exhortation' (*coḍana*) (becomes) as though white. This is the secret state of contemplation, the esoteric immaculate wisdom.

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[36] A. Wayman, the work of note 3, above.

This translation by the 'literal meaning' fits the imposition of the 'poison' theory which agrees with this Tantra, Chap. XV. This 'poison' terminology is also frequent in the West, especially in folk medicine. Thus, when a person has a goiter on the neck it is often said that the overactive thyroid is poisoning the body; and often it was said that a boil is an attempt of the body to rid itself of a kind of poison. It follows that even the tantric method suggested here is not meant to fit all sicknesses, but rather the visible ones (like boils), namely, of the skin-excrescence type.

And I continued in that essay, "The trouble with the literal meaning is that one still does not know how to do it. There are spots in the three verses that are obscure and raise questions: Where does one imagine that 8-petalled lotus? What is the function of the five rays? How does the 'black' change to the 'white'? Accordingly, one consults the commentaries to find answers to such questions. The *Pradīpoddyotana* does not clarify the 'where' of the 8-petalled lotus; but the Celupā commentary explains that the 8-petalled lotus is imagined on the right hand of the Amitabha-family *yogin*.[37] From the ĀḤ come five rays which attract the poison. But the annotation comments on the *Pradīpoddyotana* explain that in the middle, i.e., of the lotus, the black ĀḤ is called the 'seed syllable'.[38] (By 'seed syllable', *bīja*, this literature means a syllable which is imagined to change into something else, but like a seed does not veer from its 'own nature', *svabhāva*). Then in Celupā one learns that 'exhorting' means for the black to change to white, which signals the disappearance of the poison. There is now enough commentarial explanation, when we put the information from the two commentaries together, to get a reasonable idea of what is intended by the verses."

And I continued, "That is, we learn that there are certain types of skin excrescences that can be cured by a certain tantric machination. So, in a kind of *samādhi*, one imagines that on the palm of the right hand is an 8-petalled white lotus (since it is said to be pure like the moon); that in the center of this lotus

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[37] PTT, Vol. 63, p. 215-4-6,7.

is the seed-syllable ĀḤ, black in color to go with the nature of the presumed poison in the body. The yogin imagines that from this ĀḤ go five rays through the body and return bringing all the poison into the center of the lotus. The yogin then 'exhorts' this black center to become white; that is, he calls upon it to change color, and imagines that the black color has changed to white. This change of color signals the destruction of the poison. Having meditatively succeeded, it is presumed that the skin excrescence will promptly recede to the normal skin surface. If one grants that this is what the three verses intended, then we must further concede the unlikelihood that even the followers of this cult would know just from reading the 'literal' version what was going on. We need not speak of the Westerner who presumably lacks this cultic zeal or training as being able to get from the mere reading what these verses were alluding to." Even a learned scholar of India might claim to read this literature without commentary and understand what it says, because of knowing Sanskrit with 'proven intelligence'.

Having concluded my treatment of the difficult on purpose, I could mention that another approach is by way of the performer's ability, which Buddhist texts frequently express in terms of the weak organ, middling organ, and keen organ. I shall here give just the conclusions of Tsong-kha-pa's commentary on the Lui-pa lineage of the *Śrīcakrasaṃvara* system.[39] The implication of Tsong-kha-pa's discussion is that the performer with the middling organ is able to perform cures of mundane nature by mastery of what is called the 'hundred syllables'; while the performer with superior organ can perform cures of supramundane nature, i.e. curing others while regarding both oneself and the other as illusions. No ability to cure oneself or others was attributed to the performer with weak organ.

The foregoing essay hopefully covers the main points of the Buddhist tantric healing processes.

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[38] PTT, Vol. 158, p. 130-1-6,7.

[39] The Tashilunpo edn. of collected works of Tsong-kha-pa, Vol. Ta, the *'Dod 'Jo*, f. 34b-6 to 35a-1.